Evaluating economic policies for promoting rainforest conservation in developing countries by Ruitenbeek, Herman Jack
EVALUATING ECONOMIC POLICIES FOR PROMOTING RAINFOREST 
CONSERVATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Hennan Jack Ruitenbeek 
Submitted for the Degree of Ph. D. 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Univcrsity of London 
Q 1990, ILL Ruitenbeek 
ST COPY 
AVAILA L 
Variable print quality 
BLANK IN ORIGINAL 
3 
ABSTRACT 
Economic policies are often suggested as mechanisms for promoting rainforest 
conservation in developing countries. To help decide whether international resources 
should be used to protect specific rainforcsts, the calculation of a "rainforest supply price" 
(RSP) is proposed. If protection is warranted, then empirical analyses explore the 
conditions under which selected policies within developing countries might be effective in 
protecting rainforests. 
Korup National Park in Cameroon contains the oldest rainforest in Africa and - as a haven 
for important endangered species - it is the subject of active international conservation 
efforts. A cost-bencfit analysis of a conservation project to protect Korup from increased 
land-use pressures suggests that it is not in Cameroon's interest unless a 5.4 million ECU 
inducement is transferred to Cameroon. Given the protection afforded, the transfer is 
equivalent to a RSP of 1060 ECU per km2 per year. Evaluations of six other tropical 
rainforcst prcjects suggests that international donors made transfers having values ranging 
from 15 to 1575 ECU per km2 per year. It is thus concluded that the inducements required 
are within a range which conservation interests arc apparently willing to mobilisc. 
To target inducements, the provision of incentives in a "buffer zone" around a park is often 
believed-to promote conservation. This is based on the hypothesis that increased incomes 
will draw individuals out of the park and will give them something better to do than exploit 
the park. A survey of 341 households around Korup was analysed in detail to test this 
hypothesis. Evidence suggests that economic development in the buffer zone would 
increase pressures on the park because: a) higher incomes would reduce emigration from 
the region and would thus cause greater population pressure on the Park; and, b) hunting 
effort increases as non-hunting income increases. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
§ 1.1 Background 
Increasing attention is being paid today to the conservation of tropical minforcsts as the 
developed world is becoming aware that they are a source of both amenity and significant 
economic potential. The popular literature is replete with assertions that these forests are 
important havens of genetic resources which can contribute to the discovery of Important 
foodstuffs and pharmaceutical products. Furthermore, it is often asserted that tropical 
rainforests provide important environmental functions. whether in maintaining a balance in 
global climates, or in providing more localiscd benefits through the prevention of soil 
erosion and flooding. Tragically, many of the worlSs rainforcsts am being decimated by 
their very owners as the immediate needs of the developing world overshadow the often 
uncertain future benefits which the rainforcsts have to offer. In response to this need, 
however, major conservation groups and international organisations - the World Bank 
among them - have recently committed themselves to transfers to the developing world to 
ensure that the rainforests are exploited 'properly'. Ile current vogue is to promote 
rainforest conservation as an integral part of economic development initiatives. 
In certain respects, the current attitude of conservationists is to look towards the economics 
discipline to provide a justification for minforest conservation in developing countries 
(LDCs). This poses interesting analytical challenges which include elements of 
environmental economics, development economics and public policy. Issues dealing with 
production and consumption externalities play a prorrinent role, as do issues dealing with 
feasible policy reforms in LDCs. Many of the problems which would be tractable in a 
wel. 1-developed modem economy do not lend themselves to obvious solutions under the 
circumstances imposed in developing countries. 
Because tropical deforestation is occurring at a relatively rapid rate, pressure is being placed 
on all concerned parties to act quickly. Some of this pressure is applied directly to 
economic planners, who are finding themselves suddenly responsible for devising or 
designing policies which will promote rainforcst conservation. Frequently they must also 
then provide an economic rationale for the policy which has been so devised. 
The planner's job in this case is encumbered by two very real constraints: time and data. 
Even if optimal policies could be designed given enough time and information to analyse 
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the implications of implementing various policies, the time constraints, coupled with a 
paucity of data typically found in LDCs, impede the decision-making process. As is often 
the case in such situations, rules-of-thumb and the planners' own judgment are the primary 
tools available for designing policies. 
In many cases the rules-of-thurnb have generated policies which would apparently promote 
rainforest conservation. Simple models can be constructed to argue, for example, that 
kerosene subsidies will dissuade fuelwood cutting. Similarly, if local populations are 
overexploiting a forest, there is an intuitive appeal to promoting conservation by "giving 
them something better to do" through increasing economic opportunities elsewhere. Such 
policies have an added appeal because they can often be readily incorporated into existing 
taxation reform programmes or rural development programmes. 
But the acid test of the theory behind any of these policies is ultimately whether they will 
indeed promote conservation. The costs of erring may be particularly high. If in 50 years 
we look back and rind that we have used the wrong policies, it will probably be easy to 
rewrite the theories, but the rainforests may not have a second chance. It is hence 
imperative that we carefully evaluate economic policies which are meant to promote 
rainforest conservation in LDCs. That theme is the focus of this thesis. 
In evaluating policies, the practical problem reduces to identifying some of the major 
linkages between the economy and the environment. Pearce and Turner (1990) note, for 
example, that much of economic science has been concerned with analysing what goes on 
within an economy, while the natural sciences have been concerned with analysing the 
interactions and relationships which occur within what we commonly call the natural 
environment. They note further that - as a research priority - one current challenge to the 
economics profession is to gain a better understanding of the actual interactions and 
relationships between the economy and the environment. The empirical work in this thesis 
is conducted in that spirit: in the process of evaluating selected policy options, some 
important insights can be gained into how the economy and the environment interacts. In 
original empirical work, I investigate how the policies do, or do not, in practice contribute 
to rainforest conservation. 
1.2 Scope and Objectives 
The range of issues which must be addressed in rainforest conservation and management is 
both complex and vast. It extends from specific technical silvicultural practices to more 
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general concerns associated with land-use conflicts in a country. Given this diversity of 
potential areas for study, it is important to derine the scope of this thesis in a manner which 
will generate testable hypotheses. 
It is useful initially to narrow the scope by discussing some areas which are specifically 
excluded. First, the study does not in any detail relate to commercial logging practises In 
developing countries. While this is an important issue in its own right, and contributes to 
deforestation if the logging is not undertaken on a sustainable basis, this study will focus 
on deforestation pressures arising from local land-use pressures from the encroachment of 
rural populations on forest zones. Exclusion of conunercial logging from our discussion 
does not, however, unduly limit the relevance of the work. Indeed, Myers (1986) 
estimates that only 22% of deforestation of the world's total forest stocks can be attributed 
to commercial logging-, the balance is due to activities such as fuelwood gathering, forest 
farming, and ranching. 
Second, the study does not attempt to provide a quantification of the global benefits of 
conserving forests. Although such a quantification would be of interest, I shall direct the 
analyses to a local level to dctcrmine ultimately what directions should be pursued. 
Third, we shall take a fairly limited view of conservation. It is useful to note that the term 
'conservation! has received various definitions and, indeed, it can have completely different 
and inconsistent meanings in the economic and environmental literature. Barnett and Morse 
(1963; p. 72) give an interesting historical account of what "conservation" has meant 
through the ages, including a description of the conservation movement of 1890-1920 for 
whom "Conservation ranged all the way from abstract metaphysics to practical everyday 
activity of the individual - it concerned all the various natural sciences, economics, political 
science, public administration, sociology. engineering, art, and public health. " The 
economic literature often ascribes some idea of 'efficiency' to conservation and, in this 
regard, it is not unusual to see accounts such as those by McKie and McDonald (1962), in 
which conservation could be consistent with complete consumption of the available 
resource over very short time horizons. In contrast, the ecological and environmental 
literature often provides a much broader scope, an example of which includes the definition 
provided by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 
(in McNeely [1988]; p. 10): "The management of human use of the biosphere so that it 
may yield the greatest sustainable benefit to present generations while maintaining its 
potential to meet the needs and aspirations of future generations. Thus conservation is 
positive, embracing preservation, maintenance, sustainable utilization. restoration, and 
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Figure 1.1 
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enhancement of the natural environment. " In this thesis, the term 'conservation' should be 
construed in its more common connotation meaning 'preservation'. 
The scope of this thesis can best be understood with reference to Figure 1.1. Although the 
nuances and details of the problem are pursued in greater depth throughout the thesis, 
Figure 1.1 provides a useful stylised description of the broad issues. Also, it illustrates in 
simplified terms the conceptual framework which underlies the work in this thesis. 
Considering first the flows inside the developing country, note that some subset of 
individuals - the "TRF Consumers" - assert various pressures on the tropical rainforest. 
Further, the actual stock of TRF is postulated to provide some flow of environmental 
services "e", which can normally be characterised as public goods. These services are 
available for consumption by the TRF Consumers (e, ), others in the developing country 
(el), as well as individuals in the rest of the world (ell). To the extent that the consumption 
of the TRF affects the availability of environmental services, externalities might be 
generated both within the developing country and in the rest of the world. 
The process of "internalising" these exterrialities requires, in pfinciple, the existence of 
appropriate institutions (such as property rights, compensation structures, or regulations) 
which somehow insinuate themselves into the decision process of the TRF Consumers. A 
government in a developing country has a number of mechanisms "W" at its disposal 
(which we call "Domestic Interventions"), for trying to mitigate the impacts of TRF 
Armhetion 21 
consumption on others within the economy. These measures range from blatant control or 
regulation of the TRF Consumers, to more subtle strategies such as taxing the TRF 
Consumers while compensating those who rely to some degree on the environmental 
services. 
But the problem becomes more complex when individuals in the rest of the world are 
considered. Ilese may range from nature enthusiasts in the developed world who derive 
some pleasure from knowing that there are rainforcsts in the world, to neighbouring 
countries which rely on the TRF to protect their own watersheds, fisheries, or lowland 
agricultural areas. In any such cases, depletion of the TRIT affects their level of well-being 
and those affected should, theoretically. be willing to pay some amount for rainforest 
conservation. For a variety of reasons, however, it is typically not feasible for them to 
negotiate this conservation directly with the TRF Consumers, and pressures can only be 
placed on the sovereign government in the particular LDC The negotiations between the 
rest of the world and the LDC government can be characterised as "International 
Interventions". Iliese intcrventions might range from mild political pressure, to economic 
sanctions, to direct funding or cash transfers to assist rainforcst conservation. But at this 
juncture, in spite of the perhaps very generous transfers from the rest of the world, it is 
important to note that the developing country still has only the "Co" mechanisms at its 
disposal for actually controlling the land-usc pressures on the TRF. 
Finally, we note that this formulation abstracts from the difficult philosophical and practical 
problem of how to accommodate the needs of future generations. Conceptually. we might 
consider that each of the service flows eo, el, and ell has a time dimension which extends 
to infinity. In that event it is relevant to ask whether any of the agents (W consumers, 
others, or governments) somehow act in the interests of future generations. 
In this overall context there are a number of issues which can be addressed in deciding, 
ultimately, how much rainforest conservation should be promoted. We need to know how 
the stock of TRF actually affects the level of environmental services available. We need to 
know the available policies and interventions. We need to know the motivating forces 
behind those agents which are the actual `MF Consumers". and, finally, we need to know 
how the interests of future generations might be best served. Addressing any of these 
problems poses a considerable task, and it is certainly beyond the scope of this thesis to 
pursue all of them. The problem of actually measuring the amount that individuals are 
willing to pay for rainforest conservation is not addressed in detail in this thesis, nor shall I 
examine in more than a cursory fashion the more technical linkage between the stock of 
TRF and the environmental services which it provides. Instead, I shall concentrate on the 
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problem of evaluating the effectiveness of various interventions in promoting rainforest 
conservation. 
In doing this, I shall concentrate on how typical interventions can influence the production 
of environmental services. More formally, if dca represents some reform, and de 
represents the incremental production of some environmental service e as a result of dco, 
then in selecting policies which promote conservation we must first ask ourselves what the 
sign is of de/dw. In practice, this involves modelling not so much the interventions but 
rather the actual behaviour of the TRF Consumers - which is far from a trivial task in the 
context of an LDC. More generally, we might suppose that our policy intervention 
influences behaviour, which in turn influences the stock of TRF, which in turn influences 
the environmental functions. I'llat is, 
de =(W) 
aTRF behaviour dca ... (1.1). ýa-TRF) 
(abchaviour 
aw 
In brief, the objective of this thesis is to apply a number of economic tools to identify the 
sign and magnitude of de/dco. In practice, this will be done by concentrating on the second 
and third terms on the right hand side of Equation (1.1). 
§ 1.3 General Approach 
As there is both an international as well as a domestic dimension to the policy interventions, 
the empirical work in this thesis essentially addresses the following questions: 
a) Is some international intervention, through direct transfers or otherwise, 
justified for promoting conservation in developing countries? 
b) If the developed world is willing to transfer resources to LDCs in exchange 
for their commitment to conserve tropical forests, what domestic interventions 
are available to ensure that conservation occurs? 
It is recognised that, in principle, these two questions must normally be answered 
concurrently: before international funds are committed we might reasonably want to know 
whether effective policies might be mobilised within the countries. While the theoretical 
model which is developed in this paper reflects this interdependence, the actual empirical 
work is simplified by treating the issues separately. 
In addressing the first question, I shall define a concept called the "rainforest supply price" 
(RSP) which reflects the amount which the world would have to transfer to a particular 
LDC to induce it to conserve a particular rainforest. Ile RSP can be calculated as a 
relatively straightforward extension to cost-benefit analysis, although it is important in 
empirical work to estimate the value of some of the environmental services of the TRF to 
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the LDC itself. Such a cost-bcncrit analysis is conducted for a rainforcst conservation 
project in West Africa - Korup National Park - and the rainforest supply price is calculated 
and then compared to a number of other projects to determine whether the amount which 
must be transferred is an efficient use of international conservation resources. 
While the first question can be addressed at a fairly general level, the second question 
dealing with domestic policy interventions requires more detailed specification of how 
individuals behave in response to specific policies. In addressing this, I concentrate on 
situations in which local populations are consuming the forest non-sustain ably. and 
investigate selected alternatives to achieve sustainable consumption levels through two 
broad categories of policy refonn: 
(i) targeted 'economic dcvelopimne incentives; and, 
(H) indirect taxation mechanisms. 
A third alternative - direct control - is not evaluated but is often regarded as the default 
policy if others are ineffective. - 
While these alternatives are not meant to be an exhaustive list of government policy, they 
subsume many of the major 'strategies' currently being promoted in conservation circles. 
For example, the targeted 'economic development! incentives normally attempt to entice 
people out of the forest by giving them something better (individually more profitable) to 
do in the area outside of the forest. 71e incentives are targeted by defining a'buffer zone' 
around critical conservation areas, and this buffer zone then becomes the subject of spccif*ic 
policy efforts to improve incomes. Reform of indirect taxation mechanisms is often 
regarded as an effective and feasible measure in LDCs for modifying the behaviour of 
individuals in a manner which is perceived to be more consistent with government goals. 
If income or taxation incentives are ineffective, then the default strategy - direct control - 
often entails forced transmigration and policing. Ile direa control strategy is, for a variety 
of reasons, not normaUy favoured; hence actual efforts often concentrate on decentralising 
the control thmugh incentives or taxation. 
Furthermore. the use of incentives or taxes can often be rationalised using what are 
apparently sound and unambiguous rules of thumb. Increasing farm incomes should, it 
might seem, discourage hunting. Subsidising kerosene should, it might seem, discourage 
fuelwood use- But economic theory itself is more ambiguous than this, and arguments can 
be marshalled for asserting that an increase in farm incomes might increase hunting 
pressures (if hunting is a leisure activity) or that kerosene subsidies will increase fuclwood 
use (if there is a strong income effect). Given that the results of theoretical constructs can 
be ambiguous, it is therefore important to test these rules of thumb with empirical research. 
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In the empirical work, I shall focus on three specific poNcy-behaviour interactions: 
a) the impacts of targeted economic development incentives on migration; 
b) the impacts of targeted economic development incentives on forest-use; and, 
C) the impacts of untargeted indirect taxes on forest-use. 
For the evaluation of targeted incentives, a theoretical model suggests that development 
incentives may not be effective at promoting conservation if there is full migratory 
adjustment. Intuitively, what occurs is that increased development in the buffer zone may 
attract people out of the forest, but it will also attract people from the rest of the country (via 
urban-rural and rural-rural migration) into that area and thus potentially assert additional 
pressures on the forest. Ironically, the required strategy (if conservation is the only 
objective) in that event would be to depress conditions in the buffer zone area. Empirically, 
the answer to whether such policies are effective depends upon the nature of the inigratory 
adjustment process and the nature of forest-use activities in and around the park. 
Modelling of the migratory adjustment and forest-use process is conducted for Korup 
National Park based on household survey results. 
The argument for using indirect taxes suggests that, to reduce negative externalities arising 
from consumption, one must tax the consurnption activity. If taxation of this activity is not 
administratively feasible, as is often the case with fuelwood gathering, for example, then 
such taxation might be ineffective. One might then revert to taxing activities 
complementary to fuelwood consumption or to subsidising its substitutes. In this thesis, 
empirical work is undertaken to illustrate how this problem might be approached. Ile 
specific analysis deals with the nature of fuelwood demand in India, and investigates 
whether subsidising kerosene would be an effective mechanism for reducing fuelwood 
consumption and pressures on the forest resoume. 
As data are often limited in developing countries, a central task of this thesis is to 
demonstrate that important propositions can be tested using the limited data which are 
available. To this end, the empirical studies rely both on highly aggregated national data as 
well as microeconomic household data. Because much of the household data are qualitative 
in nature, econometric models using qualitative dependent variables are developed to 
analyse the data. In the process, the discussion also sheds some light on the applicability 
of various practical modeffing techniques for evaluating such data. 
Finally, it is useful to realise that, when we are dealing with tropical rainforests we are, for 
the most part, dealing with LDCs. It is impossible to summarise here all of the issues and 
concerns which are relevant in undertaking economic analyses of policies in LDCs, but 
there is one recurring feature of these economies which merits mention here: that relating to 
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the identification offeasible policies and policy reforms. While much of the literature in 
resource and environmental economics deals with optimisation theory and finding optimal 
development paths, such concepts are of limited value in economics which arc constrained 
politically or economically in the strategies which they have available. In practice, 
therefore, the aspirations of the economic planner should be fairly modest: rather than 
identifying the optimal state of the world and jumping to it, it is more realistic to try to 
identify reforms which are somehow both feasible and wel fare- improving. As will be 
shown in this thesis, even the identification of such reforms is far from cut and dried: 
theory is often ambiguous and data are often limited. 
Also, identifying optimal policies - as opposed to evaluating specific policies - requires 
fairly detailed information on the interactions which exist within the economy as well as 
between the economy and the environment. As information regarding such interactions is 
often sporadic for LDCs, the evaluation of specific policies can make an important 
contribution to the information base which would eventually be required for conducting 
optin-dsation studies. 
In light of this, the focus of this thesis is generally to evaluate feasible economic policy 
reforms which promote rainforcst conservation. 71is should not, however, belittle the 
importance of identifying the optimal state of the world. Indeed, it should not surprise ut 
in the long-term if the policy reforms which we identify through marginal techniques do not 
necessarily move us towards the optimal state of the world: they may simply move us 
towards some local optimum; and there is no a priori reason for assuming that the 
applicable set of feasible policies and states of the world is convex. Nonetheless - and 
without apologies - the appropriate maxim here is that if you want to climb trees, and you 
cannot see the highest tree in the forest, then climb the highest tree you can see and hope 
that you will learn something more about the forest in the process. 
1.4 Empirical Research in Korup 
Much of the empirical work in this thesis involves the Korup National Park project in the 
Republic of Cameroon, and it is useful to review its history to sct some of the work in the 
thesis into an appmpriate conteXt. 
Ibc Korup Project centres on a programme initiated by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) to 
promote the conservation of the rainforcst in Korup National Park in Southwest Province, 
Cameroon. 7be rainforest region in this part of West Africa, which includes Korup 
National Park in Cameroon and Oban Park in Nigeria, is unique in that it includes one of 
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the oldest rainforcsts in the world which displays a high degree of endernism arnong its 
indigenous species. Without conservation efforts, the area faces the nsk of falling fate to 
persistent land-use pressures from within both Camercx)n and Nigena. 
The Korup Project is equally significant in that, through the efforts of the Govemment of 
Cameroon and extemal funding agencies, an economic development plan is being pursued 
for the area which is meant to complement the conservation goals of the park. Rather than 
hizure 1.2 
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seeing the various goals as conflicting, the attitude has been that conservation of the blome 
and its products can promote economic development in the region. To this end, a 
management area has been defined consisting of 126,000 ha of core park area plus a buffer 
zone of 300,000 ha around this core. 
Figure 1.2 shows a map of the area. Virgin rainforcst is found in the areas delineated as 
Korup National Pwik and Oban National Park. The international boundary, which follows 
a river course, divides the forest in two. Although the forest itself differs little between 
Nigeria and Cameroon, the land-use pressures and economics of the two regions are quite 
different. While the work in this thesis pertains entirely to C=croon, circumstances in 
Nigeria are also of relevance to the extent that land-usc pressures in Nigeria threaten the 
integrity of the forest in Cameroon. 
On both sides of the border, a central protected area has been dcrined which is regarded as 
the critical ecological zone. The protected area in Oban is uninhabited, whereas that in 
Korup contains just under 1000 individuals in six villages. A rural development zone 
(RDZ) has been derined around the protected regions. The RDZ has a population of 
approximately 37,000 in Nigeria and approximately 12,000 in Cameroon. Access to Oban 
from Calabar - the capital of Cross River State - is excellent along the MCC Road and the 
corridor along this road is quite heavily populated. By contrast, the area around Korup has 
poor access from outside and is relatively sparsely populated. The mad from Mundemba 
(the site of the park headquarters) to the regional trading centre of Kumba is often closed 
during the rainy season and is a one-day joumey at the best of times. Most individuals 
travel within the park and surrounding buffer zone on foot over an extensive trail system. 
Similarly, any goods entering or leaving the region are normally head-loaded to the nearest 
road. 
Ile actual administrative history of the park goes back to 1937, when the Korup Forest 
Reserve was established. Hunting, trapping and tree felling were prohibited by law in the 
area in 1980, and the concept for a park was first entertained seriously by the Republic of 
Cameroon in 1984. Following negotiations with international agencies, Korup National 
Park was gazetted in October, 1986. giving it the highest protection possible under 
Cameroon law. In August, 1987, an agreement between WWF and the Republic of 
Cameroon was executed which called for the development of a management plan for the 
Park. The planning and implementation period was expected to require 5 years and had a 
capital budget of about E3.7 million. The funding would come primarily from WWF and 
the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) of the UK, with a contribution of some 
L150,000 from the Government of Cameroon, primarily through the secondmcnt of 
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personnel to the project. By 1989, significant contributions had also been made by 
USAID, the European Community, and the German Technical Assistance Programme 
(GTZ). 
Interest from the international aid and conservation community has ccntred on Korup and 
Oban because of its importance as an international reserve for biodiversity. It is the oldest 
remaining rainforest in Africa - having survived over some 60 million years - and is 
characterised by very high species richness believed to have arisen as a result of its 
isolation as a rainforest refuge during Pleistocene glaciation incidents. It is home to over 
1000 species of plant and 1300 animal species, including 119 mammals and 15 primates. 
Of all species in the area, 60 occur nowhere else and 170 are currently listed as endangered 
or vulnerable. These include the drill, angwantibo, otter shrew, and Preuss' red colobus. 
The economic significance of this diversity is illustrated by the fact that at least one major 
intemadonal crop originated in the area (the oil palm, Eleis guineensis) and endemic co- 
evolved insects which pollinate this species are currently being used in Southeast Asia to 
safeguard crop performance. In addition, the forested watersheds of Oban and Korup 
appear to perform a vital role in sustaining mangrove fishery production downstream of the 
forests. The region's physiography is such that the two countries exchange major rivers, 
and the maintenance of forest cover on both sides of the border is believed to be essential to 
maintaining hydrological stability downstream. 
Land-use pressures in the region include timber production, fuelwood gathering, hunting 
and trapping, and forest farming. Forest fanning occurs both from clearing land in a 
traditional bush-fallow fanning manner, as well as direct gathering of forest products for 
both subsistence and cash. While all of these pressures pervade in Nigeria, land-use 
pressures in Cameroon are limited primarily to hunting, trapping, and forest product 
gathering activities. 
Timber production pressures are greatest on the Nigerian side of the border. Nigeria has 
already converted 90% of its primary tropical rainforest and, whereas it was at one time a 
major exporter of timber products, it currently is a net importer of wood products. Ile 
area around Oban has been logged and one timber concession still exists within the current 
park boundaries. In Cameroon, on the other hand, the rough terrain and poor access 
makes timber production in the Korup area uneconomic. Cameroon does have a vital 
timber export industry, but it is currently concentrated in other parts of the country. As 
such, the major timber pressures on the forest estate in Cameroon come indirectly from the 
Nigerian side: deforestation in Nigeria would likely decrease the quality of the forest in 
Korup as well. 
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Similarly, fuelwood gathering and bush-fallow fanning are significant pressures on the 
forest only in Nigeria. The relative sparseness of population in the Korup area is such that 
land-intensive activities do not pose a serious threat to the forest. In Nigeria, however, 
recent deregulation of farm prices and restrictions on food imports has created substantial 
incentives for farmers to produce at the extensive margins. This has manifested itself in 
accelerated forest clearing in the Oban area- primarily for the production of cassava. In 
addition, the problem is exacerbated by a traditional land tenure system which can best be 
described as'claim staking': an individual can achieve rights in perpetuity to a plot of land 
either through inheritance or through clearing primary forest. Again, while such direct 
pressures do not exist in Cameroon, the land-use pressures in Nigeria would eventually 
contribute to degradation of the forest estate in Carneroon. 
The primary pressure on the Cameroonian forest estate is through direct harvesting of 
forest products: through both hunting and gathering activities. Forest animals arc hunted 
and trapped as a source of meat: some of it is for subsistence but most is sold. In 
Cameroon there is an active cross-border trade of 'bushmcat' to Nigeria. In addition, 
forest products which include fruit, spices, medicinal plants, and materials for small-scale 
manufacturing are gathered throughout the year. NVhilc the gathering activities are largely 
regarded as sustainable and not detrimental to the forest. hunting activities arc of major 
concern because many of the animals being hunted are endangered and hunters themselves 
report that the incidence of many species has declined rapidly over the past ten years. Ai a 
central purpose of the park is to protect many of these species and their habitat, initiatives 
are concentrating on mechanisms to protect the park- areas. 
Because the land-usc pressures are quite different in the two countries, different strategies 
must be adopted. The problems are somewhat more tractable in Cameroon as there is rcaUy 
only one immediate pressure - hunting - which threatens the forem But in Cameroon - 
unlike Nigeria - the problem is complicated by the fact that there are individuals living 
within the Nadonal Park. 71cse people, mostly of the Korup tribe, most probably settled 
in the region about 300 years ago, having been driven inland by European colonists. Land 
tenure arrangements are informal but well respected. As there has been no land shortage, 
any individual from within a village could claim land through claim-staking and farm it 
within an area of control of that village. Outsiders wishing to farm land can do so only 
upon payment of some considcraflon to the village chief, or upon marriage into one of the 
families in the village. 77he commonness of this pracf1ce has made the region somewhat 
impervious to immigration and most migration which has occurred has been intra-regional 
or strict emigration. 
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The challenge in Korup arises because, legally, the 1000 individuals in the Park are not 
allowed to live there under Cameroonian law (Republic of Cameroon [1983; 1984]). 
Strictly, they must be resettled and must be compensated for certain costs incurred in the 
resettlement. But the Government of Cameroon, under its current economic reforms, does 
not have the funds necessary to resettle them and international aid agencies - largely 
because of the controversy associated with certain resettlement programmes - is reticent to 
become involved in the direct compensation and resettlement of these villages. 
Appropriately, a feasible strategy which has been selected is to commence an active 
programme of economic development in a buffer zone around the national park area. The 
idea is that such a programme will both induce individuals out of the park as well as giving 
them something better to do than hunt. 
To provide some basis for eventually assessing the impacts of the development in and 
around the park, WWF conducted a losocio-economic survey". This consisted of a series 
of surveys through 1987 and 1988 which were originally supposed to be used both as a 
baseline for analysing eventual impacts, as well as a basis for recommending the 
resettlement strategy. In total, three household surveys were administered by WWF 
covering the following: 
a) food consumption; 
b) hunting activities; and, 
C) household demographic and income characteristics. 
In undertaking these surveys, it should be noted that the intent of WWF was never to 
perform any rigourous statistical analysis of this information. The surveys generally had 
quite different goals and, consequently, the sample group for each survey was completely 
different. Ilie goal of the food survey (Malleson [1987]), for example, was primarily to 
get an idea of what types of food people ate at various times of the year. As a resultý there 
are no income characteristics corresponding to the households for which food consumption 
data are avaUable. 
The surveys with applicability to this thesis are the household demographic/income survey 
and, to a lesser extent, the hunting survey. The demographic survey was conducted by 
WWF primarily to obtain a count of the people in and around the park, and to identify the 
activities with which each household in the park was involved. Again, no rigourous 
statistical analysis of this survey was undertaken by WWF, and some of the results relating 
to park populations and activities are provided in Devitt (1988). The hunting survey was 
conducted as a cross-check of the interviews conducted in the household income survey. 
Because hunting was technically illegal in the park, it was feared that responses to the 
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income survey would be biased, hence a separate hunting survey was conducted which 
involved placing one researcher in the field for a period of 7 months. JMe mscarcher. after 
gaining the confidence of local villagers, joined hunting parties and recorded the level of 
hunting activities and successes. Results of this hunting survey are provided in detail in 
Infield (1988). 
In November, 1987,1 agreed with WWF to provide an assessment of the development 
incentive approach if I could have access to the data from the household demographic and 
income surveys. At that time, the survey instruments had been designed and printed, so it 
was not possible to add specific questions to the survey which might be particularly helpful 
to providing such an assessment. Nonetheless, the questions were relatively extensive in 
scope and they would provide some basis for making an asscssment. In February, 1988, a 
field trip was made to Korup to discuss the conduct of the surveying with the surveyors, 
and to initiate surveys in the first villages. The surveys were completed by June, 1988, 
and in July a final field trip was made to discuss the survey results with the surveyors and, 
in particular, to flag any responses which were suspect. A final field trip was made to 
Oban National Park in April, 1989, to gain some impressions of how Cameroonian hunting 
activity might be influenced by conditions in Nigeria. 
In total, from February to June, 1988,357 households were surveyed in 24 villages in and 
around Korup National Park. Mime different individuals were involved in the surveying to 
allow the completion of the surveys before the start of the July rainy season. The normal 
routine was that the surveyor would be accompanied by a guide and an interpreter, and 
would spend up to one week living in each village. Ile guide was necessary because most 
of the villages could be reached only by foot through trails in primary or secondary forest. 
Although English is predominantly spoken in Southwest Cameroon, the lingua franca in 
the villages is a pidgin English and, often. the presence of a local interpreter both facilitates 
discourse and allows the interviewee to feel more at ease in the situation. The actual 
interview would normally last I to 2 hours and, in most cases, was with the household 
head. When the household head was absent, the spouse or other household member would 
be interviewedL As this was in some instances the third time that interviewers were visiting 
the villages, they were generally well received and respondents were quite open in 
providing information. 
During the field work, a map of each village was made while walking through the village 
with the chief or other elder. who was able to indicate where houses had been abandoned 
due to people moving away. Also, where household heads were temporarily absent and 
where no-one within the household was available to answer the questions, the- chief or 
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elder provided as much information as 
possible on that particular household. 
Although the income data in these 
circumstances was often absent or, at 
best, suspect, the demographic data are 
probably fairly accurate. In addition, 
the map-making process allowed an 
enumeration of the availability of some 
basic facilities (schools, churches, and 
meeting places). 
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As one contribution of this thesis research, I transferred all of the demographic and income 
data from the household surveys into a data management system which would allow 
summary statistics to be generated, as well as allowing various economic analyses to be 
undertaken. As considerable effort was dedicated in this research to the generation and 
analysis of this original data set, a separate appendix to the thesis provides a detailed 
description of the data gathering and reduction process used for these surveys. 
One of the striking descriptive results of the income survey \vas the importance of the forest 
to local cash income. For example, Figure 1.3 illustrates that income from forest product 
gathering and manufacturing was about as important as cash crop production, and that 
hunting and trapping activity represents almost one-quarter of total income. Wage labour 
and remittances contribute very little to local incomes. In short, without access to the 
forest, one might expect economic well-being to decline if the integrity of the forest is 
threatened or - for that matter - if very restrictive enforcement programmes are required to 
protect the forest. 
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§ 1.5 Organisation of Study 
'ne thesis is broadly organiscd Into two parts. Part I consists - in two chapters - of a 
technical background to the issues involved in rainforcst utilisation and an overview of 
some of the contributions which economic theory might make to these issues. Part 11 
consists of four chapters which present specific empirical evaluations of programmes 
which are intended to promote rainforest conservation. 
In Part 1, Chapter 2 sets the context for the thesis, historically and geographically. by 
introducing a number of the technical issues involved in tropical rainforcst development. 
The chapter relies to a great extent on technical literature in the biological, agricultural, 
atrnospheric, and environmental sciences in an effort to summarise the lssueswhich are of 
central importance to designing economic policies. In short, the goal of the chapter is to 
provide an appropriate context in which one can define a number of the poNcy options for 
promoting minforest conservation, highlighting especially the central role which economic 
policies are anticipated to play. Chapter 3 presents a review of some of the economic 
literature of relevance to the issue of rainforest conservation, and elaborates on the 
conceptual framework presented earlier in Figure I. I. A decision process is outlined 
which suggests adoption of a two-tier implementation procedure to promoting 
conservation, corresponding to the international and domestic interventions discussed 
earHer. 
Part 11 provides selected empirical evaluations. Chapter 4 addresses the question of 
whether international resources should be allocated to any particular conservation project. 
A formal derivation of the rainforest supply price is provided to illustrate its relationship to 
welfare economics and the theory of policy reform. An operational definition of the 
rainforest supply price is offered which can be calculated as a natural extension of cost- 
benefit analysis. A cost-benefit analysis of Korup National Park is then conducted which 
also includes estimates of the values of a number of environmental functions associated 
with the forest. Ilie rainforest supply price of Korup is computed and then compared to 
amounts which have been paid elsewhere for rainforest conservation projects. The 
comparative analysis is based on six recent conservation projects, four of which are 
associated with "debt-for-nature" swaps. 
Chapters 5 and 6 then consider the behaviour of individuals in the Korup, area, with the 
intent of suggesting whether targeted econon-dc development incentives will be effective in 
promoting conservation. Chapter 5 discusses in more detail the notion of promoting 
conservation by establishing a buffer zone around a park. Rural development is initiated in 
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the buffer zone in an attempt to draw people away from the park and give them an 
alternative to exploiting the park. In Chapter 5,1 investigate how effective such policies 
will be if some degree of migratory adjustment occurs within the region. Chapter 6 
provides an extension to Chapter 5, although it explicitly attempts to model one of the 
primary production relationships occurring between man and the tropical rainforest, 
concentrating in this instance on hunting activity. 
In Chapter 7, the effectiveness of indirect taxes as a mechanism for promoting 
conservation is investigated through an empirical analysis of fuclwood demand in India. 
Finally, Chapter 8 summarises the results of the thesis and provides suggestions for 
further research. 
An Appendix provides additional detail on the household surveys conducted in Korup. 
The inforimflon contained in the Appendix is relevant primarily to Chapters 5 and 6 and, to 
a lesser extent, to Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 2 
TROPICAL RAINFORESTS: BACKGROUND 
2.1 Introduction 
In both the popular literature as well as academic papers, one finds that authors place no 
small amount of the blame for tropical deforestation squarely on the shoulders of 'bad' 
policies. Although numerous factors will often contribute to the implementation of such 
policies, one recurrent refrain is that policy-makers are simply unaware of how tropical 
rainforests work. The implication is that before we embark on solving any of the problems 
associated with deforestation. we should first have a fairly sound understanding of the 
nature of the problems. Only then will we be in any position to prescribe Wective policies. 
To this end, this chapter concentrates solely on some of the technical and institutional 
issues which will eventually both dcrine and constrain the economic policies which might 
be implemented. In the process, the reader unfamiliar with the discipline will also receive a 
primer on the "non-economic" issues before the economic issues are treated more 
rigourously in subsequent chapters. 
Tle tropical rainforest "problem" can be characterised most simply as depicted in 
Figure 2.1. Various land-uses exert pressure on the tropical rainforest biome. This in turn 
has impacts on the rest of the world. As the world becomes aware of these impacts, there 
is some desire to offset the pressures by introducing new policies or policy reforms. 
Although our ultimate interest, from an economic perspective, may be to identify optimal 
policies or - more modestly - policy reforms which are somehow welfare improving, this 
can only be done with some- understanding of each of the elements in this process. 
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First, in Section 2.2, the physical nature of the biome itself is described, drawing particular 
attention to how some of the technical literature charactcrises it as a single living organism. 
Section 2.3 concentrates on the various land-use pressures exerted on the biome, 
especially: timber production; ranching; fuelwood gathering; and forest farming. In 
addition, it outlines the contributions which perverse government policies have made 
through these pressures. Section 2.4 describes the environmental impacts and effects of 
rainforest development. It draws extensively from the literature in the environmental 
sciences and serves to describe the nature of some of the externalities involved with the 
various land-use pressures on the biome. Section 2.5 concentrates on the international 
awareness of the rainforest problem which has developed, and how this has led to both 
political and economic pressures for instituting some policy reforms. Finally, we discuss 
in Section 2.6 the policy options which are available in light of the growing awareness and 
the fact that people and countries are willing to dedicate resources to conservation. In 
particular, this section describes how economic policies have come to the forefront as a 
promising mechanism for promoting rainforest conservation. 
2.2 The Rainforest Biome: Its Nature and Exploitation 
In examining the tropical rainforest, it seems natural to ask first what distinguishes it from 
other forest resources in the world. Prance (1986) alludes to three types of forests in 
tropical latitudes: deciduous forest, moist forest, and rain forest. Moist forests normally 
occur in lowland areas which receive amounts of annual rainfall in excess of 2000 mm and 
rainforests typically receive well in excess of 4000 mm of rain annually. 1 But seasonality 
is also an important factor, and areas receiving less than 120 nun of monthly rainfall for 
more than one month typically revert to tropical moist forest. Where there is strong 
seasonality or low rainfall, deciduous species tend to take over from moist forest species 
and, as a result of this seasonality, the deciduous forest has fewer species and biomass than 
does moist forest or rainforest. Although such distinctions can be made between moist 
forest and rainforest, much of the literature uses the terms interchangeably, as we shall 
here. 
Even within the rainforest biome, there are extremes. Among the wettest are those in 
Southwest Cameroon in West Africa (Djimde and Raintree [1988]) and in the Choc6 area 
of Colombia (Gentry [1982b]) where annual rainfalls in excess of 10,000 mm are regularly 
documented while the "driest" are those seasonal rainforests in Central Amazonian Brazil 
I By comparison, London receives an average annual rainfall of about 600 mm. 
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which receive only some 1800 mm of rainfall annually. But tropical rainforcsts are found 
all over the world where climate, soil and landscape allow. Perhaps one of the more 
interesting gencralisations made by botanists from cross-sectional studies of rainforcst 
areas is the observation by Gentry (1982a) that there exists a strong correlation between 
species diversity and rainfall. While many tempcmte forests can be regarded essentially as 
monocultures of a single trce crop, rainforcsts tend to be species rich. Dodson and Gentry 
(1978) surveyed a 1.7 square kilomctre area in a coastal forest In Ecuador and identified 
1033 individual tree species. 
The species diversity found in rainforests applies not only to tree species but also to plants, 
animals, and insects. Associated with this rich diversity in the rainforcst ecosystem, there 
have developed complex interactions and interdependencies between the various living 
parts. The ecological literature is replete with examples of how the survival of some parts 
of the forest are intricately tied to interactions in other parts. An illuminating example of 
this interaction involves the survival of the well-known brazil nut. P=ce (1985) showed 
that the brazil nut tree flowers need to be cross-pollinated with pollen from another tree 
before they would bear fruit. Ibis pollination is performed by local carpenter bees, which 
feed on the brazil nut flower nectar during a short pcriod of the year, and rely on other trees 
during the rest of the year when the brazil nut tree is not flowering. Mic brazil nut could 
not survive without the bees, the trees for cross-pollination, and the other tree species 
which support the pollinators. The web gets more intricate when one realises that the bees! 
mating success depends in turn on the presence of certain epiphytic orchids found in the 
foresL And the formula becomes more complex still. when one realises that the propagation 
of brazil nut seeds occurs through scatter hoarding by a large forest floor rodent - the 
agouti. In summary, the brazil nut depends not only on the bees and the trees, but also on 
the presence of the orchids and animals of the forest. Removing any one element in this 
mosaic could threaten the survival of the brazil nut. 2 For numerous other examples of such 
interactions, the interested reader is referred to Mitchell (1986) or Longman and Jenfk 
(1987). 
Given the interrelationships and interactions which exist among a rainforest! s individual 
species, some authors prefer to treat the 'rainforcst' as a single living organism. 77his 
implies that we cannot exploit any single part of it without risking - in some manner - 
affecting other parts of it as well. A corollary to this view, however, is that the rainforcst, 
as with any single organism, has substantial adaptive mechanisms available to it to survive, 
albeit in an altered form, any pressures or stresses which it encounters. This adaptivitY 
2 Because laws in Brazil recognise the economic importance of the brazil nut, it is illegal to fell them. 
lron'cally- it is not uncommon to see individual trees in areas which have been Completely CICX-CUL 
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Figure 2.2 
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concept is paralleled in an idea which is gaining increased support in the ecological 
sciences: the Gaia hypothesis. Writers such as Lovelock (1979) assert that the world as a 
whole is a sipgle organism which can adapt to most any stress which is placed on it. For 
instance, if the world gets too warm from something that humans happen to be doing, then 
ice caps will melt, clouds will form, the earth's albedo will increase, and more of the sun's 
light will be reflected into space: a new equilibrium is eventually established and the earffs 
ecosystem will continue to flourish. Whether humans can survive in this changed 
ecosystem is a moot point. The parallel to treating rainforests in this fashion is that minor 
stresses can perhaps be readily accommodated without causing complete destruction of the 
rainforest. Unfortunately, our understanding of all of the interactions and adjustments 
which occur within the rainforest biome is not sufficiently advanced either to defend or 
refute such a hypothesis. 
What is irrefutable, however, is that, when subjected to major land-use pressures, 
rainforests will eventuafly succumb. Ile evidence for this fact is far from fragmentary. 
Repetto and Gillis (1988) estimate that more than II million hectares of forests are cleared 
annually in the developing world for other uses. In addition, Melillo eLal. (1985) estimate 
that some 4 million hectares are 'converted annually from virgin primary forest to lower 
quality secondary forest. Furthermore, the rates of deforestation appear to be increasing 
with expanding populations and demands for land. The International Institute for 
Environment and Development and the World Resources Institute (1986) recently 
completed a country-by-country inventory which estimated the extent of deforestation * 
of 
primary forests in developing countries. The results of this study are shown in Table 2.1, 
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along with estimates of the per capita GNP for these countries. An interesting conclusion 
which arises from comparing deforestation rates to incomes, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. Is 
that there is no particular relationship between GNP and current rates of deforestation. 
While one must be careful in making and interpreting such broad cross-sectional 
comparisons, this one is of particular interest because it is often asserted that poor countries 
are more short-sighted than their richer counterparts and would, therefore, be inclined to 
consume any capital assets at faster rates. About the only gencralisation which can be made 
is that the countries where deforestation is taking place are poor in comparison to the rest of 
the world, and this is simply because most of the developing countries are found in the 
tropical latitudes. 
Although deforestation may be occurring at an alarming rate, it is important to note that 
estimates of deforestation rates vary substantially in the literature. To a large degree, this is 
because the techniques used to measure deforestation on such a large scale are not 10017c 
reHable. It is only recently that satellite imagery has been used with any degree of success 
(Woodwell, cLal. [1986]) to measure deforestation. and even then it can only 
unequivocally identify areas which have been completely clear-cut or have been subject to 
major conversion. Areas where minor conversion has occurred in the rainforest undcrstory 
can not be discerned with this techniquc. 
To sum up, this section has provided simply a brief look at some of the physical 
characteristics of the rainforest biome, highlighting especially the species diversity and 
interaction which arises. Deforestation pressures have been substantial throughout the 
developing world, and in the next section we investigate more closely the individual 
sources of these land-use pressures. 
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Table 2.1 
Deforestation Ratcs and per Capita GNP in Tmpical Countries 
Closed Rate of Area Per Capita 
Forest Area Deforestation Deforested GNP 
1980 1981-1985 AnnuaHy 1985 
Country (" ha) (rtrmnt)- (000 ha) (SUS) 
Group I- 
Colombia 47.351 1.7 820 1.320 
Mexico 47.840 1.2 595 2.080 
Ecuador 14,679 2.3 340 1,160 
Paraguay 4.100 4.6 190 860 
Nicaragua 4,508 2.7 121 770 
Guatemala 4.596 2.0 90 1.250 
Honduras 3.797 2.4 90 720 
Cost& Rica 1,664 3.9 65 1.300 
Panama 4,204 0.9 36 2.100 
Malaysia 21.256 1.2 255 2,000 
Thailand 10.375 2.4 252 800 
Laos 8.520 1.2 100 n/a 
Philippines 12.510 0.7 91 580 
Nepal 2,128 3.9 84 160 
Vietnam 10.810 0.6 65 n/a 
Sri Lanka 2,782 2.1 58 380 
Nigeria 7.583 4.0 300 800 
Ivory Coast 4.907 5.9 290 660 
Madagascar 12,960 1.2 150 240 
Liberia 2,063 2.2 46 470 
Angola 4.471 1.0 44 n/a 
Zambia 3,390 1.2 40 390 
Guinea 2,072 1.7 36 320 
Ghana 2.471 0.9 22 380 
Total 241,037 1.7 4.180 
Group H- 
Brazil 396,030 0.4 1.480 1,640 
Peru 70,520 0.4 270 1.010 
Venezuela 33,075 0.4 125 3,080 
Bolivia ". 013 0.2 87 470 
Indonesia 123.235 0.5 600 530 
India 72,521 0.2 147 270 
BUMM 32,101 0.3 105 190 
Kampuchea 7.616 0.3 25 n/a 
Papua New Guinea 34,447 0.1 22 680 
Zaire 105,975 0.2 182 170 
Cameroon 18.105 0.4 80 810 
Congo 21,508 0.1 22 1.110 
Gabon 20,690 0.1 15 n/a 
Total 979.836 0.3 3.160 
Continued 
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Ddorestation Ratcs and pcr Capita GNP in Tmpical Counnies 
Ckwd Rate of Arco, Pet Capita 
Fomst Ama Defomstation Dcforcsted GNP 
1990 1981-1985 Annually 1985 
Country MM ha) (P=ni) (TW ha) (SUS) 
Group IH - 
E3 Salvador 155 3.2 5 820 
Jamaica 195 1.0 2 940 
Haiti 58 3.4 2 310 
Kenya 2.605 0.7 19 290 
Guinea-Bissau 664 2.6 17 n/A 
MorAmbique 1.189 0.8 to 160 
Ugz-d& 879 1.1 to n/A 
Brunei 325 2.2 7 n/A 
Rwanda 412 0.7 3 280 
Benin 47 2. t 1 260 
Total 6,529 1.2 76 
Group IV - lowhnoderate rates and emall =, as affecud 
Belize 1.385 0.6 9 n/a 
Dominican Republic 685 0.6 4 790 
Cuba 3.025 0.1 2 n/A 
Trinidad and Tobago 368 0.3 1 6.020 
Bangladesh 2.207 0.4 8 ISO 
Pakistan 3.785 0.2 7 380 
Bhutan 2.170 0.1 2 160 
Tanzania 2.659 0.4 10 290 
Ethiopia 5.332 0.2 8 110 
Sieff a LAone 799 0.9 6 350 
Central African Republic 3.595 0.1 5 260 
Somalia 1.650 0.2 4 280 
Sudan 2.532 o. 2 4 300 
Equatorial Guinea 1.295 0.2 3 n/a 
Togo 304 0.7 2 230 
Total 31.789 0.2 75 
Sources: International Institute for Emironment and Mvelopment and World Resour= 
Institute (1996). World Bank (1996) 
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2.3 Rainrorest Development in Perspective 
Land-usc pressures in developing countries are often severe where population growth rates 
are among the highest in the world, amble land is available in limited amounts, and desires 
for foreign exchange place pressures on local governments to export forest resources or 
clear forest land for other development objectives. Although there are many contributory 
factors to deforestation in any given area, the literature normally identifies four principal 
direct causes: 
a) timber production; 
b) ranching-, 
C) fuelwood gathering-, and, 
d) forest farming. 
In addition, two other contributory factors are often cited as exacerbating tropical rainforest 
deforestation. Ilese are: 
e) perverse government policies (operating through [a]-[dl); and, 
f) random changes in the global cnvironmenL 
Each of these factors is discussed in detail in the following sections. 
First, the literature on the international timber trade (Bums [ 1987]; Hyde [ 1980]; Nectoux 
and Dudley [1987]; Ross and Donovan [19871; Repetto [1988]; Repetto and Gillis [19881; 
Myers [1983; 1984; 1986]) is virtually unanimous in its assessment that tropical 
hardwoods are being harvested at non-sustainable rateS3 and that this land-use pressure 
alone is responsible for the clearing of some 4.5 million hectares annually. For many 
countries, timber is an important source of export earnings, and government concessions to 
encourage the timber trade have often resulted in increased deforestation. The deforestation 
caused by the timber trade wW, eventually, lead to degradation of the hardwood assets in 
LDCs and limit their ability to export or, indeed, meet their own requirements. Nigeria was 
at one time a major timber exporter but 90% of its native forests have been cleared and it is 
currently a net importer of timber products. As shown in Table 2.2, a study undertaken by 
Grainger (1987) suggests that timber exports wiU start to decline from most developing 
regions within the next two decades. In the case of Southeast Asia, these exports have 
already commenced their decline. 
In an attempt to preserve the integrity of their forests, many countries require that timber 
logging companies engage only in selective logging and replant any areas which have been 
3 The issue of "sustainability" is of considerable interest to rainforest deforestation. and it is addressed in 
detail in the context of the economics literature in the following chapter. In this instance, and throughout 
this chapter, "non-sustainable" simply means that the physical harvest rate exceeds the natural rate of 
regeneration. 
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Table 2*2 
on M3 Projected Exports of Loggs and Processed Wood from Dcveloping Countries (million M3) 
Rui2a IM M 122Q M MQ M = = = 
Mica 7.9 7.7 11.4 15.8 32-8 33.7 21.6 25.2 8.1 
Asia-Pacific 41.5 473 35.6 30.9 12.1 13.3 11.8 4.2 7.1 
Latin America 1.2 8.4 32.2 51.7 77.0 104.0 55.4 33.2 20.7 
Source: Grainger (1987). 
cut. In many cases, however, the replanting is not conducted or - if it is conducted - it is 
not effective because the biome has been damaged to the extent that it can not regenerate 
(Ledec and Goodland [19881). Further. selective logging practices which allow cutting of 
only certain species often leave entire areas damaged and incapable of natural regeneration. 
Part of the problem is that the very species diversity which exists in rainforests, also implies 
that the density of individual species is very low. Thus if an individual species - such as 
teak - is exclusively harvested, it may not be capable of re-establishing itself in an arca 
without substantial silvicultural management. While the state of forest management is 
certainly adequately advanced to conduct these prac6ccs, the economic return to such 
activities tends to be low for individual operators, and the propensity to clear-cut is thus 
high in the absence of govemrmnt intervention. 4 
Second, although cattle mnching as an agent of deforestation is confined to Latin America. 
the best available indication suggests that at least 2 million hectares are cleared annually to 
support this activity. In this case, timber is not cleared for cxpon but rather the standing 
forest is clear-cut and then bumed in an attempt to return some of the nutrients to otherwise 
poor quality soiL Browder (1988a) estimates that the amount of cattle pasture in Amazonia 
would account for as much as 72% of the total deforestation measured by Landsat 
satellites. 
T'he impetus behind the ranching has been Brazil's attempt at gaining access to the 
international beef export markets. Massive subsidies (see Binswangcr 11987); Browder 
[1988b]; Dudley [19851; Goodland (1980; 19831) were provided to the livestock sector to 
attract foreign capital and establish a viable industry. Unfortunately, livestock production 
is not economically viable at world prices: income covers only some 45% of the costs. But 
4 For examples, see Sartorius and Henle (1968). Hyde (1980), Wyatt-Smith (19873; 1987b) or McNeely 
(1988). 7be usual argument is that the private discount rate exceeds the social discount rate, and that 
individual operators therefore would not undertake some investments (in replanting) which. from a social 
perspective, are dcsiralýle. 
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because the land it uses is of such poor quality, continued expansion of pasture lands is 
necessary even to maintain current herd sizes. In addition, Shane (1986) notes that the 
clearing often results in substantial displacements of local indigenous peoples - taking 
away their livelihoods while providing no compensation or employment alternative. 
Third, although both timber companies and cattle ranching interests operate on large scales, 
small scale wood gathering by individual households is estimated to account for as much as 
2.5 million hectares of forest clearing annually. As wood is still one of the most 
predominant energy sources in the developing world, the pressures being exerted by this 
activity pose a serious threat to existing resources. While the world went through various 
oil price shocks in the 1970s and 1980s, decreasing wood availability can, in many 
developing countries, be regarded as the relevant energy crisis. 
The extent of this energy crisis is not isolated to any particular area of the globe, although 
its persistency is concentrated in rural areas. A detailed survey undertaken by the FAO (de 
Montalembert and C16ment [19831) projected that about one-half of the world population 
would be facing wood shortages by the year 2000. Of these people, about 80% would be 
living in rural areas or in towns of less than 100,000 population. As shown in Table 2.3, 
the estimate for 1980 was that about 100,000 people suffered from "acute scarcity" of 
fuelwood and that almost 1.3 million were in a "deficit" situation. The FAO defined acute 
scarcity as a situation in which individuals were harvesting the resource base at rates 
exceeding its sustainable yield and were - even then - not meeting their subsistence fuel 
requirements (from all sources). A deficit situation was characterised also by rates of non- 
sustainable harvesting, yet individuals were meeting current subsistence requirements 
through an aggregate of the wood use or other fuels. 
Ile fuelwood problem poses special challenges to rainforest management programmes 
because the agents creating the pressures are often the most disadvantaged in the country: 
the rural poor. As fuelwood becomes scarce they are forced either to spend more time and 
effort gathering marginal fuel sources, or to revert to burning agricultural residues which 
could otherwise serve as fertiliser, or simply to cook their food less. T'he various aspects 
of this problem are discussed in considerably more detail in Chapter 7. 
Fourth, by far the most substantial impact on tropical rainforests has been the small-scale 
forest fanner. Forest farming includes the shifting farmer, the migrant squatter, or the 
landless colonist; and activities associated with forest farming usually include non- 
sustainable harvesting or gathering of forest resources. Because their impact is not usually 
to clear-cut the forest but rather to degrade its quality, it is difficult to estimate the exact 
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Table 2.3 
Populadons_Expcriencing a Fuclwood Dcricit (millions) 
1980 2000 
A=c Deficit PMSpCctIvC A= 
ty Deficit Scal-citX/MfIcit 
Total Rural Total Rural Total Rural TOW Rural 
Pop'n Pcvp'n Por; n Pop'n Pop'n pop'n pop'n popen 
Africa 55 49 146 131 112 102 535 464 
N. E. & North 104 69 268 158 
Africa 
Asia-Pacific 31 29 832 710 161 148 1,671 1,434 
Latin America 26 18 201 143 50 30 512 342 
TOTAL 112 96 1,283 1,053 323 280 2,986 2.398 
NOTE: Rural dcruxd as total less that of to%%ns with > 100,000 population 
Source: de Montalembert and Clement (1983). FAO. 
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contribution which the forest farmcr has on the biome. Nonetheless, most estimates 
(Myers [ 1986]; McNeely [ 19881) would confirm that forest fanning is responsible for in 
excess of 10 million hectares of deforestation annually. 
Where land is scarce and populations are expanding, the landless will often carve out a 
niche in the rainforest to practice traditional rotational agriculture or, at times, more modem 
agroforestry practices which involve the joint production of wood and food crops-5 While 
these practices may even be indefinitely sustainable, they do involve permanent conversion 
of the rainforest biome and increasing population pressure is a persistent threat. It is often 
argued (see, for example, Dudley [1985)) that the blame for this type of deforestation 
should be placed not on the individual forest farmers but rather on timber companies and on 
development projects such as hydroelectric dams. He argues that these projects involve 
mad-building and that - inevitably - people will go where the roads are and try to make a 
living along such corridom 
Part of the problem with estimating the impacts which forest farming has is distinguishing 
between sustainable and non-sustainable production and assessing the actual extent of the 
resulting conversion. A case in point is the harvesting of minor forest products - plants, 
sceds. and fruit - for minor manufacturing, food or medicinal purposes. Some recent 
Exampks of this can be found in Brechin (1994), Ilockstra (1987) and Rain= (1986). 
46 Chapter 2 
surveys indicate that this is an important forest use, 6 and sustainable harvesting in such a 
manner is likely to add to the well-being of those involved while not unduly threatening the 
integrity of the forest. 
Fifth, while the above discussions may tempt one to start blaming timber companies, cattle 
ranchers and the rural poor of the world for tropical deforestation, one should recall that in 
most cases these agents were simply responding to their physical and economic 
environments at the time. More recent literature rccognises that in many cases this 
economic environment was under the direct influence of local governments which were 
perhaps in turn corrupted by pressures from local power brokers. Repetto (1986; 1988), 
Repetto and Gillis (1988), and McNeely (1988) therefore cite 'bad' public policies as 
instrumental in the deforestation. While the previously described example of giving 
subsidies to cattle ranchers is a case in point, numerous other examples can be found. 
Among them are the incentives given by Indonesia and Malaysia to timber companies for 
harvesting hardwoods. 
But the judgment that such policies were somehow 'bad should be interpreted from the 
point of view that they did not - for whatever reason - promote rainforest conservation. In 
hindsight we may be able to see that the deforestation has had dctrimental economic effects 
on the individual countries, but nonetheless - where not driven by corruptive influences - 
the policies may have seemed both reasonable and desirable at the time they were 
implemented. Whether the policies were implemented at the time to provide foreign 
exchange to reduce debt burdens, or to support infi-astructure developments, governments 
at the time implicitly placed a premium on the immediate benefits of deforestation. While 
attacks on many such policies have been relentless, the encouraging implication is that - if 
policies have acted as such a strong influence in leading to deforestation - they can 
presumably be applied with equal vigour and effect in the opposite direction to promote 
minforest conservation. 
Finally, the last factor which contributes - albeit unpredictably - to deforestation is shifting 
weathcrpattcms. Ile basic argument hcre (see Ledec cLal. [19851, Muscat [19851) is that 
carrying capacity of certain areas is being diminished, not ncccssarily by intensive land- 
use, but rather by changes in local or global weather pattcrns. Such changes lead to 
droughts which in turn lead to deforestation and - in extreme cases - desertification. Gorse 
and Steeds (1987) acknowledge these effects have been contributory to the deforestation 
associated with the Sahel droughts of the past ten years, and Starr (1987) argues that much 
6 See Schwartzmann and Allegretti (1987). Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen (1983), and Chapter 5 of this 
thesis. 
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of the impoverishment and deforestation in Central Niger was linked directly to drought 
and environmental variability. 7be problem with actually estimating the direct contribution 
which droughts have on deforestation is that the impacts may occur indirectly quite far 
away as individuals leave drought-stricken areas. Refugees from the Sahel droughts, for 
example, can be found living as far south as the forest zones in Southern Cameroon. 
In summary, the direct pressures to which the tropical rainforest biome is subjected are 
quite varied, ranging from large-scale public timber companies to the small-scale forest 
farmer who is concerned simply with making a living in a rainforcst environment. The 
pressures have often been exacerbated by public policies which effectively promote 
deforestation, and environmental variability has contributed in some unquantifiable degree 
to the ovemH deforestation. 
§ 2.4 Effects of Rainforest Development on the Natural Environment 
2.4.1 Overview 
Whereas the previous section focused on the types of pressures to which the rainforest 
biornee is being subjected, in this section we shall be more concerned with characterising the 
effects of any degradation on the natural environment. Accordingly, we shall consider the 
following salient issues which arise in the environmental literature: 
a) local clirnate effects-, 
b) global cHmate effects-, 
C) biological diversity; and, 
d) in absentia bencfits. 
Many of these issues will highlight that there is considerable uncertainty involved in the 
linkages between deforestation and the natural cnvironmcnL In this chapter I shall 
concentrate on the technical aspects of this uncertainty-, Chapter 3 will deal in more detail 
with the potential contributions of economic theory to dealing with this uncertainty. 
In addition, to the extent that people are part of the natural environment, it is useful to 
review briefly the effects of deforestation on indigenous peoples themselves. Although in 
many cases they are the direct and immediate beneficiaries of any of their activities (at least 
if they are farming or wood gathering), they will also be the first to experience any 
degradation in the quality of the environment. Although it is World Bank policy to protect 
tribal societies from the potentially negative effects of development projects, it 
acknowledges (see Ledec and Goodland [19881) that one of the greatest challenges arises 
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when indigenous cultures start to modify their own environment. Ibis can occur due to 
technological change which makes harvesting easier, to population growth, increased 
participation in market economies, or simply the breakdown of traditional value systems. 
Whatever the cause, the effects of non-sustainable harvesting cventuaUy fall back on those 
individuals who initially relied on it for their livelihoods. Reyes (1983) estimated that 60% 
of the primary forest had been lost in the Philippines to persistent non-sustainable shifting 
cultivation over the period 1971-1980. Boado (1988; p. 167) cites population growth and 
a general lack of conservation ethics among Filipinos as contributory, and notes that it has 
resulted in "unproductive croplands, degraded soils unsuitable for agriculture, increased 
erosion and siltation of watersheds, and a growing shortage of forest products. " Similar 
stories can be found throughout the developing world. 
2.4.2 Local Climate 
The major local climatological linkages which could occur with tropical rainforests are 
associated with precipitation recycling, surface run-off, and soil erosion. Salad et. al. 
(1986) argue that regional precipitation recycling is an important function of the rainforest. 
In the Amazon basin for example, only about one-half of the rainfall actually leaves the 
catchment area through the Amazon River system - the rest is returned to the atmosphere 
through evapotranspiration. Any decrease in the capacity to recycle this water will have a 
number of effects. First, there will be less cloud formation and more of the sun's energy 
will reach the forest zones. But the lower recycling capacity implies that less energy will be 
required to evaporate the water, and hence an overall heating can be expected in the forest 
environment. As the survival of many forest species depends on well controlled 
temperature and humidity bounds, any deforestation is expected eventually to cause 
weather changes which will themselves threaten the entire biome. 
A second associated effect deals with surface run-off. The forest canopy normally Protects 
the forest floor from the sun's intense equatorial rays and from the high volumes of 
rainfall. 7 But with reduced cloud cover coupled with the removal of the canopy, forest 
soils are subjected to a dual barrage of sun and rain. 71is effect on peak flows, coupled 
with a decrease in low flows due to the lower overall water balance in the system leads to 
much larger extremes in surface run-off. In Malaysia, conversion of forests to plantation 
doubled peak stonn flows and halved low flows (Salati, et. al. [1986]). 11is can have 
substantial impacts on any fishing or farming operations which are accustomed to and, 
indeed may depend on, less variability. 
7Longman and lenik (1987) note that as Ettle as 10% of the rainfall falling on a tropical rainforest canopy 
actually reaches the forest floor directly. 
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The final effect is closely associated with the surface run-off phenomenon: soil erosion and 
siltafion. With peak floods increasing in volume and the forest floor unprotected by the 
canopy, soils arc removed from the forest and the surrounding catchment area and 
deposited downstream. This deposition and siltation can have fairly catastrophic impacts 
on both overall agricultural productivity or on important infmstruct=. MacKinnon (1983) 
estimated that the destruction of a typical catchment area In Indonesia would decrease 
irrigation efficiency by about 30% to 40%. The Aswan High Dam on the Nile River, for 
example, has had its useful life expectancy reduced from 100 years to 15 years due to 
siltation in the reservoir (Blaikie [19851). In Cameroon, road maintenance costs in 
deforested areas are typically 10 times higher than normal due to repairs necessitated by 
erosion. In sloping terrain the problems are compounded because of higher soil erosion, 
and it has become more widely accepted (WRI [19991) that the severity of the flooding 
which occurred in Bangladesh in 1988 was at least partially attributable to deforestation 
upstream in Nepal. In summary, changes in local weather patterns can affect not only the 
forest itself, but also economic productivity in the entire catchmcnt area. 
2.4.3 Global Climate 
Connections between rainforest deforestation and global weather systems are less well 
defined than those involving local climate effects, and the scientific literature is far from 
unanimous that deforestation will effect global weather. Dickinson (1981) concludes based 
on htmospheric modelling of energy and water balances that even complete tropical 
deforestation will lead to variations no greater than those caused by natural fluctuations. 
His study, however was based simply on the passive functions fulfilled by tropical 
rainforests, and more recent work has focussed on interactions between the world's 
oceans, forests, and atmosphere which are influenced by the deforestation process - 
especially the process of burning forest for the purpose of clearing land. 
NjcElroy and Wofsky (1986) stress that an important shift in scientific thought has occurred 
with respect to interactions between various parts of the biospherc, and that the study of 
tropical systems is increasing in importance. In part this has come about because of 
specific concerns such as the ozone layer, but also due to the availability of better data 
collection and analysis techniques to atmospheric chemists. T'he short conclusion from the 
research is that atmospheric chen-dstry has definitely been changing. Whether this can be 
correlated as well to climatic changes, and whether tropical deforestation can be held 
responsible for any part of this change in atmospheric composition are points still very 
much open to debate. 
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The first issue relates to how tropical rainforests influence atmospheric chemistry. It is 
often asserted in popular literature that rainforcsts are the "lungs of the world" and that they 
make an important contribution in maintaining oxygen levels in the atmosphere. In fact, 
however, rainforests play a minor role in this regard as the most significant sources of 
oxygen are the world's oceans. 8 Similarly, tropical forests appear to play only a minor role 
in maintaining equilibrium levels of some trace gases. Although ozone is only one of the 
important trace gases in the atmosphere, it is useful to describe how tropical forests might 
effect ozone accumulations as some current popular literature draws strong correlations 
between deforestation and the well-being of the earth's ozone layer. In fact, however, the 
connection between the two is sfiU tenuous. 
Ozone plays an important role in regulating the conditions for life on earth, as it effectively 
shields organisms from potentially harmful ultraviolet radiation. Concems for the ozone 
layer were first expressed in the early 1970s in response to high-flying jet aircraft (Crutzen 
[ 19701; Johnston [ 197 1 ]) and scientific study has since identified the importance of nitrous 
oxides and chlorides in the removal of ozone from the earth's atmosphere. Nitrous oxide is 
produced both by natural decay as well as by burning, and simple forest clearing and 
burning are estimated to contribute only about 3% of current man-made emissions. 9 Tle 
major threat posed by chlorine originates with industrial chlorocarbons. used as propellants 
in aerosols and as refrigerants. A strong natural buffer against these is methane, which is 
also produced by decay processes and which, when present, effectively intercepts the 
chlorine molecules before they break down the ozone. McElroy and Wofsky (1986) 
estimate, however, that the total contribution of tropical forests to the atmospheric methane 
burden represents about 2% of the total annual supplieS-. 10 
The most significant contribution which tropical forest clearing makes to atmospheric 
composition is through the generation of carbon monoxide (CO) and carbon dioxide (CO2). 
CO and C02 production arises primarily from combustion and from oxidation of 
hydrocarbons. While it is not possible to estimate the contribution of man-made C02 
production to the atmosphere, 11 Khalil and Rasmussen (1983) estimated the total man- 
9 For excellent recent references to scientific compendiums on the issue of global and local climate stability 
the reader is referred to U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (1989), OTA [U. S. Off ice of Technology 
Assessment) (1989), National Resources Defense Council (1989), and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (1989b; 1989c). 
9 The remainder comes from fertilised agricultural lands (48%) and combustion of hydrocarbons (49%). 
(McElroy and Wofsky [1986]) 
10 Cattle are responsible for 30%, rice paddies for 23%, termites for 12%, and the remainder is attributed to 
various sources including oceans, tundra, biomass burning, natural gas loss, and coal mining. 
II There is good documentation for increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide of about 10% over the past 
three decades (McElroy and Wofsky [1986]), but the problem lies in attributing this to any particular 
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made sources of CO to be 460 million tons annually, of which 200 million tons were 
directly attributable to forest clearing and the burning of savanna and agricultural land in the 
tropics. More recent studies (Crutzcn, ct. al. [19851; Delaney, et-al. 119851) attribute a 
rccw-ring photochemical CO smog over the Brazilian Amazon dircctly to emissions from 
agricultural burning and forest clearing. The local effect which this may have is to destroy 
the regional forests through toxic components in the pollution. although no evidence of this 
has yet been notedL 
This brings us to the second major consideration: what effect does atmospheric chemistry 
have on the weather? We have seen that tropical forests appear to contribute little to our 
ability to breathe and it is argued that any degradation in the ozone layer can be corrected 
more easily by addressing concerns other than tropical rainforcsts. But through 
combustion and decay, deforestation does lead to increased production of carbon monoxide 
and carbon dioxide. A substantial body of literature based on historical scientific records 
suggests that - over a history extending back 600,000 years - there has existed a high 
positive correlation between carbon dioxide loads in the atmosphere and global 
tCMpCrat, =S. 12 Given that tropical systems do appear to play some role in equilibrating 
trace gases critical to these fluctuations, many believe that massive deforestation will have 
some effect on global climates. This would in turn cause redistributions in rainfall and 
changes in ocean currcnts, 13 and would invariably effect agricultural productivity - perhaps 
positively or negatively - throughout the world. 
In summary, tropical rainforests, do have some potcntially important contribution to make to 
the maintenance of global climatological balances. But the scientific community has only 
begun to understand these contributions and the mechanisms which link the rainforests to 
the rest of the world ecosystem. Ilere is still considerable scope for interdisciplinary work 
in the physical sciences before even the direction - let alone the magnitude - of the effects 
on global climates can be estbnated. 
source. While burning of vegemion from deforestation could have contributed as much as ft burning of 
fossil fuels, Seiler and Crutzen (1980) suggest that much of the vegetation burned is converted to charcoal 
and - in this process - would not rel=e the carbon dioxide. In most cases this charcoal Is returned to soils 
or river sediments and does not enter the atmosphere. Even if one argues. however, that the charcoal is 
eventually used as an energy source, it would simply displ3ce other wood or fossil fuels and the incremental 
ontn nimal c 'budon of burning cleared rainfortst to czbon dioxide build-up would be relatively mi - 12 Delmas. eLaL (1980) and Neftel. etAl. (1982) reconstructed the historical record from ice cores back 
60.000 years. and Pisias and Shackleton (1984) extended this record further through measuring carbon 
composition in marine skelctonL 
13 'Me effects which major ocean currents have on world weather has been well documented. See. for 
=3 CO 0 die C en example, Leighton and Wira%%-an (1986). who comlated droughts and ri in Dom tI Nifto ev t in 
the South Pacific. 
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2.4.4 Biological Diversity and Extingdon 
Much of the literature regarding tropical rainforest values asserts that their most important 
contribution to the world is through their role as a storehouse for biological diversity. In 
simplest terms, it is implied that - because of their immense diversity and abundance of 
species - there remain substantial discoveries to be made in the rainforests which can 
contribute germplasm to the food and pharmaceutical industries of the world. Various 
estimates suggest that there exist some 5 million to 30 million species of living organisms 
in the world, of which less than 1.5 million have been described (McNeely [1988]). Many 
of these are found in tropical rainforcsts. Mitchell (1986) describes that it is only in the 
past 5 years that technology has allowed scientists to study the rainforest canopy, and that 
his investigations alone caused him to revise his estimates of species counts in the 
rainforest upwards by a factor of 10. With access to the rainforest canopy (provided in fact 
by modem mountain climbing equipment), new species were discovered, and others which 
were previously believed to have been endangered were found to be thriving. Given that 
science has only scratched the surface of what the rainforest has to offer, the destruction of 
species through deforestation causes inestimable losses to food and pharmaceutical science. 
In exploring this further, we shall first outline in more detail what is meant by biodiversity. 
Second, we shall investigate some of the significant historical contributions which have 
been made by wild germplasm to the pharmaceutical and food industries. FinaUy. although 
they are in a minority in the technical literature, we shall look briefly at some of the 
dissenting views which, more particularly, focus on the usefulness of laboratory science. 
gene banks, and the overaU 'optimality' of the extinction process. 
Biological diversity actually encompasses three distinct concepts which often have 
conflicting meaning. 14 These three levels include: ecosystem diversity; species diversity; 
and genetic diversity. Ecosystem diversity is the most general level and relates to the 
diversity of ecological complexes in which species occur. The functions of the ecosystem 
include the cycling of nutrients and the storage and transport of minerals, biomass and 
energy. Species diversity relates quite simply to the number of varieties of living 
organisms which exist on earth. Genetic diversity relates to the variability of genetic 
characteristics within a particular species, sub-species, or breed. Genetic diversity is 
important to the survivability of a species as it determines how adaptable a species can be to 
changes in its environment. It is also of key concern to genetic scientists as wide genetic 
diversity effectively broadens the menu of characteristics which can be chosen when 
14 For a more detailed discussion, see Wilson (1988), OTA (1987). Sould (1986) or Ricklefs. Naveh and 
Turner (1984). 
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developing disease or pest resistant strains of agricultural products. 
But although genetic diversity is perhaps the key characteristic, and although genetic 
diversity can normally be increased by increasing population sizes. other factors must be 
considered. For exarnple, increasing populations of one species may threaten other species 
within that ecosystem so - to maintain species diversity - some balance must be struck. 
Furthermore, in the interests of ecosystem diversity, much of the theoretical literature 
rccognises that a number of small 'island' ecosystems may be better than one large 
ecosystcn, L Because there are obvious land constraints, a further balance must be struck 
between species diversity and ecosystem diversity. 
Assuming for the moment that mankind can select which species and ecosystems arc going 
to survive and which arc going to perish. then, in theory, one might wish to address 
biodiversity as an issue which can be solved as a straightforward optimisation problem. In 
such a formulation, we might ask, for example, what the optimal number of ecosystems, 
species, and genetic characteristics are given some objective of maximi'sing a biodiversity 
index which in turn, we suppose, reflects the value of the biodiversity to mankind. The 
optimisation problem itself would be subject to constraints imposed by spccies-specics 
interactions, spccies-ccosystem interactions, and ecosystem-ccosystcm interactions, and - 
presumably - some initial conditions which are themselves a product of natural selection 
and adjustment mechanisms. While the mathematical constructs are available to address 
such problems, 15 the nature of the biological interactions within generations - let alone 
over long time horizons - is not known well enough to conclude what should be done if we 
are trying to optimise biological divcrsity. 16 
Ile importance of having access to wild resources is, however, in little dispute. Wild 
genetic materials have made considerable contributions in the past to agricultural products, 
the pharmaceutical industry. and to material sciences. Wild genetic resources have been 
used - sometimes successfufly. sometimes unsuccessfully - to enhance the productivity of 
most major food and cash crops in the world. A detailed study by Prcscott-Allen and 
Prescott-Allen (1983) covered 29 of the major world crops. A summary of the results of 
their study are presented in Table 2.4. 
15 See, for example, Scierstad and Sydsxtcr (1987), Barrett (1987), Brown and Goldstein (1984). 
Kmud=ner (19a5). 
16 Even if one manages to overcome all of the opractical* problems. there still exists an important 
philosophical question as to what extent mankind's intervention in the process of natural selection is 
warranted. Sonx would feel on moral grounds that any such interventions are unethical - that they = 
paramount to playing the role of a god which mankind has no right to pl3y. Others would assert that such interventions are themselves pan of the natural selection process and therefore require no explicit 
justification. 
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Table 2.4 
Origins of Wild Gennplasm Used to Improve Major Crops 
Crop % of Product 
Developed 
ion Grown in 
Developing 
Source of Wild Gcrmlplasm 
Countries Countries Country (Number) 
Barley 87 13 Turkey (1) 
Maize 65 35 USA (1). Venezuela (1) 
OaLs 94 6 Israel (1), Portugal (1), Algeria (1). 
Tunisia (1) 
Rice 7 93 India (1) 
Wheat 66 34 Turkey (2), Israel (1), Italy (1), 
Spain (1) 
Carrot 74 26 U. S. A. (I -introduced) 
Cassava 0 100 Brazil (1) 
Potato 83 17 Argentina (3), Bolivia (1), 
Mexico (2), Peru (1) 
sweet Potato 2 98 Mexico (1) 
Oil Palm 0 100 Ivory Coast (1), Nigeria (1). 
Zaire (1) 
Sesame 0 100 India (1) 
Sunflower 79 21 U. S. A. (2) 
Tornato 60 40 Ecuador (4). Peru (5). Chile (1) 
Beans 22 78 None 
Peas 39 Israel (1). Jordan (1), Lebanon (1), 
Syria (1). Turkey (1) 
Soybean 67 33 None 
Grapes 80 20 U. S. A. (6). U. S. S. R. (1) 
Apple 77 23 Japan (1), U. S. S. R. (1) 
Banana 2 98 None 
Citrus 51 49 None 
Pear 78 22 U. S. S. R. (1) 
Stmwberry 90 10 U. S. A. (3). Canada (1), Chile (1) 
Sugar Beet 92 8 Italy (1) 
Sugarcane 9 91 Papua New Guinea (1). India (1), 
Indonesia (1) 
Tobacco 39 61 Australia (2), Peru (2), 
Argentine (1), Bolivia (1). 
Brazil (1), Paraguay (1), Uruguay (1) 
cam 0 100 Peru (1) 
coffee 0 100 None 
Cotton 42 58 Cameroon (1), C. AJL (1), Chad (1). 
Ethiopia (1). Niger (1), Nigeria (1). 
Somalia (1), Sudan (1), Angola (1). 
Namibia (1). Mexico (1), U. S. A. (1) 
Rubber 0 100 Brazil (1) 
Source: Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen (1983). 
Tropical Raimla"st v Barkeround 
- 
55 
Three general conclusions stand out from their work. First, no country is self-sufficient in 
its potential for use of genetic resources. Second, although rive of the crops havc not been 
improved using wild germplasm (soybeans, beans, banana, citrus, and coffee), developing 
countries are a major source for wild germplasm for those crops which have been 
improved. Finally, the flow of benefits has not only been South-North, as it was often 
characterised, but substantial benefits flow South-South: i. e., the developing world 
benefits substantially from having access to wild germplasm for improving its domestic 
crops. In hindsight, this is not surprising as the domestic and wild growing environments 
are similar, hence desirable characteristics which arc sought for domestic crops may be 
found in wild varieties near at hand. 
While specific examples of the contribution of tropical genetic resources abound, the case 
of maize serves to illustrate the point. Domestic varieties of maize have two major 
problems: they require sowing annually-, and, they are prone to serious diseases. In 1977 
the Mexican botanist Rafael Guzrriari made what has been hailed the "botanical discovery of 
the century" (Ilds and Doebly [1980]) in a moist forest area which was about to be cleared 
for development: Zea diploperennis -a wild maize variety which hybridises easily, is 
perennial, and is immune to the four most serious diseases of maize. 17 Although its most 
desirable traits have not yet been =sfcnr-d to domestic varieties, it holds tremendous 
potential as a wild genetic source. Fisher and Hanemann (1985) estimate that the variety 
may potentially contribute some $6.82 billion in net benefits through decreased planting 
costs. 
Contributions of the rainforest to medicine are not readily subjected to quantification, yet 
their importance to health both in the developing world and to the developed world is 
substantial. Prescott-Allcn and Prescott-Allen (1982), Myers (1983), Oldficld (1984), and 
Namkoong (1986) all draw attention to the importance of plant-based drugs in primitive 
cultures and in local healing in rural and forested areas. In the developing countries, 
Principe (1988a; 1988b) estimates the retail value of prescription and non-prescription 
plant-based drugs to have been $43 billion in 1985 in the OECD countries, and that 
additional social benefits associated with better health (higher productivity, lower health 
care costs, amenity value of better health) provided an additional bencrit of between S 150 
billion and $1,750 billion annually in those countries. Although it is impossible to estimate 
the incremental contribution of tropical rainforest plants, a single example can again 
illustrate the point. The rosy periwinkle (Vinca rosea), native to South American 
17 These am chl=tic dwarf virus - the major disease responsible for maize crop losses in the United States; 
chlomdc mottle virus - significant in South America and paru of the United States; sutak virus - 
responsible for most disease related losses in Africa: and bushy stunt mycoplasm -a serious disease at high 
elevations in Ccntml and South America. (Nault, LR. and W. R. Findley (19831) 
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rainforests and used locally as a hallucinogen and as a treatment for inflammation, was 
found to have powerful properties against certain forms of cancer. Alkaloids derived from 
extracts of this plant are now used commonly in the chemical treatment of acute 
lymphocytic leuken-ýia. 18 Whereas 50 years ago the life expectancy of a sufferer of this 
disease would have been measured in terms of months, these drugs are now effective in 
causing remission in all but 2% of cases. 
While few would argue that genetic germplasm is important, a position can be taken that 
there are means of preserving genetic diversity other than in situ in the rainforests. 
Proponents of this view argue that - in practice - local governments have not bothered to 
catalogue genetic resources in protected areas, or that the amount of land required to 
effectively protect a biome is impractically large. In such cases, it is argued, ex situ gene 
pools can be maintained in laboratories, zoos, or botanical gardens where scientific access 
is guaranteed and conditions for the protection of the varieties can be closely monitored. 
The disadvantage of the ex situ gene bank approach, however, is that human error 
sometimes causes the loss of gcnedc resources. Hymowitz (1976) documents a case where 
seed explorers col. lected 4000 samples of soybean seed from China, Japan and Korea and 
about two-thirds of the collection was at one point inadvertantly lost or thrown out. 
Further, maintenance problems still arise, as is documented by (Berding and Koike [19801) 
who noted that the wild material in a sugarcane collection was reduced by half after a period 
of 18 years because of poor maintenance. Quite often the lack of maintenance can not be 
blamed on any particular human error, but rather is a result of removing the genetic material 
from its natural environment where it may have established interdependent relationships 
with other species. This was the case with wild African rices moved to a gene bank in the 
Philippines. (Harlan [1981]) Also, in situ reserves provide a natural laboratory which will 
often provide the researcher with insights which would not otherwise have developed. 
Rick (1974) attributes improvements he made in tomato size to observations of how the 
fruit was developing in natural conditions. Finally, once in an ex situ gene bank, varieties 
will generally stop evolving, whereas in situ species can co-evolve with various pests and 
diseases. To summarise, however, it should most probably be concluded that in situ and 
ex situ gene banks should not be regarded as competitive methods for preserving biological 
diversity: both methods have merits. 
Ile last issue we deal with here concerns extinction as a process. Although the arguments 
presented above tend to support policies which would slow down the extinction process, 
we should be reminded that extinction of weak species is a natural evolutionary process 
18 Matt, Watson and Winsten (1980). 
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which is critical to the survival of strong species-19 We should not necessarily be 
squeamish every time a particular species disappears: varieties mutatc. the strong survive, 
the weak fail. We may more rightfully be concerned, however. if human actions are 
accelerating the process. McNeely (1988) regards the deforestation in the tropics as an 
unprecedented destruction of species, and many writers obviously feel that mankind's own 
long-term survival as a species depends, to some degree, on the well-being of a healthy 
minforest biome. 
2.4.5 In Absentia Bencrits 
Both the environmental and the economic literature is replete with assertions that natural 
areas provide some in absenda benefits to individuals or societies quite apart from those 
discussed above. Unfortunately. many of these bcncrits are often lumped into one category 
loosely referred to as 'option value'. For the sake of clarity, and to discern among the 
different interpretations of these benefits in the literature, we divide these into the following 
general categories: 
a) basic option value; 
b) access option value; 
C) quasi-option value; 
d) screndipity value; 
C) bequest value; and, 
f) existence value. 
Ile earliest literature in environmental economics which discusses option value essentially 
intends to capture the amount which an individual would be willing to pay to preserve their 
option to have access to an environmental good or servicc. 20 The essential contribution of 
this work was that individuals would pay to keep this option open, even if they did not 
specifically have any intent of visiting the area which rnight provide the good or service. In 
addition, society as a whole may be willing to pay to have access to a specific genetic 
resource at some time in the future, even if it has no immediate consumption or production 
value. This value, that of being willing to pay for the option of having certain access to 
consumption, we describe as basic option value. It is normally implied that this 
consumption will be at some future date, although Smith (1983) notes that the passage of 
time is not essential to the Nmulation of this type of option value. 
19 For an exccUent discussion of extinction. see Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1981). 20 These earlier papers include: Weisbrod (1964). Cicch,: Ui. Seneca and Davidson (1969). Cicchetti and 
Freman (1971). and Fisher, Krutilla and Cicchetd (1972a; 1972b; 1974). 
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Gallagher and Smith (1985) subsequently defined "access option value" as the amount that 
individuals would be willing to pay for increasing the probability that they would at one 
time have access to a given environmental good or service. In essence, this simply 
recognised that - even once an option was 'purchased' - it might not guarantee the abifity 
to exercise that option. Nonetheless, it seems clear that individuals might be willing to pay 
for an improvement in their opportunity set, which is essentially what access option value 
reflects. As with the basic option value, the existence of access option value does not 
depend on the passage of time. 
Freeman (1984), by noting the fact that irreversible decisions were often involved in 
environmental projects, argued that a "quasi-option value" existed in conservation projects. 
This argument essentially extended the 'time-dependent' aspects of option value put 
forward independently by Arrow and Fisher (1974) and Henry (1974b). It requires that, at 
the outset, the planner does not have complete information on the intrinsic value of the 
resource. In the case of tropical forests, for example, the argument would be that we do 
not know everything about the forcst' s value. If we clear-cut, we will never find out. If 
we defer clear-cutting the forest and wait, then the opportunity that we have generated for 
finding out more about the intrinsic value of the forest is our quasi-option value. Fisher 
and Hanemann (1985) proved that this quasi-option value is positive provided the expected 
value of the information which might be gained by deferring development is positive. 
Hanemann (1989) later demonstrated that, under circumstances where a continuum of 
development levels is available, the quasi-option value might, in fact, be negative for some 
levels of development. 
A further distinction is sometimes made in the popular conservation literature to 
"serendipity value" (Pearsall [ 1984], Schultes and Swain [ 1976]), although it is equivalent 
to the quasi-option value usually addressed in economics literature. Ilis basically relates to 
the potential that some species might have a currently unimaginable and undiscovered 
human use. An example of this would be the role which animals have been found to have 
as early indicators of ecosystem stress responses to air pollution (Newman and Schereiber 
[1984]). 
An interesting extension to option value is the concept of "bequest value" (KrutiHa and 
Fisher [ 1975]). 21 This reflects the fact that this generation might vicariously be willing to 
pay to leave open the options of future generations. It expresses the idea that current 
generations feel some obligation to future generations, and to some writers (Pearsall 
21 An excellent recent review of the literature relating to this aspect is provided in Chapter 9 of Pearce and 
Turner (1990). 
TrqWral Rainforevc. - Background 59 
[1984]; Spash and d'Arge [ 1989]) it dominates all other benefits of wilderness preservation 
and environmental integrity. 
Finally, we come to "existence value". 'nis reflects that some individuals derive 
satisfaction from knowing that some species or natural environment exists, even if they 
never intend to see it. may never want to see it, nor cam if anyone else ever derives any 
economic value from it. They may simply be happy to know that there arc gorillas in the 
rainforests. Ethics and morality are clearly a significant component in establishing any idea 
of existence value. Many writcrs22 would argue that normal valuation procedures should 
be dropped at this stage, and that certain rules of ethics should be treated as constraints to 
defining the feasible set of alternatives. To Stone (1972). for example, trees and other 
natural objects should have legal rights such that we would no sooner eliminate a species of 
trec than we would murder an individual. 
In short, the in absentia benefits provided by rainforcst conservation often extend well 
beyond the rainforest biome. While it is difficult to estimate the values which individuals 
place on these benefits, the interested reader is referred to empirical work by Krutilla and 
Fisher (1975), Abelson (1979), Cuddington, et. al. (1981), and Harrington and Fisher 
(1982); or to Eltringharn (1984), Redclift (1984) and Usher (1986) for less technical 
accounts. 
§ 2.5 International Awareness 
On March 11,1989, twenty-four member states23 of the United Nations were signatory to 
a declaration which stated4 in part: 
Today, the very conditions of fife on our planet are threatened by the severe attacks 
to which the earths atmosphere is subjected. Authoritative scientific studies have 
shown the existence and scope of considerable dangers linked in particular to the 
warm. ing of the atmosphere and to the deterioration of the ozone layer.... 
According to present scientific knowledge, the consequences of these phenomena 
may well jeopardize ecological systems as well as the most vital interests of 
mankind at Large. Because the problem is planet-wide in scope, solutions can only 
be devised on a global level. Because of the nature of the dangers involved, 
remedies to be sought involve not only the fundamental duty to preserve the 
ecosystem, but also the right to live in dignity in a viable global environment, and 
the consequent duty of the community of nations vis-h-vi resent and future 
generations to do all that can be done to preserve the quality olf 
Se 
atmosphere.... 
22 SM for C=Plc. Partridge (198 1) 3M Norton 0 988). 23 Th= nations include the Federal Republic of Germany. Australi3, Brazil, Canad3, Ivory CoasL Egypt, 
Spain. France, Hungary. India, Indonesia, Italy. Japan, Jordan. Kenya. Malta. Norway, New Zealand, 
Nedcrtands, Senegal. Sweden, Tunisia. Venezuela. and Zimbabwe. (United Nations 119891) 
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What is needed here are regulatory, supportive and adjustment measures that take 
into account the participation and potential contribution of countries which have 
reached different levels of development. Most of the emissions that affect the 
atmosphere at present ori&ate in the industrialized nations. And it is in these same 
nations that the room for change is greatest, and these nations are also those which 
have the greatest resources to deal with this problem effectively. Ile international 
community and especially the industrialized nations have special obligations to 
assist developing countries which will be very negatively affected by changes in the 
atmosphere although the responsibility of many of them for the process may only 
be marginal today. Financial institutions and development agencies, be they 
international or domestic, must coordinate their activities in order to promote 
sustainable development. 
Without prejudice to the international obligations of each State, the signatories 
acknowledge and will promote the following principles: 
(a) Ibc principle of developing, within the framework of the United Nations, 
new institutional authority which... shall be responsible for combating any 
further global wanning of the atmosphere and shall involve such decision 
making procedures as may be effective even if, on occasion, unanimous 
agreement has not been achieved, ... (d) The principle that countries to which decisions taken to pr9tect the 
atmosphere shall prove to be an abnormal or special burden, in view, inter 
alia, of the level of their development and actual responsibility for the 
deterioration of the atmosphere, shall receive fair and equitable assistance 
to compensate them for bearing such burden. To this end mechanisms will 
have to be developed;.... 
While this declaration specifically mentions the ozone layer, and is partially a follow-up on 
an earlier resolution made in the General Assembly (United Nations [19881), it is typical of 
the growing international resolve to address problems of an environmental nature. From 
previous sections it is clear that even rainforest conservation would not fall outside of the 
purview of this declaration. Such awareness and resolve is no longer isolated in small 
fringe environmental groups in society. 
Individual and consumer action has also become a mounting force. Individuals contribute 
almost $100 million annually to the World Wide Fund for Nature -a non-governmcntal 
organisation committed to conserving wildlife and wildlife habitat. Consumer boycotts on 
large hamburger chains in the United States are largely credited with reducing beef imports 
from Latin America (Browder [1988b]) over the past three years. Similar campaigns are 
now being mounted in Europe to respond to a shift in marketing strategy on the part of beef 
producers in Latin America. Consumer pressure is also being levelled against non- 
sustainable timber production in developing countries. Purchasers in the United Kingdom 
are being encouraged to buy temperate softwoods in place of imported tropical hardwood 
products, and they have access to a Good Wood Guide (Friends of the Earth [19881) to 
guide their shopping. 
While scope for individual expression and action has been growing, most of the large scale 
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efforts are being initiated by international organisations. In 1985, an International task 
force was convened by the World Resources Institute (WRO to address tropical forest 
development. The proceedings of that task force (WRI [19851) eventually spawned the 
"Tropical Forest Action Plan" published by the FAO. the World Bank, WRI, and the 
United Nations Development Program in 1987. It is essentially a framework for 
coordinated action in the priority areas of forest related land-uses, forest-based industrial 
development, fuelwood and energy, conservation of tropical forest ecosystems, and 
institution building. Another product of the work was the proposal (WRI [ 19881) to put 
into place an International Conservation Funding Project intended to provide funds for 
conservation projects in developing countries. 
Perhaps most of the clout, however, is being wielded by institutions such as the World 
Bank. It has more recently accepted that wildland management is an important component 
of economic development in aU countries, and in particular in LDCs where environmental 
degradation can have severe local consequences (Ledec and Goodland [19881). 
International aid agencies such as USAID. CIDA. and the ODA-UK are also starting to 
integrate environmental concerns with their economic development projects. USAID, for 
example, has a special budget allocated specifically for projects which promote biodivcrsity 
in developing countries which. in 1988, contributed $150,000 to the Korup Project in 
Camcroon. 
In summary, individuals and large organisations have taken notice that the conservation of 
tropical rainforests is something that they wish to promote. Whatever the basis for these 
sentiments, there is little dispute that actions are being taken to institute policies and 
programmes which will fulfill these wishes. 
§ 2.6 Defining the Options for Promoting Rainforest Conservation 
We have to this point described the tropical rainforest biome and the various pressures 
exerted on itý and outlined some of the potential effects of deforestation on both a local and 
global scale. This, coupled with a gmwing intemational awareness of the problem and a 
growing desire to do something about it. now brings us full circle to the very practical 
problem of whether we can do anything effective about promoting rainforest conservation. 
In this section we shall highlight the mechanisms which are available for addressing the 
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problem. Broadly speaking, the methods which have been used or suggested fall into the 
following areas: 
a) direct control or regulation; 
b) education and training; 
C) natural n=agement systems; 
d) economic incentives; and, 
C) integrated cconomic/conservation development. 
While many programmes will use combinations of strategies from these methods, we shall 
investigate them individually to highlight the salient advantages and disadvantages of each. 
First, the most fundamental option which is available to policy-makers is direct control or 
regulation. It involves direct physical intervention in a situation by legally restricting the 
activities which individuals would otherwise want to pursue. Given the inherent simplicity 
of the approach, it has often been used in developing countries where other policies seem 
ineffective. Its most immediate advantage is that it can be administered quickly. One 
disadvantage is that individuals will often feel chagrined by the regulations and thwart them 
either out of spite or out of economic incentive. For example, Western (1984) notes that in 
Amboseli National Park, Kenya, Masai deliberately killed rhinoceroses in the park to 
register their objections to being excluded from land which they regarded as rightfully 
theirs and which they traditionally required as a grazing area for their cattle. A second 
disadvantage to direct control is that some international organisations - conservation groups 
in particular24 - are reticent about giving money to projects which require massive 
disruptions to indigenous populations unless the individuals being disrupted are somehow 
themselves compensated for their losses. A fmal disadvantage to direct regulation is that 
the illegal activities (such as poaching) are often so profitable that they can corrupt local 
enforcement agents or - in the extreme - the governments which oversee them. Despite 
these disadvantages, however, some form of regulation is often unavoidable when 
establishing a national park area. 
The second strategy which is commonly touted involves education and training of local 
people. Ibis might involve the instruction of techniques of farming which are more 
conducive to rainforest conservation, or might simply involve trying to convince native 
peoples that conservation is in their own self-interest. A striking example of the latter 
involves the Chipko movement in India. (Dudley [1985]) Although traditionally there had 
been few constraints on firewood, population growth exerted pressures on fuelwood 
supplies which spawned the Chipko movement. Supporters of this cause, through 
24 The WWF. for example, will fund park planning or infrastructure but does not contribute funds to 
resettlement programs. 
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education by word-of-mouth, attempted to instill into the current generation a sense of 
moral obligation to future generations. As a practical exercise. it organised trce-planting 
sessions which, in the end, became as much a symbolic gesture of their commitment to 
their children as a more immediate fulfillment of their needs for firewood. While education 
is a useful strategy. its primary disadvantage is that the returns to it are often not realised 
immediately. In the case of rainforcst conservation, where time is of the essence and more 
immefflate remedies arc required, education can seem to be too lengthy a process. 
Ile third option involves the use of what has been variously described by Lundgren and 
Raintree (1983) and Johns (1985) as sustained management or by Leslie (1987) as natural 
management systems. Ilis approach involves using advanced techniques to increase the 
productivity of existing rainforest areas as much as tcn-fold without materially disturbing 
the environmental services of the forest. Selective logging, when done properly, falls into 
this category, as does a wide range of agroforestry systems which involve the joint 
production of wood crops with food or cash crops. Makeharn and Malcolm (1986) point 
out that practices such as agroforestry can improve the economics of growing traditional 
crops because of lower losses from pests and diseases, as well as due to higher overall 
productivity from the available soil. While the advantages of such practices are clear, the 
disadvantage is that they require significant agricultural extension programmes to support 
the training and follow-up needed to ensure success. Further, the long-term nature of the 
techniques are such that they can be applied only to non-pastoral groups: populations which 
are traditionally pastoral may not be amenable to adopting the suggestions put forward. 
7"he term 'economic incentive' is somewhat of a catchall concept which has grown in the 
literature of rainforest. n=mgemcnt to include any policy or prograrnme which uses money, 
goods or services to influence individual agents. While at the individual or national level 
the meaning is normally confined to incentives in cash, in kind or through various fiscal 
mechanisms such as those described in OECD (1989a), at the intemational level McNeely 
(1988; p. xiii) extends the term to include "... grants, loans, subsidies, debt swaps, 
food... commodities agreements, technical assistance, equipment, ... information 
[ 
and] very abstract incentives such as peer pressure and public image. " Thc advantages to 
using economic incentives are that they are well within the mandates of local governments, 
they still leave economic choices open to individual agents, and they can be implemented on 
fairly short time framcs - often through existing institutions or reforms. 
The greatest disadvantage to economic incentives is that - if one is interested in using them 
to promote conservation - knowledge is required of how individual agents will act 
in 
response to a given economic incentive. While this is not news to any applied economist, it 
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seems to have sometimes slipped the attention of planners. Section 2.3 previously noted 
that economic policies were at times responsible for accelerated deforestation. These were 
generally intended to promote some other goal; but even when the intent is to preserve the 
productivity of a given forest or habitat, economic incentives may backfire. Perrings et. al. 
(1987) note that, when droughts became more persistent, the Botswana Meat Commission 
paid farmers elevated prices for cattle in an attempt to still meet farmers' income 
expectations while allowing reduced stocking rates on and lands. While incomes were 
indeed maintained at pre-drought levels, stocking rates went up in response to the higher 
prices and accelerated degradation of grazing land ensued with an itinerant loss in diversity 
of both fauna and flora. Although this is a simple example of what might go wrong - even 
when planners do have conservation in mind - it should serve as a warning that the effect 
of any given incentive may indeed be the opposite of that which was intended. This is 
especially true given that many policies - such as those evaluated in Chapters 5 through 7 
in this thesis - are based on some rule-of-thumb which appears reasonable on the surface. 
To conclude this section we look at the idea of integrating conservation with economic 
development. It is treated separately because it can perhaps be better described as an 
approach (if not a philosophy) rather than a specific mechanism. Yet it receives significant 
attention in the current environmental planning literature as well as in the stated policies of 
lending institutions such as the World Bank and conservation organisations such as 
WWF-25 In a nutshell, it is argued that conservation and economic development should not 
be regarded a priori as conflicting goals. The premise is that, in many cases, they are in 
fact complementary: economic development initiatives will be more successful if they 
include a conservation component and, conversely, conservation efforts will be more 
successful if they include an economic development component. 
McNeely (1987) cites an example of the former: the World Bank invested $1 million to 
establish the Dumoga-Bone National Park to protect a major irrigation project in Indonesia. 
T'he project was geographically quite removed from the Park but it nonetheless relied on the 
rainforests in the park area to keep water levels in the catchment area at the required levels. 
An example of the latter is Ilailand's Khao Yai National Park. 26 The park was established 
to protect a forest area and the wildlife in it, but it was adjacent to small villages with low 
incomes, few services, and no land tenure system. Villagers persistently encroached on the 
park to poach wildlife or to farm. In 1985, a trekking program was established out of one 
village which gave preferred employment to local villagers as guides and porters at three 
25 For further discussion of these principles, the interested reader is referred to Ayensu (1987), Casey and 
Mai (1987), McNeely (1987), Pearce (1988), and Ledec and Goodland (1988). 
26Praween. Tavatchai. and Dobias (1988). 
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times the average wage for village labour. 'Tbe program was complemented by agricultural 
extension and a subsidised loan fund provided by an environmental group which 
essentially guaranteed access to the funds as long as the park habitat remained intact. The 
program, to date, has shown considerable success: Incomes have gone up, poaching has 
stopped, the farmers are reforesting areas of the park where they had previously 
encroached, and the concept is now being extended to 10 other villages along the park 
outskirts. 
In summary, of all of the mechanisms which have been identified, economic incentives are 
becoming increasingly popular tools of rainforest conservation management. If these 
incentives are applied prudently, they may indeed be effective in conserving some 
rainforest. 
2.7 Summary 
A pervasive theme throughout the literature dealing with tropical rainforests, is that the 
tropical rainforest biome is a complex organism. Although some progress has been made 
in understanding its interactions with the rest of the world, our knowledge is still relatively 
limited about how humanity influences rainforcsts, how rainforcsts influence humanity. 
and how we can possibly optimise its development for the benefit of humankind. Despite 
the complexity of the interactions between the rainforest and the rest of the biosphere, there 
has developed a growing awareness that there may be benefits to conserving rainforests 
beyond those normally taken into account by those responsible for deforestation. Whatever 
the impetus behind this awareness, it is clear that steps are being taken to promote tropical 
rainforest conservation. 
Ile mechanisms for promoting conservation are likely to be as complex as the problem 
itself; but it is becoming increasingly clear that economic policies will be a part of the 
overall strategy. One reason for this is the premise that such economic policies are well 
within the mandate of local governments, and are somehow more desirable and effective 
than are strategies involving direct control and regulation. A second reason for relying on 
economic policies involves the critically short time scales involved: while education and the 
implementation of natural management systems arc important elements in conservation 
promotion, their effectiveness is measured over generations, whereas the response to 
economic incentives is more immediate. A final reason for placing the onus on economic 
policies is not necessarily flattering to the economics profession: poor economic policies in 
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the past have been blamed for much of the current deforestation and, if they had such a 
calamitous effect when they were improperly applied, one might presume that they can act 
as an equally powerful lever in promoting conservation if they are properly applied. It is 
thus incumbent upon economists to select policies prudently. This theme serves as an 
appropriate introduction to the following chapter, wherein we investigate what guidance 
economic theory can provide in the identification of appropriate policies and strategies. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ECONOMIC THEORY AND RAINFORESTS 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter illustrated that economic policies are becoming Increasingly relied 
upon as a mechanism to promote minforcst conservation. Because of time and information 
constraints, planners often rely on economic ruics-of-thumb to guide their strategies. For 
example, simple policies such as kerosene subsidies might seem relatively innocuous and, 
in addition, appear to promote conservation by discouraging fuclwood gathering. But the 
relevant tests are not only the theory on which these rules-of-thumb are based, but also the 
empirical evidence of what happens when the policies arc actually implemented. Theories 
must constandy be revised in the fight of new evidence and, appropriately, rules-of-thumb 
should also be adjusted in the wake of new evidence. But before evaluating any specific 
policies, it is useful to review what general contributions economic theory might make to 
rainforest. managemen 
In reviewing some of the applicable theory, this chapter first outlines in Section 3.2 the 
contribution which natural resource economics might make to how we dcrinc and attack the 
rainforest problem. Some central issues in natural resource economics arc treated in light 
of the technical issues discussed in Chapter 2. As many of the problems raised deal with 
environmental concerns, Section 3.3 reviews the major issues which arise in the 
environmental economics literature. Third, as noted in Chapter 2, much of the intrinsic 
value in tropical minforests supposedly relates to as yet undiscovered products which are of 
value as genetic material in the agricultural or pharmaceutical industries. Issues discussed 
in this context are not dissimilar to those addressed in the literature dealing with research, 
development and invention, hence that is covered in Section 3.4. Fourth, Section 3.5 
addresses some of the lessons which can be applied from the cconon-dcs of contract theory, 
especially as it relates to devising policies involving 'agreements' between developed 
countries and LDCs. In all of these cases it should be noted that, in the interests of brevity, 
I shall primarily be presenting intuitive arguments for the results, making reference to the 
fomW proofs which occur in the literature. 
Ile concluding sections of the chapter provide a conceptual framework for evaluating 
policies which are intended to promote conservation. In particular, it is argued that, in 
addition to some of the generalisations which can be made from the economic theory, it is 
useful to adopt an analytical structure which allows studies on a case by case basis. The 
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central idea is that - although we may want to promote conservation - identifying 
appropriate reforms relies on knowing who will be affected by such reforms and, 
ultimately, what their reaction will be to the reforms. To this end, Section 3.6 introduces a 
two-ticr evaluation process for policy design which parallels the two levels - international 
and domestic - of policy intervention. Finally, Section 3.7 highlights the main points in 
the chapter and introduces Chapters 4 through 7 which deal with individual empirical 
problems. 
It should be noted that one relevant area of the literature is welfare economics, and many of 
the issues discussed in this chapter - such as public goods, externalities, and the 
measurement of benefits - rely extensively on this literature. Applications of welfare 
economics are also found, however, in cost-benefit analysis, and conservation projects are 
increasingly being subjected to social cost-benefit analyses which attempt to define and 
estimate all of the values associated with the environmental services provided by 
rainforests. If undertaken properly, such analyses can provide useful contributions to 
identifying beneficial projects and policy reforms. Rather than including the discussion of 
cost-benefit analysis in this chapter, however, I shall defer it to the following chapter. In 
Chapter 4, some of the applicable theory of welfare economics and the evaluation of policy 
reforms is treated more rigourously as an introduction to selected empirical work involving 
a cost-benefit analysis of the Korup Project. 
3.2 Rainforests and Natural Resource Economics 
Although there is a vast literature dealing with natural resource economics, I little of it 
specifically addresses the problem of rainforest conservation or management. While this 
may seem unusual given that tropical rainforests are natural resources, one of the 
challenges lies in selecting whether the rainforest should be treated as a renewable or a non- 
renewable resource. To explore the implications of each in the context of the literature, I 
shall look at the following issues: 
a) 'mining' vs 'harvesting' tropical forests; 
b) 'population models'of tropical forests; and, 
C) the role of open access on deforestation. 
Natural resource economics is generally disaggregated into non-renewable resources and 
renewable resources. Non-renewable resources include those which are available in a fixed 
I For an overview see Herfindahl and Knecse (1974). Dasgupta and Heal (1974,1979), Dasgupta (1982), or 
Heaps and Helhwell (1987). 
Fronmic Theory A RalAftiresit 
__ 
69 
amount which, once depleted, are gone. Renewable resources are those which either grow 
or, if harvested, regenerate themselves to some degree. Non-renewable resources norrimlly 
involve inanimate resources such as oil, gas, or minerals. whereas renewable resources 
include biological rcsourccs. 2 The discipline of natural resource economics primarily 
addresses the quesdon of how such natuml rcsourccs can be developed opdrnally. 
71e essential results of non-renewable resource depiction were first derived by Ilotelling 
(1931). They say simply that an operator will organisc his production plan such that the 
discounted marginal profits are the same at all points in time. If this were not the case, 
production could be shifted away from a period of low discounted marginal profit to 
improve the overall profitability of the extraction plan. While formal proofs of this are 
relatively standardý the important implication is that if it is expected that the value of a 
resource will go up at a rate faster than the discount rate, then it pays to hold on to it, 
whereas if the value is expected to increase at a rate less than the discount rate, it should be 
consumed inunediatcly. T'his result is also not unfamiliar in capital theory, and can be 
readily extended to renewable resource economics. In the case of a natural resource which 
grows or regenerates, the extraction plan is simply adjusted to reflect the physical rate of 
growth in the stock of the resource: here the rule would be to leave the asset alone if the 
sum of the rate of appreciation in its per unit net value and the rate of physical growth are 
greater than the discount rate. It also results in the well-known conclusion (see, for 
example Clark [ 19761 or Johansson and Lbfgmn [ 1985)1) that the optimal strategy for a 
slow-growing forest is to clear-cut it immediately and replant it with a faster growing asset. 
Tlere is, however, considerable difficulty in characterising tropical rainforests as either 
renewable or non-renewable. If it is renewable, then harvesting models can be applied to 
determine the optimal rate of annual harvesting. If. on the other hand, we assert that it is a 
non-renewable resource then we must approach the problem from the point of view that the 
rainforest is esscndBy a mine-- For any individual rainforest, this will normally imply that 
we either completely clear-cut it or leave it standing. As was intimated in Chapter 2, 
however, environmental and botanical science suggests that the rainforcst unit should be 
treated as a single complex organisnL Because of the great age of the forests, little is 
known of its regenerative capacity over long time periods. What is known is that a clear- 
cut forest arta can often not be reforested because soil conditions under such circumstances 
2 It is also useful to make the distinction between Ostockso and 'flows". Sunlight and wind, for example. 
are often mfcrrtd to as "rcneu-able" to the extent that they keep recurring and consumption in one period 
does not preclude consumption in another period. In this context, natural resource economics has little to 
say about the flows of such services. with the exception that they be used In any given period in that 
a 
3pplication 
which nuximises net benefits. 
See Knc= and S%%=cy (1985) or Scott (1967). Also. see Lecombcr (1979) for a derivation using the 
optimal control approach. 
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Figure li 
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will not support the same level of life. The 'optimal rotation problerrý - on which much of 
the temperate forestry literature concentrates - is not an appropriate model for the tropical 
rainforem 
If we choose to treat the forest as a single organism, it is perhaps easiest to characterise the 
forest in a typical population model. A useful technical model is shown in Figure 3.1. It is 
commonly used in modelling biological populations, and has been used most extensively in 
fisheries (Clark [1976]). The simple form of these types of models shows population 
growth rate dY, /dt as a function of stock X. 
The first model - Figure 3.1a - illustrates a case where a population will grow 
asymptotically to a maximum stock size of 7. There are two characteristics of interest in 
this model. First, the population size is self-limiting because of some external constraints 
on the system: often food or habitat availability. In the biological literature, this 
characteristic is known as 'compensatiorf. Second, a process of 'dcpcnsation' occurs at 
low stocking rates. 11is reflects the fact that populations often exhibit low initial growth 
due to higher vulnerability to predation or lower breeding opportunities for sparsely 
distributed species: here, it generates an inflection in the growth function. In the model, a 
population can be maintained at any given size X in perpetuity by choosing a harvesting rate 
h equal to the growth rate at that stock size. The'maximum sustainable yield (MSY) is 
said to occur at a population size at which dX/dt is at a maximum. Depending on the nature 
of the harvesting cost function, optimal sustainable economic equilibria can be generated 
anywhere on this function. The practical side of fisheries economics is thus concerned 
with discovering what the growth function looks like, choosing an optimal harvesting 
strategy, and then finding policies which achieve this strategy. 
xc x 
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Although the above model Is often used, Figure 3.1b is often asserted to be a mort realistic 
depiction of certain types of populations. It is characteriscd by a process referred to as 
'critical dcpcnsadon': once the population falls below a critical size Xc, it will eventually 
become extinct because its natural growth path actually experiences an annual decline. For 
wildlife resources this may arise due to minimum stocks necessary for breeding to occur 
viably, or due to increased vulnerability to natural fluctuations in the environment. In the 
case of tropical rainforests, the model in Figure 3.1 b would appear to reflect three of the 
salient features often encountered in the technical literature. First, it reflects that old-agc 
primary forests appear to be extremely stable in their virgin state: charactcrised by the 
equilibrium populadon Y. Second. it captures the idea that some form of harvesting of the 
rainforcst would be sustainable (between xc and Y). Finally, in the area of critical 
depensation, it shows that if the rainforcst is ovcr-harvcstcd it will be incapable of 
regeneration and will continue to decline in quality even if harvesting is halted. 
Although an 'organic' model with critical dcpensation may be the simplest conceptual 
model which we can devise of the rainforcst, the most significant problem which we 
encounter is that our understanding of tropical rainforcst interactions and dynamics is 
inadequate to provide a basis for devising optimal harvesting strategies. How, for 
example, does one measure X? Is it cubic metrcs of wood, tonnes of biomass, numbers of 
species, area of rainforcst, or some index incorporating all of these? And even if we rind a 
useful definition, the task is then one of estimating the growth function. Knowing an 
approximate value of Xc would be a good start. but even that has not been estimated with 
our current knowledge and resources. In shortý although natural resource economics might 
have some specific prescriptions to offer if we can provide such information, we are, in 
practice, far short of describing the technical relationships which exist in the rainforest. 
One pervasive theme in the natural resource cqonomics literature is that dealing with 
intergenerational. equity and the selection of optimal extraction strategies. It is largely 
independent of the type of model used and has usually centred. around the discount rates 
used for evaluating such strategies. While I shall not summarise the vast literature relating 
to discount rates here4, and while them is by no means a unanimity of opinion on how to 
treat intergenerational equity, a common conclusion is that 'social discount rates' (which 
would be used by society as a whole) are less thanprivate discount rates' (which would be 
used by private agents). 5 If one accepts this, then under many natural resource models, 
4 See Fisher (1989). Spash and d'Arge (1989). Mukandya and Pearce (1988) for recent discussions of 
discount rates which also include reference to environmental issues. 
Perhaps one of ft more relevant rationales for arguing that social rates are less am private rates is that 
provided by Marglin (1963). He noted that the wclf= of future generations is a public good to members of 
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resource depletion under private development generally happens more quickly than is 
socially optimal. 
A second general result arising from the natural resource literature is the role of open access 
in resource exploitation. Whether in the case of n-dned resources (McKie and McDonald 
[19621), fisheries (Gordon [1954)), or other biological resources (Clark [1976]), 
unregulated open access will generally yield rates of exploitation in excess of those which 
would occur optimally. This result normally arises because of two factors. First, when 
profits or 'rents' exist in any time period, more agents will enter the market to attempt to 
extract some of this rent. Second, even if others are barred from entering the activity, those 
already engaged in the activity have an incentive to try to capture more rent, even though 
this will decrease the total rent available in the future. In extreme cases, Berck (1979) notes 
that open access - with each agent behaving rationally - can readily lead to complete 
extinction of species. Generally the only cases in which open access has riot resulted in 
over-harvesting are those where implicit or explicit contracts have been struck among 
participants. Such cases can arise through peer pressure, or simply where everyone 
behaves in a manner which attempts to maximise the welfare pf the collective. 6 
3.3 Rainforests and Environmental Economics 
3.3.1 Inn-oduction 
Because the term 'environment! can be defined to include almost anything, environmental 
economics potentially covers many areas of study. 7 In practice, however, the discipline 
has concentrated on studying the interactions between natural environments and economic 
activities. As such, environmental economics has much in common with the overall field 
of natural resource economics; natural environments, and the manner in which they can be 
used optimally, can be addressed using tools developed in the area of natural resource 
economics. Nonetheless, there are a number of particular problems which have been 
addressed to a greater extent in the environmental economics literature, and it is thus 
the present generation and that. on conventional efficiency (rather than equity) grounds, the present society 
as a whole would want to invest more than the aggregate of investments made by its individual members 
acting independently. 
6 For examples, see Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop (1975), Livingstone (1986). or Runge (1986). 
7 Indeed, there are some colossally vague definitions of environment, such as "... the components of the 
Earth and includes (a) air. land and water, (b) all layers of the atmosphere, (c) all organic and inorganic 
matter and living organisms, and (d) the interacting natural systems that include components referred to in 
paragraphs (a) to (c);... ". While this def inition might appear to be so all-encompassing that it is without 
practical application, it is, in fact, that given by the Government of Canada (1988; Article 3[11) in the 
Canadian Environmental Protection Act which allows Federal Government interventions in any activity if 
environmental integrity is at stake. 
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appropriate to highlight some of the salient contributions which can be made by this 
literature. 8 Appropriately, I shall review each of the following areas In turn: 
a) externalities and public goods; 
b) unccrtaintr. 
C) sustainable development; 
d) bldng the physical environment and the economy; and, 
e) estimation of benefits. 
3.3.2 Extemalities and Public Goods 
Although the theory of externalities and public goods applies to more than just problems of 
an environmental nature, many of the situations involved with evaluating environmental 
goods are virtually textbook cases of the theory of public goods. Before proceeding, 
however, it is useful to clarify the concepts of "wernaUties" and "public goods". 
In the theory of welfare economicsý economic agents interact through their effect on prices, 
and an externality occurs when one person's actions affect the environment or well-being 
of others other than by affecting prices. Externalities can in some cases be treated or 
'intcmalised' by various mechanisms (such as taxes or the assignation of property rights) 
but. where unmted externalities arise, production and distribution is inefficient; goods 
having positive externalities will tend to be undcr-consumed or undcr-produced whereas 
those creating negative externalities will tend to be over-consumed or ovcr-produced by 
private agents. In the case of tropical deforestation. for example, an cxtcmality arises 
becausc the damage inflicted on the world as a whole is not normally considered by those 
di=dy responsible for the deforestation. 
The principal characteristic of a public good is that its general availability is not decreased 
as it is consumed or as it is used as an intermediate input into a production process. 
Samuelson (1954; 1955) described public goods as those for which "one man's 
consumption does not reduce some other man's consumption. " Because of the nature of 
public goods, they are often regarded as a special case of externalities: if I choose to 
'consume one unit of national defense then everyone else. whether they like it or not, will 
consume that same unit of defense. Cean air is another example of a public good. 
Although the theory of public goods has developed significantly over the past thirty Ycam 
8 Useful texts on the topic of environmental economics we Dorfman and Dorfman (1977) and Pearce and 
Turner (1990). Mpta I of Pe= and Turner (1990) also gives an excellent review of the history Of the 
discipline of 'environmental oconomicL' Krabbe (1989) provides a thoughtful essay on what he regards as 
the nascent field of 'environmental %%vlf= economics!. 
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(see Oakland [19871 for a review), the lessons derived from the basic model apply quite 
well to typical environmental problems - including that of rainforest exploitation. Ile 
essential nature of a public good is that, for all individuals, we have: 
xi :5X, foralli, ... (3.1); 
where xj represents the consumption of the good by individual i and X represents total 
production. This is in sharp contrast to a pure private good, for which we are constrained 
by: 
xi :5X ... (3.2). 
It is clear that in the case of a public good, the amount available to any individual is not 
constrained by the amount consumed by others. Ile strict inequality in Equation (3-1) 
applies only if there is some exclusion possible, but, in general, it is possible for strict 
equality to hold over all individuals. Under these circumstances Samuelson (1955) 
demonstrated that, to achieve a first-base state, the aggregated marginal benefits of the 
public good should equal the marginal cost of supplying the good. This is in sharp contrast 
to the case for efficient production and distribution of a private good, for which the 
marginal cost of production will be equal to the marginal benefit to a single consumer and 
that, moreover. the marginal benefit to each consumer will be identical. Ile upshot of this 
is that, while prices will both allocate and pay for the production of a private good, the use 
of prices in public good provision will generally suboptimally exclude consumption of a 
good for some individuals. It is readily seen that, if for some individual xj<X, then 
welfare can be improved cosdcssly by increasing xi by some small amount Axi. In other 
words, the appropriate pricing rule is that the public good should be free at the margin. 
711is raises two problems for the general provision of public goods: i) how to finance their 
supply, and ii) how to determine the optimal level of production when there is no obvious 
mechanism (such as prices) available to determine how much individuals would be willing 
to pay for them. The first problem is usually resolved by assigning the function of their 
production to some public authority or, alternately, to a private authority which is regulated 
or induced to supply the optimal quantities. The second problem is usually addressed by 
some combination of polling peoples! preferences, measuring revealed preferences, or 
reacting to voting behaviour. In practice, however, solving either of these problems 
successfully is far fmm trivial. 
An important exception to this is where mechanisms are introduced which allow a lindahl 
equilibrium' to arise (see Johansen [19631). In this model, individuals are in principle 
taxed whatever price the service is worth to them at the margin. As it is often difficult to 
obtain a truthful revelation of preferences, however, one practical alternative is to attempt to 
achieve a'subscription equilibriuiW, whereby individuals are given the opportunity to pay 
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whatever price they believe a service is worth. A typical example of this is public 
broadcasting financed through private subscription, but it might be asserted that rainforest 
conservation groups funded by private donations play a similar role. But even under such 
mechanisms, "frec-ridcr" problems might arise. 
Mie incidence of fmc-riders is a chronic problem in the provision of public goods. It arises 
because any single individual will not generally rind that their payment for the good will 
materially affect the amount of the good provided. Since they know that they can not be 
excluded from reaping the benefits of any public good, the rational individual will attempt 
to "free-ride" at the expense of those individuals who do pay for it. 9 Because of this free- 
rider effect, there is often a tendency to under-produce the amount of any public good. A 
corollary to this deals with public "bads" such as pollution: where individual contributions 
are relied on to pay for pollution c1can-up, there is a tendency for pollution to occur at 
greater than optinW levels. 
We can now distinguish between two separate issues relating to deforestation by drawing 
attention to the following generalisations. 
Issue I. Physical consumption of rainforests at rate h affects the flow of 
environmcntal services e from the rainforcst, and this creates an 
externality as those responsible for its consumption do not 
consider the effects of changes in e on others. 
Issue II. The flow of environmental services e is a public good. 
Issue I deals with the effects of physical production from the forest on the well-being of 
individuals other than those strictly responsible for the deforestation. As the environmental 
services are not priced, an externality is generated and - as most of the externalities can be 
regarded as negative because an increase in h reduces e which in turn reduces the well- 
being of others - the consumption of rainforcst is greater than the optimal amount. It is 
important to note that this result is independent of whether e is a private or a public good. 
With respect to Issue II, it is useful to define how certain aspects of the benerits from 
tropical rainforests. can be regardcd as public goods. First, the consumption of certain 
environmental services (such as weather control, information) by one individual does not 
9 There is a very practical dilemma in getting individuals to reveal their preferences for a public good. If 
you ask someone what something is worth to them and then require them to pay that amount. there is an 
incentive for them to understate the value and frce-ride on others. In that case the good is provided but at a 
suboptimal level. It you ask someone what something is worth to them and then do not require them to 
pay (or pay some nominal amount which is independent of their answer), there is an incentive for them to 
overstate the value to ensure that the good will in fact be supplied. In that case the good will be provided at 
more than optimal levels and, often, its provision is not self-financing. 
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restrict the consumption of those services by others. Second, it would seem quite 
Implausible to exclude individuals from consuming the services once they have been made 
available. As a public good. we know that there is a tendency for individuals to frec-ridc 
and for a suboptirnal tunount of the service to be provided. It is again important to n(xc that 
Wr result Is Independent of Issue 1. 
In summary. therefore, the major gencralisation which arises from the theory of 
externalities and public goods is that - to the extent that those responsible for consuming 
the TRIT do not normally consider the effects of deforestation on the rest of the world, and 
to the extent that the environmental services from standing rainforests are public goods - an 
excessive amount of Wortstation %ill occur. 
3.3.3 Uaccrtainly 
Tbc second major connibudon which can be made by environmcnw economics deals %ith 
uncertainty. Whereas Chapter 2 discussed the nature of this uncertainty and how it might 
generate some type of option value, the actual implicadons of this on opfimal development 
are explored here. 
Some of the earlier literature dealing with uncertainty formaliscd its notational treatment by 
regarding each possible state of nature to be a diffcrcnt attribute of a given conunodity 
(Debreu [19591). Subsequent literature investigated the implications of uncertainty on 
optimal Investment decisiom and in two notable cases it was shown that the treatment of 
uncertainty by the'collective was rightfully different than that of individuals. Samuelson 
(1964) argued that, through what can be described as'risk-pooling- where individuals 
can pool risks by ccxnbining many risky projects - the collective %%ifl be apparently less risk 
averse than any one individual and, will, in aggregate invest more in the currcnt pcriod. 10 
7be same conclusion - that society should invest more than individuals - %%-as arrived at in 
a celebrated article by Arrow and Lind (1970) which argued that uncertainty could be 
ignored under certain conditions. 71ey proved that, in evaluating public projects, 
Individual risk premiums (reflected In private discount rates) vanished In the limit and 
random variables could be replaced by their expected values if private and public risks %%= 
uncorrelated and if the public risks were absorbed by a large number of individual agents. 
This 'risk-spreading' assertion by Affow-Lind resulted in a substantial amount of 
10 In the literature dcaling wiLh discount mtes this is also UkCn as an Ugumcnt for using social discount 
f3WI 'A hkh VC lower L%AA Pcivate discount rates 
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theoretical debate on the nature and effects of uncertainty in the economics literature in 
gcnerallt and the environmental economics literature In particular. In much of the 
discussion of opdon values. and especially in articles by Schmalcnsce (1972), Fisher 
(1973) and Smith (1987). the Arrow-Lind hypothesis is attacked and shown to be of 
firnited validity when an option demand exists for a service or a good. It Is further argued 
by Arrow and Fisher (1974) and, more recently, by Viscusl (1988), that when investment 
is irreversible or when it has environmental effects which arc Irreversible. optimal 
investment decisions would involve less investment than might otherwise occur in the 
absence of such irreversibility. 
Bishop (1978). however, asserts that typical optimisation procedures are not helpful in 
practice and that - where the possibility of extinction arises - development should be at 
levels which set a safe minimum standard for populations and that no amount of 
development should be pursued if these standards might be breached. It is not obvious, 
however. that such standards will necessarily lead to less investment or less resource 
depiction than would an invocation of the optimisation procedures. if. for example, we 
consider the organic population model in Figure 3. Ib with critical depensation, one would 
presumably set the safe minimum standard at a population level Xc. One mýight well 
imagine that, if the expected growth function were known, optimisation procedures would 
under some circumstances generate results which allowed population levels to exceed Xc- 
In short, while the generalisations provide useful insights, they provide little guidance as to 
the actual levels of investrnent which are optimal other than, as noted by Fisher (1989; P. 
86). "to go slow". 
3.3.4 Sustainable DcN-clM=nt 
It is worthwhile to review in somewhat more detail how the environmental economics 
literature treats the concept of sustainable dc%, clopmenL While it was discussed briefly as a 
policy option in Section 2.6. the literature also argues that there is some theoretical basis for 
promoting sustainable development as an appropriate objective in and of Itself. 
Unfortunately. the term 'sustainable devclopmcnf is quite vague and it has often been used 
loosely. Only recently have some authors attempted to make the concept of sustainable 
development tractable by concentrating on the (perhaps equally vague) concepts of 
economic growth and environmental integrity. 
Ilere are essentially two contexts in which the tenn "sustainable" am found. The first 
" Sector cxsmplc llcmy(1974a; 1974b). Schm3Jenwc(1976) and S3ndmo(1972). 
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definition is Wily broad, to the extent that it gcncmHy applies to sustainable development of 
society or, Indeed, of the planet, as a whole. The broad definition for sustainable 
development Is exemplified by that of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (1987; p. 43) as "development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs". Ile second is a 
fairly specific definition - Introduced earlier in the natural resource economics literature - 
relating to a distinct rcric%ibic resource base. The specific dcrinition is that development is 
sustainable as long as the rate of harvesting does not exceed the long term growth rate. 
While the two apply to quite separate issues of resource management, many use the broad 
definition for asserting that we must harvest our renewable resources 'sustainably'. 
One of the earlier positions, perhaps most strongly identified with Daly (1980; 1987a; 
1987b), argues essentially that the traditional preoccupation with 'growth' is ill-founded 
because, ultimately, we shall run into various binding resource constraints for which there 
arc no substitutes yet which are necessary for our continued economic wcll-bcing. 12 In 
this argument, the nco-classical model with substitutable inputs is not valid and must be 
modified to account for some necessary and non-rcproduccable inputs. Daly essentially 
argues that although this does not preclude economic growth, such growth can only be 
achieved through increased efficiency with respect to the non-reproduceable inputs and that 
optimal management dictates that these inputs should be developed on a sustainable basis 
only. Whfle standard growth theory does deal with such cases, the sentiment is well taken: 
we should not forget that some non-rcproduccable inputs have no substitutes and pay close 
attendon to their exploitadon. 
Even though many wem to construe sustainable development as maintaining environmental 
Integrity. even this leaves scope for debate. While it might be analytically useful to regard 
environmental integrity, say T. as a constraint to any development decision13 (i. e., that we 
will choose a policy reform do) only if dTjdo)ZtO), we are then still faced with the problem 
of how to measure I,. In overcoming this, practical considerations often seem to suggest 
that one working rule is to require that individual assets be harvcsted'sustainably', thus 
returning us to the specific definition of sustaimbility. 
Although spccific resource sustainability is then often further interpreted (Daly [19801, 
Wyatt-Smith 11987a-, 1987b), Leslie [19871) as its maximum sustainable yield (MSY), 
natural resource theory might dictate driving stocks to a lower level and - perhaps 
sustainably - continue exploiting the existing stocks at lower levels. While sustainable 
12 This posi6on is also cloqucndy expressed in the natural resource economics literature by Boulding 
1198M and Gcorgescu-Roegcn (1971). 3 See Pearce, natbic: and Markantlya (1989) and Pcwm NLukandya and Barbier (1989). 
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development is often Intended to mean NISY, It is equally conceivable that exploitation 
occurs on a sustainable basis at rates of less than the NISY. Suppose, for example, (and 
assuming that Fig= 3.1 represents the growth function of the resource) the stock size In 
the current period is smaller than (to the left on that which would be required to harvest at 
the NISY. Presumably. one could then harvest at the growth rate In perpetuity. or harvest 
at less than the sustainable growth rates and allow stocks to grow to the point where the 
MSY would be achieved, and then harvest at the NISY in pcrpctuity. 
In short, while sustainable development is widely professed. in many respects. It is largely 
tautological: sustainable development is a good idea if one believes that It is a priori a 
necessary condition for our survival. Perh3pS one of the most useful contributions of the 
sustainable development rnovemcnt his been that it is sufficiently vague that it has allowed 
many to intcrpmt it as an cxcuse for promoting enviromncnial intcgrity. 
On a related note. one of the contributions which the literature makes arises from an 
observation by Pearce and Tumer (1990) that economic growth and environmental integrity 
are not necessarily substitutes. They assert, in fact, that at low incon-4 levels in developing 
economics the two are actuaUy complementary: better environmental integrity allows higher 
incomes and vice versa. In richcrdcvcloped countries, bcttercnvironmcntal Integrity can 
only be achieved by sacrificing some income, and increases in income will require 
sacrificing environmental integrity. While specific examples of projects can no doubt be 
found to support or refute this hypothesis, it will be interesting to see how the hypothesis 
holds up as empirical work is conducted. If it turns out to be correct, then we again rind 
support foc promoting consemation in devcloping countrics. 
3.3.5 Linking the Physical EnNironment and the Economy. 
IMe environmental economics literature has provided some important means by which to 
characterise the link3ges between the natural environment and the economy. In defining 
such interactions. there are essentially two broad approaches which dominate in the 
literature. 7be literature in economics has a somewhat different approach from that in the 
area of the ecological sciences-, yet the two approaches are complementary and can be 
merged to develop a framework for evaluating policy rtforms. 
'ne ecological lit=t= concentrates on defining the technical interactions between various 
'cnvironmental functions' and 'environmental stocks'. In defining linkages between the 
economy and the environment, the economic literature concentrates on accounting for the 
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demands of final and lntcn-ncdiate consumption of environmental goods and services. At 
this stage. It Is useful to distinguish more clearly between stocks and flows, hence we shall 
denote environmental stocks by E and flows of environmental services by c. In addition, 
we shall distinguish direct harvesting of the resource stock as h. The services C can 
normally (but not necessarily) be charactcriscd as public goods, and the direct harvest h is 
often (though not necessarily) tradeable output for which exclusion is possible. 
Strictly speaking, one might regard the natural environment as a complex dynamic 
interaction of environmental flows and stocks, but the ecological literature dealing with 
rainforcsts has concentrated on characterising the various functions (goods and services) 
provided by standing rainforcst. Formally, they concentrate on the relationship C=C(E). 
This is the position taken by Farmworth (1994), Margules (1986), and de Groot (1987, 
1988a, 1988b), and most of this literature is descriptive in nature: attempting to highhght 
the various functions provided by natural environments. Unfortunately, the term'functi& 
In the ecological literature Is used rather freely: it is used both for goods and services, and 
does not normally distinguish between the consumption of flows and stocks. Nonetheless, 
the catcgorisadon of the various 'functions! does provide a basis for disaggregating various 
stocks and flows Into environmental accounting structures often adopted by environmental 
economists. 
A synopsis of relevant environmental functions pertaining to tropical Minforests - typical Of 
that found in the ecological fiterature: - is provided in Table 3.1. Here a distinction is made 
between regulatory, carrier, production, and information functions of the rainforest. 
Regulatory and information functions are normally passive in nature and involve no 
physical consumption. By contrast. uses involving physical harvesting are identified by 
production functions (referring to direct utilisation of rainforcst products). Finally. carrier 
functions refer rather loosely to some cicnient of the stock of the rainforest which provides 
sonic implicit flow of services. Using our nomenclature, the production functions would 
nonmfly be included in h and the others would be included in e. 
Much of the economic literature of modelling the linkages uses a simple input-output (1-0) 
approach to defining the interactions between the economy and the environment. Ltondef 
(1970) and Lee (1982) incorporate environmental goods into a constant returns to scale 1-0 
model of an economy. lie materials balance approach adopted by Knccsc, Ayers and 
D'Arge (1970) Is also essentially an 1-0 model. In addition, the 'environmental 
accounting' literature which deals with Integrating environmental quality into national 
accounting systems also essentially falls into the class of 1.0 models. 14 
14 A rment survey of this ficld is found in the compendium edited by Ahnud, Scrafy. and Lutz (1989). The 
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Table 3.1 
Examples Of Environrmntal Functions of Rainforcsts 
Rtgulatory Functions 
Climate RegulaLion 
WatersW Pmtection & Water Catchmcrd 
Erosion Prcvcnfion & Soil Protection 
Storage & Rw)vhng of Human Waste 
Pollutanu 
Suxngc & Tmnsformation of Solar Ewgy 
Ntaintcriarice of Biodi%usity 
Biological Control 
Provision of Migration Habitat 
Carder Funclions 
IlabiLat for IndiScnous "It 
Culdvation Ares 
Dam Sites 
Rocrea6on Site% 
Nature Conwn-adon Areas 
Production Functions 
Tunbcr 
Od= Wood Products 
Non-wood Forest Products 
Gerwtic Resources 
Information Functions 
SpiriuW Religious Infomation 
CulturaJ Artistic Inspirafion 
Educational. llistaricaJ & Sciendfic Inforrnation 
PotcntW InforTn3tion 
Source: Based on de Groot (1987: 1988a) and McNeelv(1988). 
Depending upon the purpose, the usual approach is to model one of two different 
structures. 7bc first approach is applicable when one is interested in knowing the 
consumption of some environmental good (such as water) or service (such as degree-days 
of weather). A typical structure would look sormthing like: 
L%Tvr 
XI X2 hc 
ounvr xI all : 112 bl cl 
X2 
1 
a2l a22 b2 C2 
... (3.3). 
Ile second approach concentrates on the production of some good (such as pollution) and 
is characterised by the follo%%ing smxture: 
L%qIVT 
XI x2 
OUT" x1 all a12 
x2 321 
1 
-122 
c di d2 
Tic two approaches are readily combined to reflect, for example, processes which both 
consurne and produce environmental goods (one could, for cx=plc, designate clean water 
as an input and dirty water as an output). The primary advantage of such approaches is that 
impetus behind this work is that rutional =ount diu. and associsttd calculations for GNP or NNP. 
provide no mea=v of environmental quality or resotm intc; rity. The adoption of environmental accounts 
- %% hich are finked as satellite accounts to 0-4 S)vcm of NitionA Accounts - Is meant to Mpresent the 
first 
sWp towards Mikicting enviionnwrital value in nw, ýXW inCOM OCCOunting- 
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It Is possible to determine the total environmental impacts of any change in economic 
activity and, where environmental goDds or services arc limited, explicit constraints can be 
specified. For example, a resource constraint on the first model can be characterised as 
(cjXj): 5. Ej for all I where X is the gross production vector and Et is the total flow of 
environmental service available In any given period if c is a 'public" good. For the 
tradeable harvested goods for which complete exclusion is possible, the applicable 
constraint would be UbXj)-: 6j. where fig Is the maximum harvcsL Constraints on the 
production of environnic ntal 'bads' can be rnade in a like fashion. 
While this topic provides no Implicadons for policies. it provides a useful framework for 
formalising some of the connections between the economy and the environment. In 
particular, it focuses our attendon on the specificaflon or identification of specific goods or 
services provided by rainforests. 
3.3.6 Esdmation of Bencrits 
Ile literature in environmental economics provides important practical approaches to 
estimating the bencrits of conservation, while also providing some interesting insights into 
the theory of valuation. 
First. the literature is rich with examples of the measurement of environmcntal benefits. As 
public goods, frcc-ridcr problems normally prevent researchers from simply asking 
individuals what they feel a particular environmental good or service is worth to them. 
Although such informadon about individuals' dcmand curves is critical to determining the 
optimal amount which should be provided of any good or service, there arc strong 
incentives for Individuals to understate their preferences. Much of the literature has thus 
been occupied with using means other than direct poUing to estimate demand curves. 
Where services have some spatial component, for example. individuals' preferences may 
be revealed by noting where individuals locate in relation to various levels of services. 
This mechanism, associated with Ticbout (1956), normally has limited practical 
applicability because of some very restrictive assumptions. 15 A more promising approach 
Is to estimate the demand for environmental goods or services by observing individual 
demand for related private goods or services. In the deniand for national parks, for 
example. this might involve analysing expenditures on traded substitutes (such as private 
15 Noubly, it requires some restrictions on individual mobility and requires further that there be a large 
number of communities available for Cach tastc CWL For aW discussion of ft TiCbOut model, the Mader 
is rcfcrred to Rubinfeld (19M 
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theme parks) or - using more complex technIquesI6 - on complements (such as camping 
equipment). 
Finally, where no privately traded related services exist, a relatively simple means of 
estimating the value of an environmental service may be to estimate the costs of providing 
the comparable service duough man-made mechanisms. In the casc of the potential genetic 
benefits provided by rainforcsts to the pharmaceutical industry, for example, it may bc 
more appropriate to attempt to estimate the amount of laboratory research effort that is 
saved by having access to the rainforest products than to measure the amount that society 
would be wiffing to pay for the bctier level of health. 17 
In addition to the practical aspects of measuring benefits. the literature provides an 
interesting forum for addressing the appropriateness of various measures of consumer 
surplus. The discussion has concentrated on two measures: willingness to pay (WTP) and 
willingness to accept (WrA). Inc NVTA measure provides an indication of how much 
income compensation individuals would accept for the loss of some good or service, 
whereas the WTP rne-asurc estimates how much income they would be willing to give up in 
exchange for some benefit. Many argue that. conceptually, %VTA is the appropriate 
meas= when valuing losses in environmental services or losses in amenity. Although in 
theory the difference bctw"n WTA and %VTP is normally small when evaluating price 
changes (AVillig (19761). empirical evidence (Knctsch and Sindcn [19841) has suggested 
that WTA can cxcccd WTP by up to an order of magnitude. Ibis implim for cx=plc. that 
an individual might be willing to pay CI to have an extra tree to look at on the boulevard. 
yet might require LIO in compensation If one of the trees presently on the boulevard were to 
be rc=vedL While it might be argued that this discrepancy is simply a nicasuremcnt error 
related to the particWar measurement techniques, there is also sonic theoretical basis for this 
discrepancy. 
Tle economics literat= provides one such rationale, as 11anernann (1984) illustrated that 
the difference between WTA and WTP could be large if there arc no or few private 
substitutes for the environmental good or scrvicc. In addition. the result is not anomalous 
to psychologists who observe tImt people are usually more adamant about keeping what 
they have radw than getting what they do not have. Often. this is associated with the belief 
that they have innate rights to - or implicit ownership of - some existing (albcit publicly 
16 TWs process is described in &tA by Bradford and I lildcbrandt (19711 17 This ugunxnt is often mulooked in Lk consmation litm=. Suppose that a cure for cxxcr would 
be %, Onh = billion to the worid and gul -*t will rind such a cure by keeping our minforests inUct for the 
next 50 YCAM But Suppose as well that we will rind the cure by spcading $100 billion on laboratory 
ms=h without access to the minforcsts. The maximum v%t should be willing to pay to conserve the 
MWOMUS (if ft is Mr only function) should then be S 100 billion - not S500 billion. 
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available) asset. 
If. as evidence suggests. WTA docs indeed exceed NVTP for environmental goods and 
services, and If this also applies to services provided by rainforcsts, then there arc three 
Important Scrieralisations which arise from this. First, one obvious result is that analyses 
based solely on current WTP may still provide a suboptimal level of rainforest 
conservation. Second, as observed by Fisher (1989). there may be a tendency for WTA 
and WM to diverge more in the future than they do currently if the substitution possibilides 
for the environment decline with time and, in that event, even basing analyses on current 
WTA will provide suboptimal levels of rainforest conservation. Finally, as noted by 
Pearce and Turner (1990), with the implied discontinuity in the demand function, there is a 
tendency for the optimal level of provision of an environmental good to occur at the level of 
the status quo. This is, in no uncertain terms, a relatively simple argument for conservation 
based purely on efficiency grounds. 
While the fortgoing sections have concentrated on summary arguments from the literature, 
considerable detail can be found in each of the areas discussed. For more general 
explorations into environmental economics and conservation, the reader is referred to Smith 
and Krutilla (1982) or Fisher and Krutilla (1985); Baumol and Oates (1971; 1975) and 
Smith (1972) treat externalities in further detail; and Hufschmidt, ct. al. (1988), Johansson 
(1987) and Cummings et. al. (1986) provide excellent technical reviews of the current 
state-of-the-art in measuring and estimating environmental benefits. Empirical examples 
which attempt to quantify some of the environmental benefits associated with tropical 
rainforests can be found in McNeil (1986) and Peterson and RandaU (1984). 
§ 3.4 R2inrorests 2nd the Economics of Invention 
Since Arrow (1962) drew attention to the fact that a suboptimal amount of inventive activity 
may be undertaken if inventors can not fully capture the value of their inventions, 
considerable effort has been dedicated to describing both theoretically and empirically the 
actual determinants of inventive activity and research spending. Whereas Arrow 
concentrated on the Importance of 'appropriabiUty' in determining the amount of inventive 
activity, others highlighted the importance of global demand growth (Schmookler [19661) 
or Investment (Nordhaus 119691 and Rosenberg [1969; 19741) as driving forces behind 
research and devc1opment. Considerable theoretical debate has focussed on whether 
productive investment leads R&D investment, or whether R&D investment precedes 
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productive investmcm. but empirical evidence suggestsis that productive investment leads 
R&D and that the Overall value of R&D invcstmcnt Is actually proportional to total dcmand. 
While there is considerable scope for debate, there am a numbcr of particular concerns 
rtgaziling the actual measummc-nt of R&D effort. Some of these problems were rocogniscd 
by Kuzncts (1962a), and they generally rclate to the difficulty in separating R&D 
expenditures from other invcstments. As a proxy for inventive activity, researchers have 
often used patent data to estimate activity, but many of the most valuable discoveries have 
never been patented, while of those which have been patented, many = of extremely low 
value. Indeed, Shankerman and Pakcs (1986) rind that the patent system is not 
exceedingly cffectivc in protecting the values of inventors! activities. 
Ilis brings us back. therefore, to Arrow's earlier concern regarding appropriability. A 
similar argument is put forward by Ifirschicifer(1971), who draws attention to the fact that 
much inventive activity does not generate goods but generates information. Information is 
a public good but, if it is indeed free, then it will generally be undcr-supplied by private 
agents. The appropriability model is quite straightforward: if V(r) is the social value of 
R&-D at some level r. and if some proportion cuO is appropriable by private agents for 
whom research costs C(r), then an amount of research rp corresponding to C(rp)=ctV'(rp) 
%%iU be undertaken. whertas the optimal, amount r* would occur at C(r*)=Nr(r*). With the 
usual downward sloping marginal benefit and upward sloping marginal cost functions, it is 
clear that rp<r* and that research spending will be under-supplied. 
In the case of rainforests, it has been noted in Chapter 2 that the products and inventions 
which might come from increased research of the biome could have a considerable value. 
But for a number of reasons, this value is not readily appropriable cither by the 
governments of the countries or by companies which might be undertaking research in the 
fOresM First, products occurring naturally am - under the rules of all patent systems - not 
patentable. While individual processes for extracting useful products from naturally 
occurring products are patentable, alternate processes are often readily designed to extract 
the useful ingredients. Second. even if a useful product is discovered, it is not usually an 
exportable commodity because many of the ingredients can be synthesised in laboratories 
(and subsequently patented) once scientists know what they arc looking for-19 Third, 
IS See Pakes Wid Shankerman (1984) wJ L3ch and Schmiken= (1987). 
19'Mis has been a common complaint in some developing countries. When natural products are given to 
laboratories outside of tM countries to tietermine if they have any economic value. it is not uncommon to 
find s)mLhesised quantities based on that product on the muket a number of years tita, with no benefits 
going to the country which initially supplied the product. The recurrcnce of this prompted ES)Pt and 
Ethiopia to ban exports of selected genetic materials (Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen 119831) and has 
caused the Government of Cameroon to stop transfers of genetic materials to laboratories in France. 
M 
nuny developing countries do not have the research facilities available to investigate 
properly the genetic potential of products which occur in their rainforests, and Yankey 
(1987) notes that the patent systems within these countries are even less effective than those 
In developed countries for protecting the cornrnemial interests of individual researchers. 
In conclusion, the literature from R&D economics suggests that in practice - even if 
ownership rights arc recogniscd or conferred - the total value of genetic resources, for 
example. will not be appropri3ble by the individual LDCs owning those resources. 71c 
reasons for this relate both to InstitudonA constraints as well as the very practical fact that 
"knowlcdgeor Information Is a free good once it is released. This result has important 
Implications for valuing the potential benefits of conservation: if we rely solely on 
evaluating the benefits of current or recent research efforts. we may well understate the 
bcncrits of conscrvation and, therefore, under-invcst in conservation initiatives. It suggests 
as well that normal market mechanisms may fail to provide adequate incentives to 
individual LDCs to conserve their rainforesm and that it may be appropriate to overcome 
this failure through providing additiorul incentives at an international level. 
13.5 Contract Theory and R21nforesl Conservation 
The previous section as. =ed that It is difficult for LDCs, to capture the genetic value of 
their natural resources. To provide incentives for LDCs to conserve their rainforests, it is 
often argued that sonx sort of direct transfer must be made to thcm. In many respects, we 
can draw parallels to this In contract theory: which addresses the general problern of the 
optimal form of contract between two parties. In this case, the two parties are the LDC and 
the rest of the world (ROW). 7bc specific problcm is how to design a contract between the 
LDC and the ROW such that the rainforcst %ill be conserved. Many of the issues 
md&csscd In contract theory have some application here, and hence it is illun-dnating to 
review some of the conclusions which might bc drawn from this theory. In particular, I 
shall address the following specific issues: 
A) moral hazard. - 
b) additionalitT, 
C) the role of a ffiW party; and, 
d) the role of repetition. 
Ile discussion in the following sections relies entirely on relatively straight- forward, 
Intuitive arguments, and the formal models developed in contract theory are not presented 
hcrc. 20 
"0 rior a more formal treatment of this subject. the interested rcJLkf Is rtfemd to 1101msuOm (1979; 1982)- 
Miff kes (1976). or Doyle wW Dultcr*orth (1988) for speciric modch. and to an cxcclicnt text on these 
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71c concept of moral haind arises from situations In %khich It Is not possible to observe of 
control all of the actions of a particular agent. Tbe basic situation Is dcwribcd concisely bY 
Boylc and Buttcmvnh (1988: pp. 169f): 
In the basic model of this genre there are two cconomic agents - the principal and the agent - who operate in an uncertain envircrimcrit. The principal cnýgcs the 
agent to perform a certain task where the output is both a function of Ic cffort 
exerted by the agent and the r-indom state of nature that ensues. Both the principal 
and the agent strivc to maximisc their own welfare. The principal's problem is to design a contract that is efficient from a risk-sharing viewpoint and provides 
appropriate incentives for the agent. If the agent is wotk averse - an assumption 
normally made in these models - then he has an incentive to shirk if his actions am unobscrvablc to the principal, giving rise to moral hizartL 
It is clear that this situation has a close corollary in the relationship between LDCS with 
rainforest resources and the rest of the world. We want the LDCs to conserve the forest$, 
we are perh3ps wflling to pay them for it, but wc do no necessarily know what means they 
have at their disposal to do this nor can we nccessarfly monitor the means or effectiveness 
of their policies. We want to make surc that wh3tcvcr agreement we strike will, ultimately, 
yield some arnount of consen-ation. 
But the situation implies that. because we cannot see what is going on, there is a good 
chance of shirldng on the pan of the LDC Tbe fomul models norrnally show that optirnal 
contracts &rise when the timing and degree of compensation accruing to the agent 
corresponds in both timing and degree to the levels of benefits accruing to the principal. If 
rainforcsts provide a continuous service and benefit to the rest of the world, it would 
therefore imply that the optimal compensation formula would involve some on-going level 
of transfers. 
Closely related to the problem of moral h=xI is the issue of addidonality. it is noted here 
that in so= instances it is conceivable that in LDC' will rind it to be in its own interests to 
conserve a rainfortst, possibly because of the local environmental functions It provides. 
Again, howcvcrj, bccausc the outside world may not bc -able to obsme the value which the 
LDC attaches to thm benefits. it could feel compelled to compensate the LDC for 
conserving rainforests which might have been conserved in any event by the LDC. 
BerSsman and Edisis (1988) argued that the issuc of additionality is not a trivial component 
even in conventional investments in LDCs-. they estimated that about one-third of recent 
debt-equity swaps undemk-cn In Lzdn America would have been undertaken even without 
the concessionary pmgram=s and transfers implicit in these swaps. As "dcbt-for. n3ture" 
swaps are also bcaxning it popular mechanism for nature conservation. 21 and as most have 
mancn cdiW by r-dthxn. AmcnhL and Ziembs (1998). 21A,, ws dcuikddiscuWanotdcbt. for-amurcs**3p%isivovkWinCtL3i, -a4- 
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been modelled on simple debt-equity swap scenarios, there is some risk that donor funds 
will be divcncd to projccu which would have actually proceeded without external SuPML 
'ne effects of both the moral hazartl and additionality issues noted above can be rnýitigated 
by Involving a third party which has Interests which more closely resemble those of the 
principal. Without such a third party, the agent (LDC) is responsible for meeting its 
conscrvadon obligadonswHe also - presumably - addressing a host of other goals. 71c 
designation of a third party - having conservadon as its primary objective - will decrease 
both shirking and the monitoring and Informadon difficulties which gives rise to the 
shirking. Thc use of a third party has been adopted in a number of cases; local 
conservation groups have been given the mandate to oversee government programmes and 
- In some cases such as Costa Rica where the entire Park Service is private - have an 
exprcss mandate to carry out the conservation programmes. One problem with this 
approach Is that the third party has only a limited number of poficy instruments available to 
It to promote conservafion. It would presumably not have the authority. for example, to 
give kerosene subsidies to promote subsfitudon away from fucl%%-oodL 
Ile complexion of the moral hazard issue changes considerably where repctidon becomes a 
factor. In the standard principal/agent model, the contract is construed as a one-time 
agCcnxnt on a single projccL With repcddon, the potential exists for additional projects to 
be pursued at future dates. In the context of this study. it imphcs that the LDC might have 
different sections of rainforcst which could be the target of internadonal transfers for local 
conservadon efforts. In such cases, if the agent - the LDC in this case - perceives that 
there is somc potential for future support on other projects, then the incentives to shirk- on 
ewHer projects diminishes. 
In summary. contracting theory and principallagent theory do allow some useful 
gcneralisations to be nude in approaching the problem of how to structure transfers to 
Induce LDCs to conserve rainforests. It suggests that, with one-time lumpý-sum transfers, 
there Is an incentive for LDCs to shirk in fulfilling their obligations to attempt to conserve 
the rainforests, and there is also a risk that international conservation efforts may not 
generate Additional conservation activity. 71csc risks are reduced. however. in cases 
where a third party (with conservation interests) can be made responsible for the 
conservation efforts, or where there is sonic chance of future projects being pursued. 
Specifically, one result which this suggests is that the best contract is not normally expected 
to be a one-time lump-sum transfer. Ironically, this is precisely what some agencies and 
countries arc doing in the world right now: debt-for-nat= swaps Arc (on the surface) one- 
time transfers; environment oriented development injections by conventional donors Arc 
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similar in natim 
13.6 Role of Economic Policies 
3.6.1 A Rm2 
An important gencralisation anising from the econon-dc theory is that tropical forests arc 
being developed too quickly with respect to the optimal rate. A corollary to this Is that a 
sub-optimal amount of conservation is occurring. While this result has been dcrivcd using 
a number of different arguments from many parts of the litcmture (a number of which 
invariably have overlapping c1cments) sonic of the salient factors which contribute to it =: 
3) much of rainforest exploitation is through cotiditions of opcn access; 
b) the services minforests provide to the rest of the world am public goods frorn 
, which exclusion is essentially Impossible; 
C) those harvesting the resource do not take into account the Weds their actions 
have on the rest of the world; 
d) dcveloprnent is irreversible and benefits arc uncertain*. and. 
C) typical valuation procedures of conservation benefits nuy understate social 
benefits because of frec-rider effects, the lack of appropriability of research 
beriefivs., and potentially significant divergences between NVTP and NVTA. 
Although we rnight gencralisc that we should conserve mom rainforcst, we can not %ith the 
information available at hand estimate the deviation between the current rate of deforestation 
and the optimal rate of defortstation. While this may seem disconcerting. the theory his 
provided us %%ith sonre sound rationales for promoting conservation. while also providing a 
framework in which a number of the relevant policy issues can be discussed. ne practical 
problem is therefore reduced to finding policies which protnote conservation. 
It is important to identify rmt the linkages between the economy and the environment, and 
then to classify which groups in particular = affecting or being affected by the changes in 
the provision of envimnmental good and services. Based on some identification of this 
nature, it will be possible to focus on particular policy rcfonns. This section themfore 
describes a conceptual fmnv--%%vrk and highlights a number of salient features about policy 
design. 
3.6.2 A Cbnceptual Framc%%vk 
It isappropriate to commence with a stylised framework for addressing some of the major 
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policy conskicrations. Figure 3.2 desci-ibcs the gcncral situation. 
In this f(mrmulation. the tropical rainforcst (TRF) can be regarded as the stock of 
crivirorimcnial good E. from which flow environmental scrvices e. A single group %hich 
%%c designate as the TRF Consumers is responsible for the land-use pressures %%hich 
consume an amount h of the moist forest. The environmental services, ho%%cvcr. are 
consumed by thrrc gnmips in the amounts: 
CO - by thc'FRF Consumers. 
el - by odws in the dcvcloping country (LD-C), and. 
Cu - by the rest-of- the -world (ROW). 
Although Co. el and ell havc bccn designated as the consumption of an envirOnmcnial 
service. strictly speaking the level of consumption will be the same by cvcryonc (as it is a 
public good with no exclusion) and the tnic difference relates to the different values which 
each group attaches to the con%umpnon of the environmental service. The reader should 
bear in mind that C is actually a vector of many cnvirorimcntal services and individuals %%'III 
value thern differently: %hade could he uw. ful to one fwTmr and a hindrance to the next. 
But dc%ignating consumption in this manner allows us to Investigate the utility of each 
group in turn and. in the pr(x: c%-.. identify any 
'llic government in the LDC has available to it a policy set (s. w I. and can influence 
hcha% iour of agents in the LDC economy by introducing reforms do), which we shall call 
Domc%tic Interventions. The policies s am cndogcnous and am assumcd to adjust optimally 
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to any exogenous perturbation da 11c to policies am cxogcnous but am subject to policy 
shifts or shocks as in comparative statics. For analydcal purposes the Sovemment has been 
separated from the TRF Consumm but it Is rccognised that In some cases the govcmnncnt 
is actuVy the direct consumer and - In that event - It has a dual mle. 
Ile ROW can not directly influence individual agents in the LDC, but It has available to It 
certain interventions at the international level which I %hill designate cis International 
Intervenflons. 
While this is a relatively simple framework. it depicts fairly accurately conditions Involved 
in introducing economic reforms which are intended to conserve the TRF. 
First, although CO can be regarded as the consumption of an environmental service, no 
externalities arise at the level of the TRF Consumer. ills is because individwil TRF 
Consumers will automatically internalisc any adverse effects which their consumption 
decisions will have on thern. Formally. if Uo Is the utility of the TRF Consumer, if X0 is 
his consumption of goods and services, if It is his physical consumption of TRF. and eo is 
his consumption of TRF servicc4, then 
Uo=Uo(XoNca), h(s, ca). co [E(h)) (3.5); 
and he chooses X0 and It to nuximise UO subject to various income and side constraints. 
Because eo explicitly enters his utility function. he can be expected to adjust his 
consumption level h to optimise the total amount of h and co consumed. By way of 
example. suppose that the U= in the forest provide him with both fuelwood and shade for 
his crops. If he had no crops, then he would likely consume more wood thin he would in 
the event that he did have crops. As such. to the extent that the individual is actually aware 
of the existence of such shading bcncritsý there is no externality. Although this seems like 
a trivial point, it is often overlooked when conservation groups attempt to convince local 
TRF Consumers that it is not in their self-interest to ovcr-exploit the forest. An inordinate 
amount of effort is often expended trying to convincc these individuals that they should 
conserve the forest 'for their own good7 but - under the extant policy environment - these 
individuals are already doing %%hat is in their opinion best for themselves. Although we 
might feel compefled to educate them - i. e., draw attention to the existence of such 
'externalities! - them is little ft can be done beyond th3t. 
Ile true externalities arise when we consider the %tIl-being of others in the LDC 
Ui=UWXi(s, (j). cj JE(h)jj ... (3-6): 
where it is now clear that the well-being of these individuals depends on the actions of the 
TRF consumers. NVe SUI call these Domestic Externalities. IMcsc often have both a 
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spatial and temporal component. In the fuclwood harvesting example introduced abovc, 
the reduction in the TRF may lead to dccrcased agricultural productivity in areas 
downstream from the forest, or may reduce the future availability of gcncdc resources for 
nxcdng the LDCs own requirements for genetic feedstock. As noted Carlier, the existence 
of such externalities will nonTully cause too much consumption in the current period. As 
shown In Figure 3.2, there are essentially two mechanisms which are available to 
Intcmalisc these externalities. 11c first involves direct negotiation between the party 
Affected by the externality and the party causing the externality. As noted by Coasc 
(1960). 22 as long as there: is a clear assignation of property rights and parties can ncgodatc, 
then the cxtcmality will be My intcrnaliscd. In the diagram, this is depicted by the arrow 
from'othcrs'lo 7RF Consurners'. In LDCs. however. we seldom have clear assignation 
of property rights and the abflity to negotiate is styn*d by various practical consideradons. 
Any Intcmalisafion of these externalities must therefore normally bc done via government 
policies. These policies Hght include such pmgrammes as taxing fudwood consumption, 
cstablishing forest reserves and compensating TRF Consumers, or numerous other options 
within its control. 
At this stage it Is useful to raise in issue regarding the design of these policies. Let us 
assume for the moment that the government is aware of the externalities. and that it has 
designed its policicsopdmally' to the extent that it has - %ithin the perhaps considerable 
constraints faced in nuking policies - selected a set such that some idea of social %%-elf= 
has been maximiscd. Formally. if V is the social welfare function (S%M, then it has 
scloctcd policies such that it has maximised: 
V=V (Ucj..., h, c. G)j. Ujj .... C101'... ) (3.7); 
subject to any side constraints. T'hen, although this is at a national level now rather thin at 
an Individual level. a direct comliary can be made to the earlier statement relating to the 
Internalisation of externalities by Individual TRF consumers. In this case - %ith complete 
information - governments %%ill do the best they can to design their policies optinufly. %Vc 
might spend lots of lobbying effort trying to explain to an LDC that the environmental 
services of the TRF are important for the country's future agricultural productivity. yet - 
once the LDC Is aware of this - it may stiH choose to design its policies to promote 
deforestation if the benefits from that deforestation outweigh (in the S%VF of the LDC) the 
costs of future doclines In agricultural productivity. 
But the assumptions required to nuke this argument work are perhaps too bold. Thm is 
often a lAck of hornogcncIty within developing countries which causes policies to be 
formulated with only particular groups in rnind. This is, after aH, one of the exacerbating 
22 nis is taken up further In Chapter 4. 
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factors which - as noted in Chapter 2- often contributed to deforestation. In that cvcnt, 
such lobbying efforts as described above might indeed be effective means to promote 
conservadon. 
Finally. we tum to the situation of International Extemalitics. Thcse &rise bccause the 
utility of the rest of thew-orld. which we can show as: 
U11 - U11 ( .... C11 JE(h)j) ... (3.8): 
is dependent upon the actions of the individual TPX- Consumer. As noted In Chapter 2. 
substantial services may be providod by the TRF to cvct)vne in the world. As consumers. 
producem and go%-cmmcnts in the rcst-of-tht-world become aw= of these services, there 
has been an increased commitment to promoting conservation. As indicated In the diagram, 
however, the rest-of-the-world does not normally have direct access to the individual 
agents causing the Womstation in the LDCs. Also. It has little dircct control over the 
intemal policies of LDC governments. It does, however, have cenaln mechanisms 
avaflablc (which %-c call Interriational Interventions) to compel the govcmment of the LDC 
to conserve TRF. In theory, we have a simple situation of an LDC having sovereign 
control over its TRE Because in this case them am clear property rights (the TRF bclongs 
to the LDQ it is pmsunxd that some Intemational Interventions can be put Into place to 
bencrit all parties. In the simplest sense. these interventions can be construed as payments 
to the LDC to conserve the TRF. In practice. these pa)lncnts can take many fonns: from 
direct gmnts to assist in the fomution of national parks, to commodity agreements to 
induce activities which do not consume the TRF. Irbe ultinutc effectiveness of these 
payments u-Ul depend not so much on the namm of the Intcmational Intervention. however. 
but mthcr on the availabifity of effective Domestic Interventions. 
3.6.3 Ussons for Polia Detigll 
Much of the current emphasis in designing policies for conservation promotion is on 
convincing developing countries that it is In their self-interest to conserve their domestic 
forests. In addition. efforts am mounting to Identify or create mechanisms which can 
effoctively be used at the international lc%tl to compensate IDC governments for promoting 
rainforest conservation. Based on the preceding discussion, there are two primary lessons 
which I wish to highlight relating to designing economic policies for promoting rainforcst 
conscmdon. nese relate to the follo%%ing: 
a) intcmaUsing "t=lities and the mic of education; and, 
b) tWO-der policy Implcmenution. 
First, attcnflon was drawn to the idea that if Individuals or LDC governments are already 
W C)iqverl 
aware of the role of environmental services and the nature of the 'externalities' which arise 
from tropical rainforcsts within a country. then they might already be optirrtising the 
exploitation of the resource from their perspective. Changes to this rate of exploitation 
might only arise If new policy options become available, side constraints are changed, or 
inducements am offcmd to LDCs to change their policies. 
Second, the formulation of the problem in the indicated manner highlights the fact that, 
even though there may be a substantial willingricss-to-pay on the pan of individuals in the 
rest-of-thc-world. the ultimate onus for designing policies to promote conservation rests at 
the national level of the LDC 'Mis suggests that a two-tier implementation strategy is 
appropriate: the first involves providing induccmients, to LDCs to conserve their rainforests; 
the second Involves implementing policies at a national level which promote rainforest 
conservation. 
It Is noted that both the rationale for providing international inducements as well as the 
effectiveness of the domestic reforms will depend ultimately on how individuals in the LDC 
react to the reforms. Appropriately. when evaluating these policy reforms empirically, we 
are ultimately concerned%ith the sign of dc/da 7bis we can expand to: 
aD 
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where we have explicitly rccognised that huvcsdng behaviour is affected by policies, and 
that the forest and the scrviccs from it In turn depend on that behaviour. If we accept that 
DC/aF>0 wid that aWh<O, then the policy problem essentially becomes one of looking for 
policy mforms dw for which al0o)*O and then implementing the reform in the appropriate 
di=ion to achiman Incrose in E 
It Is also clear from this formulation that the preoccupation of the rest of the world is 
prernised both on the idea that rkjRE>O. which in Chapter 2 we described as the effects of 
deforestation, and also on the assumption that DU11 /Dc>O. which in the context of Chapter 
2 can be construed as the a, %=ncss of these cffwm 
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netwo-fierstratcgysuggestod abovc can be tcwonled to rcflcct two questions or cmpitical 
importancc to any givcn cue of conservation in a dcvcloping countrr. 
Ql. Are the intcmational induccn)cnu ut pay worth the consavation roceivcd? 
Q2. Will the policy mforms available to the LDC achim oonscrvadon? 
Although these am only mv elements of the overall problem. they provide ample scope for 
empirical study. 
In the follo%ing chapters, I shall concentrute first on the fairly general Issue of evaluating 
International Interventions. Because there am few examples of international Interventions, 
it is not possible at this stage to undertake crnpirical studies based on statistically significant 
samples. Nonetheless, an analytical fmmc%%x)rk- based on applied welfare economics can be 
developed which allows us to answer the question of whether such Interventions M 
economically efficim This analysis is undcruk-cri in: 
Chapter 4 Ile Rainfortst Supply Price: A Step Towards n-flnuting a Cost 
Curve for P. -iinfortst Conservation 
In doing this. it is important to note in principle that this requires a valuation of the bcnefits 
of conservation (i. e., a measure of allll ME). In practice, however. we shall concentrate 
first on generating a measure of the costs of conservation - which I call the rainforcst 
supply pricc - which can then be used for comparativc analyses of cost-effectiveness or 
compared to some estimates of how much individuals am willing to pay for conservation. 
Second, I shall address more specifically the Issue of Domestic Interventions. In some 
respects this level of intervention is the most critical because, whether the impetus for 
conservation comes frorn %%ithin an LDC to protect the local environment or from outside 
the LDC through Internafional Interventions, the LDC %%ill ultimately have to choose from 
amngst a number of internal strategies. 
In selecting the reforms for evaluation, I shall concentrate on those which have been 
identified by aid agencies and governments as appropriate In this context. Also, the ones 
that art selected = those which am based on seemingly sensible rules-of-thurrib and which 
are being pursued to a fairly extensive degrm Furthermore, recalling the major land-use 
pressures which existed - timber extraction. cattle ranching, forest farming, and fuclwood 
gathering -I %ill concentrate on the 13tter two pressures. This is not because timber 
extraction and cattle ranching am unimportant, but mther because they typically Involve 
small numbers of easily identifiable agents responsible for the deforestation. The agents 
often have straightforward ob ective functions rel3ting to profit miximisation, and the j 
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direction which refomu must take to promote conservation are often obvious. 23 Pressures 
exerted by the forest farmcr and the fuclwood gatherer. on the other hand, involve large 
numbers of Individuals. It Is not normally obvious how such Individuals will respond to 
policy Wornu nor how their response will ultirnately affect the rainforest bionr- 
71c principle strategics Identified deal with economic incentives through the injection of 
funds to provide Individuals with something better to do than exploit the forests and fiscal 
rcforTns through indircct taxation. 71csc arc &Jdresscd in the following chapters: 
Chapter 5 Dcvclopnxnt lnccnd%-cs and Migmtory Adjusunent 
Chaptcr 6 Dcvclopnxnt lw=dvcs and Human Interacdon %ith the F=st 
Mptcr 7 lndircct Taxes to Reduce Extemafifics 
Chapters 5 and 6 investigate two quite different aspects of the use of development 
Incentives to promote conservation. Both aspects stcm from rules-of-thumb which arc 
being applied extensively as the basis for using such inccndvcs. Economic development 
Inccnflvcs = used. in this context, in buffer zones around protected areas. By injecting 
m, oncy Into the buffer zones. the idea is that people %%ill voluntarily leave the fragile 
protected areas and will rind something better to do than exploit the foresL Ile two issues 
suggested by this argument arc addrcsscd indepcndcndy: Chapter 5 looks at how income 
levels might affect Hgmtion out of a protwed area into the buffer zone; Chapter 6 looks at 
whether economic lnccndvcs which are meant to give people something better to do than 
exploit the forest can actuaUy be effective in promoting conservadon. Ile empirical work 
in both of these chapters relies on original household survey data coHected in 1988 around 
Korup National Park, Cameroon. 
In evaluating the effectiveness of Indirect taxes. we basically rely on the premise that it is 
efficient to tax any activity which creates mcmalitics, if property rights can not be traded. 
Where the particular activity is itself not taxable. we tax complements or subsidisc 
substitutes. 11c empirical example which I investigate is fuclwood. Fuclwood is often 
rcg. m, dcd as untaxable because a large proportion of it does not go through any formal 
muket, so governments rely on subsidising substitutes to reduce any consumption 
externalities resulting from fuelwood consumption. From a conservation perspective. 
however. the relevant empirical question is whether the subsidisadon of substitutes - such 
as kerosene - will actually decrease or incrc= fuelw-ood consumption. Empirical wvrk is 
undertaken In Chapter 7 rclating to kerosenc and fuclwood demand in India. 
23 See, for cx=plc.. DIMwAnger (1987) rcLuinS to calda ruching and Rcrttw (1988) rcg3rding timber 
cA uxtion W procasing. 
97 
CHAPTER 4 
THE RAINFOREST SUPPLY PRICE: A STEP TOWARDS ESTIMATING 
A COST CURVE FOR RAINFOREST CONSERVATION 
14.1 Overview 
As noted in Chapter 2. perhaps the most significant effects arising from deforestation are 
those which fall outside of any particular LDC A natural corollary to this is that the rcst of 
the world may be willing to =kc significant transfers to LDCs in rctum for ensuring that 
the activities which cause these effects are mduced. In this ch3ptcr. therefore. I shall be 
broadly concerned with providing some means by which the rest of the world can evaluate 
whether it %ill be beneficial to make such transfers to a particular LDC In the process, I 
shall concentrate on dcrining and opcradonalising a concept of "rainforest supply price" 
(RSP) as a practical tool for guiding crertain, types of policy dccisiom 
The RSP is essentially a measure of the amount which an LDC must be given by the rest of 
the world to induce it to institute reforms required to conserve a particular rainforest. In 
principle it is based on a one-time lump-sum transfer. But to permit comparative analyses 
between projects, the RSP is expressed as what might be regarded as an annual rental 
payment - such as ECU per hectare per yeart - which reflects the amount which would be 
tiwufcrmd to the LDC for the particular level of conservation which occum It is clear that. 
as the amount required depends entirely on the net costs of the riccessary reforms within the 
LDC, we can then address the issue of whether it is worth this amount to the rest of the 
world to save a particular minforest. 
In addressing this Issue, Section 4.2 first discusses the theoretical rationale for using some 
type of intervention to induce LDCs to conserve their minforcsts. Section 4.3 expands on 
this mtionalc to discuss the potential We of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and reform theory 
in identifying when it will be beneficial to save rainforests. Ile practical limitations of 
these approaches am illuminated - which relate to our present Inability to quantify many of 
the more important benefit streams - and it is concluded that some other analyfical tool is 
required which relics less on quantifying these benefits yet Is still c3pable of providing 
some meaningful policy guidance. Section 4A proposes such a tool - the RSP - and 
discusses its meaning in theory and its basis in calculation. Its operational definition rinds 
a parallel in a supply price concept frequently used in natural resource econornics for long- 
I For6gn cuff=y u-insxtions in this ch. 2pta ut nonnilistd to the European Cumncy Unit (ECU) tO 
aHow compuisom 
term planning. Scction 4.5 illustrates how the RSP can be calculated for Korup Nadonal 
Park In Cameroon. Starting by conducting a cost-bentrit analysis of this conservation 
projcct. It generates a numerical estimatc of the RSP. and concludes with the quesdon of 
whether it would be cfficient for the rest of the world to compensate Cameroon this 
amount. Section 4.6 then, using the RSP. provides a comparative analysis of selected 
projccts, to illustrate what has acnially bccn paid in direct compcnsaflon on several projects 
to ensure rainforest conservation. 11is analysis is conducted to illustrate how one might 
address the question of whether a particular project Is too cosdy. Finally. Secdon 4.7 
provides some general conclusions regarding the versafility and usefulness of this too], and 
suggests dirccdons for extending its use. 
f 4.2 Ev; klu; ktlng Inicrventions 
4.2.1 Rationale forIntervention 
The rationale for pursuing some type of intervention at an international level can be 
demonstrated graphically in a simple externality framework. Such interventions can be 
conccptuafly characterised as contracts between the LDC and the rest of the world (RONV). 
Ile Scncral nature of the intervention is that the LDC is obliged to do something about 
promoting conservation and, in exchange. it receives some: form of economic incentive. 
N=rfly because of sovereignty issuesý it is assumed that the world can not dictate which 
strategies the LDC ultimately chooses to promotc conservation. From the perspective of 
the LM this is also desirable bcousc it can choose the most cfficicnt strategy (through 
Domestic Interventions) for meeting its contractual obligations. 
In Figure 4.1. NIS BLW represents the marginal social benefit of rainforest consumption to 
the developing country after netting out any local conservation benefits, and NISCRow 
represents the marginal social cost to the rest of the worldL If the LDC has so%=ignty and 
the ability to control its output, It would consume the rainforcst to a level of C in the 
absence of any contracting with the rest of the world. The LDC would reap the area OAC 
In benefits, and the rest of the world would suffer a loss of ODC In the example. it is 
clear that, if the parties were to negotiate. the optimal level of consumption CO would be 
attained and net global bcnefits would be maxin-dsedý2 71c gain in global welfare would be 
Area BCD. and It would be distributed between the parties according to the nature of the 
2 Throughout thit discuuion It Is assumed that them are no co&U to conducting the negotiations or to 
Mministering the terms of the contrwts. In &"Lion. it is assumed that the measurcment of consumption - 
*hkh Is In principle nectuxy for the enforcement of contracts - is costless. aldiough. as intimated in 
previous chapter%. It might be diffi"t in some cim=sumc: L 
Ral4ore It Supply prife Qq 
mcchanism which was Used to achicm dre optimunt 
Coase (1960) showcd that, in such cases. the optimum could be rcachcd by any of a 
numbcr of mcchanisms if the two panic% arc fmc to contract and If thcre Is a clear dcrinition 
of propcrty Tights. In this case, the mcchanisms %%hich can be applied Include: 
2) a consumption pcnalt)r, 
b) a conservation inducement; 
C) an assignation of freely traded pmpcny rights: and, 
d) a lump-surn transfer ficd to a specific consumpdon level. 
In the case of the consumption pcnalty. a tax in the amount of OT would be applicd to 
every unit consumcd by the LDC. 71c LDC would consume an amount CO. the nct bcncfit 
to the LDC would be ATB and to the rcst of the world would be OTB. Such a policy can 
not, however, normally be rcgardcd as fcasiblc in a situation whcrc the LDC has 
sovereignty over its resources. 
The second altcrnative, a conservation inducement. would be made in the amount CS (by 
any account a subsidy which is, of course. exactly equal to OT) for any amount not 
consumed. The LDC then again would, voluntarily, consume up to C*. Ile net benefit 
accruing to the LDC would be OABCO+C*BSC and the net loss to the rest of the world 
would be OBC*+C*BSC It is clear here that both parties would be better off than in the 
case where no negotiations took pl: icc and amount C was consui=L 
If property rights were assigned to consumption and they were frccly traded, no taxes or 
subsidies would br- necessary and a price equal to OT would arise in the mwkcL The LDC 
would own rights corresponding to CO units of consumption and the rest of the world 
would own rights for C-C* units of consumption which it would not, in fact, consume. 
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Again, however, such a solution is 
rcganW as infeasible in this case because 
of sovereignty issues of the LDC states. 
Finally. the fourth alternative involves 
some lump-sum pa), mcnt "P" to the LDC 
in return for its commitment to consume 
only up to a level CO. As long as P were 
such that C*BC<P<COBDC, the contract 
would be w0farc-improving to both 
parties. Most of the mechanisms which 
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have bccn actually lmplctncntcd can bc charactcriscd as falling in this category. As noted 
by hIcNccly (1988). although a widc rangc of mcchanisms including loans, food grants, 
subsidies. dcbt swaps. comrnodity agrccincnis, technical assistancc. sanctions. and "Pecr 
prcssurc" are avalbblc at the international level, the most predominant strategies include 
dircct transfer% of sonx variety. 
4.2.2 Rainfmat Dgmand and Supply; A Global Pcrx-mti%v 
11c discussion in the previous scction showed the case of one LDC negofiating with the 
rest of the world. In fact, howcwr. it is clear that there arc many countries %%ith rainforcsts 
which. from the pcrspcctive of the ROW. may warrant saving. In that event, it may be 
preferable to consider the entire world demand and supply for the untouched rainforCSL 
Such a simple conceptual fmmcwork is shown in Figure 4.2. Ile demand for untouched 
rainforcst is Ditow. and is presumed to slope down to the right to reflect the idea that the 
marginal bcncrit to the rest of the world dccrcases as more rainforest is conserved. Ilis is 
equivalcnt to the assertion in Migurc 4.1 thatINISCROW of rainforcst Constowtion is lower at 
low consumption levels. 7bc supply curve for rainforests is depicted by SLDc, and is 
drawn such that there is some amount Eo which would be Icft untouched even at a *zero 
pricc'. This reflecu the Idea that some LDCs might choose to conserve these rainforests 
for the local environmental fuctions they provide. It it were possible to transfer resources 
from the ROW to the LDCs to conserve rainforests, the optimal amount conserved would 
be E6. 
Ilem are a number of complications which arisc from such a model, and it is useful to 
reflect on some of them at this stage. First, because of the 'public good' nature of the 
benefits arising from standing rainforcst, the demand curve represents the usual vertical 
summation of 'individual' demand 
functions rather than lining up individuals 
(or countries) in order of decreasing 
willingncss-to-pay. It leads to the 
potential forfree-riders' to benefit from 
conservation while some other group 
financcs that conservation. To the extent 
that this occurs, it may limit the amounts 
which LDCs are able to collect in the 
form of transrers. 
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A second issue relates to the fact that there are relatively few organisations which have a 
mandate to make direct transfers to LDCs for conservation. If only one or a few 
organisations are actually involved in the process of directing transfers to IMCs: It could 
place individual LDCs in poor bargaining positions. This is because there are, In fact. 
multiple LDCs with rainforests causing the externalities. For example, if therc Is a singlc 
ROW negotiatior there is, In a sense. a monopsony for some of the environmental services 
provided by the world's rainforcsts. From a bargaining perspective, rcfcffing back to 
Figure 4.1. a country may previously have been able to extract an "incentive" of C*BDC 
for its rainforesCs services. If. however. there are other LDCs all willing to accept 
incentives, if the world has limited resources to put towards such incentives, and If people 
are indifferent to saving rainforests in Brazil, say. to those in West Africa, then we 
presume that the incentives would go to the lowest bidder. In such a case, the LDC may 
eventually extract only marginally more than C*BC from the world. Tbc competitive 
nature of this market limits the amount an LDC could get. While this may seem perverse 
from an LDC's perspective in that it gets only marginally more for conserving rainforest 
than it would for consuming it, it is actually efficient (from the point of view of optimal 
resource extraction) in that it implies that we would be spending our money First on 
conserving those areas which have the lowest opportunity cost. Conceptually. the supply 
curve in Figure 4.2 is then clearly a cost curve, and cfricicncy would normally dictate that 
the ROW provides incentives to those LDCs with the lowest rainforest supply'cost' to 
stop consuming their forests. Countries with high rainforest supply costs would not be 
given incentives to conserve their forests. 
A third issucwhich must invariably be addressed relates to the measurement of the actual 
rainforest 'commodity. Wc have spoken relatively loosely of minforcst area, prices, and 
costs, tacitly assuming that rainforests can be treated equally: conserving a hectare of 
rainforest in Brazil is of no greater or lesser value than conserving a hectare of rainforcst in 
West Africa. In fact, however, this is an oversimplification and conservationists often 
assert that some rainforests am more important than others: those with high numbers of 
endangered endemic spcciesý for example. = generally of greatest interest. While this 
point is well taken, I shaU assume for the time being that some area unit of rainforcst can be 
considered as a common numdraim At this stage I shall take this unit to be it hectare of 
tropical rainforest, u=ting all such hectares equally, and I shall return at the end of this 
chapter to how one might extend the analysis to using 'quality adjustcd' or hedonic *values. 
Given some of these caveats, it is nonetheless clear that two types of information are 
required before we can determine the optimal amount of minforcst to conserve: the nature 
of the demand for such rainforcsts; and the supply of int3ct rainforcst which might be 
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offired by LDCs. A corollmy to this Is that. to dctcrmine the optimal amount, we must be 
In a position to measure the benefits of conservation as well as its costs. It is this 
conncction which has prompted significant interest in the potential use of cost-bencrit 
analysis to cvaluite consciva6on projects. 
14.3 Cost-Benefit Analysis and Rerorm Theory 
Conservation groups are currently turning to the economics profession to provide 
evaluations of proposed conservation inidatives. Similar techniques which had been 
previously appbcd to evaluating the economic desirability of a specific development project 
are being apphed %%ith equal vigour to conservation projects. The most common technique 
being used involves the use of social cost-bcncrit analysis tojustify such projects. Pister 
(1979), Porter (1982) and Loomis (1986) all provide examples of how cost-bcncrit 
analysis has been used tojustify the conservation of %%i]dUfc or wflderncss. Others provide 
no specific examples but make a general plea for the incmased use of cost-bencrit analysis 
to such apphcadons. 3 In recent conservation guidcfincs published by the FAO, Grcgcrscn 
CLal. (1987) suggest that social cost-bcncrit analysis be routinely applied to conservation 
projects. Given this great call for the use of cost-bcncfit analysis, it is useful to review 
bricfly sornc of the strengths and limitations of this technique- 
Although it is certainly beyond the scope of this chapter to summarise the vast literature: 
dealing %ith the theory of cost-benefit analysis, we can highlight here a number of its 
salient features &nd requirements. 4 Ile primary goal of cost-bencrit analysis is to identify 
projects which %iU improve social welfare. Ilis requires first that the analyst be willing to 
specify some normative measure of social welfarc. Ilis social wclf= function, which I 
ShA call V(W is uniquely determined by an environment which is represented by a vector 
of signals *s" to which private agents respond. 77hese signals include all of the variables 
(prices. quotas, taxes, and so on) which ultimately determine the behaviour of individual 
agents. Ile second requirement in cost-benerit analysis is to define a'projece as some net 
change in the supply of commodities to the economy. We represent this as a small change 
Ue. where z is a vector of production under the direct control of the planner. F=Uy, it 
3 Ahm3d (IM calls for a Smaw use of cost-bencrit analysis In cnviron=nLd decision-malcing and 
Bxborak (1988) suggests that cost-bmsefit analysis m provide justirrations for rnaintaining biological 
divasity. 
4 Useful minwils and examples f egarding the subject am provided by Little and Miff Ices (1974). Bell, 
Ruell wW SLuk (19V. ), Squire (1985). and ODA (1988). Price wki Nsir (1984) illustrate Lm Use of cost- 
bencrit analysis In f6fintry practices. W Drtze uW Stem (1987) pment a tomW description of cost-bcnefit 
wWysls and exasnine Its dicorctical basis in %df= ecaxxMcs. 3 Ue following discussion uv-s conventions simiLu to those in DrUc and Stem (1987), %ith the exception 
dw net demands by the private sector are dencted here by Lk voctor D(s). 
RaInforo, f t. Tuppty Mee im 
must be recognised that planncts exercise some control over s subject to relevant 
constraints. 7be scope for choice may be very limited but we assume that such choice that 
is available is exercised to maximise V for any given z. We witc smo(z) to denote the 
choicc, however made (optimally or otherwise). 7bc scarcity constraints say that 0 must 
generate net demands (D) by the privatc sector equal to the net supplies (z) of the public 
sector. 6 
Given this fmrm%vrk, it is now possible to evaluate any project dt by detcrrnining: 
dV = 
av 
dz FS 
PZ 
... (4.1). 
A vector of shadow prices, v, which correctly identifies welfare improvements from a 
change dz must thcrcforcbcgivcn by 
"). 
7 Ibis is equivalent to 
a" 
where V* Is the 'a -S Cri -jz- 
nmimised value of V(s) given z in the case where the choices are optimal. Ile natural 
project selection rule then is to select any pmjcct dz for which dV>O. and this corresponds 
to selecting projects which have positive valuc, V dz. at shadow prices. While this may 
seem obvious, this formulation allows us to concentrate on two specific empirical points 
which are of special mlevance: to conservation projects: 
a) project derinition; aM, 
b) the role of opd=r policies. 
Even though conservation proponents are now calling on cost-bencrit analysis to justify 
their projects, much criticism has been directed to the mis-use of cost-bencrit analysis to 
justify large-scale development projects without taM ng proper account of other impacts of 
these projects. Many cost-benefit analyses would either disregard environmental services 
or assign arbitrarily low shadow values to them As a result, projects were funded which. 
in hindsight, would appear to have decreased social welfare when all of the impacts were 
included. Although this criticism does not invalidate the use of cost-bencrit analysis, it 
underlines the importance of defining all of the changes in production which afise from a 
given project: a project &rlncd as "use labour and chainsaws to chop down trees" may look 
perfectly reasonable until it is pcrh3ps more completely defined as "use labour and 
chainsaws to chop do%%m um and c=tc nuss, floods. " 
Fortunately. analysts now arc tald- ng better care to derine projects which encompass MrC 
than the obvious direct inputs and outputs from any given project. But less attention is 
being paid to the role of optimal policy choices. In the formulation above. it is clear that 
shadow prices and hence welfare changes %ill actually depend upon the choice of Policy. 
6 FonraUy. Otis simply states that D(s)mz. Ah= wQ x is tiouschold consumption, y 
is private production. u4 m is a wtor of net impons. 7 Note Mat aVIDs is a %cctw am t1lat a,; W& is S m, 2uix. 
-I(U 
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I'lanncts will nonmily have mort thin one policy available to than and concentrating only 
on the pmjcct definition and Ignoring potential changes to the policy cnvirouncnt can lead 
to foregone lmprovcnxnLs In social wc1fuc. 
Indeed, In many circumstances the current demands being made on the economics 
profession by conservation interests = described as "cost-bencrit analyses of projects". 
whereas they should probably be more accurately described as "evaluat, ions of policy 
reforms". In this respect. it is useful to look briefly at how the theory of reform can 
contribute to evaluating the problem. 11cre has been considerable interest rcccndy in 
developing both a theory of policy reform and applying techniques for ideriffying welfare- 
Improving reforms. Earlier work was specifically concerned with such problems as 
designing optimal taxation policies, whereas more recently some opdmal taxadon rules 
have been derived in a more general theory of policy reform. 8 Ile theory of reform 
paralleh closely the theory of cost-bcncrit analysis of individual projects: both attempt to 
ldcndfy changes which improve social welfare. 
Form. ally, let us consider so= small policy change dw and investigate its impact on social 
welfare Wsm), where we now distinguish between those signals which are under a 
plannees direct control (s) and those which are otherwise fixed exogcnously (0)). 9 71cri 
we consider a reform do) to be welfare improving if and only if. 
dVII m 
aV* dw >0 &0 
... (4.2); 
where V* has s chosen optimally such that it maxirnises V. Intuitively, what occurs is that 
a planner starts In some policy environment with all of the 's-policies! under his control 
chosen optimallr, thc'uý-policies'arc taken as exogenously fixed. Some small reform to 
an co-policy is undertaken, and adjustments in s-POlicics are made to accommodate any 
constraints. Drtze and Stem (1987) show that for small reforms, assuming that other 
policies are set optimally. we have: 
(LV v 
aD 
dV, b- ý2) dca. 
0% N ... 
71c marginal social value of some policy ca (i. e.. dV*/do) which we call NISVO can thus 
I The development of much of this theory in a general equilibrium frimc%vrk can be found in Diamond and 
Nfirrices, (1971-. 1976). Mintm (1971). Diamond (1975). Atkinson (1977). Deaton (1979; 1981). Deaton 
and StcM (1985). AM Bird (1987). A review and synthesis of the reform literature is provided In Stern 
19874 and aUtional a; Vi=Lkxu of the theory can be found in NcAbery and Stern (19M. 
We scp=tc s and bx s viU be retarded as adjustint optimally to any peawbadon in ox 
-Ralplarmt. 
Tupphrrine 
- 
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be interpreted quite reasonably as the gradient of the Lagrangian La VO-v I DO-z). Any 
small policy change dca can be disaggreg3tcd into a direct impact on social wclfarc aV/Dw 
less the cost of the additional net demands at shadow prices v DD/Dca. In any empirical 
work, the challenge is thus to rind policies to for %hich. locally. NISVw*o, and then to 
introduce reforms dco in the appropriate dirccdon. 
In practice, however. the problem is more complicated thin this. if w are the cxogenous 
policies, then presumably we would want these to be adjusted optimally once they comc 
under the control of the planner. which presunubly they have if they are being considered 
for some type of reform. Ile usual cmpirical caveat (see Ahnud and Stem [19841 or 
Guesncric (19771), however. is that the planner lacks the necessary information to do 
anything but make smaU reforms based on local informafion. The opfimurn may be a long 
way off and the reform approach crawls 'up the hill" using local infomution all the %; -ay. 
In addition, this brings us to a final caveat which must be considcrcd in applied welfare 
economics: that relating to large projects or large rcfomis. %Vhcthcr evaluating projects or 
reforms, most of the rules relating to shadow-pricing relate to small changes. In general. 
these shadow prices are gradients of a social welfare function - or 'surface - with respect 
to a vector of supplies whcrc the dependence incorporates feasibility constraints, side 
constraints, government policy, and the actual unconstrained welfare function. Large 
projects. and largc rcformsý require analysing this function at two discrete points which are 
not contiguous: we must determine if some change in welfare AV-mV(zi)-V(zo) is actually 
desirable. While somc authors have suggested approxi=tions of AV for large projects 
under certain restrictive conditions Ulamrnond 11980; 19831). the general solution would 
require more extensive global knowledge of the social welfare function rather than just the 
local infornxition using convcndonal &Wow pricing rules. 
To summarise, there am a number of points which can be learned from the application of 
cost-bcncrit analysis rules. Fast. the projects should be defined to include all changes in 
goods and services. Second, where rcfonns are being proposed rather than pmjects. it is 
important to identify both the direct effects of these reforms on social welfare as well as the 
impact on the net demand for goods and services and then to evaluate any net changes in 
goods and ser-Oces at shadow pricts. Ilird. it must be rccallod that the validity of many of 
these techniques requires that other policies under the planncrf control arc set using the 
same cost-bencrit criteria to the best of the planners' control. Fin3lly. the limited - though 
valuable - contribution of identifying 'small' projects or reforms which arc welfArc- 
impmving nuy be aU that can reasonably be expccted for now. 
I (VI Ob qver 4 
14.4 Rjainforest Supply Price 
4.4.1 Intyrduction 
In support of cost-bencrit analyses, considerable effort is currently being directed to 
evaluating the global benefits of conservation. Although progress is being made in 
measuring the value of certain local environmental functions. the global benefits of 
'biodivcrsity value' or 'climate control value' arc far from being quantified. In many 
Informal analyses, It is often asserted that the genetic and climate control value attributable 
to the rainforcsts In LDCs is immense. It is not hard to imagine, therefore, that sufficiently 
large numbers mIght be applied to evaluate gencdc resources or the integrity of the global 
clirruic such th: t. if one applies these values in a cost-bcncrit analysis, one can readily 
justify saving every rainforest in the world. Although this result may be of some 
philosophical interest. it is not particularly helpful to planners faced with hmited budgets. 
The very existcricc of these limited conservation budgets would suggest either that the 
'large numbers' are wrong or, as noted in Chapter 3, that there exist some basic 
Inefficiencies In marka or social processes which prevent us from doing more to save the 
rainforests. But both of these issues have more to do %kith the valuation of global 'dcm=X 
than they do with the =ual costs incurred by an LDC in conserving rainforests; it suggests 
that we might still be able to learn something useful by closely examining the'supply'of 
such rainforcsts. 
To provide it more meaningful decision-making tool. I shall develop In this section a 
concept which I shall refer to as the LDC Rainfomst Supply Price (RSP). Quite simply, 
the RSP Is the amount which an LDC must capture through direct transfers from the rest of 
the world in order for it to save a particular rainforeSt. Through selecting a comrnon 
dcnon-drutor (one hcct= of rainforest), a step is taken towards derining a cost curve for 
rainforest conservation. While this does not allow us to select the optimum amount of 
rainforcst to be conserved (which would still require an estitmte of the benefit function), it 
does allow us to nuke cross-country comparisons, thereby giving donor agencies and 
intcnutional funding bodies an objective assessment of how much must be deployed in any 
given area to save a rainforCSL In addition. the cost curve eventually derived would be a 
relevant Input Into any Same, however structured. which describes positive outcomes. 
71c RSP effectively provides a preliminary measure to which standard cost-efficiency 
principles can be applied: if funding to save the rainforests is limited by a fixed budget or 
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by some decreasing willingness-to-payas mom forests are savcd, then efficient allocation 
of this funding quite simply involves applying it to those forests which am the cheapest to 
save. 7bc following sections dccribc first the theoretical basis of the RSII In terms of the 
notation of welfare economics, and then a practical mechanism of applying this theory as an 
adjunct to stancLard cost-bcncrit analysis. 
4.4.2 ncmtical Bmis 
To extend the application of the approach taken in Section 43. It Is useful to ch=ctcrisc 
explicitly some of the relationships in a styliscd modcl. Essentially. the current situation IS 
that outside interests am attempting to induce LDCs, to conserve rainforcsts, and that they 
are willing to compensate LDCs for any losses which arisc from minforest conservation. 
Consider an LDC in sonic initial position where the value of the plannees social welfare 
func6on is W-V. Ile world is willing to nuke some s=ll transfer of resources dR to that 
country in return for it conserving some incremental amount of forest dE. Ile reform 
required for the country to achieve this is d" which - in the absence of the compensating 
transfer dR - results in a change in socialwWare dV. For notational case, we define the 
reform such that dE/dco>O. and think of %VV and R vvded in terms of a common currency 
uniL We assume that the transfer dR isjust. adequate to compensate the change in welfare 
required by the policy reform: 
dW-0-dV+dR (4.4); 
where dV-. NlSVcjdu We suppose that dR-: 513dF., where 0 is the marginal willingness-to- 
pay of the rest of the world for saving the rainforest. If we let 80 be the minimum amount 
which we must be willing to pay to compensate in LDCý then dR=B*dE. and the amount 
which ur. must be uilling to pay is: 
Nlsvt3 
(Mdco) ... 
Expressed differently. the amount 00 is the net social cost of the Measures which are 
required to save a unit of r-linfortst. Recalling our definition of NISVOO. we can dcrinc BO 
nx= explicifly as: 
aV 
VýD 
dE 
dca 
... 
Although B* is the minimum which we must be willing to pay. the LDC would actually 
require no compens3don if calculadons indicate that 811 is negative. While I &hall take up 
Ns point later. it suggests that the rainforest supply price - which is the minimum the LDC 
should be willing to accept to invoke the necessary irfornis - can be dc-finod AS: 
RSP m Nfax (0, BO) ... (4.7). 
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Ilicre am a number of important aspects to Equations (4.5) to (4.7) which merit comment. 
17irst, there Is an element of definition hcre which rccogniscs explicitly that, even with 
external Intcrvcntion. thcrc Is sfill some Inicrnal policy reform which must be undertaken to 
induce conservation, and that the indicated reform may effect both individual welfare as 
well as net demands in the economy. In practice, this highlights the fact that we must 
nitcmpt to Identify sorneftasibk refomL While this =y seem obvious, it suggests that 
one place to start is to look at mforning existing structures. 
Second. rccognising that an LDC will normally suffer some direct loss in social welfare 
from Introducing the reform (i. e.. that NISVO)<O) the formulation simply says that the 
supply price will be higher when the reforms which they have available arc either very 
Ineffective at conserving rainforests (Lc.. dF/da) is very small) or if the negative effects of 
such reforms arc very large. These negative effects arc large when v3D/aw >> Maw 
(i. e.. when there arc very high input costs at shadow prices). 71iis can occur when there is 
either a significant increase in the net demand for goods and services. or there arc 
significant direct detrimental impacts arising from the necessary reform. Appropriately, 
from an empirical perspective, we should be concerned %%ith identifying reforms which are 
effective at promoting conservation, have little dircct negative impact on individual welfare, 
and generate few net demands on production. 
71ird. explicitly Including an expression for Wfcka highlights the fact that the supply price 
wifl be higher if the refonns affect disadvantiged groups and if the LDC govcmmcnt has a 
high degree of aversion to inequality. Empirically. therefore. it would be desirable to 
identify Wonns for promoting conservation which also improve the %%-cll-bcing of the most 
disadvantaged. 
Fourth, it is clear that there may be sonic policy reforms for which MSVca>O mid dEldo)>O. 
In which case 1110 will be negadve. 10 These %%ill normally only occur when the particular 
LDC Is unaware of the particular improvements to wclf= which might arisc: from such a 
reform and. in such cases. it is in the interests of both the rest of the world and the 
particular LDC to promote such reforms. This aspect is often seen as the primary 
Justification for 'educating' LDCs about the importance of the rainforcsts to the LDCs 
thcmsclvcs. But it is also clear that such an education process depends on identifying 
correctly NISVO and it can be argued that the LDC is in a better position to assess that than 
the outside world. In parýcular, where the LDC is aware of the effects of its policies and it 
hzis adjusted them to the best of its ability. then one should probably normally presume that 
10 In riture 42 thil would coffespond to the =a of rainforest rcprcscnted by E0. 
Afirfor, f it S&q! ptv prito I (Y) 
the only feasible changes in ca are in di=ions which dccm= social welfam. 
4.4.3 A Practical Formuladon 
7'he previous discussion illustrates how the principle of a rainforest supply price Is readily 
expressed in the theoretical constructs of welfare economics. The theory also produces an 
equivalent expression which can be used in the practicc of conducting a cost-benefit 
analysis of a rainforest conservation project. In deriving such an expression, the reader 
will note from Equation (4.6) that 00 is, dimensionally. some value per unit S of 
rainforest. The specification of this unit is somewhat arbitrary and. as noted earlier. It is 
probably appropriate eventually to make some adjustment for the quality of the rainforem 
For now, howcvcr,, %-c concentrate simply on rainforest area. 
Ile area of the rainforest is, in itself. not an adequate basis for expressing a price, prima- 
rily because services which are received from conservation Mprcscnt a continuous flow. 
To reflect this concern, I shall select an evaluation unit of one hectam. ycar of raiinforcsL 
Ile definition of rainforest E is then formally a vector En ( EoX where 1ý is 
the area maintained intact in any given Year LA conservation project AE then generates 
some change in the amount of intact rainforest, where AE-Jfflý)AEIAE2, ... tAF-t".. ) 6 it 
%ill become apparent later that this discrete structure is easily accommodated within the 
cost-bencfit accounting of rainforest conservation projects. 
As an operational definition forthe rainfortst supply price, we again base it on the idea that 
we are attempting to compensate a host LDC for conserving some amount of rainf=st AE. 
Tojust compensate the LDC. the amount of compensation must be equal to the net cost of 
the project such that. II 
0= NTV of Project to Host Excluding Transfers 
+ NPV of T=sfers ... 
Ut us now consider P* to be the constant real amount of compensation paid for every 
hccmm-ycar of conservation. It is, in a sense, a year' s rental for a hectare of untouched 
rainforr-St. While in principle the real rentil could change over time, we &hall assume for 
the moment that it remains constant In real terms. If we now Introduce simple cost-benefit 
accounting conventions, we have the condition th3t, 
00 00 
(BrCO + 7, (l +r)*t 0 P*AEt 
t-0 t-0 
II Throughout this discussion I dull assume tfut the NPV of the pmjoct In Che abscnce of transfcrs is 
nesalm 
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where B, Is the stream of local benefits at shadow prices (excluding transfers) to the host 
LDC as a result of the minforest conservation projcct AE, Cj is the stream of local costs at 
shadow prices, and r Is the real discount rate. It Is Important that all of the local 
conservation costs and bcncrits (for example soil fertility maintenance and flood control) be 
Included In this formulation. 
Assuming still that P* is constant, we can rearrange Equation (4.9) to provide an 
operaflonal dcrinition for the rainforcst supply price as RSP=, Niax(O, P*), where, 
ße m- IM()- - to 
Di +r)-t s mý t*O 
This fairly simple formulation allows one to calculate readily the minimum amount which 
we have to pay to get an LDC to conserve a unit of intact MinforeSL It is Sinlilar to Supply 
cost concepts used In dcrining the long-term costs of resource production, 12 and has a 
number of advantages in applied work. 
Must, it Is rcadily addod to cost-bcncrit analyses of conservation projects as the calculations 
required for such analyses can be extended to computing the supply price. In this case, 
however, the cost and bencrit strc= must bc idcntiried as that which is clearly accruing to 
the host country. From a donoes perspective, this may actually simplify the CBA as it 
does not rcquire Identification of conjectural bcncrits outside of the country. 
Second. the explicit exclusion of the external benefit stream from the supply price 
calculation allows the estimation of such external bencrits - which is often more complex 
and conjectural than estimating the supply price - to be relegated to a secondary activity. 
Dcpcnding on the circumstances, it may never be necessary actually to estimate this cxt=al 
b, cricrit stream. Consider, for example. a donor which has 20 million ECU available to 
give to LDCs for rainforest conservation. Suppose that there arc two pmjccts (A and B) 
being considered with the foUo%ing characteristics: 
1"Imi AR 
Cauantkn Ams IOOPW hCcum 2"MCOO becum 
PV of Local Cbsu of Cmxzvaion 30 million ECU 40 miHion ECU 
PV of Local Dawras of Conwvxion 10 millim ECU 20 minion ECU 
rmi" Tmnifm RMuimd in mAr NWA '210 million FCU 20 million FCIJ 
12 In these fomul4tions. AF. is the incrcmenud pfoduction of some commodity (such as oil). B is the 
revenue su= from wocLucd Mducts, And C is the capital wsd oirs3ting cost strt= as=iatcd %ith an 
Investrnent which Senmics the inamentA productim Examples of this appro3ch applied to depletable 
resource poduction can be found In Bragey (1979) or Ruitenbock (1985). 
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It is obvious that, as long as the foreign benefits am dependent only on conservation, one 
would invest in Project A as it would hmt the lowest supply price. 'MIS decision would be 
independent of the actual external benefits of the rainforest (assuming still that a hatare of 
rainforest generates the same extemal benefits anywhere). 
'Mird, the supply price is sensitive to the timing of conservation cf forts In that It explicitly 
requires identification of AE, which I shall refer to as the 'protection scenario% This 
allows one to make comparisons between projects which have markedly different Impacts 
on conservation. A national park Investment programme which has expected pcmuncnt 
conservation benefits can be compared to projects which, for example, require short-term 
bridge funding to maintain parts of the biome intact while other planning efforu proceed for 
the long term initiatives. Specific examples of such projects will be evaluated in upcoming 
sections, but it underlines the importance of actually specifying the protection scenario 
which applies to any given investment. It is important to dcrine because the first increment 
of conservation might not happen for many years as a result of an investment project. In 
the case of Korup National Park. for example. the major physical conservation benefits 
would not become apparent until about 2010 - which is when destructive logging of the 
park might commcncc. 
Fourth. while it has been assumed that DO is constant over time, this assumption can rcadily 
be relaxed to allow it to grow. One of the most relevant cases to deal with empirically - 
and one of the most straightforward analytically - involves a case where the local real 
benefits and costs arc gmwing at a real rate g>O. and %%herc one might expect that the 
tannual rental rate B*t should also grow at that same rate. In that event. we might be 
interested primarily in the time path of B*t which is required to compensate the LDC If we 
al. low explicit accounting of the growth in Bt and Ct, and suppose that B*gn(I +g)t Do*. then a 
Equation (49) can be gencralised to: 
to Do 
0=Y, (I+r)*t (I+g)t * (BrCO + 1(1+r)-t * (I+g)t BO*AEt 
t=O 1-0 
In this case (assuming that both r and g are snuU) uv can approximate the base )= supply 
price as: 
(Brcj 
t. 0 
00 
Ile reader %%ill note that this is equivalent to the case investigated In Equation (4.10) with 
the exception that the cffcctive discount rate has bccn reduced from r to (r. g). Such 3 
calculation is relatively simple and the case with escalating rentals is readily rcflcctcd in 
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discount me senildvitics typically undcnakcn in corst-bcnerit analyses. 13 
Finally. although I have assumed that till rainforcsts are of the same quality. it is 
conceptually not difficult to introclucc some form of hcdonic pricing and adjust for 
rainforest quality. If we IctO be a dimensionless index for rainforcst quality, normalised 
such that Os I for a standard hectare-year for some standard rainforcst. then we can define 
a hcdonic rainforcst supply price RSPh as RSP/%), and higher quality rainforests would 
then 2ppcar as having lower hcdonic supply prices. One would presume that 1) could itself 
be a func6on of many criteria, and there is thus some risk of arbitrariness in specifying 
such quality. It would. nonetheless, give individual donors a means of ranking 
consm-Adon altematives. 
f 4.5 Calculating the R2inforest Supply Price for Korup National Park 
4.5.1 Int-oduction 
The purpose of this section is to illustrate how the rainforest supply price can be calculated 
for a specific conservation initiative. The project evaluated is Korup National Park in 
Cameroon, whichw-as introduced in Chapter 1.71c starting point for the evaluation is a 
cost-bcnerit analysis of the conservation project, undertaken from the perspecuve of the 
Government of Cameroon. IMc CBA uses WWF plans for park development as a dcsign 
basis, and it attempts to nuke a preliminary estimate of the value of a number of local 
environmental functions to the Cameroonian economy. The actual key analytical criteria 
and shadow prices were selected through discussions with Govcmmcnt of Cameroon 
planncM and they are thus consistent with other project evaluation criteria used in the 
country. Because of the paucity of data available for the CBA, it should be noted that sonic 
of the cost and bcnefit streams am to a degrtc conjecturaL and they represent best estimates 
at the time that the park planning was being undertaken. Nonetheless, the exercise 
demonstrates how the technique ran be used to calculate the rainforest supply price and, as 
with many situations involving project evaluation, refinerricnts would normally be expected 
as planning progrcsscd and projects became better defined. 
4.5.2 General Assum2tions 
11c first stcp involvcd In the evaluation involves actually dcrining the 'projece and the 
13 One must uke care. however. In using 8; as a comp=dvc measure betwccn counuics and projects 
unicts the Lame gto*th assumpdocu have bccn mide w. = proj= 
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impacts which it has compared to a status quo case. Undcr the status quo case. nonnal 
exploitation of biological and forest resources eventually results In cortiplac climinition of 
the primary forest. and the national park csscritially dirccily protccts two critical resource 
componcnts: the ums (and other flora); and the animals (and other fauna). 
71c primary potential threat to the trcc resource is far Into the future-, the forest's timber 
resources would most likely be exploited by logging bct%%tcn the years '1010 and 2040 In 
the absence of protective measures. 77his scheduling is consistent with the marginal nature 
of the timber and the current rate of exploitation in the "gion-, It is expected that the forest 
on the Nigerian side. for example. will be eliminated by 2000-2010 without protective 
measures. By the simple expedient of gazetting the park at this time. It ensures that timber 
concessions - often granted ten to M-cnty years in advance of their actual exploitation - will 
not bc nude available to logging int=ts. 
Protecting the animals in the area is a more immediatc conservation goal and is. logistically, 
considerably more complex. Just gazctting a park will not. in itself, prevent continued 
hunting of endangered species. Two broad options arc being considered by park planning 
authorities to protect the animals: (I) relocating people away from the park; or, 
(ii) providing dircct compensation paynicrits to those within the park in return for their 
compliance with hunting regulations. Ile relocation option. while mandatcd by current 
Cameroon legislation. is disruptive and costly-, efforts am currently under way to introduce 
legislative reforms allowing individuals to live in the park and to pursue some traditional 
activities. The option of providing conditional compensation, by directly transfering funds 
to village authorities on a regular basis (about every thrcc months). has proven successful 
elsewhere in gaining the cooperation of indigenous hunting populations In Zambia (NVNVF- 
UK [1989a]), 1"hailand (Praween. Tavatchai, and Dobias 119881) and Zimbabwe (Child 
119881). 71is CBA assumes that some compensation mechanism will be instituted to 
promote compliance with the regulations and that relocation will not be necessary. As 
hunting losses are explicitly counted in the CBA as lost production, compensation 
payments are not included as project: costs. 
Reducing hunting would still, however. involve sonic regulation of hunting activities. Thc 
enforcement programmes designed for Korup - and the costs in the CBA - include: park 
boundary demarcation and maintenance; game: guards with the mandate to patrol the park 
and enforce regulations; guard posts within the park; and adequate radio and other equip- 
ment to support the activities of the game guards. To decrease potential hunting activity. 
jobs as guards arc given prefcrcritially to nules currently resident in the park area. The 
CBA assumes that such an enforcement programnic will be required and will be successful. 
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A number of assumptions were nude relating to key evaluation p=mcters rcquired in the 
CBA. First. planners in the Government of Cameroon wcrc consulted to establish what 
assumptions they used for projcct evaluations. and a case was developed which uses a real 
social discount rate of 8% and a labour cost of 50rt* of the marka ratC. 14 Official exchange 
raics werc uscd to shadow price afl goods. 
Second, little dctailcd infonnation was available rcgarding the composition of project costs. 
Although estimaics of labour inputs verc available. there were no estimates of the import or 
indirect tax components. In such circumstances, it is common practice to use a standard 
conversion factor (SCF) for costs to allow for diffcrcnccs between domestic and 
international prices caused by indirect import lc%ics or other trade distortions. This practice 
was not, however, follo%vcd by Cameroon planners. In the interests of remaining 
consistent with Cameroon critcria. no SCIF adjustment was made in the base casc. 15 
Third, it was assumed that dccision-makcrs placed the same welfare weights on people in 
the project area as they did in the rest of the economy; no explicit distributional benefits 
were assigned. If explicit account were made of some distributional characteristics of these 
households, the net benefits of the project n-dght be different than those indicated here. 
Finally. as the project is quite long. discounting was done over an infinite time horizon and 
it, %, as assumed that no real increases in the cost or benefit stream occurred beyond the year 
'1040.16 If populations and productivity in the area were going to increasc, then the value 2 
of sonic local environmental functions of Korup, forest might in that event also be higher. 
14 Many different rationales can be given for discounting market wage rates for social maluation purposes; 
the rca-son given by Goverrinicrit of Cameroon planners was that 50% appeared to reflect the marginal 
productivity in the agricultural sector. By hiring someone to 'Aork on a project for one day at. say. 1000 
CFAF. the lost output to the economy by removing that person from the agncultural sector for the day is 
only 500 CFAF While the basis for such an awnion is often disputed in the cost-bcnelit literature. it is 
taken at facc value here as it was being used with some consistency within the planning department. 
15 Planners in Cameroon believed that there was no shortage of foreign exchange and that no SCF 
adjusunent %as necessary. ODA (1988) notes that this =umption is often incorrectly made as the SCF is 
meant to correct for price distortions c3used by trade restricting intzmentions n0er than for foreign 
exchange shortages. Based on consultafions with ODA and USAID representatives in Cameroon. a 
sensitivity analysis was thercforc conducted by applying a con%crsion factor (CF) of 0.90 to the applic3ble 
cost sUcams. Thc result %%as that the rict benefit of the project increased by 2-16 million CFAF from - 1852 
million to -1626 million CFAF. The relative inscrisitivit) to this CF is attributed to two factors. Firq. 
budgets prepared by WNVF excluded import duties on major import itzms such as vehicles and computing 
equipment: WNW has imported such equipment duty free under a special agrccmcnt and the CF was not 
applied to these costs in either the bxsc or ft sensitivity case. Second, the CF increased some of the 
opportunity costs of the project. An ex3mple is lost timber value: applying the CF to the dircet costs of 
tunt%-r extr3ction improves its profitability and thereby incre-ises the opportunity costs of conservation. 
16 It D, is the net benefit sucarn in yew t. ycar T is the year in %% hich net bcn. -fits reach a level RT. benefits 
c, scalate annually at a rate 'S' thereafter. then. at a discount raw r, the net prcsent value of this s=m is: 
T-i 
NIIV= 1: 139 * (1, +r). t + (I +r)-T * IIT*[I+lAr-g)] 
two The second term is the value in year 0 of An annuity Ahich grows annually over an infinite time horizon. 
The terics is finite if and only if &<r. Mve gwO. r=0.0% T=2040-1989. the second term is 0 '1665*BT. 
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Summaiv of Korup Pmjcct Cost and lIcncrit Streams 
(Mdl"u of consunt CFAF: 1989 Values) 
1989-1993 1996.2m 2010-2039 2040-" 
Dirra Covs (at niark-et pd ctsl* 
Capital & Running Cosu 2338 
Infrastruct= Cosu 3683 
OpcraLing Costs 2SM-r 2SO6. r 
Q=rtunity_Cb%ts fat Shad gw pricell 
Lost Timber Value 147/yf 
Lost Forcst Use 0-34/yr 34hir 
Dirm Bencrits fiff shadow 
Susuinod FOMSI Use 
I! dm) 
0- 13 Zýrf 132/yr 
Tourism 3-241)-t 24-4M-r 4fti 4Mlr 
Fisheries Protection 54-1628/yt 162Mi 
Flood Contiol 8-244/yf 244/yr 
Soil Ftnility NUntenance 4-120/yr 120/yr 
Summanci for 198'9-1995 vemicwl imah wA are Kited on datingi in WW'F. IIK (I 9Vh). 
4.5.3 S=dfic Cog and lRenefit Ccntre,, 
4.5.3.1 Cost Summary 
7le impacu of the park project on the Cameroon economy are most readily summarised by 
disaggrcgating the rn3jor cost-benefit ccntres into four distinct time periods. Itshouldbe 
noted that the analysis ignores sunk costs (pre-1989). A summary of these cost and benefit 
flows is presented in Table 4.1. indicating the value and timing of each of the amounts. A 
dismsion of each of the individual components follows. 
4.5.3.2 Dirca Coas 
The direct capital costs of the Korup project am based on budgets and plans in the Korup 
National Park Master Plan (WY; F. UK [1989b)). Their derivation is shown in Table 4.2 
and they total just in excess of 6000 million CFAF. The amount which actually eventually 
enters the CBA. however, is only 327,2. million CFAF. Costs related to compensation 
pa), ments are regarded as being purely pecuniary and are thus left out of the CBA. Also, 
certain costs involved with the mad construction are not truly incicr, ental to this project. 
Ile capital expenditures for roads and airstrips. over the period 1989-1995, are 3350 
million CFAF. Only 33% of the cost of these investments is regarded as incrementally 
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attributable to this project for social 
valuation purposes. This reflects that 
some of the Investmcnt would be 
undertaken In any event for other regional 
Imperatives. 11c level of 33% was taken 
its that proportion which was necessary to 
(it) accommodate specific park 
rNuiremcrits and (b) offset the ncgativc 
environmental impacts of this 
Infrastructure. 
Operating expenses are forecast to bc the 
equivalent of about 280 million CFAF 
annually commencing In 1995. This 
allows for all of the labour requirements 
of the park, as well as housing and 
overheads. Approximately two-thirds of 
Summary of Direct Costs of Park 
mponent of Korup Prqject. 1989-1995 
(milhms CFAF at muket prices) 
Ditta 
fmu 
Capiul Costs o(Puk Infustnicuut 895 
Pxks VchicIcs & Equipfficrit 79 
koadVAirstrips 3350 
Park L2bour & Expcnws 690 
Stoniuring & Administrafion 205 
Compmation Provision 256 
Continicncy 
Total Unadjusted Midget 
548 
6 (M 
Adjusmxnts for Social Valuation 
Compmation Provision - 256 
Non-inatmemd Roads -2245 
Contingmy ReLuing to Above - 250 
Total Adjusted Budget 3- 2r- 
I. S(vrce: F13%cd an datinjo in WWF-UK (19R9 
this Is direct labour cost for park 
administrative personnel, ganic guaMs, drivers, and maintenance workers. 
4.5.3.3 Lost Timber Value 
Ile lost timber value is that associated %%iLh commercially clearing the stands in the project 
area In the alternate development scenario. Land surveys of the region have typically 
concluded that the terrain does not lend itself well to commercW logging, and that the 
number of commercial species are limited. Nonetheless, there is some social value to 
harvesting the timber if one asserts that labour is valued at less than market wages. 
Because of the marginal nature: of the land, and the existence of better tracts elsewhere in 
Cameroon, it Is assumed that the clearing would not commencc untfl the year 2010. This 
coincides also with the deforestation trends in ncighbouring Nigeria ... it is anticipated 
there that no primary forest will exist after the turn of the century, hencc it is even 
conccivabic that the more immediate prcssurc may conic from that direcdon. 
Estimates of the net stardnS value of timber arc based on current avenge export prices for 
Cam, eroon's lumbcr products of approximately CFAF 20,000/0, with direct non-labour 
Inputs comprising CTAF 10.000/m3 to bring the product to its export point. Ubour 
Inputs at market prices are estimated to be CFAF MOW. and royalties and resource rents 
arc CFAF 250010. Commercial yields In the area are csdmated to be only 2 m3/ha, 
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attributable to this project for social 
valuation purposes. This reflects that 
some of the Investment would be 
undertaken In any event for other regional 
Imperatives. The level of 33% was mkcn 
as that proportion which was necessary to 
(a) accommodate specific park 
requirements and (b) offset the negative 
environmental Impacts of this 
Infrastructure. 
Summary of Dirca Costs of Park 
Component of Korup Project. 1989-1995 
(millions CFAF w mukct prices) 
Direct 
C= 
Capiul Cosu of Puk Infrasimmm 895 
Pxks Vchkks & ]Equiprmnt 79 
Ro; &WAirstrips 3350 
Pzk Labour & Expcnvs 690 
Slonjuxing & Administradon 205 
Compcnsation Provision 256 
Contingcncy 548 
Operaflng expenses are forecast to be the 
equivalent of about 280 million CFAF 
annually commencing in 1995. This 
allows for all of the labour requirements 
of the park, as well as housing and 
overhcads. Approxinutely two-thirds of 
Adjusuncnts for SocW Valuadon 
Compensation Provision - 256 Non-incrumnW Rmls -2245 
Con6ngcncy Relming to Above - 250 
ITotal Adjusted Budget 3 2r- 
I Scxirce- flawd m dat in s in %V%%F-UK Q 
this is direct labour cost for park 
administradve personnel. game guards, drivers, and maintenance workers. 
4.5.3.3 Lost Tunbcr Value 
The lost timber value is that associated with commercial. 1y clearing the stands in the project 
area In the alternate development scenario. Lwid surveys of the region have typically 
concluded that the terrain does not lend itself well to conunercial logging, and that the 
number of commercial species are limited. Nonetheless. there is some social value to 
harvesting the timber If one asserts that labour is valued at less than market wages. 
Because of the marginal nature of the land, and the existence of better tracts elsewhere in 
Canacroon, it is assumed that the clearing would not commence until the year 2010. This 
coincides also with the deforcstadon trends in ncighbouring Nigeria ... it is anticipated 
there that no primary forest will exist after the turn of the century, hence it is even 
conceivable dut the more immediate pressure may come from that direction. 
Estimates of the net standing value of timber arc based on cumnt average export prices for 
Cameroon's lumber products of approximately CFAF 20,000/0, with direct non-labour 
Inputs comprising CTAF 10,000/M3 to bring the product to its export poin Labour 
inputs At market prices are estimated to be CFAF 7500/M3. and royalties and resource rents 
arc CFAF 2500/m3. Commercial yields in the area are estimated to be only 2 m3/ha, 
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considerably less thin the Cameroon average yield from currently productive tracts of 5 
m3/h: '. Of the total pmjcct area. some 350,000 hi arc assumed to account for this yield. 
With the assumed shadow prices of labour. the net standing value of timber was hcncc 
estimated to be about 4400 million CFAF. %%hich would be harvested over a thirty year 
period commencing in 2010. Tbc value of the timber harvest would thus be about 147 
million CFAF annu: dly. assuming no real ln=scs In benefits or costs. 
4.5.3.4 Changes In Forest Use 
Under the Government of Cameroon regulations pertaining to national parks, people am 
not allowed to hunt and gather within the "k boundaries. Part of the initial mandate of the 
Korup studies was thereforr- to dverminc how best to deal with the villages lying Inside the 
boundaries. Currently them am six 013Scs which fall into this category: Bamka Batanga, 
Esuku=, Beta. Menge, Ek-undukundu and EmL %Vhilc the final strategy for compensating 
vill3gcs in the park has yet to be firmly established, it Is clear that restrictions will be 
imposed on their traditional activities. Although the restrictions may be regarded as 
necessary to promote conservation, they may lead to lost production for the Cameroon 
economy and, in the context of the CBA, any changes in %-Auc must be estinutcd. 
Estimating the change in forest use Is by no means a trivial task. BroAy speaking. we 
want to know the contribution the forest nukes to income and to what extent, in the 
presence of restrictions on forest harvesting, the labour will be productively used 
elsewhere. For examp1c, if a hunter can no longer hunt within the primary forest zone of 
the park but can still - %ith little change in effort - capture the same amount of quarry 
by 
hunting in the secondary forest zone around the park. then the lost value Is minimal. In a 
similar manner. if hunters simply reven to farming %%hen hunting restrictions are imposed, 
then the hunting losses %%ill to some degree be offset by applying labour to farm land. 
Alternately. one might imagine that sonic households utight relocate to equally productive 
arms whm th= = no restrictions, thus incurring only mlocation costs. 
In addition. them is also an impo=t dyr=ic element: although rcstricdons Imposed in the 
current period may limi't current income, they may - fluvigh protccdng the integrity of the 
forest - permit sustainable harvesting of the forest over a longer period than would 
othemise have been possible. Depending again on how libour shifts from one activity to 
the other, them may therefore be some net gain In future Income by maintaining access to 
the form 
Valuing the net effects depends, therefore, on how Individuals will mict to restrictions on 
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their activities in the face of other opportunities available to them. When opportunifles 
abound and labour is mobile. the restrictions may in fact have little impact on production 
within the economy. But It is difficult to assert. that such gencralisations will always apply 
- particularly In developing countries. In the case of Korup. the household surveys and 
field work conducted for the project provided somc important empirical information for 
evaluating the changes in income, %4-hHc also providing some: equally important impressions 
of how Income opportunities might change in reaction to restrictions on acdvides. Chapters 
5 and 6 of this thesis provide dctiilcd investigations into household and individual 
bchaviour but, for the purposes of the CBA, the follouing observations arc relevant. 
0) Villages inside the park - Involving somc 800 people - would have few other 
Immediate opportunities avaflablc to them if they were prevented from hunting 
and gathering. It is assumed that all hunting and gathering income is lost and is 
not replaced by other actividcs. %Vhilc this may overstate the loss as it assumes 
that the labour freed would havc a marginal productivity of zero elsewhere, 
such an assumption may, in fact. not be far off the mark in this case. First. 
they are prevented by trudidonal tribal and vfllagc land-usc customs from using 
the secondary forest zone outside of the park. Second, they cannot under 
Cameroonian law clear rnorc land within the park for firming. Finally. 
rclocadon Is apparently more costly than their income losscs. 17 In sununary, it 
seems likely that the restrictions would. to a large dcgrec. reduce incomes 
markedly. 
b) Villages outside the park. while they depend as well to varying degrees on 
hunting and gathering. generally have access to forested areas in which they 
could confinue their tradifional activides. It was therefore assumed that the 
restrictions would have no effect on their incomes in the current period. 
C) ON-cr the longer term, it was assumed that - in the absence of the park and if the 
area were logged - the gathering income would be lost even for those living on 
the forest peripheries and the displaced labour would have a marginal 
productivity of zero elsewhere. While again this latter assumption may involve 
overstating the bcnerits of conservation, it is believed to be reasonable given 
that the gathering activities are apparently highly productive (require fairly little 
tirnc) and are conducted primarily by women and children in their spare timc. 
While some of these assumptions arc certainly debatable, they provide a prelim4iazy basis 
for estimating the impacts on forest use. We explicitly separate them into two components: 
the opportunity costs Involved with the lost forest use of the households urithin the park, - 
and the longcr-term benefit of the sustained forest use arising from conservation of the 
priMary fOrCSL 
17 In the original budicu set out for the Korup project. 04 Governinent of Carnercm had alloc=d 3,00 
million CFAF to a relOatim provvnme %hkb would h-I%'C mOvCd ft Vilb9cs v6hcre they could 
h3ve continued their traditionaJ hunting and 92Lhaing Prxticm By cornparism. the pmxn1 %-Juc Of the 
hunting swid Sithering hmts me just over 200 million CFAF. 
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The household surveys utrc used as a basis for estimating the proportionate values of 
income from various activities for all of the villages in the forest =. If we let Y be the 
average incomc of villages in the park. and dcrinc further Income shims Sh, Sc' Sf. and So 
as shms of income from hunting, cashcrop production, fortst product production. and 
Oothce, the lost forest usc value in any period is readily estinutcd. In our specific example, 
defining N as the population of the six villages, the value of lost forcst usc (VL]r-U) In any 
period becomes: 
VLFU= N*Y*(Sh+Sr). 
which explicitly assumes that these villages can still continue to have access to their 
cashcrop and other inconv-- (pimazily from rcmittarwes, trading and livestock) but. as noted 
earlier, that income from thcsc other soumes does not Increase. From the surveys of the 
villages in the park. the value Y is estimated to be 63.7W CFAF and the lost sham Is 
cstimatcd as 67% for the CBA calculations. A total population of 800 individuals is 
involved and it is thus estimated that VU-U is 34.14 million CFAF once full enforcement 
of park programmes occurs in 1995. The loss is phased in to reflect partial enforcement 
levels of 50% in 1993. Note from Table 4.1 that VLFU=O after 2010 as it is assumed that 
the villages would not have had access to this incomc in any event if clearing of the area 
commenced at that tinz- 
Sustained Fmcst Usc (ftncfit =gum= 
Tbc existence of the park will ensure the availability of forest products to the entire 
population of the region for longer than they would otherwise have access to these. Under 
the assumptions noted vulicr, %%r- can estimate this for years beyond 2010 as: 
SFU- YONOSr, 
where Na is the a= population which obtains some share of its income through hmcsdng 
forest products. Again, from the household surveys. the relevant csti=tcs of the 
parametcrs diffcmd depending on %here the individuals were. For this calculation, survey 
results for villages in the "Eastern Buffer Zone" %k= used to ch=ctcrise forest use in the 
rural development zone around Korup National Park. This implies that about 12,000 
people would benefit from sustained gathering activities at 11.000 CFAF per capita 
annually-, these activities would likely halt quite abrupfly once logging commenced In the 
area. In the year 2010 and beyond, this amounts to an annual benefit of about 132 million 
CFAF. 
cm 
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4.5.3.5 Othcr Dimct 13cncriu 
T(-Ajdtm flencrits 
No detailed tourism study has been undcnakcn to this date. hence estimates are somewhat 
conservative and conjectural. Ile estimate is based on an assumpdon that the park uill 
generate an incremental 50 visits from bodi researcheri and toufists in 1989 and 1990,100 
visits In 1991, and then escalating to 1000 visits annually by the year 2000. Based on 
typical expenditures wW itineraries elsewhere in Cameroon, the average visitor is assumed 
to spend 7 days on a visit. spending E225 on goods and services. At the assumed shadow 
wage rate. the net income component of this expenditure to Carricroon is estimated to be 
43% of the gross. The resultant net tourism benefits arc about L96,000 annually. or 48 
million CFAF. 
Fisheries Prcxcction 
Both the Korup Project rainforest area and its complement in Nigeria - Oban Park - protect 
a vast onshore and offshore fishery which has been estimated by some to exceed MOO 
million annually. 18 'ne connection bctwcen the rainforcst area and this fishery provides an 
interesting cx=plc of an environmental service provided by the rainforcst, and it is not 
atypical of how coastal communities might depend on the integrity of inland envin3nmcntal 
rcsources. 
As shown earlier on the map In Figure 1.2, there exists a vast area of mangrove swamps 
along the shores of Nigeria and Cameroon. This mangrove area supports a wide range of 
species - including whitefish, shrimps, and alligators - which are commercially harvested. 
11c connection which the rnangro%ts have to the rainforr-st 100 km away has to do with the 
fact that dirce nujor river courses collect %%-ater from the rainforest and flow into the ocean 
at this poinL Large variations in water levels of these rivers arise as a result of fluctuations 
In the amount of rainfall occurring over the forest. At periods of high water, the mangrove 
areas arc inundated with frcshwater whereas, during low periods, the salt water from the 
ocean finds its way inland along these river courses. Because of the large variations in 
river volumes, the mangrove area is larger than would typically arise from just tidal 
variations. But the entire mangrove ecosystem has evolved and flourished as a result of 
these phenomena: major changes in the frcshwater environment would likely change the 
mangroves. For example, rcrnoving the rainforest canopy of Korup forest would increase 
the peak flows of the rivers which, in addition to demasing the salinity of the mangrove 
18 See Reid (1988) for& dLxuWon of this. 
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arca. would mrry a greater volurm of sedirnent Into it. 
The scientific evidence (Reid I l9s8l) suggests that major changes In the freshwater flows - 
such as that afising from deforestation - would altcr the ecological b3lancc In the 
mangroves to the extent that n=y of its commercial spccics would be lost. Furthcrq them 
is some speculation that the offshore fishery resource dcpcnds to some dcgrcc on food fish 
which breed in the mangroves. Although the tics bctwccn the forest and the offshore 
fishery am somewhat speculative. there is less doubt that the forest pla)i an Important role 
in ni amitaining the important onshore nungtove fishcrics. Appropriately. while no estinuic 
of the value of offshore fisheries was made. estimates of the value of the onshore fishery 
can be derivel 
Two independent methods am used to estimate the value of the onshore fisheries: (I) fish 
production; and Cii) economic activity levels. ne fish production estinuic is based on the 
observation (Reid, 1988, p. 45) that the total productivc c3pacity in the relevant areas of 
Nigeria and Cameroon together is about 12,800 metric tonnes. At typical fish prices of 500 
CFAFAg in Cameroon, this provides an Imputed annual value of C12.8 million. The 
second estinutc is buW cm econonu*c activity levels. Fromavailable data. the population 
dependent on fishing is about 5000 in Nigeria and 13,000 in Cameroon. Using average 
per capita incomes in the mangrove regions. which am about C. 100 in Nigeria and C750 In 
Cameroon, the total fishery value Is about CIO. 75 million annually-19 Although these 
estimates am admittedly, son-xwhat crudc, they lend support to an annual value somewhat 
in excess of LIO million for the total onshore fishery. 
But this value falls under the watershed of both Korup and Oban. Given that Korup 
represents about one-third of the regional forest. the size of the annual bcnef its supported 
by the Korup forest is proportionately reduced to E3.59 million. Further, this benefit only 
comes into play fully in the year 2040 in the CHA, being phased In through equal 
increments of L120,000 starting in 2010. Finally, an adjustment must be made to reflect 
the value of this to Nigeria. 7bis adjustment is based on the economic dependence of the 
local popul3dons which. as can be computed from the assumptions above, Is 9.3% of the 
total; - i. e.. 90.7% of the benefits from =intalning Korup Intact accrue to Cameroon, hence 
the sustained (post' . 1040) environmental benefit of Korup to Cameroon's onshore fisheries 
197hese C31culzions latm bued on dLscuuicxu % ith the Dcr4went of Fiskrics. In Yaoung, C. Amcwon. 
and with the Ministry of Agriculture in Cilahu. Nigerii. It is noted that the income levels in the 
m3nSrOve A, = of Carnemon am aboui 5 times those in ft Korup NstiorW Patk =. L From visits which I 
made to some %ril4gcs in the nwgm%t: &, then was in &pI%=t sccumuUtion of wealth which was absent in 
Koru; r many houseWds W clecv" to*ls, vid nuny txuLs hsd pcuol engines. While this does not 
pm%v that fishing incomes were high (d= was also pLaporwd to be a gmt deal of Cross-bordef smuggling 
activity). it dOeS krAl some uqpA to the higher o%trall incMe levels. 
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It Is often asscrtcd that rainforcsts, play both imponant global as well as local meteorological 
funcdons. While there is lilde basis for estimating - for a single rainforcst such as Korup, - 
the incrctricrital benefits frtxn these functionsý it is possible to estimate the potendal bencrits 
from distinct funcdons, such as flood control. As rainforcsts disappear. the peak and 
trough levels of surface water flows become more pronounced. In a high rainfall area such 
as Southwest Province, the potential flooding increases %ith dcforestafion. 
While it Is impossible to predict exactly when a devastating flood might occur, one can 
approach the problem by replacing the net present value benefits with the expected net 
present value of bcncfim It requires assurriing that society is risk-ricuuml and that it has 
perfect perceptions of the risks involved. In pracdce it means that compensatory 
programmes are available to assist flood victinisý that some form of crop or flood insurance 
can be purchased by individuals, or that other market mechanisms (such as land prices) 
reflect the relative degrees of flooding risk. As none of these circumstances normally exist 
in developing countries, using the expected value approach is likely to undervare the 
potential bcncrits to social welfare of maintaining the forest intact. Nonetheless, the 
assumpdons of risk-ncuuulity and perfect pcmcpdons are made here. 
nc expectcd valuc loss of flooding in any year t can bc csd=tcd as: 
Flood Control Benefit, Nfc * (AdIA) * Yfr. T 
where N[c am the number of people expected to be cffcctcd by a flood event, and AdIA is 
the proportion of the deforested area of forest to the total area. Yfc is the per capita inco= 
in the region lost due to a flood event. Ibc flood event is assumcd to occur every T years. 
For calculating the N. P. V. bencrit, it was assumed that Nfc=20,000, which corresponds to 
the population in the Korup, Park rural development zone as well as about 8000 people 
living along river courses between Korup and the coast (it excludes those in the mangrove 
estuaries). 71c income loss is estimated to be that corresponding to all livestock income 
and one season of cashcrop income as the flooding would likely occur in July or August 
and the major harvest occurs in Octobcr. 20 Based on the survey, it is estimated that 
1% 
1,0 Strictly speaking. the major harvests am from annual ttee ctops juid the actual damage my be to the tree 
Itscll naha than tojust the podsor beans on the um Any pcrmanentdimage to the me would be reflected 
In lo%cr productivity for some ycxs to co=, and this approach might themfore undersure the lost income. 
On the other hxkJ. it is expected that not every crop In the arcA will affected. and some product will no 
doubt still be mxkcuble In the case o(a flood cvcnL Whether these two offsetting influences are equal in 
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Yf, u6l. OOO CFAF. 77his corresponds to livestock Income of 1000 CFAR and cashcroP 
income of 40,000 CFAF to which a conversion factor of 1.5 his been applied to reflect 
differences between producer and world prices. Pmduccr prices paid by markaing boards 
to coffee and cocoa farmers are regulated in Camcroon at levels which. during the time die 
survey was undemk-en. were about two-thirds of the world price. 11c profits reallsed by 
the marketing boards would thus also be foregone In the event of this crop loss. and arc 
appropriately valued by the application of such a conversion factor. With full 
deforestaflon, and the expecution that such a flood event would occur about once every 
rive years, the expected flood losses at shadow prices would approach 244 million CFAF 
annually. 
Soil Fcttili! y Nfaintmance 
Although the soils in the area are not generally of %-cry high quility. It has been asscricd that 
rainforcsts contribute to some maintcnance of soil fcrtility through various mechanisms. 
Although these benefits am somewhat conjectural. an ordcr-of-mignitude estimate can be 
made based on an estimate of the regional agricultural product. Specifically. it is assumed 
that, without the Korup forest. there would be a 10% loss in the value of the cashcrop 
income in the area. 11is loss would comnr)cncc in 2010 and manifest Itself fully (at about 
120 million CFAF annually) by the year 2040. It should be noted that this does not 
necessarily mean that them will be a loss in output if the fertility losses can be offset by 
increases in other inputs (such as firtiliscrs). in which case the assumption reflects the 
increased costs of these inputs (at sWow prices) to meet the sarne output levels. 
%-Wuc is PurdY cOnkctuW. but ft assumpdon Is nonctWas nude Wt fty am 
J24 Ckip#rJ 
RIP" I Tablc 4.3- 
sumnury or Korup National Park Cost Bencrit Analysis 
Net Present Value 
(mill on CFAF) 
SOCIAL COSTS 
Total Capital Costs - cxcluding Roads -1988 Total Capital Costs - Roads -1022 Total Umg-term Opcrating Costs -2381 Labour Adjustnxnt for Dircct Costs 916 
Lost Timbcr Valuc -353 Lost Forcst Usc -223 TOTAL COSTS 
SOCIAL BENEFITS 
Sustained Forest Use 354 
Tourism 680 
Fisheries Protection to Cameroon 1770 
Control of Flood Risk 265 
Sod Productivity Maintenance . 130 TOTAL B ENTIFITS 
NET BENEFIT 
RATE OF RETURN 
E%-Juadon Year (Year 0) 1989 
Social Discount Rate 8% 
Shadow Wage Rate 50% 
Years of Deforestation 2010-2040 
Road Costs Included 33% 
4.5.4 Resulm 
4.5.4.1 Cost Bencrit Analysis Rcsults 
-5051 
3199 
-1852 
6.2% 
Table 4.3 summarises the results of the cost-bcncrit analysis base case. showing the 
contributions of major cost and benefit centres. All figures = in cons=t 1989 terms, 
discounted to the year 1989. The net present value of the project, at an 8% rate of 
discount, is about minus 1852 million CFAF for Cameroon. The benefit and cost flows at 
shadow prices correspond to a real Internal rate of return of 6.2% from Camcroon's 
perspective. As the NPV Is ncgadvc, the CBA indicates that the project would not be 
welfare Improving to Cameroon if all of the costs were incurred internally. In short, one 
would not expcct Camcroon actually to take steps to conserve Korup unless some transfers 
or other Incentives were forthcoming from the rest of the world. The analysis indicates that 
the current value of such Incentives must be at least 1852 million CFAF to provide an 
adequate inducement to Cameroon to pursue the park initiative. 
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1(milhon CFAF) 
C35e 
Base Case 
Exclude Onshore Fisheries 
Social DLwmnt Rate w 6% 
s 
-1852 
-3622 
+ 319 
A number of sensitivity analyses were 
conducted. and the msults presented In 
Table 4.4 merit some brief remarks. 
First. a sensitivity analysis was 
undertaken to illustrate the effect of 
excluding the protective benefits of the 
forest to the onshore mangrove fisherics. 
Excluding these benefits essentially doubles the (negative) social cost of the project, and It 
underlines the importance of this environmental function of the forest in the overall project 
evaluation. Second, results were calculated at a discount rate of 6%. As noted earlier. this 
would be equivalent to assuming that the base case cost and benefit streams were growing 
at a real rate of 2% per year. In this case, the project shows a slight positive NPV of 319 
million CFAF. indicating that the project would be w0fare improving to Cameroon in the 
absence of international transfers. To a large degree this can be attributed to the 
considerable local bcncf its of conservation which occur beyond the year 20M. at a lo%k-cr 
discount mte these beconx significantly nuxt pmnounced. 
4.5.4.2 notection Scenario 
7bc infmstructure and programmes mobilised by the Korup Project would not. as noted 
previously, show immediate conservation bcnerits and it is important in calculating the 
rainforest supply price to be specific about how much forest is actually protected. To 
estimate this, we must estimate the amount of deforestation %%hich would occur in the 
absence of the park programme. 1"here are actually two stparatc sources of deforestation 
which we considw. the f irst deals %%ith a reduction in the area of primary forest through Its 
'conversion' to secondary forest by populations living within the park-, the second deals 
with physical destrucdon of primary forest from hirvesting timber. The relevant areas are 
summiriscd in Table 4.5 and am discussed below. 
The rust component relates to the nondcstructivc "conversion7 of primary forest to lower 
quality secondary forest. Strictly speaking. this conversion is not likely to effect the 
environmental functions rel ating to local clinute control. but - If It bcconxs permanent and 
widc-spread - it does effect the overall species diversity of the forest. it represents a 
relatively S=U Proportion of the %kholc and Is assumed to correspond to the activities of the 
populations %%ithin the parL IMc conversion occurs because, through living in the forest. 
land is cleared for village sitm temporary shelter%. farms, and general access trails. Devitt 
(1988) estimated this conversion to beabout 25 hectares per person. noting, however. that 
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Korup National Park PrcxCCtion Scenario 
Year Arca (ha) of Primary IWw Arci (ha) of Primary Fomst Net Area (M) (1) COnMw 10 Scconivy 
Fm%t h L 31 1 fi 
I larmted for Timber Pr=tcd 
AE x OC. DMI 2 gmt 
wittw3ut P"k With Pwk Withow Park* With Ruk 
P 
With Park" 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1989 20,000 20,000 0 0 0 
1990 20.000 20.000 0 0 0 
1991 20,000 20,000 0 0 0 
1992 20,000 20.000 0 0 0 
1993 20.000 10.000 0 0 10,000 
1994 20.000 10,000 0 0 10.000 
1995 20.000 0 0 0 20.000 
2010 6 .6 8.300 11.766 
.6 20,066 
2011 00 23.400 0 23,400 
2020 00 128.700 0 128,700 
2030 00 245,700 0 245,700 
2M 0 351,000 0 351.000 
2(A 1-* 00 351,000 0 351.000 
Alsumes clearing of 11.700 becu"3 pez)=. commencing wi th those =as converted by local 
popuLuion, L 
Column (5) a [(1)-(2)) + 1(3X4)) 
the forest oftcn'recovcred' quickly once people had left the area - provided that there was 
still a large area of primary forest adjacent to the disturbed area. Without the park, 
therefore. the convened area associated with its 800 inhabitants is about 20,000 hectares. 
With the park. it is cstimated that 50% of this would be able to 'rocovcein 1993 and the 
rcmainder in 1995. 
The second component corresponds to the protection of the intact forest which was 
assumed otherwise to be clear-cut for timber over the period 2010-2040. As noted in 
Table 4.5, it is assumed that som, e 11,700 hectares of primary forest would be cleared 
annually over a 30 year period conimencing in 2010. By the year 2040, in the absence of 
the park, so= 35 LOW hectares of primary forest would have been lost. 
Through Inspection of these components, the actual 'protection scenario! afforded by the 
park Is therefore clear. In the very short term, no protcction is afforded because the 
population currently living in the park are assumed to continue their activities. After about 
5 ycars. restrictions on these activities effectively protect 20,000 hectares of forest area 
which otherwise would have been IOSL It is not until after 2010, however, that the major 
protection bcnefits might be reallsed, corresponding to the restrictions on logging imposed 
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by the park. Over the long-tcrm, the existence of the park effectively protcas 35 1,000 
hoctam in pcqxtuity. 
4.5.4.3 Korup RaInfortst Supply Price 
We are now in a position to calculate the rainforest supply price according to &luation 
(4.10). Ile 'present value of the protection scenario dcWled in the previous section Is: 
be 
P. V. Ama Pmtcctcd n 7,1.08't *M-, 
too 
w 313.800 discounted hectarc-years. 
Given that the required transfer was calculated to be 1852 million CFAF in the cost benefit 
analysis, it is clear that the rainforcst supply price for Korup National Ruk is about 3600 
CFAF per hectare per )=. Ibis implies that if the rest of the world were to give 
Cameroon anything above 3600 CFAF for each hectare protected in any given year, 
Cameroon would have an inccritivic to protect the parL 21 
To allow a more meaningful comparison to other projects, we can express this in some 
i common international currency. As the selection of currency is arbitrary. I &hall use the 
European Currency Unit (ECU) which, at the time of preparing the budgets for the Korup 
plan, stood at an exchange rate of 340 CFAFIE-CU. The rainforest supply price for Korup 
then is 10.60 ECU per hectare per year (or 1060 pcr k-M2 per yeu) of rainforcst. 
It should be stressed that the RSP need not be inicrpreted as a programme which involves 
continuous tmnsfers which build up slowly stuting in 1993 and peak in 2040. In theory, 
the cxcmisc says simply that any programme of transfers %kith a present value in excess of 
1852 million CFAF will be adequate to consme the forest. In practice. this programme 
would likely include a combination of capital transfers to fund the Initial infrastructure, as 
%%-cU as ongoing transfers to undem-fite the opentions of the parL 
7bc op=ti%-c question is now whether it is worth just over 1000 ECU per km2 per yew to 
the rest of the wmid to induce Camemn to conscrve Korup. One means of ans%ktring this 
question is to investigate the global benefits of conserving minfomsts. But the rationale for 
concentrating on the supply price was to allow compuisons to be nude to other projects. 
hence I sUI now review briefly some other conservation projects %here actual t=sfcz% to 
I--S hm-e occurred. 
21 While dividing the project into kcums in this rnanner provides a convenient pedAgogical basis for 
axnpwisons to be ma& %, jLh othcc Mjccts. it $hmld no, be ukc-n 1,0 imply that tM project Is divisible 
into twam c1cments. 
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14.6 Calculating Willingness-to-Pay: Some Speciric Examples 
4.6.1 Introduction 
71c Purpose of this section is to invcsdgatc a number of cases where direct transfers to 
LDCS have occurred for rainforcst conservation. IMe previous section indicated that Korup 
would require transfers equivalent to about 1000 ECU per km2 per year, and one specific 
objective of this section Is therefore to invcsdgaic whether Korup would be a bargain or 
reladvely dear from the point of view of the rest of the world. In the process. it will also 
become clear what sorts arnounts, people have been willing to pay to conserve certain 
rainforcst areas. 
I shall be invcsdgaflng six specific tmsfers, all of which occurred over the period 1987 to 
1989. Four of these transfers involve debt for nature (DFN) swaps, and two are targeted 
fund raising campaigns to conserve specific rainforcst projects. 71c transfers investigated 
am: 
a) Beni Reserve DFIN Swap - Bolivia, 1987 
b) Amazonian Parks DFN Swap - Ecuador, 1987 
C) SL Paul Park DFN S%-jp - Philippines, 1988 
d) Santa Rosa Park DFN Swap - Costa Rica. 1988 
0 Montc Verdc Cloud Forest Direct Mail Campaign - Costa Rica. 1988 
f) Oban Park FoundeesBond - Nigeria, 1989 
Before addressing each of these individually. however, it is useful first to review how the 
calculations relating to these projects correspond to the rainforest supply price. 
4.6.2 EvalunfingWillinimns-to-PaX 
It will be recalled that the RSP is the minimum amount which a host LDC must receive 
before It will conserve its rainforest. In this section we shall not strictly bc looldng at the 
RSP, as we are investigating actual transfers. One would norrnally presurne that these 
transfers = more thin the RSP for the project and, depending on the bargaining positions 
of the various parties, it is conceivable that the particular LDC would have collected 
subsuntially more than what they would have been wWing to accept. As we are not in the 
position of evaluating the bargaining positions of the various parties in the ncgodadons, the 
evaluations which follow can not necessarily bc construed as RSP evaluations. 71ey can. 
however, be taken as some measure of how much the rest of the world was willing to pay 
for a given conservation programme. As such, they provide a useful comparison to 
cppsv l'tk# I, Q_ 
projects for which the RSP Is kno%-n (such as Korup). 
As a corollaxy to 00 given by Equation (4-10). the calculidon of the mvcalcd %killingness to 
pay 0, is then given as: 
00 
Z(I Rt 
Y'(I +r)*t 6 AEt 
l*O 
where, again, Rt Is the amount actually transferred to the LDC and AE Is the expected 
protection scenario. It is particularly important in these evaluations. as well, to specify AE 
r-=fufly as all of the six programmes cvaluatcd in this uxtion have a rather short effective 
life. 7be DFN swaps, for example, will typically provide protection for only a few yean. 
4.6.3 Debt for Nature Swalzs 
As four of the transfers investigated involve some form of DF-N,, swap. it is useful to review 
briefly the nature of such deals. 22 Ile DFN swap was first proposed as a conservation 
tool by Lovejoy (1984) when he rccognised that many LDCs struggling to meet debt 
repayment terms might prefer to redirect a proportion of their debt service payments to 
domestic conservafion initiatives. Ile basic mechanism involving a DFN swap Is that an 
external donor purchases a country*s debt paper on the discounted secondary Market and 
returns this debt paper to the LDC in return for some conservation 'cons ldcrafion'. ne 
consideration can take many formsý but the most common is that a local currency bond is 
established (usually at a face value which is also discounted somewhat from the face value 
of the debt paper which %%-as returned) which p3ys interest and/or principal over a fixed 
period to underwrite the expenses of a local conservation project. 
One of the primary benefits of such swaps to an LDC is that it effectively gives it 3 
backdoor access to the secondwy market of its own debt. Cohen (1988). for cx=plc. 
chimcterises the secondwy nurket as a partitioned markct which works perfectly freely 
with everyone allowed to participate in the trading of debt paper cxccpt the LDC itself. 
Contracts am smrt=d in this way to prevcni the LDC from having pcr%trse effects on the 
value of its own debt. If a country did have access, it could announce or undertake a series 
of apparently 'baS policies which drove the value of its debt down In the secondary 
22 For a deWled discussion of DR4 swaM the rtzda is fctcntd to Drxnble (1988) Simon$ (1998), %vn 
M1 83 rth" oUt (1988). Sevills (1997.1988). Fuller and Willimson (1998). WA WN%T-US 
i198 ). For fu 
dcuj on the role of debt-c4Wty swaps and xxvndvy dcbt mAtu in Alkvisfing LDC dcb(. Itlevant recent 
telu include Simon= (1985), NonUuus (19M), Dcrgsman and Edisif (1998). Cohen (1998). Cohen wd 
Sachs (1996). Cuddinpm aW Smd (19&5). and Sachs (198S). 
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m. ukCL Once the value reached a low enough level. It could buy back the debt, reverse the 
policies, and continue on a debt-ftcc course. While the DFN swap does give LDCs indirect 
access to their secondary markets, it Is not likely that countries witl s= to do siuy things to 
depress the secondary mukct Just so they can sign more DFNI agreements: to date the DFN 
agreements have bccn small In reladon to the outstanding dcbL 
Although the DFN agreements have not made a significant impact on the outstanding debt. 
they have been relatively large in relation to the amounts of money which conservation 
groups have traditionilly been able to muster. 7lic four Df N1 swaps investigated in this 
section are cases In point. 
4.6.4 Descdpdon of tMiects 
A total of six transfers were evaluated using the framework described above. 71ey were 
selected because in each case there was a simple direct transfer of funds intended to 
conserve a particular rainforest arm in the countries. In all cases, reasonably good relations 
existed between the initiating donor agency and the host governimcm and the expectations 
were that the transfers would indeed promote effective conservation of the rainforest. albeit 
In sonic cases for a linýtcd time only. 
The first project investigated involves a protected area in excess of 1.5 million hectares in 
the Beni Nature Reserve in Bolivia (WNVF-US [1988a)). The Beni Reserve is in the 
Amazonian region of northern Bolivia. and supports 13 of Bolivia's 18 endangered animal 
species. Mic program= involved a DFN swap in July 1987 in which debt paper having a 
face value of USS650.000 was purchased by Conservation International for USSIO0.000. 
I'he Bolivian government in return elevated the protected status of the reserve and turned 
the equivalent of USSIO0.000 in local currency over to a local non-govcmmcntal 
org3nisation (NGO) for establishing the reserve. In addition, a direct transfer of 
US$150.000 was provided by USAID to the NGO. 71ic total funds are not anticipated to 
be adequate to protect the reserve in perpetuity as their primary intent %-as to initiate 
protection of the rcscrvc and rcrno%v very short-term land use prcssurcs. 
IMe second project Involves a total of about I million hectares of rainforcst in two Area of 
the Am3zonian region in Ecuador (NVNVF-US [19871). These areas are threatened by 
spontaneous colonisation and Industrial encroachment from oil exploration. It also 
Involved a DFN swap In 1987 in which debt paper having a face value of US$ I million 
was purchased for 35.5% of its face value. 71c Bolivian treasury transferred local 
currency Instruments having an equivalent of US$ I million to Fundaci6n Natura. a local 
- 
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NGO entrusted with the conservation projects. Ile project was pan of a total US$ 10 
milfion which the Ecuador Governnxnt had agreed to treat in this nunner foe conservation 
including projects in the Andes and in the Galapagos Islands, aldmugh It Is understood that 
the initial injections were nv--&nt to alleviate sorne of the inunciliate pressures on the 
Amazonian por6ons. 
11C SL Paul Park in the Philippines is an am& of 5753 hectares containing montane and 
coastal forests as well as a unique undagmund river (WWF-US 11989cl). Ime am is 
native habitat to a number of endemic endangered species including the Philippines 
crocodile. pangolins, and the Palawan bear-cat, and green tunles are known to nest on 
beaches in the parL The area is threAtened by shifting cultivation and Illegal logging. and 
them is a lack of local government resources to fund the park department adequately to 
ensure its protection. In 1988, WWF agreed to exchange a face value of US$390,000 in 
debt - which it had purchased at a 50% discount - in return for the PhUippines Government 
support for a selection of conservation initiatives: the largest of which was the St. Paul 
Park'projea. About 40% of the funds were targeted to this project, and the government 
agreed to transfer local currency in that amount into an instrument which would allow a 
local NGO - the 1hribon Rwridation - to provide support for die are& for about 9 yeam 
The last DFN swap I investigate involves some 16,000 hectares adjoining the Santa Rosa 
National Park project in Costa Rica (WWF-US 11988b; 1988d)). This is ac=lly one of 
many DFN swaps in which Costa Rica has been involved, but most of the others involved 
multiple projects which involved only total unprogrammed budgets and thus precluded 
analysing specific cmponcnts. Specifically for the Santa Rosa Park, a face amount of 
US$270,000 in debt paper uras purchased by WWF in 1988 for USSIW, 000 and returned 
to the Central Bank of Costa Rica. Also. some 10% of a face value US$5.4 rWillion debt 
swap is carmarked for the Santa Rosa project. In exchange the Central Bank issued a local 
ct=ncy bond paying principal and interest over a rive year period to the National Park 
Service (which is operated independently from the government). the proceeds of which 
were to be dedicated to the protection of this sms 
The fifth project involved a direct transfer to purchase critical Unds from local farmers In 
the Monte Verde Cioud Forest area. of Costa Rica (WWF-US 11988b; 1988d]). Funds 
w= raised by WWF-Canada through a direct mail campaign and individual donadons, and 
involved a total of about Cdn$300,000 in 1988 dedicated to protecting some 3600 hectares 
of the Monte Verde Cloud Forest. Ile forest is In Northwest Costa Rica and it contains 
rare and endangered species found in typical mid-elcvation rainfortsts. It protects the 
watershed of Costa Rica's largest h)*oelectric facility. but it was being threatened by land 
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speculation and Illegal logging. Transfers through the programme, which may be 
channelled through a Dr-N swap arrangement, would be anticipated to provide protection 
for the forest for about five Years. 
71c last project Investigated involves the Oban Nadonal Park project in Nigeria having a 
core protectcd amaof about 250,000 hectares (WW'F-UK [1989a)). Oban Park is adjacent 
to Korup National Park In Cameroon and contains similar primary rainforest. as that found 
In Korup. While WW`F and the Government of Nigeria were undertaking long term 
planning for Oban. however. it became evident that immediate pressures from logging and 
bush fallow agriculture were threatening the integrity of the foresL A fund raising 
campaign In the form of an "Oban Park Foundces Bond" was thus initiated in the U. K. 
whereby panicipants would for E25 rcccivc a certificate saying they assisted in the 
establishment of the Oban Park. Some: E700,000 were raised in this manner In 1989 and 
the entire proceeds were used to underwrite the expenses of cl-iciting a National Park decree 
from the Government of Nigeria and paying for immediatc enforcement efforts necessary to 
keep the area Intact over its rust year. It is expected that the longcr-tcrm funding 
requirements of the park will be met, once a long-term plan is established and mobifisedL 
4.6.5 Re%ults 
A summary of the results of the willingness-to-pay calculations for these transfers is 
provided In Table 4.6. As the projects were undertaken at separate times and used different 
cuffencies, all calculations were nonmlised to ECU at 1989 values using appropriate 
adjustments for both inflation and cuffency exchange rates. In addition. an 8% discount 
rate was used for discounting to allow comparisons to bc madc to the Korup evaluation 
(although It is noted that the results arc less sensitive to discount rates over the short 
protection mid transfer scenarios sho%%m h=). 
Although the sample Is not meant to provide a statistically significant cross-section of 
conservation, It does provide some indication of how much individuals or organisations 
have been implicitly willing to pay for conservation. As noted previously, however, these 
figures should not be construed as the minimum amount which would be necessary to 
Induce conservation nor should they necessarily be construed as the maximum that the 
world Is willing to pay: all one can say with certainty is that they fall between these 
cxtmnlcs. 
- 
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Table 4.6 
Esdnutes of Revealed Willingness-to. -Pay and RaInfomit Supply Price 
Real Discam-t RAte 8% 
CuTtrocies NonnaEsed to: ECU 
N-P-V. NonTulised to: 1989 
Willin ncwto-T%X, C&kul&tkms 
prcj= PMC=Cd Prýxxtm N. P. v. of AC" P. V. Am iRtvoaw 
i Dexredm Arm scautio Thndm P(UWCW Waunvx4ktg>P&y 
(km'2) 
--fflrctl) 
c"km2. Y1) 
Bcrj Pc-vnv 15420 1 yaw 234 ISA2 13.19 
Bolivia (198D 
DFN Ss-ap 
Amazonian PmrU 10000 1 Yes 332 10.00 33.24 
Eam (1997) 
DFN Swap 
SL PAUI PWt 57.5 9 YCAM 353 039 910. U 
philopines (1988) 
DFN Swap 
Santa Rosa Part 160 3 YCAM 263 0.69 383-84 
cosu Rica (1988) 
DFN Swap 
Monic Venk Forea 36 5 YCNS 245 0.16 1575.76 
cosm Rk4 (1988) 
Dimct ýW 
Obm P*rk 2500 1 YCX 1029 2.50 411.76 
Nigeria 0 989) 
F; ours&es Rcmd 
R-sinromst-Suply Nce Calculaflon 
Sý 
Pt*Ct ptokurd Protecum N. P. V. ei P. V. AM Rimfan: a 
Dc=iffim Amt scennio Trwderl protxw Supply Plice 
(km2) M F, CU) M km2. ") (FCLIAM2Ar) 
Korup Pvt 35 10 Prawc6m o( 200 Im2 sug 5.14 1060.15 
Cameroon (IM) Frm 1993 UnW 2011 
Phued in to FuH 
Prowbon by 2040 
7'hem is a considerable mngc of msults even within this small sample: the Beni Resave 
deal was the least expensive at about 15 ECU per km2 per yew. whemss the amount 
contributed for protecting the ? &ntc Verde Cloud Forest appr=hcs 1600 ECU per km2 
per )=r. Abstru-ting from potential diff=ncts In Wgiining position, and assuming that 
the amounts am determined by some consistent mechanism or rmchanisms, I ShAll Offer A 
number of potential reasons for these differcnces. The first Is that the amounts paid do 
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actually rcncct the supply prices of these projects fairly closely, in which case we may 
conclude that some of the rcadily identifiable 'bargains' had been spotted quite early - the 
proiccis In Dolivi3 and Ecuador were indeed the first to be initiated - and subsequent 
projects am going to cost one to two orders of magnitude mom. A second reason for the 
differences may be in the quality of the area being protected: if we assumc that all six of 
these transfer% have the same hedonic price. it implies that we regard the quality of a hectare 
In Monte Verde to be about one hundrcd times greater than a hectare in Amazonia. T"his 
may not be an unrcasonablc result given that cloud forest such as that found in Costa Rica 
Is rarer than Amazonlan rainforcsL A third potential reason for the differences is that they 
reflect expectations of success in the particular protection scenario. 7"his is simflar to the 
quality ugumcnt above, except that in this case one might argue along the lines that the 
chances of success in Monte Verde are one hundred times greater than the chances in 
Amazonia. Formally. this means that the protection scenario has been mis-spccified (recall 
that It is the expected protection) but it suggests that them may be some merit in cxphcidy 
Identifying the probability of success when evaluating such projects. 
While them is little - if any - basis for testing these conjectures at this stage, the framework 
which has been used does allow us to start making comparisons and asking relevant 
questions. For example, in the case of Korup National Park. we see that. at 1000 ECU per 
km2 per year. it is not necessarily one of the great bargains in the world, yet the level of 
transfers which is required is not out of line with that which has bccn raised or paid 
elsewhere. Given that Korup is regarded by many to be one of the most important 
rainforest, areas on the African continent, 'quality' considerations may suggest that the 
necessary funds to pursue the pro*t could be raised. 
6 4.7 Summary Comments 
Ws chapter has suggested an analytical mechanism - the rainforest supply price - for 
evaluating the level of transfers which are required to induce an LDC to conserve a 
particular ralinforest projccL One particular advantage of this tool is that it allows one to 
address questions of allocative efficiency without necessarily requiring that broad issues 
relating to the valuation of global benefits of rainforest conservation are discussed. Also, it 
allows one to make cocriparisons between many types of rainforcst conservation projects on 
a consistent basis. 
One attribute of the tool Is that. as it Is currcndy formulated, it does not take explicit account 
of the quality of Any panicular rainform While some might regard this as a weadmess. the 
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approach actually allows one to Isolate the issue or required compensition levels and 
address the matter of quality as a separate issue. 17reating quality a, % a dcmand Issue rather 
than a supply issue is perhaps rnom appropriate in any case. It was illustrated that. if some 
subjective or objective measurc of minforcst quality can be constructed. It can be readily 
incorporated into the framework suggested hcm 
Specific applied work in a cost-bcnefit analysis framework rclating to Korup National Park 
illustrated that the project was not in Cameroon's Interest if Cameroon were required to Pay 
for the entire project. Transfers in the amount of just over 1000 ECU per km2 PCr Year 
would be required to compensate Cameroon for the area actually protected by the park 
programme. Transfers of twice this level would be necessary were it not for selected local 
environmental benefits afforded by rainforest conservation - In particular the protection of 
Cameroon's onshore mangrove fisheries. 
An analysis of six other rainforest projects pursued between 1987 and 1989 indicated that 
funds had been raised for these projects %% hich fell into a range of 15 to 1575 ECU per km2 
per year. Given this result, one might conclude that the cost of supporting transfers for the 
Korup project is not a mis-use of resources given that similar projects have attractcd 
transfers of this order. Indeed. one might assert that - given that Korup Is regarded by 
many conservation interests as being of high quality - supporting transfers for Korup 
would be an cfficient use of scarce conservation resources. 
In closing, one other result arose from the cost-bcnerit analysis which relates to the types of 
t=sfers which one might wish to consider for a pmject such as Korup. ne long-term 
cost and benefit projections for Korup indicated that annual financial costs of the project 
would be about 280 million CFAF. and that the level of benefits at shadow prices 
approached 2200 million CFAF annually. At the surface it might therefore appear that - 
once the capital outlays were over and the project was well established - thcre would be a 
significant incentive for Cameroon to continue funding for the park programme. A 
common problem %ith projects of a 'social' nature in LDCs. however. Is that local 
governments do rot meet ongoing current budgetary needs for programmcs which generate 
few revenues. Korup Park would fall into this category. as most of the environmental 
benefits are to m3intain income or production Ic%vIs elsewhere in the economy and they do 
not directly increase theamounts, in government coffers. This suggests that one potential 
area for transfers Is to pay for the ongoing expenses of the national park. While this 
approach dcvi, 2tcs from both the short-term nature of DF'N swaps and the traditional aid 
programmes which involve injections only at the sun of projects, it may provide a greater 
chance of successfully promoting rainforest conservation. In addition, continuous 
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transfer% are mrc In line with the ongoing benefit which the rest of the world purportedly 
rcccivcs from the crivironrncrital funcdons of rainforcsts. 
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ClIAIvrER S 
DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES AND MIGRATORY ADJUSTMEN'T IN 
KORUP NATIONAL PARK 
15.1 Introduction 
International aid and development agencies am bccoming Increasingly msponsive to tile 
idea that promoting rainforest conservation may be an effective means of Improving 
economic prospects within developing countries. As these organisadons have traditionally 
had - and continue to have - access to substantial amounts or funding, we am seeing a far 
greater propensity to invest in conservation projects in the name of local economic 
development. In contrast to nation-widc tax policies which am difficult to target, 
development incentives in the form of rural development prograrnmcs or direct cash grants 
are more easily targeted and often have greater political appeal. In addition, institutional 
channels in many countries am reasonably wtlI established for directing international funds 
to specific projects. Although the goals of a rainforest conservation project may differ 
markedly from those of traditional development projects. the logistical and managerial 
requirements am sufficiently Similar that administrative netm-orks developed for traditional 
rural development progranunes can readily accommodate the requirements of conservation 
projects- 
One of the advantages of using local development incentives is that it Is possible to target 
the incentive and custom-design it to meet conservation objectives effectively. But this 
very attribute also miles it difficult to gencralise about the effectiveness of such 
progra. mmes. As with many policies which are intended to promotc conservation. 
economic theory can be used to guide empirical verification that the programmes will %%UL 
Although some degree of ex post evaluation of such progrimmes his been undertaken 
(Repetto and Gillis [19881-. Rcpctto 119881; McNeely 119881) to criticise Ineffective 
programmes, such hindsight is not available to us for new programmes. We rely more 
heavily on theoretical constructsý rules-of-thumb. and our own ability to rccognisc and 
correct programmes which appear to be going wrong. In this regard, our cx anic 
evaluations must be used not so much to evaluate the effectiveness of the programmes. but 
rather to identify critical economic linkages and factors %hich will guide the design of the 
programmes. This is especially important with conservation Incentives which arc 
incorporated into rural development programmes. It is much more difficult to correct Or 
reverse a rural development progornme that was misconceived thin It is to correct or 
reverse an incorrectly &signed tax. 
_I 
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In this spirit. Chapter% 5 and 6 Investigate the ef(ccdvcncss of development incentives in a 
rural setting of an LDC The prcmisc behind many of these programmes is tM4 when 
targeted to a region adjacent to a protected area. they will Induce n-dgradon out of the 
proicctcd region as well as causing people to switch from activities which cause 
Worcstation to activides which promote (or at least do not interfere with) conservation. 
Because there axe essentially two quite different proposidons to be tested %ith different 
thcotttical paradigms, they are dealt with In separate chapters: this chapter investigates the 
migratory adjustment process in detail. %he= the following chapter looks m= closely at 
how people's hunting activities respond to changes in income. As the migratory 
adjustment process is hypothcsised to depend - among other things - on income- levels. 
this chapter also devotes so= aticnflon to charactcrising household incomes in the region 
under study. 
In contrast to the previous chapter which concentrated on the Korup project as a wholcý the 
analyses in Chapters 5 and 6 require very specific local household dam 7be process of 
transcribing and analysing these data from raw surveys is an original contribution of this 
thesis but, so as not to encumber the text here with all of the details, a description of the 
data collecting, reduction and management process is presented in the Appendix and 
discussions within the chapters are confincd to surnmarics of the relevant portions of the 
data. It should be noted, however, that the richness of the household survey data allows 
som, e explorations into areas not directly related to conservation. While the focus of this 
thesis Is on evaluating policies relating to rainforcst conservation, the data reveal other 
Interesting characteristics of rural communities in a developing country. In particular. the 
data allowed more detailed analyus of two other issues which often feature in policy 
planning In developing countrics: 
4) Income distribution mid inequality, and, 
b) the relationship between education levels and income. 
11csc issues arc thcreforc also addressed in this chapter. 
Given that this chapter concentrates on the role of migratory adjustroent when evaluating 
development Incentives. Secdon 5.2 reviews the thcoredcal basis for using development 
Incentives to promote conservation. It describes In a simple theoretical model the 
conditions under which development incentives can lead to a migratory adjustment proms 
which favours conservation goals. It then draws primarily on the specific theory dealing 
with rnigratory adjustment. Indicating that there is ambiguity as to whether individuals %ill 
Actually migrate In response to Income differentiMs such as those contcmpl3tcd here. 
Section 5.3 Introduces the particular case study for which the household data were 
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analysed. It deals with Korup National Park and the surrounding management area In 
Southwest Province in Cameroon. Section 5.4 provides a descriptive profile of income 
composition and distribution in the Korup area. while Section 5.5 addresses the 
supplemental analyses relating to the issues of rural income and education levels. Section 
5.6 provides the results of econometric studies of migratory adjustment in the Korup arca. 
Some concluding remarks summarising the role of migratory adjustment in designing 
development incentives are made in Section 5.7. 
§ 5.2 The Case for Development Incentives 
5.2.1 Policies and PrinciDles 
It is becoming increasingly common to promote conservation projects in LDCS by 
establishing a buffer zone around a park. Oldfield (1988; in McNeely [1988# page 1951) 0 
describcs a buffcr zone as: 
An area on the edge of a protected area which has land use controls which 
allow only activities compatible with the objectives of the protected area; 
a ýriatc activities might include tourism, forestry, agroforestry. etc. TIc 
otpývc of such zones is to give added protection to the reserve, and to 
compensate local people for the loss of access to the biodiversity resourccs 
of the reserve. 
In pmcdce. rural development is initiated in the buffer zone in an attempt to draw people 
away from the park and give them in alternative to exploiting the park. I investigate in this 
chapter and the next how effective such development incentives will be in promoting 
conservadon goals. 
Ulti=tely. the typical goal of any such exercise is to identify specific policies or policy 
rrforms which wiU: 
3) improve incoi= lc%tls; 
b) impro, -v income distribudon; 
C) provide incentives to Individuals to move away from the core rainforest area; 
and, % 
d) provide incentives to individuals to conduct activities which remove direct 
pressures fmm the bionm 
7be first two elements - relating directly to income - can be regarded as 'development 
goals! whereas the latter two elements on best be regarded asconservation goals'. While 
ideally one would want to consider every possible policy or reform to identify the best 
available, practical considerations normally preclude this and one usually can - at best - 
identify some feasible policy and analyse the consequences of that policy. 
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In pursuing these goals. the buffer zonc concept provides appeal both as an analytical 
concept as well as a tool for facilitating project implementation and nun3gcrmnL It can be 
argued that development incentives which are concentrated in the buffer zone will directly 
Improve Income In that area. This establishes an income differential which induces 
migration away from the core or protected area Into the buffer zone. By preferentially 
supporting certain types of activity In the buffer zone (such as cocoa fanning), individuals 
arc Induced to spend their tinx on these activities rather than those which destroy the 
protected am (such as hundng). Furthcnnorc. by propcrly targeting the programmes to 
certain types of activities which am traditionally carried out by those which are less well- 
ofr. Inconic distribution can also be improved. 
In selecting appropriate policies. it Is clear that fairly specific data are required regarding 
incomes In and around the core protected area. and on describing how individuals behave 
in response to income differentials or alternate incorm opportunities. In this chapter I shall 
concentrate on describing how individuals respond to migratory pressures. In the process, 
a description of the income data, %ifl also reveal how specific programmes might be targeted 
to assist those who arc the poorest and the tnost'descrving'. 
5.2.2 ASi=le', kiodclof, %Iigmt=Adiustinent 
Empirically, we %ish to know whether increasing Incomes in a buffer zone is likely to (i) 
draw people stway fmm the core area, and (H) remove land-use pressures from the core 
area. While in principle the first rnay appear to imply the second, I wish to consider a 
further potential effect: that of decreased cmigradon from the buffer zone in response to 
higher lnco= levelL 
A simple conceptual model is illustrated in Table 5.1. M= is sonic population Ni, in each 
of three zones: the protected un (inp). the buffer zone (i=b) and the rest of the country 
Owc). Nr capita incomes in each of these rcgions am charactaiscd by Yi. We dcrinc Oi as 
the proportion of Income Yj wiributable to'forcst hmvcsdng activities'. At this stage, I 
shall use the tcrm'forcst harvesting actIvitics7 to designate those activities which = not 
consistent with the conservation goals. 1 11c total income from the forest harvesting 
activities In cach zone Is then Fi=OiYjNj. and the total 'pressure' on the forest can be 
denominated by r-=r-p+r-b+r-c. Formally, In terms of the nomenclature used in Chapter 3. 
we note further that E=E(Tj and that a W-RO. such that the identification of poUcics which 
I In prxtice, as will be lho%rn bter in this chWa. some activities pursued in ft Miftforest, (such as frwt 
g3thaing) me sustainable W rot at all in conflict with consemLion goals. Although OW-Se activi6es 
might be tcgu&d semantic-illy as Toccss hmvcsting'. I" strictly not rcgard them as such in 0. 
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Table 5.1 
A Mute Zonc Model of Migralay Adjustnicnt 
Region 
Protoctcd Buffer Rest of 
Arca Zone Country 
O-p) (i-b) ONO 
Regional Population Np Nb Nc 
Per Capita Income yp Yb YC 
Income from Forest Harvesting 
- Proportion Op Ob Oc 
,. Total Fp=OYNp r*br-'ObybNb FeOcYCNC 
Income Shock 0 Ayb 0 
Iftratory Adjustment ANp ANbu-. ANp-. ANc ANc 
Change in Pressure on Forest 
if ANC=O AF - ANpOpYp + ANbobyb 
T ' 4&Nb (Obyb - Opyp) 
if ANc; sO AF a ANpOpYp + ANbObyb + ANcOcYc 
t ' WN b (Obyb - YOPYP -I I'VI OCYO 
wherc: Va --ANýANlb 
promote conservation involves idendf)ing thosc reforms dco for which aF/&o<O. 
The standardjustification for increasing incomes in a buffer zone is that it will draw people 
away from the protected area and that the pressures on the forest Vill therefore decline. 
Increasing Yb by some amountAyb %ill lead to a change in Np by ANp as people move 
away from the protected area into the buffer zone. Ile net change in income from forest 
huyesting activities is then2: 
2 Note that this assumes that any incre4se in income in the buffer =x is directed towards those activities 
other than forest blMsting activities- Strictly* Ob fAlls in PrOPOrtion to the increase in Yb. and in this 
formuL, Won 'Ob! is that which prevails before the inccxnes in the buffer zone are enhanorA Rigourously. if 
we defline per c3piu income ciplicitly by perW (1) and ux= (Worest hantsting'. o-OW). then: 
faf YbaOYb: t+Yb: t and Ob: layb: 
jyb: 
t. 
The change in direct pressin on the forest from inhabitants in the buffer zone is then: 
ff AFb 0 (Nb+&Nb)yb: 2 - Nbyb: P 
Given. however. that the entire income improvement in the buffer zone is through enhancing the 
f 
1, W hcncc it follows that: profitability of 'otW activities. ut have YL20%. 
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AFmANpOpYp+ANbObyb 
... (5.1); 
and, as ANpa-ANb, pressurcs on the biome will fall if: 
ANb>O 
... (5.2a): 
and, 
Obyb<'Dpyp 
... (5.2b). 
As it Is normally assumed that ObwO (or In any event very small), it is obvious that a policy 
which enhances Incomes In the buffer zone will lead to a decrease In pressures on the 
forest. 
But the above approach Ignores the migration process between the buffer zone and the rest 
of the country. One could equally well argue that enhancing incomes in the buffer zone 
will not only draw people away from the protected zone, but it %%ill also draw people from 
the rest of the country Into the buffer zone. 17his would have no effect on the biomc if an 
Individual in the buffer zone exerted as much pressure on the bionic as one in the rest of the 
country (i. e.. OeOc). But if "c. then it could well lead to an increase on the pressures 
on the forest. Indeed, in this case. It is readily sho%%m that the change is: 
AF n &NpOpYp + ANbObyb + ANrOcYc (5.3). 
and, as ANb*, ANp, ANc. pressures on the bio= %-Hl fall it. - 
ANb>O 
... (5.4a). 
and, 
()byb<Opyp +0 *Y)Qcyc ... (5.4b). 
where we have defined y- the proponion of the migrants coming from the protected area - 
as Yn-&VPtANb- It is clear that Condition (51) is simply a special case of Condition (5.4) 
for which Val. 
Condition (5.4) is helpful in that it allows us to specify more predsely when a poficy which 
enhances income in the buffer zone actually promotes conservation goals. While it is 
largely an empirical exercise to determine the values of the individual parameters in any 
particular case, two par6cular cases merit comment at this stage. 
Must. when there Is nobody living In the protected area and those in the rest of the country 
place no direct pressures on the forest, then we effectively have Oc=O and V--O. and 
Condition (5.4b) reduces to: Obyb<O. 71is implies that, where migratory adjustment 
occurs under such circumstances, enhancing income in the buffer zone %%ill never lead to a 
decrease in pressures on the forest and will normally lead to an increase in pressures on the 
f AFbw&NbYb: j"XNbOb; lytKl 
%hich is equivalent to that given in EqLution (5.1) if Ob and Yb am construed as the valucs WOM the 
Inconx lmpmvnxnt policy was Implcmenu-41. 
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forest as long as some forest harvesting activity exists In the buffer zone (OPO). Indeed. 
the result suggests that the preferred policy in this case - for promoting conservation goals 
- would be to depress incomes in the buffer zone. This would Induce emigration from the 
buffer zone to the rest of the country. and take pressures off of the forest. In most LDCs - 
whem rural-urban migration is in itself often regarded as a phenomenon which should be 
reversed through policy interventions - any such policy reform would normally be a non- 
starter. 
Second, we consider the case whem individuals In the buffer zone are as active In forest 
harvesting activities as those in the protected area. Forinally, this implies that ObYbs,, OpYp. 
and for cases where there is some migration from the rest of the country (y<1) Condition 
(5.4b) reduces to: Obyb<Ocyc. If we again normally assume that there arc no direct 
pressures on the forest outside of the buffer zone (Oc=O), this condition would never hold 
and the preferred policy from a conservation perspective would again be to depress 
incomes in the buffer zone. 
Although I have treated the above two as special cases, the parameter values assumed in 
those cases do probably charactcrise many rainforcst areas. In those circumstances, 
policies which promote income improvements in a buffer zone area would normally lead to 
increased pressures on the rainforcst from migratory adjustment. Ultimately, however, 
only applied research %ill allow us to decide whethcr Conditions (5.4a) and (5.4b) actually 
hold in any given area. 
5.2.3 Ili= of Nfigmtoa Ad 
The previous section highlighted the importance of measuring the intensity of forest 
hazvesting activities in and around the protected am, but it is also clear that the arguments 
only applied when there is actually some response of migration to incomes. Clearly, if 
dNb/dYb=O then the arguments favouring income enhancement to attract individuals away 
from the protected area are groundless. Furthermore, if increasing incomes in the buffer 
zone drives people out of the buffer zonO (dNbtdyb<O)o then satisfying Condition (5-4b) 
would lead to an increase in pressures on the forest. As we arc concentrating in this 
chapter on whether individuals actually migrate in response to alternative income 
opportunities, it is appropriate at this stage to review some of the theory of migratory 
adjusuncrit. 
3 AlLhough we discuss this further below, such circurnstinces might arise If higher incomes were 3 
Ixtrcquisite to iricreaxd mobility. 
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Ultimately we want to know why it Is that individuals migrate. I'Slost of the received 
thcory4 now accepts that Individuals will migrate In response to economic factors and that - 
In so doing - they arc attempting to nuke themselves better off. As such, it is not 
surprising thatincome' plays it cridcal role in most theories of migradon. Sjaastad (1962), 
Guglcr (1968). Sdglitz (1969) and Frank (1971) provide arguments and evidence that 
pcoplc tend to be 'pushed' away from areas of low income and are 'pulle& towards areas 
of high Income. In a classic article by Hards and Todaro (1970). they develop a two-sector 
model which argues that individuals In LDCs will migrate according to expected incomes 
and that the very process of migration causes wages to equilibrate to levels where 
puwulmptwf. where p is the probability of finding work at wage w. and the subscripts refer 
to the urban and rural sectors. In equilibrium, high urban wages corresponded to the lower 
prtbability of finding employment in that sector. 
One of the empirical problems with the Harris-Todaro model was that it usually 
overprcdicts the urban unemployment rate in LDCs (Turnham (19711). A number of 
anicles followed which attempted to resolve this 'styliscd face. Bhagwati and Srinivasan 
(1974) attempted to msol%v It by arguing that wages are actually rigid and tend not to adjust 
In LDCs: all adjustment occurs via migration and that them are barriers to migration which 
work, agiinst income differcrida1s. Fields (1975) enhanced the Harris-Todam fmmework 
through adding a'murky'scctor which absorbed much of the work-force as it was moving 
from the rural to the urban swors. Mort reccritly. Ready (1981; 1987; 1988) suggests that 
the failure of the l1arris-Todam model to predict urban unemployment rates is that we need 
to equilibrate expected utility levels rather than expected income levels. Through this 
mechanism. It is possible to construct a utility funcdon of expected income which 
accommodates both the Income level and the risk of unemployment to describe extant 
conditions. 
In sbon. however, regardless of how Income and migmtory adjustment eventually leads to 
an equilibrium in any given economy, most analysts rind that expected income does play a 
role in the decisions which individuals make. Further, n=y have argued that this position 
Is reinforccd by the fact that young people - who would normally expect to be able to cam 
the higher levels of Income for longer periods upon migrating - have a higher propensity to 
m1gratc. 71c propensity of the young to migrate to better areas was first discussed by 
Sjaastad (1962). and empirical work by Jolly (1969) and Bowles (1970) confirmed that 
younger Individuils were mrc prone to nýgmtc than their cldcm 
Although there often exist cconorrtic incenfives to niigmtc, econorrflc and social pressures 
4A mview of the exty litawult reLiting to migmdon can be found in Yap (1977). 
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also at times provide barriers to nftration. This barrier orcost' of migration often enters 
in two forms: (I) as a real cost of relocation; and (ii) as the cost of obtaining Information 
regarding job opportunities at other locations. Both of these factors arc used for arguing 
that physical distance should be used as a proxy in any empirical work for such costs. As 
distance to the regions with higher wage opportunities goes up, it becomes more costly to 
obtain information and to move. and it is less likely that an Individual will have effective 
contacts in that area. While such distance variables are often found to be significant 
empirically, there is disagreement as to how they should be specified: I lagerstrand (1957) 
suggests using logarithmic distance as a variable on the grounds that distance is more 
important when you are close to a source than far from it, whereas Courchene (1970) 
suggests using linear distance as a variable. Empirically, Vandcrkamp (1971) found that 
reciprocal distance was the most useful explanatory variable for modeffing costs, and that - 
for remote rural regions far-removod from urban ccn= - distance made little difference. 
As an additional proxy for information costs, some authors suggest that a 'relatives and 
fricrids! variable be used to explain migation. 5 Tbe rationale behind it is that individuals 
arc more likely to rnovc to regions where they havc relatives and friends, as these contacts 
provide both an infonmtion function as well as a form of social security while job-search 
activity occurs. Empirically. this is often captured in a migratory stock variable which 
specifies the number of individuals which ha%v previously migr-ated to a given arca. 
In summary. a typical migration model will define migration hid from region i to region 
as: 
Mij =Mij (Yi, YJUi, UJ, Dij, NlSji) ... (5.5). 
where Y is income. U is unemployment. D is distance, and \ISji is a migratory stock 
variable. This formulation captures the income opportunities through Y, the risk elements 
through U. the costs through D and the information function through MS. In pairticular, as 
we are trying to estimate the role of incomes on migratory adjustment, it is useful to 
elaborate son-cwhat on the values of aNVZY. 
Most of the empirical literature rinds that a. MýDYj<O and aN1OYj>O, which is consistent 
%%ith the idea that individuals move from low income to high income areas. Vanderkamp 
(1970) argues, however, that there should be no a priori expectation that Wj^<O, due 
to either productivity or wealth effects. If a region is characterised by a low income level 
then, to the extent that incomes reflect average productivity. one might argue that the region 
has a lower quality labour force which is less likely to migrate. It follows that a higher 
income in the origin region will increase migration from that region. 11iis effect is 
5 This posi6on is held by Nelson (1959). G rmnwood (1969) and Ungley (1974 1). 
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compounded by wealth effects: If Individuals require funds to finance a move or to provide 
security during job warch, then -to the extent that income and wealth are correlated -one 
would expect that those from higher Income regions are more likely to rnýigrztc. 7bis cffect 
may be particularly Important in dcvcloping countries where individuals are living at 
subsistence levels and have few financial resources on which to fall back in the event of 
unsucccssful job sc=h iacdvitics. 
An Issue which Is not always explicitly addressed in migration theory relates to the 
relationship between education, wealth and mobility. Vanderkamp (1970) argued as above 
that If financial barriers to moving existed. then increased wealth would lead to higher 
mobility and individuals from higher income regions would be more mobile. But many 
empirical studies rind that education is also an important contributing factor to labour 
mobility. and that higher education leads to greater mobility. In countries where 
individuals am required to finance their own education, one might therefore expect that 
Individuals will be less likely to migrate from areas of lower income. Explicitly. for any 
Individual k. where Mk represents, say, his mobility in terms of the probability that he %%iH 
migmic, thc'wcalth argumcntis prcrnlý on: 
Nik n Nik(Wk(yk.... ) ) aNVZNV>o awgy>o, 
whcreas theeducation ugumcnf is premiscd on: 
ýjk n %Ik (Sk(yk,.. ).... ) a, %Ims>o asmy>o. 
where W represents wealth and S represents school. ing. While both models %%ill yield the 
result that higher incomes lead to higher mobility (3, '%LQY>O), the adjustment meclianism 
c1carly differs. Although this might make little difference over long time: frames, one 
would probably (but not necessarily) expect that the model which specifies education as an 
explanatory variable will be less responsive to changes in income over the short-term. 
Unfortunately, a model formulatcd in terms of Equadon (5.5) will shed little light on the 
mechanisms by which incomes actuafly influence migratory behaviour, and dam respecting 
wealth and educaflon are usuaUy unavailable when modelling aggregate Hgradon. 
To conclude, while incomes are theoretically important in determining the direction and 
magnitude of n9gratory adjustment. the theory is ambiguous regarding the actual direction 
of the migratory flows. In the context of our previous problem, enhancing incomes in a 
buffer zone may cause individuals to movc to that zone if income is a strong attractive 
force, or they may cause Individuals to leave that arca if the higher income facHitatcs their 
mobility. 
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5.2.4 Summ= 
To evaluate the effectiveness of development incentives in promoting conservation goals 
through a migratory adjustment mechanism requires knowledge of how people use the 
forest and how they migratc in response to changes In income. Empirically. we must 
estimate incomes from various sources in both the buffer zone and the protected area, and 
charactcrise the factors which cause individuals to migrate Into and out of the buffer zone. 
In the empirical studies contained in the following sections, I Oall be investigating a 
number of fairly specific hypotheses relating to migration and income. Individual 
household data are analysed for a specific national park Initiative in an LDC, with the 
ultimate goal of identifying appropriate policy reforms which will be consistent both with 
the rural development goals in a buffer zone and the conservation goals of the protected 
arca. In particular, I shall bc concomW with the foflo%king: 
a) nvmuring total household incomes. by source; 
b) charactcrising inconve distribut. ion and inequality, dmomposed by source; 
C) exploring the rclationsWp bctwcen inconre and educadon levels*. 
d) describing migratory bchaviour, 
C) analysing the link-age bct%%, ccn migration decisions and income levels; and, 
f) analysing the linkages bctwccn migmfion decisions and other characteristics 
relating to the individual. 
Total household incomes %%ill provide estimates of 0 and Y for various regions. which are 
relevant in determining whether Condition (5.4b) holds. Issues relating to migratory 
adjustment are important primarily in determining whether aMiPYj>O is true, but also to 
test whether such factors as age. sex, or education are important in describing migratory 
flows. Finally, from the income data. income distribution and inequality can be 
characteriscd to gain some insights into what sorts of policies might actually improve 
income distribution in the buffer zone. The goal is ultimately to provide some idea of what 
types of development incentives are likely to promote conservation, improve incomes, and 
reducc inco= incquality. 
In the empirical work which follows, there are three points which merit highlighting. First. 
while many studies of incomes in developing countries concentrate on wage income or 
income from cash crops, the empirical work here attempts to capture all sources of income 
to a household. Ile purpose of this is to determine what the contribution is of traditional 
forest-based hunter-gath= activities to total incorms. 
Second, %%ith respect to migration, I shall concentrate on the individual migration event 
ý 
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rather than on the mass migratory flows between regions. While this requires a fine level 
of detailed Information on both individual and household characteristics for many 
Individuals. the approach rclics on data which can be gathered using household surveys in 
developing countries. 711S Avoids relying on aggregated regional migration data, which - 
although readily available in developed economics - are normally not available or are 
unreliable In LDCs. Also. this approach allows explicit investigaflon of a numbcrof the 
linkages between education And income. While these linkages may be of only limited 
relevance to conservation objectives. they arc of considerable importance in most 
developing countries and - as the household survey provides the opportunity to investigate 
such linkages - some supplementary analysis is pursued to take advantage of these data. 
Finally. the third point that I wish to demonstrate is that household surveys which are 
undcnakcn in association with socio-economic impact studies for rainforest conservation 
projects can - If analysed carefully - provide useful information about incomes and 
migration which %ill assist in selecting appropriate pohcics. 
f 5.3 Korup National Park: A Case Sludy6 
71c rT=nagcment plan for Korup National Park (%VNVF-UK 119871) called for three 
potential areas of devclopnxnt and inco= support: 
0) new agricultural initiatives; 
b) support for existing agricultural initiatim; and. 
C) intensification and support of sustainable forest gathering initiati-ms. 
First, the promodon of newagricultural initiatives is intended to be primarily a long-term 
dcvclopn-xnt initiative to improve agronomic standards and incomes in the region. It 
concentntes on agroforestry techniques which are appropriate to the area (Newman 119871; 
Djimdc and Raintrce 119881) and forestry practices (Synnott [19881). Second, support for 
existing agricultural Inidadves was meant to concentrate on a price suppon scheme for 
cash-crop farming of cocoa and coffee. Ilis was idcndricd primarfly because farmers 
often complained of difficulty in getting these crops to market and receiving fair and timely 
paymcnts upon delivery. Also. such schemes would be relatively quick and easy to 
administer through existing markedng boards and cooperatives. Finally, support for forest 
product production centred on improving marketing structures and 'farm-gatc' prices for 
natuml products gathered from the forest and for goods manufactured from forest products. 
7119 Altcmativc was again thought to be important as it did not require the inmAucdon of 
6 Further background to the Kocup NaxlorW Park pm*t w%d to the surwy work conducted to semale the 
dala used In this and the foHouing chapter is provided in the Appcndix. 
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new techniques and could fulfil short-term income and development needs. 
In this chapter. we concentrate primarily on whether income support for the latter two 
programmes will indeed support conservation and development goals. While the first 
programme -the introduction of new agricultural techniques - has interesting Attributes AS 
well. we are concerned for the moment in pronuxing initiatives which %%ill be effective ovcr 
a five to ten year time horizon, as Us is the critical period for the conservation objcctivcs-7 
Appropriately, the specific problems being addrcsscd for Korup National Park are the 
foHowing: 
Q1. Will increasing incomes in the buffer zone reduce pressures on the core area 
ffimugh inducing voluntary mscttlcn=t or nýgration? 
Q2. Will increasing incomes in the buffer zone provide effective alternatives to 
individuals who would otherwise hunt in the protected area? 
In answering these questions, I shall be charactcrising incomcs in and around the park area 
and shall try to describe those factors which actually cause individuals to migratc. Chapter 
6 spccirically inves6gatcs problem Q2. 
In addition, the data will allow us to investigate the following question: 
Q3. What type of income support strategy (cash crops or traditional harvesting) is 
more likely to improve income disuibution in the region? 
While income distribution is not normally regarded as a conservation concem, Chapter 4 
first raised the issue in rccognising that such issues might explicitly enter into the rainforcst 
supply price for any project. T'he basic idea is that - if the LDC govemment has some 
advcrsion to income inequality - then income support which benefits low income groups 
would have a IoAr-r net social cost than the same level of income support for higher income 
groups. If the strategies have equal effects on conservation, then the best strategy from the 
point of view of the rest of the world (assurning it is interested only in conservation) is to 
target the low income group; that strategy would generate the lower RSP and the level of 
transfers required to compensate the LDC for instituting such reforms would be 
conunensurately lower. 
7 This is primarily because of the %-try immediate pressures or hunting. It Is anticipated Out. If such 
pressures am not reduced, %ithin ten )tars rnany of the animals would be lost and hunting kwif would have 
become a marginal entcqxise for individuals. In a sense. therefore. the prograrnmes might be seen as 
inducing circumstances which would have occurred naturally in any event in ten years time. We note as 
well. however. that. in some regions or countries. new agricultural techniques could become well 
established within this Lim Name. The "Green Revolution'. for ex=rAe. is at times ch=ctcliscd 89 such 
an occurrence. In this area. however, the major agricultural improvements am believed to involve 
agroforestry techniques. Because of the relatively slow growth Of tree, crops. it %-OuU tale rive to ten y=s 
simply to demonstrate the technical and economic fusibility of such improvements in this setting. and 
drAr widespread adoption would take commenswaiely lonScr. 
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As a conservation goal. we am Interested primarily in reducing hundng and. as such, there 
are only a limited number of feasible policies available to do this. Because many of the 
non-labour Inputs (guns, cartridges, and carbide) as well as the final products (bushmeat) 
am smuggled from or to Nigeria, taxation of inputs or outputs is ineffecdve. For the same 
reason. suWdising subsdtutc protein sources (chicken or livestock) is not feasible as most 
of the consumption Is in Nigeria. Forced resctdcmcnt with compcnsadon is technically 
feasible but currently poli'dcally unviablc. 8 This leaves dirtct control of hunting - through 
and-jwching controls - as the only remaining direct alternative. Such control requires the 
availability of trained Same guards wflling and Able to police the forest estate. In the case of 
Korup. those best qualified for this task are those currently active in hunting and - 
normally - they Are hesitant to enlist in An activity which would involve policing their 
family and friends. Training outsiden can be expensive and - as %%itnessed by a recent 
murder of it game guard in Korup - outsiders face other risks and deterrents for which they 
must be compensated. Hence, while some degree of regulation will be insfitutcd, the most 
Attracdvc and apparently feasible jiltemative is to use econon-dc incentives to induce 
individuals to migrate and to undertake activides other than hunting. 
In summary. the particular short-term problem of promodng conservation is quite tractable 
here because there is only one major pressure which is regarded as unsustainable. The 
potential externalities arising from this pressure are easily defined: there is a potential 
positive cxtcmality from hunting those animals which might otherwise destroy crops, and 
there is also a positive exterriality from not hunting for which outsiders arc %illing to pay. 
71c other cxtemalitics often considered for rainforests - including in this case the 
maintenance of mangrove fisheries and various environmental functions - arc morc closely 
associated with the immediate integrity of the forest estate rather than the animal biomass. 9 
Furthermore, migration into the region is apparently restricted by cultural traditions, hence 
we can concentrate on modelling cmigrafion decisions without distorting our picture of 
migratory adjustment. Finally, the number of feasible policy altematives for limiting 
hunting is relatively sm; all. and the use of some: form of development incentive in a buffer 
zone appears at the outset to hold promise. But, as noted in the preceding section, the 
actual success of such development inccndvcs in promoting rainforest conscrvadon is not a 
1 In &Lhtion. ho%tva. there is some question whether this would indeed be effoctim One might argue that 
at Ivesent the forest Is being treated as a common property resource by those cuffently in it. with 
exploitation rights informally allocated to those resident in of near the forest. If the area %tre depopulated, 
then any traditional patterns of Und tenure would disipp= and essentiDy an open access condition would 
jxCvail. For example, wherm trdtiotul hunting arm exist and are respected by outsiders. such areas 
would disappear and the area would be open to increased hunting pressurm Hence. while the original 
irlabitants might be rextdcd and compensated, others might enter the forest esuf tocontinue%herethosc 
% hich had been rcuttled Jell off. 
9 It can. of course, be awned - as It was In Chapter 2- Out degradation of the animal biom-us will 
eventually lead to degradation of the forest estate. As there is no manner of formally modelling this, 
ho*A ever. &Wy of this is be)wd the scope of d9s thesis. 
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foregone conclusion, and hence empirical work is useful to dcrinc die behavioural 
responses which will occur. 
In support of the empirical work. data were analysed from 357 households In the Korup 
National Park protected area and buffer zone. A complete description of the survey and 
data reduction process is provided in the Appendix, along with summaries of the data. 
Ilere arc a total of 30 settlements which are found within a3 kilomctrc wide buffer zone 
around Korup National Park. Of these villages. 24 were swvcycd In the demographic And 
income survey. As indicated in the following table. this rcpmscntcd all of the villages in 
the Park and the Western Buffer Zone (WI3Z). and 12 of the 18 villages In the Eastern 
Buffer Zone (EBZ). 
Region 
Western Buffer Zone 
Korup Nadonal Park 
Eastern Buffer Zone 
Villages In Region 
6 
6 
18 
Wages Surv eyed 
6 
6 
12 
Referring back to Figure LZ the NVBZ %%-as defined for analyýcal purposes to include those 
villages in the strip of forest reserve between the northern, part of Korup National Park and 
the Nigerian border. and the EBZ included the a= to the cast and south of the park. The 
target population within all 24 villages consisted of 379 households, although demographic 
data were obtainable for only 357 (94%) of the households, and income data wcrc analysed 
for 341 (90%) of the households. 
A sample of the surveY form is provided in Appendix Figure A. I. Data were collected in 
the foUo%%ing areas for each household: 
a) demogmphic data on mch individual in the household (age, sex. schooling); 
b) rnigmtory status of tach individual; 
C) food crops gro%%m-. 
d) fam-dng problems; and, 
C) annual income by sou= 
Demographic dam included all of those individuals normally present as well as those who 
were 'normally' absent and had left in the previous 5 year period. 10 In specifying the 
"migratory status" of each individual, they were eventually categorised as either present, 
absent at school. absent at work. or absent not-specified. If they were absent, information 
was obtained rcgarding their whereabouts. No data were collected on consumer durables 
or major assets. 
10 The rive yeas period %%w an informal guideline and - no doutot - sonw individuils utm MIUNI I'd othe" 
were noted as having migrwed %hen in fict they had been gone (Of ffwc thAn I We )'CAM 
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Table 5.2 
Lo2ulation of floutchold% Surveycd. 1988 
EBZ mmz ME Dmi 
Total I louscholds 129 115 113 357 
Total Population 997 806 915 2,718 
- Prcscnt 662 740 761 2.163 
- Absent (at School) 81 25 42 148 
- Absent (at Work) 209 37 83 329 
- Absent (not Specified) 45 4 29 78 
15.4 Empirical Evidence: Income In Korup 
5.4.1 PoRulation Sufftm= 
A deWled brtakdown of population statistics is provided in Appendix Tables Al to A-5. 
Summaries of these are presented in Figures S. I and 5.2. and in Table 5.2. 
Figure 5.1 and Table 5.2 indicate that the total survey population is 2,718 individuals, of 
which 407 %%-cre normally absent due to work or other reasons. 71c remaining population 
of 2.311 individuals were actually present or away at school. Per capita income figures 
presented later arc based on this subset of 2,311 individuals as it is assumed that those 
normally absent will have their own sources of income or means of support. Income 
statistics obtained from this survey included income accruing only to those actually present. 
and children away at school were treated as part of those 'normally present' in the 
household as they would normally be supported by their home family. 
Sgure 52 provides a summary of the population structure of those normally present or at 
school by sex and age cohort. Two results arc of particular note here, especially as they 
relate to work being carried out in subscquent sections of this chapter. First, over one-half 
of the population in the survey area is under twenty years of age. 11is trend is little 
different from that found in the rest of CanxToon. 11 and is responsible for the increasing 
budgetary requirements of education in Cameroon. In meeting these requirements, the 
government relics heavily on private schools and - in some parts of the country - 
enrollment In private schools represents 85% of total attendance. For the country as a 
II The 0.19 ycar age Voup wits cstimtcd to rcpmsent $4.7% of the toW popuL2don of Cameroon in 1986 
(Republic of Camcrow 119861). 
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Figure 5.2 
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0000009 (168) (190 *esse*** 20-29 
*tote (116) (128) *"00" 30.39 
0** (M (103) 00110 40-49 
o*OO (89) (55) 00 50-59 
0# (54) (63) 000 6o+ 
Nor=Uy Absent Age 
(23) (23) 0-9 
(41) (36) 10-19 
0 (69) (79) 090 20-29 
(47) (216) 30-39 
(19) (9) 40-49 
(6) (3) 50-59 
(3) (3) 6o+ 
Now 0 rc; wcscnLs 25 ind3viduals 
whole in 1986 about one-half of total enrollment was in private schools, both at the primary 
and secondary level. (Republic of Cameroon 119861) Thc government currently has an 
explicit policy which requires families to finance: much, if not all, of the current expenses 
for education. This policy is intended both to assist in firtancing education in the country as 
well as creating a disincenfive to traditionally high birth rates. As censuses have been only 
sporadic in Cameroon, it is impossible to determine from the historical data whether this 
policy his been cffccfivc in curbing birth rates but. at present, Cameroon is estimated to 
have among the lowest birth rates in Africa. 12 A potential crificism of the policy. however. 
Is that it makes even a basic education a privflcgc of wealth. Whether or not this crificism is 
valid in the current survey sample is invesdgated further in Section 5.5. 
A second notable attribute of the population structure is that - of those nonnally absent - 
12 At An esUnutcd crude binh r2tc of 42.5 births per thousand popuLuion. it rAnks twelfth lowe4i in 49 
countries In Africa (World Resources Institute 119871). 
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more than 36% are from the 20 to 29 year age cohort. even though this age group 
represents only 18% of the total population. This Is also consistent with trends In the rest 
of the country: migration away from rural a=s has bccn concentrated disproportionately In 
what many regard as the most productive age group. Cameroon government policy Is also 
concerned with this trend, and in its most recent five-year plan (Republic of Cameroon 
[1986; p. 51), it expresses concern over the "aging of the active faMXr population, fall In 
production in the agricultural and stock-brceding sectors, subsistence agriculture 
characterised by absence of trade, disintegration of traditional family structures [in the 
abandoned regions. and ... ) pressure on socio-cconomic infrastructure, higher 
unemployment. mushrooming of slums, and juvenile delinquency [in towns and cities]. " 
A similar story can be told in many developing countries, and, while Income opportunities 
in towns and cities are often cited as a magnet for the rural poor. I will test more 
thoroughly the role of incomes in migratory behaviour in Section 5.6. In particular when - 
as is the case in Cameroon - individuals arc required to finance some of their own 
educations, it is not at all obvious that people will migratc primarily from the poorcst areas 
simply because they are poor. 
5.4.2 Incon-c-ComMsition 
The starting point to analysing the impacts of any, potendal income support policy in the 
buffer zone must be a careful characterisation of income in the region. The household 
survey thus attempted to account for all sources of income (over a one-year period) to those 
normally present in the household. Two types of questions were asked in relation to 
income. Ile rust was simply "what was the total household income in the previous year? " 
Most respondents had difficulty in answering this question and, of a minority who did 
answer, the reported figures nonnally were about two-thirds of the total income deduced 
from the second set of questions. Ws second set concentrated on a fairly fine 
disaggregation by income source, and most respondents were readily able to provide 
estimates of individual income sources when it was appropri3tcly disaggregated. The 
major difficulty which was at times encountered then relited to estinuting incomes over a 
full one-year period. Fortunately. both the nujor cash crops (cocoa and coffee) and the 
major gathered crop (bush mango) have distinct harvesting seasons and respondents were 
able to remember incomes from their most recent harvest. Activities which were 
undertaken on a more regular basis (such as trading) wcrc at times cstirrtated duHng the 
intemiew on a monthly basis and multiplied by the respondent's estimate of how many 
months the activity took- place. It should be noted that most activities were at least to Some 
degree seasonal. as travel for the purpose of tnding. hunting, or gathering can become 
particularly difficult during the rainy season from June to August. 
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]'able 5.3-- 
Per Capita Income Composiflon by Source 
(CFAI--'[Ycat) 
Enz mz ME 12MI 
Tbud I fouscholds 125 113 103 341 
'Nescne Population 721 753 759 2,233 
Ilouscholds with 
No Inconx* 4 10 1 15 
Incorm Source Em mmz KHE Izal 
All Inconne Sourccs 67.894 46.467 63.708 59.246 (100.0%) 
Cash Crops 40,428 9,139 12,226 20,291 (34.2%) 
- Cocoa 30.607 3.707 8.555 14,040 (23.7%) 
- Coffoe 9.215 31 1.543 3310 (59%) 
. Oth" 605 SAW Z128 2.740 (4.6%) 
Uvcstock 822 471 11100 798 (1.3%) 
Hunting 5,732 3,526 11,911 7,088 (12.0%) 
Trapping 2.884 6.148 8,002 5,724 (9.7%) 
Fishing 2,860 3.138 2,747 2,915 (4.9%) 
Trading 2,550 2,865 4,011 3,153 (5.3%) 
Forest Products 10,853 21,131 20,055 17,447 (29.4%) 
Rcdtmnm 1,765 48 3,656 1,828 (3.1%) 
See Table A. 10 for &-scriptions 0( the circwnuxxcs of thm houschokis v6ith no cash inemes. 
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The following discussion of incomes is primarily descriptive. The collection of data 
relafing to the input requirements for all of the activities was beyond the scope of the 
household survey. and hence one can not draw any explicit conclusions regarding the 
production funcdons of the various activities or the nature of the production process. An 
cxccpdon to this arises with hunting, which is analysed more rigourously In Chapter 6. 
Nonetheless. when supplemented with knowledge gained about the various Income 
sources, a number of interesting observadons can be made from even the descriptive data 
provided by the household survey. Appropriately. the following discussion highlights 11 
number of results relating to: 
a) per capita inco= levels; 
b) incoffr- sources from convenfional market activides-, 
C) income sou= from tradifional hunting and gathering activides; and, 
d) income levels inside and outside the Nadonal Park 
The summary results provided in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 provide the basis for these 
discussions, and addidonal data regarding par6cipation in each of the activides am provided 
in Appendix Table A. 9. 
71c mean per capita income in the sample was just under 60.000 CFAF per year from all 
SoUrccS. 13 When based on an economically active populat. ion of age groups of 15 to 54 
years of age - comprising 49% of the population - this translates to average earnings per 
active individual of about 120,000 CFAF per year. Although earnings figures arc not 
available for Cameroon as a whole, income in this region is comparable to that which 
would be paid to individuals in cities and towns forjobs requiring modest skill levels. 
Based on employment ministry figures, in unskilled Cameroonian worker could expect to 
cam at most 74. ODO CFAF per year, and a scmi-skilled worker could expect to cam 
101,000 - 170,000 CFAF per ycar. 14 On the basis of wages alone, therefore, earnings 
in 
the survey area do not appear to be overly depressed when compared to wages in the 
formal sector. Tbcrc are, of course, additional bencrits available in the formal sector - such 
as pensions and higher levels of services in the towns and cities - but most households in 
the survey group are sclf-sufficicnt from their own farming. hunting and gathering 
activifies. 'ncre is, of course, a fairly wide distribution of income within the survey, and 
this aspect is addressed in further detail later in Section 5.4.3. 
13 The CFA Franc (CFAF) is essentially a hard currency as it is pegged and convertible freely to the French 
Franc (FF) at a fixed rate of 50 CFAF ra FF. At the time of conducting the survey. the cxdwge rate to L 
Sterling %%u approximately 500 CFAF/f- 
14 These = based an public sector p3y categories. On a scale c(xnprising 12 categories. unskilled 
is 
defined as Categories 01 -06, wul semi -sk il led is defined as categories 07-09. UnskilledlabourCOWnscs 58% of the public sector work force, Highly skilled Category 12 jobs can pay up to 450,000 CFAF 
annually, but only 23% of these positions are fdlcd by Cameroonians. Ibe public sector represents about 
43% of total fmrW emplopnent. wo %iges in the pri%-jtc and public sectors are comparable 
for unskilled 
Libour. (Republic of Carneroon 119M- pp. 276-71) 
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Pcr Capin Incomc from Forest Product Gathcring and Manufacturing 
(CFAF/Ycx) 
EBZ mz KNE IQW 
Total I louscholds 125 113 103 341 
'Prescnt' Population 721 753 759 2,233 
Income Source m mz Ka M2MI 
TMAI r-0n: 9 Pmducts 10.853 21.131 20.055 17.447 (100.0%) 
Cadxmd Pmducts 8.333 13.592 15.512 12,547 (71.9%) 
- Tirnbcr 2,080 1"9 72 1.323 (7.6%) 
- Bush Ntmso 3.713 8.194 9.808 7,296 (41.8%) 
- Njanjung 2.187 1.745 3.648 2,534 (14.5%) 
- Njabc 117 762 573 490 (2.8%) 
- ShCH Nut 94 753 608 491 (2-8%) 
- Wild Onion 0 0 2N 78 (0.4%) 
. PCPC 14 7 346 124 (M) 
- Kola Nut 73 0 66 46 (0.3%) 
- MiscelLuvous 55 272 162 165 (0.9%) 
Mmwfactured Products 2.521 7.540 4.542 4.900 (28.1%) 
. Cam Rope 0 635 0 214 (12%) 
- Wovcn wgs 251 43 164 151 (0.9%) 
- Fish NcWHaActs 36 165 88 97 (0.6%) Mats 346 96 632 359 (2.1%) 
- Fumiwrc 0 133 175 104 (0.6%) 
- Building 21 504 0 177 (IJ)%) 
- Afofo or Wine 1.839 4.990 2.561 3.147 (18.0%) 
. cwms 0 963 0 325 (1.9%) 
- Palm Oil 28 11 922 326 (1.9%) 
7bc economic development literature relating to urban-rural income differentials often tends 
to concentrate on wage levels in the two areas and, indeed, most of the frameworks which 
try to explain migratory adjustment tend to concentrate onwagic rate differendals. Where 
the nature of rural labour markets is such that most income is not from wage contracts - as 
is the case here - it is necessary to characterise incomes from the various income sources. 
Becausc of information constraints, estimates are often made based on what I shall term 
'convcntional'markct acdvidcs. 11csc include the net proceeds from cash crops (including 
surplus food crops), livestock. trading acdvities, and remittances from wage income or 
other family members. In the context of this study. such an approach would grossly 
underestimate the earnings in this region, as such 'conventional' sources generate only 
44% of the total income. The remaining 56% of the income is generated by'traditional' 
activities which Include hunting, trapping, fishing and the gathering and manufacture of 
forest-based products. Without this traditional income it might appear that substantial 
Income differentials exist between this rural area and the formal sector. As noted earlier. 
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however. when all sources am included the average income levels = comparable. 
It is clear from Table 5.3. however. that cash crops do provide an important source of 
income in the area. While most of the per capita income of 20,000 CFAF per year Is 
attributable to cocoa production, coffee and other crops also play an important role. These 
other crops include primarily oil palm but - in the WBZ - much of the additional cash crop 
income comes from the sale of surplus food crops. Most of it Is in the form of garri -a 
staple of partially fermented and processed cassava - and it is sold locally to feed Nigcrian 
traders travelling through the area. Cocoa Is produced throughout the region but it is most 
significant in the EB7- This is partially bccause of growing conditions but also partially 
because of access: all of the cocoa grown in the region must be hcad-loadcd to a road and 
terrain conditions mean that the WBZ is the most isolated and the E-BZ has the best access. 
It is notable that them is very little coffee production in the WHZ- This Is not so much due 
to its isolation as it is attributable to the growing conditions: because of soil, terrain, and 
climate. coffee production becomes technically more difficult as one proceeds cast to West 
through the region and, across the border in Nigeria, no coffee Is grown at all whereas 
cocoa is still produce& It is equally notable that cash crops continue to play an important 
role even in the primary rainforcst. Although wild oil palm can be harvested directly, 
villagers will normally clear areas in the rainforest to grow coffee or cocoa. 
Although livestock is kept by almost one-half of the households, it represents only a small 
income source in the region: less than 1,000 CFAF per capita annually. Cattle arc not 
raised in the =a. and goats and pigs have been banned in most villages because of their 
tendency to destroy crops. The goats and pigs which are kept are restricted to those which 
would be slaughtered for special village cmmonies or feasts. 71c livestock income which 
is received thus comes almost entirely from poultry farming. Many households keep 
chickens and they are a regular source of food protein when bushmeat or fish are 
uaa%-Aable. 
Trading represents a source of incomc for one-half of the households surveyed. but on 
average contributes only about 3.000 CFAF per capita to annual income. Trading I's fairly 
common primarily because of the relative isolation of some of the vill3ges. Individuals 
leaving %ith cash crqpsý bushmeat or gathered products for sale in the regional nwkcts will 
often return %ith quantities of cigarettes, dry goods, alcohol, or kerosene for trading in 
their own villages or villages on route. 
An important characteristic of the region is that few people receive cash income from jobs. 
The category of 'remittarices' in the survey included remittances from family members who 
Ifil) 
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had left the household. wage Income, as %%vll as direct cash grants to some- individuals from 
churches. Even under this dcrinition. only 28 households had income from this source, 
and on average the remittances represented less than ZOOO CFAF per capita annually. 11c 
small amount of wage Incorm earned reflects, to a significant degree, the free availability of 
land and the tendency to use household labour to conduct most of the farming activities. 
Women and children typically tend the food crops. gather forest products, fish and do 
routine weeding of cocoa and coffee crops. All family members are most active on the 
farms during the cocoa and coffee han-esting periods, and some of the larger farms do hire 
labour for a four to six week period at this dme. In those cases, however, the labour 
applied Is usually transient labour from outside of the village: most villagers will be busy 
with their own crops and, in any event. the surveyor's were often told that there was a 
stigma attached in the Korup villages to being in another's employ. While this might cause 
a downward bias in the responses. the general nature of land tenure and the labour market 
In the arca seemed to confirm the relatively low income from this source. 
In aMdon to contributing to subsistence requirements, tradifional activides continue to play 
an Important role in providing cash income to the region. For the entire survey as a whole, 
these activities account for over one-half of the cash incornc. 
Income from hunting and trapping represents a per capita income of almost 13,000 CFAF 
annually In the entire region. Inside the park it accounts for almost 20,000 CFAF per 
capita. Hunting is conducted exclusively by adult males, although young boys often join 
hunting parties for fun or - on longer cxpcditions - to take the bushmeat (or simply'bif in 
the local pidgin) away to be sold. Hunting is typically conducted using shotguns, dogs and 
lights. Carbide lights arc used to dazzle the prey to allow hunters a few clear shots, and 
dogs arc used to chase monkeys and drills into the trees both to allow the hunters clear 
shots as well as allo%ing them to shoot upwards (thus decreasing the risk of injuring 
fellow hunters). Hunting parties often venture into the bush for two or three weeks at a 
timc, living In'bush huts'or in the open, and eating the organs of their prey as well as root 
crops which are either carried with them or grown in proximity to the bush buts. 77he most 
common prey are monkeys. drill, and duiker. Larger mammals - buffalo, elephant, and 
chimpanzees - are also found in the forest, but they are seldom captured as most hunters do 
not have the required fire power. Most hunters will claim that they hunt primarily for cash 
income, but also for meeting household food requirements, keeping ani=1 pests away 
from farrns. and because it is a traditional pursuit which increases an individual's stature 
within the vill3ge. 
Trapping Is conducted as quite a separate exercise from hunfing, and is often concentrated 
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closer to the villages as a means to protect crops and provide bushmeat. Snares, dcadfalls. 
and occasional leghold traps are set and am checked rcgulaxly by younger members of the 
family. The most common animals trapped am porcupines, rat moles and the African 
grasscutter - all common pests. Monkeys, duiker. snakes and crocodiles are also caught 
on occasion in these traps. 
Although in rate circumstances captured prey can be sold as stock for foreign zoos. most Of 
the hunted and trapped products rind their way to the cooking pot either locally or - more 
often - to a booming bushmeat market in Nigeria. From informal discussions with hunters 
in Cameroon and with buyers in Cross River State in Nigeria. It was estimated that as much 
as 90% of the bushmeat caught in Cameroon was sold in Nigeria. Thcre is a definite local 
preference in taste for bushmeat, over cattle, chicken or small ruminants, and bushmc: kt 
commands somewhat higher prices than its substitutes (Malicson 119871). Bushmcat is 
typically dried for transport and storage, and chopped into bits and Cooked as a hot stew 
which has been spiced %%ithbush pcpe! (a peppery forest spice derived from the leaves and 
seeds of Piper guineensis. a forest climber) and thickened with dried "bush mangd (a local 
forest fruit). This mixture is then eaten with garri. cocoyarns, plantains, or bananas. 
While bushmeat captured through both hunting and trapping is most pronounced in the 
forested zones of the park and the WBZ, it is notable that it also contributes substantially 
(12.7%) to incomes in the EB7- INS is consistent with accounts that hunting parties from 
some of the villages outside of the park have traditional hunting rights in =as which 
extend wcH into the park- and. indeed, tight to the Nigcrian border. 
Fishing is a traditional acti%ity undertaken almost exclusively by the women. It provides an 
important staple as well as contributing about 3,000 CFAF annually to per capita income in 
all parts of the survey area. Fish arc normally caught with nets, dried after being caught, 
and sold locally for consumpfion in SIMS aS an aItCM3fi%T to bUShnr-3L 
71c most significant source of income from traditional activities is associated with the 
gathering of forest products and the manufacture of goods derived from forest products. In 
the entire survey. these sources contributed more thin 17,000 CFAF per capita annually to 
income, comparable to that provided by cocoa and coffee cash crops togcthcr. In addition, 
84% of the households were involved In some way with gathering forest products, and 
59% of households surveyed were involved in manufacturing goods from forest products. 
Table 5.4 highlights the t)Te-s of goods involve& 
Ile survey asked respondents wh3t qrpes of forest products were harvested and how much 
- 
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they would cam fnxn each product. Of the gathered products, all of those gathered for sale 
(with the exception of timber) were fruits or bark used for consumption either in cooked 
foods or - as with the kola nut - as a stimulant caten separately. Medicinal plants were not 
usually gathered for sale as these were noamlly gathered and used exclusively by the 
village hcalcm The one exception to this waschewing stick(Garcinia menii) which is 
used widely for dental hygiene. Because all of the gathered products am madily available, 
they were not usually sold to fellow villagers but rather were 'exported' or were sold in 
tmall quanddes to transient travellers (usually Nigerian traders). Such exports concentrated 
on bush mango (Irvingla Gabonenjis) and Njangsang (Ricinodendron heudelorii). Bush 
mango is processed by drying and is sold as a base and thickener for soups or stews. 
Sccds from the Njangsang are ground up and used as a flavouring in soups. It should be 
noted that. with the exception of the timber gathering. all of these forest products wem 
gathered almost exclusively by women and children. 
Goods rnanufacturcd from forest products included any commodity which required some 
amount of processing beyond simple preservation mechanisms commonly undertaken for 
fruits wd spices. It ranged from fairly simple tasks: such as weaving raffia fronds for bags 
or sleeping nuts, to highly skilled crafts such as canoe building. While rnany such small- 
scale 'industries! were important in a few households, the most common - it was done in 
38% of the households surveyed - was the production of palm wine or distillates. It 
contributed about 3,000 CFAF per capita to annual income and - as with the gathered 
products - most was sold outside of the village or to traders visiting the village. It was also 
commonly expected that any visitor - including the interviewers - purchase a few bottles 
locally as a gift to the . ilbgc chief. 
Finally, it is appropriate to make a few comments on the aggregate income levels inside and 
outside the primary forest zone. First, it can not be said from the data that those inside the 
forest are generally any better or worse off than those outside - from the point of view of 
incomes. Although in the EBZ substantially more is made from cash crops, hunting and 
gathering activities In the forest zone of the park apparently compensate for the lower cash 
crop incomes. An exception to this is the area I have designated as the WB7- Incomes 
here are about 70% those in the rest of the region: hunting, cash crop, trading and 
remittance incomes here arc less than those in villagcs not far aix-ay in the KNP 2rea 
Before continuing with a discussion of the income distribution in the region, a few 
comments regarding the reliability of responses arc in order. In any household survey, it is 
always appropriate to question what precautions were taken to ensure that the responses 
ACtu3lly reflected facts. lFirst, this was the third survey undertaken in the region and most 
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households were aware of the project and had previously met someone Associated Willi It. 
Interviewers had gained the confidence of villagers on previous visits and - when 
accompanied by an interpreter - generally had a good rapport with survey respondents. 
Second, a major concern arose from the questions dealing with hunting And trapping 
activities. Technically, these activities am illegal in the park and - outside the park - 
hunters are required to have permits for their guns although few actually had such permits. 
One might have expected therefore that responses related to these activities were 
conservative. In spite of regulations, however, most people think that they arc 'cxcmpC 
because they have traditional rights and - in any event - none of the rcgulations had been 
enforced. As a result, individuals did not generally hesitate in providing answers to these 
questions. In addition, Infield (1988) spent seven months accompanying hunters on their 
hunting parties and - although no explicit attempt was nude to reconcile his observations 
With those in this survey - he noted that hunting regulations were not enforced and that 
responses from interviews which he had with hunters were generally consistent with 
observations made on trips. 
5.4.3 Incom Di-, tfibu6on 
Although one of the primary goals of development incentives is to improve income levels in 
the buffer zone, a supplementary goal was to improve income equality in the area. As 
noted by Warford (1987), natural resource management strategies often include some 
provision for trying to improve the lot of those which are the worst off and - in the case of 
Korup National Park - the particular question has arisen as to whether giving income 
support to those growing conventional cash crops such as coffee and cocoa would be any 
more or less regressive than giving similar support to forest gathering enterprises. In this 
section I present results relating to the current income distribution in the region. and 
provide a suggestion for the answer to this question. Two basic approaches arc used: the 
first simply uses descriptive statistics relating to population means and variances to 
determine if any gencralisations can be =dc regarding income distribution by region; the 
second uses conventional indices of inequality to highlight income inequality in the entire 
sample and to describe how different sourcev of income contribute to or mitigate income 
inequality. 
First. Table 5.5 provides a summary of the statistics mlating to population and income 
distribution. The mean (pi) and standard devi3tion (si) are provided for the sample by 
survey block as well as for the sample as a whole. A coefficient of variation (sVPj) is 
calculated to provide a summary statistic of the variation in incomes in each region. As 
noted, there is a large distribution of incomes In all pans of the mgion: some households 
ýIM- 
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Table 5.5 
Yopulation mind Income Sutistics (3411 louscholds) 
EDZ mm KU IQMI 
ToW I louwhokis 123 113 103 341 
litsof PopulAon 
linu h ld Mg - fi il h 
721 
h 4d 
753 759 2,233 
sc o t ndiv g 
Kan 
= b= c j 
5.77 6.66 7.37 6.55 
Sundard Dcviiaion 3.68 4.12 3.98 3.97 
Cociricicni of V"6on 0.638 0.619 0.540 0" 
Minimum I I I I 
hkdian 5 6 7 6 
Wlimum 20 20 25 25 
Nk= 391,611 309,645 469,460 387.964 
Sundzd DcvLuiion 609.931 556.221 751,619 641.197 
CocMcicnlo(V"6on 1.558 1.796 1.601 1.653 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 
hkdian 130.376 108,400 198,002 150.576 
Maximum 3AM. 873 4.074DW 4.347,200 4.347.200 
Bar CaCiU fritme (CFAE 
M= 
6al 
67,894 46,467 63.708 59.246 
Sundard DcvWion 112,231 80.244 $7,469 94.429 
cocfrlcicnlc(V"60n 1.653 1.727 1.373 1.593 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 
WdLin 31,871 20.173 38,12-1 27.001 
Nuximum 902.469 679.000 869,440 902.469 
have no cash income whereas the n=imum incomes exceed 4 million CFAF. 71c per 
capita income statistics arc derived based on the number of individuals in each household 
and, as such, the standard deviations should not be used for calculating any significance 
statistics, 13 but the data again illustrate the substantial variation in per capita incomes. It is 
also c1car from these data that the large income earners are distributed such that the nrdian 
household (and per capita) incomes are substantially less than the means. For example, 
although the mean per capita income for the entire survey is almost 60,000 CFAF. one-half 
of the individuals have an income of less than 27,000 CFAF. 
13 For ejumpk. the m=% and sundud deviations for any Sample assumed that there were ni observations 
at yj for any given houschold. %here ni it the popuLuion of household i wo Yi is the Calculated Per Capita 
Income for household I (yinYVni, %here Yj is the household income). This ensured that the means %= 
Consistent With per Capita Summaries for each rcSion as a %hok. 
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The statistics expressed in this manncr also allow us to test explicitly - using simple F-tests 
and t-tcsts - whether the per capita income distributions arc the same across the survey 
regions. Ile t-tcst presumes, however. that the underlying variances behind the 
distributions are equal, and we must therefore first test whether these arc indeed equal. 
Consider two samples having means pi and pj, standard deviations &I and ij. and 
observations ni and nj, uith the sub-samples chosen such that s, -'>sj. On the hypothesis 
_22 is distributed as that the population variances are the samc. the statistic N- si/S; nj. I* 
On the hypothesis that the population means are the sanx (prcsunýng that the variances are 
the same), the statistic tlJ=(pi-pj)/Sjj is distributed as t with ni+nj-2 degrccs of frccdom, 
where: 
22 (si (nj-l)+sý (nj. l) 
+x ni4. nj-2 
It can be calculated from Table 5.5 that, using a critical value of F=1.45 at the 2.5 
percentile level, the variances on population am equal In all pair-wise comparisons of the 
EB7, WBZ and KNIP sub-samples (FA'e-1.25,1: *k,, 1.07. Fkýe=1.17). At the 5 per cent 
level of significance, one must reject the null hypothesis that the means of household 
population are the same in the EBZ and the KNP (t1cm-3.15) and we hence conclude that 
household size in the park- tends to be larger thin that in the castem buffer zone. Similarly, 
however. we accept the hypothesis (PýC=1.76) that mean household sizes in the WBZ and 
EBZ are the sme. 
If we go through a similar exercise with household incomes, it is readily calculated that the 
variances of the EBZ and WBZ are the same (Fcwnl. 20) but that in the other cases the 
population variances am actually different (Fkw=1.83, Fkc=1.52). The West is therefore 
not applied in the latter two cases, but it can be demonstrated that, in the former case, 
ew=-1.08 and that we therefore accept the hypothesis that household Incomes in the EBZ 
and WBZ are equal. 
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To conduct direct tests on whether the per capita incomes, distributed by howehold, 
differcd between regions, test stadstics were calculated as folloWS: 16 
Sk. 1.98 
I'C*m 2.41 
Ir-lwm 1.22 tkwu . 1.10 
The West was only calculated when the variances of the two distributions were accepted as 
the sanx, hcncc fmm these tests we accept only the null hypothesis that the distributions of 
per capita Incornc are the sa= Inside the KNP and the WB7, and the distribution in the 
1-: 13Z Is different from both of these. 
Although the previous comments applied to all of the possible pair-wise comparisons 
between two sub-samples in the survey, the sample can also be split in a way that any 
particular sub-sample is compared to the rest of the survey. This lets us ask the question of 
whether per capita incomes are different in some region from those in the rest of the 
sample. Although the details of the calculations are omýitted here, the procedure generates 
the test statistics shown in Table 5.6. where Fi is the test statistic for testing whether the 
variance In sub-sample I is different from the rest of the sample and ti is the test statistic for 
testing whether the mean is difriercrit from the rest of the sample. 
The test statistics for household income indicate that for KNP - and for the WBZ - we 
must reject the null h)Tothesis that the variance is the same as that in the rest of the sample, 
and hence no tests regarding the means arc made. In the case of the EBZ, on the other 
hand, we can comfortably accept the hypotheses that both the variance and the mean of the 
household incomes are equal to those in the rest of the sample. A similar conclusion might 
have been drawn simply by observing that household incomes in the EBZ lie almost 
midway between those in the WBZ and KNP, so it is not necessarily surprising that this 
result should arise when the EBZ is compared to the aggregate of the KNP and WBZ. 
Ile test statistics for household size again confirm that significant differences exist 
amongst the various sub-regions. Here the F-test statistics all indicate that we can 
comfortably accept the nuU hypotheses that the variance in household size in any one region 
is the same as that in the rest of the sample. The t-test statistics indicate that Korup 
National Park has a household size greater than the rest of the sample, and that the EBZ has 
an avcr2ge household size less than the rest of the sarnple. As the WBZ has close to the 
16 Ihc rckvant dau are (in CFAF/yr pa Capita. distributed by hotwjwld): 
EU Amz Lým low 
85.858 52.165 65.830 68.643 
Sundard Deviation 137.605 88.593 97.905 112,109 
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Table 5.6 
Significance Tests for Population and Income Niewurts (3411 fouscholdi) 
Household Income 
Fi Fcrit 101 
Korup National Park (ink) 1.65 F102.237=1.37 1.53 
Western Buffer Zone (inw) 1.48 112=1.39 P227 1.59 Eastern Buffer Zone One) 
H h ld Si 
1.17 . P124.213=1.36 0.08 
ouse o - ze 
Korup National Park (ink-) 1.04 F102.23? ul. 37 2.55 
Western Buffer Zone O=w) 1.12 227mi. 36 F112 0.37 Eastern Buffer Zone 6=0 
Per Ca ita nco= 
, r-215.12, &ul. 37 2.79 
p 
Korup National Park (ink) 1.45 F2,37 102-1.40 0.30 Western Buffer Zone O-w) 1.88 F227: 112-1.39 1.92 
Eastern Buffer Zone 0=0 2.18 F124.213"1.36 2.17 
* Crifical t33P 1 -97. 
average household size. it is again not surprising that twr-0.37 compels us to accept the 
hypothesis that households in the WBZ are on average the same size as those in the rest of 
the allmgated sample. 
Finally, little can again be concluded from the per capiti income statistics because. in all 
three casesý we must reject the null hypothesis that the variance of the per capita income in 
any of the sub-regions is equal to the -*-ariance in the rest of the simple. lie t-statistics can 
therefore not be used to test whether the means arc the same. 
To summarise the major conclusions regarding means from these tests. there are few 
generalisations which can be made about differences in income distribution amongst the 
various areas surveyed. With respect to household size, we conclude only that they are on 
average largest in the KNIP and srnallest in the EBZ. With respect to average household 
incomes, formal tests %%ill indicate only that those in the EBZ and WBZ are equal. With 
respect to per capita incomes, we can only st3tc conclusively that - as distributed per 
household - they are the same inside the KNIP and the WBZ; most formal tests arc 
inconclusive. In short. while some differences in per capita incomes exist among regionso 
very little can be said from the simple summary statistics to determine how one can account 
for the underlying distributions in income. Simply trying to describe it on a regional basis 
is inadequate, and the following discussion hence ccntres on other descriptive statistics 
which allow us to account for any differences in income which exist within the sampleý 
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While the previous analysis revealed statistics showing the variance in incomes, by itself it 
does not suggest any measure of income inequality which can be usefully compared to 
those calculatcd for other developing countries. Appropriately. the second approach shall 
now focus on two descriptive Indices of income inequality: 
a) the Gini cocfricienr. and, 
b) the Atkinson index. 
Mw Gini coctricient is derined as: 
+ 
1_ 2 Gini -I it n2 y[ 
nyl + (n-I)y2 +. - + 2yo. 1 + Yn 
where n is the number of individuals, yj is the income of individual in rank I (arranged such 
that Yl: 5Y2'-"o -4n-15YO, and Y Is the mean income. In a Lorenz curve such as that in 
r-igure 5.3. the Gini coefficient represents the proportion of the area between the 450 line 
and the income locus to the area below the 450 line. In a Lorenz curve, any particular point 
(a, b) along the income locus indicates that the poorest a% of the population cams b% of the 
income. Perfect equality would thus have a Gini coefficient equal to zero, and with perfect 
Inequality (%ith all the income in the hands of one person) the Gini coefficient approaches 
unity. 
ne Atkinson index of inequality explicitly incorporates a social valuation of income 
distribuflon. and is defined as 1-(ý, ny. where P is the equally distributed equivalent income 
defincd dirough: 
n 
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whcrc it (. ) is a utility function. A distribution where every individual has an income level 
P is thus socially equivalent to the actual distribution of incomes. Although any one of a 
number of utility functions can be used, I shall use the isoclastic form u (y)--yI*c/I -C. no, 
and u (y)aln(y) when cul. When E=O we have ý=Y, and as c-4oo, P will tend towards the 
minimum income level in the sample. Atkinson (1970) discusses properties of both the 
Gini coefricicnt and the Atkinson index. Summaries of these indices for the entire survey 
sampic are shourn in Tablc 5.7. 
Before discussing the results, some specific comments are in order. First. two sets of 
indices arc shown: one for the set of all 341 households. and one for a set of households 
which excludes those households with zero incomes. As noted earlier, there were 15 
households which had no cash income of any sort. While this does not affect the 
calculation of the Gini cocfficient, it does complicate calculation of the Atkinson index for 
c2 1. as the utility function is then undefined. To accommodate this in the first set any zero 
incomes were treated as a nominal inco= of I CFAF per year. 71is problem does not 
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Figure 5.3 
Lortnz Curves of Income Distribution 
(341 HwwhoWs: PoNl2tion - htscnt or at Schc)ol) 
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arise in the second set - for which such households arc excluded - but the Atkinson index 
in these cases will slightly undersute income inequality. 
Ile second corrunent relates to the basis of measuring incomes. if we use household 
income as a basis for the distribution calculations, the Gini coefricicnt Is 0.653 for our 
sample. 71is may be compared with indices for the distribution of income of Poor 
countries of about 0.4 to 0.5 as calculated by Anand (1978) and Atkinson (1970). Ibis 
indicates that fairly high inequality exists in comparison to that in LDCs in general. But 
using the household as the unit for calculating income distribution may o%, crstatc incqu, 21itY 
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0-80 0-90 . ()o 
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.30 0.60 0.70 0-80 0-90 1.0() 
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If larger Incomes acme to larger households. Thc reasons why larger households have 
higher Incomes are varied. First. given that many of the activities still involve: gathering 
tasks, the greater availability of household labour suggests that more would be gathcrrd. 
Furthcr, the phenomenon of an 'cxtcndcd' family occurs here - as in other developing 
countries - whcrcby Individuals with large incomes attract new additions to the family. 
This is especially a factor in this area where: it Is not uncomrnon for the household head to 
have more than onc wife, and where the number of %%ivcs he has will depend to a dcg= on 
how many hc can afford to kccp. In any cvcnt, this suggests that it would be more 
appropriate to specify the individual as the basis for calculating income: distributions. Ile 
second column in Tablc 5.7 provides such an estimate. It is based on per capita household 
Inconx and calculated - for the 'all household' case - on the basis of the 2,233 individuals, 
with each individual bcing assigned the per capita income of the household in which they 
livC. 
A final adjustment was made to reflect the fact that even per capita income may not 
adequately reflect income inequality if there are substantial differences in household 
demographic structures. Very old and very young people %ill generally require less than 
adult males, so adjustments are at times made to reflect this. The usual method is to specify 
an 'equivalent' population for each individual: for exarnple, an 8 yew old girl is equivalent 
to only about 0.8 adult males in consumption requirements. The third column in Table 5.5 
accommodates this adjustment. 17 
The results shown in Table 5.5 mid Figure 5.3 confirm the existence of fairly high levels of 
Inequality by most any measure, although it is noted that inequality measures based on 
individually distributed per capita incomes are lower than those based on household 
37 The actual conversion factors = provided in Appendix Table A. 14. In calculating the Gini coefficient, 
It should be noted that Equation (5.9) can not be used as it applies to discrete individuals whereas in the 
formulation of equivalent incomes it is common to have a non-integer number as household population. 
The following algorithm was OwWore used for a sample containing It households: 
I -Ginl 0 
It 
It tf 
7, Nti 7, Yh 
iml iml 
Where household of rank hW an equivalent pqmbtion Nh, a household income Yh, and ft ranking is 
defined Such that (yhNh)2! (Yh-l/Nh-1) for all hA. and we have defined Y"O. It has a computational 
advantage as well In this application as it can be applied to the vector of households rather than the entire 
vector of Individuals. It can be demonstrated, hovtvcr. that this is equivalent to Equation (5.9) if all 
households have an integer n=bcr of nwmbcm 
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Indices of Inconic Inequality (341 Households) 
Based m BLWd m fruthidnalIX MgrihulM 
Per I kuschold tw cao u Pcf CAPUS 
twme lo=t Eattly2lof Inang! 
Gini Cmfficierd 0.653 0.621 0.618 
Minson Ird--x 
- t-0 0 0 0 
- t-025 0.193 0.173 0.171 
eaoso 0.367 0.330 0.328 
tiz0.75 0.337 0.479 0.477 
cm 1.000 0.747 0.630 0.651 
-tulaso 0.967 0.891 0.896 
- tm 1304 0.999 0.993 0.994 
- tmI000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
- cm3.00* 1.000 1.000 1.000 
. t-. )oo 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Gini Cwffjcient 0.638 0.612 0.609 
Atkinson lrukx 
- t-0 0 0 0 
- c=015 0.180 0.166 0.164 
- c=0.50 0.339 0.313 0.312 
- twO. 75 0.475 0. "6 0.442 
- t-1.00 0.593 0.559 0.555 
- cm 1.25 0.6% 0.658 0.653 
-tal. 50 0.786 0.741 0.738 
- c=2.00 0.914 0.868 0.866 
- c-3.00 0.982 0.966 0.966 
. C-40* 0.999 0.997 0.997 
0 Zero incomes =ted as I CFAF/year. 
incomes. 7bis supports the earlier arguments that larger households %ill have larger 
incomes. Also, very little change c>ccurs in the indices If an adjustment is made for 
equivalent consumption units. This reflects either that there is little variadon in household 
structure as family size and incomes increase. or that any such variation does not effect the 
equivalent population of a small household differently than that of a larger household. 
Inspection of the Atkinson indices for the entire sample rc%vA that tbosc based on per capitA 
equivalent incomes arc lower than those calculated on a strict per capita income basis at low 
values of c, yet they are higher at high values of r- In words. this suggests that the per 
capita income basis overstates inequality if one is not too avcrsc to inequality. Yet 
understates it if one is very averse to income- inequality. As this 'anomaly' does not arise in 
the second set of data for which households with zero incomes am excluded, its APPC=ncc 
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In the first set Is attributed to the inclusion of such zero income households. Intuitively, 
what seems to be the case In this sample is that these households apparently have a 
somewhat higher average consumption 'requirement' pcr individual in the household than 
the rest of the samplc. As a result, this would have a proportionately greater effect on the 
inequality If you were very concerned about the existence of low income groups. 
While the Indices provided in Table 5.7 describe the inequality in the population as a 
whole, they do not specifically account for it in any way. Table 5.8 explicitly decomposes 
the income inequality into Its component parts. 18 It is calculated for all households on the 
basis of Individually distributed per capita incomes. The decomposition allows calculadon 
of the contribution Ginik for each income source k= I ., K to the overall Gini coefficient: K 
Gini I Ginik ... (5.11); kni 
where, 
Ginik G ... (5.12); 
where Yk is the mean per capita income from source k, and Gk is a 'pseudo-Gini 
cocfricicnt defincd similuly to Equation (5.9) as: 
02 Gkn I+1-[ nylk + (n-I)y2. k +... + 2Yn. lk + Ynk (5.13); n n2 Yk 
where Yi. k is the income to individual of rank i attributable to income source k. It is 
important to note that, for these formulae to be consistent with Equation (5.9), individuals 
must be ranked in terms of increasing total incomes (yj! 5y2! 5.. Syn. j5yn). Hence we refer 
to Gk as a pscudc>-Gini coefficient: the ranking is such that it could conceivably be negative 
(coffesponding to an income locus in a 'pscudo-Lor=7 curve which went above the 450 
line). 
Intcrprctation of the decomposition is, however, quite straight forward. A high G0 k 
corresponds to an income source which is distributed prefeTcntially towards the rich and a 
low G; corresponds to an income source distributed preferentially to the poor. Using the 
population Gini=0.62 as a benchmark and treating a difference of 0.04 from this as 
significant, it Is clear that Incomes from cocoa. hunting. trading and remittances all increase 
inequality in the sample. By contrast. incomes from food crop sales, trapping, and forest 
product gathering and manufacturing all decrease inequahty in the sample to the extent that 
they contribute more relative income to the poor than to the rich. Inequality ascribed to 
18 This follows a procedure outlined by Shorrocks (1982) foe dccomposing the contribudons of various 
factor Componcnts. 
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Table 5.8 
Decomposition of per Capita Inconx Inequality by Incom Source (1411 lou,. chold%) 
Source (k) TI yvy- a *k Glnlk GIML/Ginl 
AU Income Sources 59,246 100.0% 0.621 0.621 100.0% 
Cash Cmps 20,291 34.2% 0.649 0.222 35.7% 
. cocoa 14.040 23.7% 0.669 0.159 25.6% 
- Coffee 3.510 5.9% Obw Ob36 5.8% 
. Oth" 2,740 4.6% 0.580 OW 4.3% 
Livestock 798 1.3% 0.369 0.005 0.8% 
Hunting 7,088 12.0% 0.660 0.079 12.7% 
Trapping 5,724 9.7% 0.567 0.055 8.9% 
Fishing 2,915 4.9% 0.626 0.031 5.0% 
Trading 3,153 5.3% 0.697 0.037 6.0% 
Forest Products 17.447 29.4% 0.562 0.165 26.6% 
- Gathcrins 12,547 21.2% 0379 0.123 19.8% 
- NUiufacturins 4.9W 9.3% 0.516 0.043 6.9% 
Remittances 1.828 3.1% 0.879 0.027 4.3% 
fishing and coffee production are no different to that In the sample as a whole. 
Values of G* should not be used in isolation to determine the total contribution of each k 
source to the inequality in the samplc. The fact that G*k k>0 
for all k indicates that each 
source does contribute to overaU inequality to some degrcc, 19 and the total contribution to 
the Gini coefficient depends also on the share Gj, 5) of a particular income source in total 
income. As shown in Table 5.8. remittances by themselves are distributed very unequally, 
yet they are a small share of the income total (3.1 %) and hence contribute little to the total 
inequality (43%). The distributions of both cash crop incomes and forest product incomes 
contribute most significantly to over-all inequality-. 36% and 27%. respectively. 
Recall that we were most interested in conducting this exercise of describing Income 
distribution to deterraine whether providing income support to either cash crop production 
or to forest product production would improve inequality in the region. Table 5.9 shows 
the results of simulations undertaken to illustrate the impacts of various types of income 
19 To an extent this is attribuuble to the inclusion of the rem inme housdholds. 
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Tabic 5.9 
Impact of Inconx Sur"ti on Income hwquality 
(3411 kxvwholdi - lUwd on I"viduadly LhsinbuW pcr Capta Inconw) 
Gini Atkinson Index 
cp-0.5 CM1.0 CM1.5 
Base Case 0.621 0.330 0.650 0.993 
10% Increase In Cocoa + Coffee 0.622 0.331 0.652 0.993 
10% increase in Forest Products 0.619 0.328 0.648 0.993 
30% Increase in Cocoa + Coffee 0.625 0.334 0.657 0.993 
30% increase in Forest Products 0.616 0.326 0.646 0.993 
50% increase In Cocoa + Coffee 0.628 0.338 0.662 0.994 
50% increase in Forest Products 0.615 0.324 0.644 0.994 
Changes from Ba--tt Cate- 
10% incrcasc in Cocoa + Coffcc 40.001 
10% incrtase in Forcst Products -0.002 
30% increase in Cocoa + Coffee +0.004 
30% increase in Forest Products -0.005 
50% increase in Cocoa + Coffec +0.007 
50% increase in Forest Products -0.006 
+0-001 +0.002 0.000 
-0.002 -0.002 0.000 
+0.004 +0.007 0.000 
-0.004 -0.004 0.000 
+0.008 +0.012 +0.001 
-0.006 -0.006 +0.001 
support on income inequality. Income support is, for illustrative purposes, in the form of 
price support for the particular income source. lie simulations assume that there are no 
changes in income from the other sources. It should be noted that a 10% income support 
programme would have an annual cost of 3.92 million CFAF if applied to cocoa and coffee 
cash crops, and 3.90 million CFAF if applied to forest products. Hence it is fair to 
compare the two types of programme. In the particular case of Korup National Park, the 
project has annual funding of about 20 million CFAF available for such programmes, 
hence a simulation is also undertaken to show a 50% income support scheme which would 
use up this funding. 
nc results of these simulations confirm what was also revealed in the decomposition in 
Table 5.8: income support provided to conventional cash crops will tend to increase income 
inequality in the region, whereas support provided to forest product industries would assist 
the poorcr households and improve income inequality. But the results also illustrate how 
one's degree of aversion to income inequality affccts the results. In the case of f: =1-5, 
Income support provided to either cash crops or forest products would increase inequality 
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in the sample. Intuitively, what occurs is that the spread I>ctwccn those households with 
income and those without income increases - the income support mechanism used here 
fails to target the poorest - and therefore there Is greater inequality. If however, one Is not 
too averse to income inequality (cul), thcn It is better to support forest product based 
pursuits. 
5.4.4 Summ= 
As the discussion has been quite detailed to this stage. I shall be brief in my summary 
comments. First. income from mEtional hunting and gathering activities Is found to be 
substantial in all areas of the survey - both inside and outside the prinury forest zone. 
Second, there is a great deal of variation in incomes within the survey, but income 
distribution from traditional gathering activities benefits the poorer households more than 
does the income distribution from conventional cash crops such as cocoa and coffee. 
Appropriately, if one had to select between an income support policy which benefited cash 
crop producers, or one which benefited those involved in traditional forest based 
industriesý the latter policy would normally be preferred if one were interested primarily in 
improving income distribution in the region. 
While this section has characteriscd the inconx distribution. it has not made any attempt to 
explain how the current distribution actually evolved. While any such explanation is of 
interest in designing policies and. indeed. has been the subject of recent studies elsewhere 
(see Lanjouw and Stern 119891) it is bc)-ond the scope of this thesis to investigate it. More 
detailed panel data on input mukets is usually roquired to investigate such problems and the 
survey data collected for this study were for only one period and did not contain 
information rcgarding production inputs. 
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15.5 Income and Education 
A striking rcature which one can not help but notice when in the viflages is that - in spite of 
the results of the previous section - there Is very little conspicuops consumption. Although 
some villages and households seem to have morc income than others, there is an apparent 
homogeneity in living standards which seems to cona-adict the assertion that substantial 
Incocric Inequality exists. Although this is not directly related to the problems addressed in 
the rest of this thesis, It is of interest to try to account for this discrepancy between incomes 
levels and apparent living standards and - in the proce . ss - learn something about how 
income is "capitalised' in this part of the country. 
I"he usual manner to account for such a discrepancy would be to address an expenditure 
survey for the region and to note explicitly how incomes were spent. Unfortunately, no 
such data am available for this sample. We must therefore revert to other observations 
which were nude as a part of the demographic and inconx survey. In particular, it would 
seem natural to try to look at the actual assets held by various households: if no 
conspicuous consumption is occurring in spite of substandal income differences. one might 
presumc that those with higher incomes have greater assets which would not be noticed by 
wandering around the villages. Items which n-dght conceivably constitute assets would 
include: bank balances, fann land, farm implements, or consumer durables. 
Although no statistics were gathered on bank balances, savings and loans, it was clear from 
Informal discussions that credit institutions were not used in the region - primarily because 
of its isolation - and that any assets held in this form would account for only a handful of 
households at the most. With respect to farms. labour is the primary input other than land 
and seed, farm animals are not used, and there was no evidence of mcchanisation. 
Ploughing and weeding arc manual tasks, hencc the only potential asset was the actual 
amount of farm land controlled by each household. 71his statistic, in terms of 'lopc'(whcre 
I lope is about 0.75 ha) was gathered for each houscholdL Finally, as noted earlier, there 
was no obvious consumption through consumer durables. 
From discussions with individuals in the villages, it was clear that one of the greatest 
priorities for any household head was providing an education for his children. As noted 
earlier in this chapter. education must normally be paid for by a child's family in 
Cameroon, and individuals regularly complained that - because of income constraints - 
they had to make decisions as to which children could go to school and which had to stay 
home. Given these conditions, it seems natural to ask whether earnings are being 
"capitalised' by educating children. If this is the case, then we should be able to detect this 
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in the sampic. To address this, two approaches are taken: the first approach Involves the 
calculation of descriptive statistics for some of the potentially mlatcd Income and cducadon 
variables; the second approach is more detailed in that it invcstigatcs on an Individual basis 
the conditions under which children in the sample are rccciving an cducation. 
The first approach taken in describing correlations bct%ixn income. assets and education 
involves simply an3lysing the correlation nnuix of the mievant variables. The variables 
used are described in Table 5.10, and the correlation matrix of the variables is presented in 
Table 5.11. To evaluate the significance of any correlation coefficient r. we use the result 
that, to test the hypothesis that rwO. the statistic to is distributed as t with (n-2) dcgrccs of 
freedom, where: 
r2 t* (n-2) 
L' 
r2 J. r2] ... (5. I 4). 
For 339 degrees of freedom at a 5% significance level. the critical t value Is 1.98 and the 
critical value of r is thus 0.107. If r is significant, then It indicates that a simple pair-wise 
regression of the two variables under consideration would also be signifiCant. While this 
does not capture all of the results which might arise from more detailed multivariate 
analysis, it does provide an initial indicator of correlition baween variables. Spccific tests 
using muld%-ariate analysis %%iU be addressed later. 
Using the result that any correlation coefficient greater than 0.107 indicates significance, 
we ran now go to Table 5.11 to determine which pairs of variables would be correlated 
significantly. First. we note that all of the variables am significantly positively correlated to 
income. With respect to the education variables, the most significant correlation occurs 
between TOTED and INCOME. indicating that total years or education in the household 
increases as income increases. Although this result may not be surprising given that we 
had already noted that income and population were positively related (rW0.308), it is 
perhaps more striking that both the marimian level or education achieved by any household 
member, as well as the average level of education in the household, increases as income 
goes up. Similarly. the data suggest that households will tend to have higher incomes if the 
household head has a higher level of education. 
Although the data clearly demonstrate that there is a positive correlation between income 
and education. one must take care in assigning any particular cause-effect relationship with 
these aggregate dam While the correlation is positive, it Is not obvious whether the higher 
incomes are being used to purchase more education, or if the higher levels of education = 
themselves allowing individuals to cam more money. On this point. however. it is useful 
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Tablc 5.10 
Dcrinition or Incorm. Asset and Education Variables 
VWWQ Definition Man S=xtxd n 
Nubsct* Iffstach oldi- All 
Dcviaaion 
INCOME Annual I III incorm (CFAF) 387. W 641.197 341 
TOT M- Total education o(IIII (), can) 14A6 11.81 341 NMED Wximum education in lilt (yean) 5.26 2.96 341 
AVERE D A%mgc education in lilt (V=) 2.16 1.53 341 
111111SCIll. Education of III I head (y=) 2.19 2.79 341 
FARM Fmm land controllod by lilt Oopc) 4.00 3.20 341 
111101101 fill population notmally prcsmt 6.55 3.97 341 
tI di Sub id 
ot abscm at school 
" lI h l 146 N A - 4 n se v 
ISEX 
offni X r=nt or at sc oo t! ge c - 
Individuars xx (O*F. I aND 0.50 0.50 726 IAGE Individuars &P (Years) 8.24 3.04 726 
ISCIII. Individual's schooling (Years) 2.25 2.02 726 
SCHOOLYN aI if IS Cl 11>0. else NO 0.70 0.46 726 
IISCIILV =I if thcm is a school in an 0.56 0.50 726 
Wividual's hocnevillam else mO IIINCOME lilt incorm of individual 51.911 78.177 726 
(CFAF/year per capita) 
III. DGINC 9.84 2.02 726 
11111111SCL Schooling of hcad of lilt in %hich 2.28 2.81 726 
individual lives (years) 
DU. %U%13Z mI if individual's I III in WBZ. else 11,0 0.34 0.47 726 
DUNUEIIZ aI if individuats III I in ED7, else =0 031 OA6 726 
DUNIMZ 
S b I di id 
mI if individuars lilt in W13Z or EBZ. c1sc -0 
l A 5 14 -N D h l 
0.65 OA8 726 
u set n y 
ISEX 
ua r gei . - orm y O=nt of at sc oo 
Individuirs sex (0-F. I nNO 0.51 0-50 626 
[AGE Imlividuars AP ()tm) 8.91 2.71 626 
ISCHL Imlividuars schooling (years) 2.61 1.96 &16 
SCIIOOLYN mI if ISCI [L>O. else m-0 0.81 0.40 626 
IiSCIILV aI if tkre is a school in an 0.56 0.50 626 
Individual's honx village, else 8-0 
IIIINCOME lilt 4x=m of individual 52,442 80,532 626 
(CFAFWcar pcr c. Viu) 
11LOGM MUKIIINCOME) 9.85 1.97 626 
1110111SCL Schooling of head of lilt in which 2M 2.81 626 
individual fives (y=) 
DU, %UWBZ mI if irulividual*s lilt in Wig, else =0 0.34 OA7 626 
DU%. UEBZ aI if individuars lilt in EBZ. else =0 0.30 0.46 626 
DUMMZ mI if Individuars lilt in WBZ oc ED7, else =0 0.64 OA8 626 
Table 5.11 
Cmeladon Matrix of Income. Asset and Education Variables (Households) 
INCOME TOTED NLAXED AVERED 111111SCIIL 
MCOME 1.000 
TOTED 0353 1.000 
MAXED 0.165 0.676 
AVERED 0.149 0.591 
IIIIIISCHL 0.179 0.253 
FARM 0.208 0.281 
Ifropol 0308 0.727 
im 
0.780 1.000 
0330 0.441 1.000 
0.106 0.034 -0.070 
0352 0.049 0.003 
FARM HPOPOI 
1.000 
0.308 
noul 
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to remark that - in this sample - one would not normally expect the earnings level to 
depend that significantly on the level of formal education achieved within the household. 
Most of the traditional practices of gathering and hunting are learned In the home rather than 
in school, mid only with cocoa and coffee farrriing might one expect a priori that agronomic 
standards would increase as the farms am being managed by better educated Individuals. 
In addition, it seems less likely that younger family members cumntly mcelving tin 
education would be able to apply this education usefully to any current Income earning 
activity for the houscholdL Indeed, one might even argue that the Income earning capacity 
of the household decreases when individuals are at school as they are then not available to 
assist in income earning activities. As such. it seems most likely that any positive 
correlation between incomes and education does mflect the fact that households must 
f i=ce the education of their nicmbcrs. 
With respect to tangible assets, the data suggest that farm land and incomes = correlated 
(r--0.21), although this correlation is primarily due to the actual household size: larger 
households will have more income and more farms. The correlation cocfficient when 
calculated using per capita land holdings and per capita inconx suggested that the two were 
not strongly connected (r=0.10). 
Given this apparently loose correlation. it Is useful to look briefly at the variation in farm 
landL As %ith income, them is considerable variation in the amount of farm land controlled 
by individual households. It ranges from a minimum of zero to a n=imum, of 23 lope per 
household. Ile mean is 4.0 lope %%ith a standard deviation of 3.2 lope. Calculation of an 
inequality index on farm land. based on individually distributcd per capita land holding, 
indicated a Gini coefficient of about 0.4. as illustrated in Figure 5.4. Tbere is no 
significant change in this coefficient if it is calculated on the basis of per capita equivalent 
land holding. 
Although there is substantial inequality in both land holding and in income. it does not 
necessarily follow that one leads to the other. One might argue that those with less land 
will have less ability to Scnemte income, but we havc already wn that most of the income 
received by households is not associated with crops rcquiring landL Alternately. one might 
argue that larger incomes allow individuals to acquire more land. but in this case - as was 
noted earlier - land is essentially 'free! and low incomes will not exclude individuals from 
controlling land. Indeed, the empirical evidence suggests that land holding and income are 
largely unrelated. Figure 5.5 shows a distribution of land holding per c3pim ranked on the 
basis of individually distributed per capita income. It indicates that there Is only moderate 
evidence for arguing that those %ith the lowest incomes control the least land. 
ý 
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5.4 L'rucnz 
Curvcs of r-wm Land Distribudon 
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Distribution of Farm Land Sorted bv Income 
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I now proceed to a more detailed analysis of the education levels of Individual household 
members. A subset of the data was chosen which selected all family member% of primary 
and secondary school age (4-14 years). Thc lower bound was chosen to correspond to the 
youngest which were in primary school attcndancc, and the upper bound for the sample 
was selected to exclude thosc individuals which were potentially economically Activc in 
some significant way. 71c upper bound is somewhat arbitrary, as them were Individuals 
younger than this who were economically active, and some Individuals older than this 
would still be attending primary school. Nonetheless, it is believed that this age group. 
consisting of 726 individualsý provides a re. -distic sample for conducting an analysis. 
In formulating a model of whether any particular individual his formal schooling. I rely 
initially on some a priori presumptions of what factors might be relevant. nose chosen 
were: 
a) the child's sex (ISEXI; 
b) the child's age (IAGE); 
C) whether there is a school in the child's honx village (IISOILV); 
d) the per capita inc(xnc of the child's household (HINCOME; ItLOGtNC)'. 
C) the lc%vl of schooling achieN-ed by the household head (IIIIIIIISCL); and. 
f) the location of the child'svillagc (DUNIIBZ, - DUNitWB7, - DUNIIEBZ). 
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in this sarnple are provided in Table 5.10. 
Of the 726 individuals in the total sample. 511 had some schooling and 215 had no 
schooling. From an inspection of the data. it was determined that 100 individuals were in 
the youngest age class -4 years of age - of which only 5 were in school. As it was 
believed that this group might bias the results, a second subset of 626 individuals was 
chosen which included only the 5-14 year age group. Results for both data sets arc 
presented, although I shall normally concentrate on discussing the first subset (4-14 year 
group) in the teXL 
Two types of estimations %%-crc conducted: a Probit model, - and a Tobit model. Ile Probit 
model uses the variable SCHOOLYN as the dependent variable, uk-ing on the value of 
unity for a child with formal schooling and a value of zero for a child with no formal 
schooling. Ile data do not allow differentiation between those still at school and those 
having some education but no longer at school. Results from the Probit model arc 
interpreted as how individual expl3natory variables influence the probability of a child 
going to school. To understand how a particular model is diagnosed and interpreted. it is 
easiest to rcfr-r to a panicular ex-amplc. 
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Table 5.12a 
f Pmbit Results for Individual Education MCAge! 04) 
L)civndent Vari3b1c: SCHOOLYN 
Total Obsmadons: 726 
Observations at 0: 215 
Ob%crvations at 1: 511 
Estimation codficients with asymptotic t-rados in parenthms: 
Variable : Model (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) 
ISEX . 0.038 . 0.023 (0.30) (M18) 
IAGC- 0.443 OA66 0.438 OA63 
(14.14) (14.02) (14.10) (13.99) 
IISCIILv 0958 1.115 0984 1.160 
(6.39) (7.03) (6.94) (7.61) 
IIINM%tE 0.183E-5 02ME-5 
(2.21) (2.53) 
M. OGNC 0.151 0.158 
(4.53) (4.79) 
IIIIIIIISCL 0.038 0.039 
(1.48) (1.51) 
DLA, UWBZ -OA64 . 0.390 (2.612) (2.16) 
DUNUERZ . 0-365 . 0.357 (2M) (2.16) 
DUMMZ -OA53 -OA14 
(3.15) (2.83) 
CONSTAN"r -3-090 4.746 -2.989 4.714 (11.06) (9.51) (11.36) (9.60) 
LOS Lilthhood (0) . 441.09 . 441.09 -441.09 -441.09 LOS Likehhood (Nlodd) . 250M -242.62 -252.58 . 244.12 
L-R Teu (Nio&-1) 380.84 396.94 377.02 393.94 
Dcr, rm of Recdoin 7 7 4 4 
Crifical X3 14.07 14.07 9A9 9A9 
ftckrrcd Nkxkt 0*00*00 
Z' (df. -3): 7.81 
Pewl. 4rowpit Intepitivvi loo KorMC 191 
Table 5.12b 
Probit Results for Individual Education (5: 5AFv514) 
Dependent Variable: SCIIOOLYN 
Total Observations: 626 
Observations at 0: 120 
Observations at 1: 506 
Estirmtion cocfficients with aspnptotic t-ratios in parcnthcscs: 
Variable : Model (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) 
ISEX -0.069 -0.047 
Aso) (0.33) 
IAGE 0.340 0.360 0.332 0.354 
(9-94) (9.97) (9.83) (9-88) 
IISCHLv lboo 1.143 1.003 1.166 
(6.29) (6.82) (6,67) (7.23) 
MNCONIE 0.177E-5 0.197E-5 
(1.97) (2.26) 
M. OGNC 0.142 0.151 
(4.13) (4.42) 
I]HHHSCL OL45 0.047 
(1.58) (1.63) 
DUMM13Z . 0.522 -0.448 
(7-74) ('1130) 
DUNUM -0.339 -0.313 (1.92) (1.75) 
DtJNUBZ . 0.467 -OA20 (3.01) (2.66) 
CONSTANT -2. W4 -3.761 -2.073 -3.714 (6.89) (7.03) (6.91) (7.09) 
Log Lik-tlihwd (0) -305.91 -305.91 -303.91 -303.91 
Lor, L&elihood (Nlodel) -214.46 -20S. 06 . 21733 . 210.43 
L-R Test (Niodel) 182.90 
Dcgrm of Ftecdorn 7 
clideal e 14.07 
Prtfcmd ? tk)dct 
194.62 177.16 190.92 
744 
14.07 9A9 9A9 
9660099 
x2 (df. u3): 7.81 
d- 
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Table 5.12a shows the results of the Probit estimations for the 4-14 year age group. Four 
scparatc models were run. 11re csdmadon coefficients are interpreted as the effect of a unit 
change of the independent variable on dic probability index of a child going to school. Ws 
Index is normally disuibutcd -Arith a mean of 0 and a variancc of 1. and is hence readily 
converted to a probabiUry condi6onal on a given set of characterisdcs. For example, at the 
means of all of the variables in the sample. the index is 0.99, which corresponds to a 
probability of 83.9% that a child will go to school. Thc particular t-rado for any given 
coefficient is also presented, taken here as the absolute value of the rado of the cstimadon 
coefficient to its standard error. At a 5% significance level. a t-ratio greater than 2 is 
regarded as stadsdcally significant. It is clear that a child's sex, for example, is not 
statisdcally significant (t-0.30 in Model II a)) in affecting cducadon. 
As Probit estimations involve procedures which maximise the likelihood function of a 
particular model, the usual test for determining whether a given model is meaningful 
Involves a likelihood ratio (LR) tCSL20 Ile test statistic LR - 2*[LL(Nlodel) - LL(O)J is 
distributed as X2 with n, degrees of freedom, where LL(Niodel) is the logarithm of the 
likelihood function of the model as estimated. LL(O) is the logarithm of the likelihood 
function of the model %%iLh only a constant term. and n, is the number of variables added to 
just the constant term. In essence, the LR statistic tests the hypothesis that the actual model 
is the same as taking a simple average of the dependent variable. If the LR statistic is 
greater than the critical value of X2, then this hypothesis is rejected and the model is 
rcgardcd as having some meaningful explanatory power. In our first example, for 
Model (In), the LR statistic is 380.84, which given the critical X2 of 14.07 at a 5% 
significance level. allows us to reject comfortably the hypothesis that the model is no 
diffcrcnt from a model with a constant term only. 
In comparing any two model struct=s, models with the samc dependent variable and the 
20 Although RI is used by some authors, it is not reported in these regressions as it is not believed to be a 
meaningful test for selecting models % hem the dependent variable is a qualitative variable. in the Probit 
model. for example. any given individual will cidier go to school or n(x go to school. hence the data are 
ones or zercm. But the estimator only purpons to estimte the probability of any individual going to 
school. Even given a pankuLu probability estimate. it would still be impossible to determine %hcthcr any 
given individual would or %ould not go to school. For large populations, however. any change in the 
cxpWuuxy variables would Mcate the change in the probability of atteridance and, hence. allow one to 
c-stimate how many morc people would go to school, even though it would not be possible to decide which 
individuals would actually do so. Given that the estimator simply provides an estimated probability that a 
child will attend school. it is c(xrunon for R2 in these types of regressions to be low- the estimators Are all 
between 0 And I %% hercas the observations are all at 0 and 1. Indeed. in our examples of schooling. the RI 
was typically of the order of 0.5. For additional discussion of the use of R3 as a diagnostic statistic in such 
CIMIscs. the feader Is rcfcffcd to Morrison (1972) who argues that it is not generally me. aningful. and 
Goldberger (1973), Aho Argues that it is meaningful in the sen that itdcscribcs the amountof the variation 
which is explained, but not necessarily in the sense that it should be used as a model selection statistic. 
For an vicellent text on using quanfiutive variables in cconometric rcgrcssionsý and for discussions of 
different'versions! of R2 statistics, the reader is WaTed to NU11-1h (1983). 
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same n, are often compared directly through inspection of the LUModel) value: those with 
a low (absolute) value are typically regarded as better. In Table 5.12s, therefore, 
Model (2a) is preferred over Model (la) because 1LL(h1odcl2)k1LL(N1odclj)1. The 
adjustment which was madc in this specific case was to correct for potential 
hmms, kcdasticity by specifying income in a logarithnic fonn. 
In comparing two models with different n., but with the same dependent variable, an LR 
test can also be conducted through the statistic LR4=2*jL1AN1odclj-WN1odclj))# which is 
distributed as X2 with n, j-nj degrees of freedom. Effectively. LRO basically tells us 
whether adding n, i. nj variables improved the =del's descriptive powers. In the case of 
Table 5.12a, although U. (Nlodcl2)1-dU. (N1odc4Y. Model (2a) is regarded as no better than 
Model (4a) because LR2,4=3.00 and the critical X2=7.81 at three dcg=s of freedom and a 
5% significance levcl. 21 
Given the above criteria for sclect: ing models and vafiablcsý it is clear f: rom Table 5.12a that 
a child's sex seemed to have little to do with whether they received any schooling. Also, 
their schooling was independent of the level of education achieved by the head of their 
houschold. These variables wem themfort dropped in Models (3a) and (4a). In addition, 
results from Models (1a) and (2a) revealed that the location of a child's village was 
significant: those in the Eastem or Westem Buffer Zones were less likely to receive an 
education than those in Korup National Park villages. But the results also showed that one 
can accept the hypothesis that the coefficients to DUNIIEBZ and DUhIIWBZ are equal 
(t=I 1.1), hence in Models (33) and (4a) they w= constmined to be equal. 
An inspection of the results suggests that Model (4a) is the preferred specification, and that 
the follo%ing conclusions can be made from it. Ile probability of a given child receiving 
some formal education is positively correlated to his or her age and per capita family 
income. Children living in a village with a school are more likely to receive an education 
than those living in a village without a school, but those living in the buffer zone arc less 
likely to receive formal education than those living in the park; at the means of the other 
variables. a child in the park had a 90% probability of receiving an education and one 
outside had an 81% probability. While these results = not surprising in light of previous 
comments. the last result rcgwýding village location tnerits further conU=L 
21 Suictly. the L-R test bawn t,. %-o models requires th3t one is fully 'nested' %ithin the other. This 
requires that all or the ivisbies in the 'smilke modd am inclwW in ft Ince. WA the test then IPPlie's to 
the %viibks -Ahich apre-ar only in the: luger model. In the pxt"Lv case, hem a n=bcror intermediate 
models were estinutcd but are not shown hem. The intermediste step A-is to exclude ft CiplnatOrY 
%-xiables ISEX and 11111111SCL These models %at naWAithin Models (1&) and (2a) &nd %%= found to 
be better. and -Atre used is ft next step to amving at SloMs (34) and (43). 
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It might have a priori been expected that those villages which were most isolated would 
have lower access to education. If this were true. those in the WBZ should be less likely to 
receive an education than those in the KNP, and those in the KNP should be less likely to 
receive an education thin those in the EBZ, all other things equal. But the data suggest that 
any such concept of 'isolation'docs not - in this case - add anything to our understanding 
of whcdxr in individual %ill receive any education. 
Based on informal discussions in both Cameroon and Nigeria. there is one possible 
suggestion why this would occur. Many hunters indicated that one of the primary reasons 
that they hunted was to try to make a rnoney windfall to pay for their children's educadon. 
While windfalls appear to be quite rare, it in-ay nonetheless occur that hunting income was 
somehow treated separately from other income and dedicated to this purpose. To test this 
hypothesis, estimations were run using an additional variable - HUNTPROP - which 
represented the propordon of income received in a household from hunting. Results of 
these csti=tions suggested that this variable was insignificant when zonal variables were 
Included, and that hunting income does not appear to be directed preferentially to educadon. 
In view of the significance of DUMIBZ. however. one can conclude only that there might 
exist some atfitudinal differences which cause those living in the KNP villages to be more 
likely to send their chiklmn to school. 
Models based on the smaller subset of age groups 5-14 years essentially confirmed the 
results obtained with the larger dat2 set. Specific cstirnations are sho%%m in Table 5.12b and 
the reader can verify that similar conclusions hold. Again, Model (4b) which specifics 
incomes in logarithrnic form, excludes sex and the household head's education level. and 
aggTegatcs the buffer zones, is selected as the prefen-ed =dcl. 
While the Probit estimations indicate the probability of whether a child with certain 
attributes will or will not receive some educadon, the results do not indicate how much 
education a particular child will have. A standard OLS regression of the number of years 
of schooling (ISC31L) on the explanatory variables used for the Probit would not provide 
an cfficicnt unbiased estimate because of the nature of the dependent variable: it takes on 
positive values for most of the sample but it takes on a zero value for a significant 
proportion of the sample. An appropriate technique in these circumstances is to use a Tobit 
estirnation. Tbe Tobit model is dcrmed as follows: 
yj = flxj + ul if RIIS>O 
Yj n0 othcxwisc ... (5. I 5); 
where 0 is a kx I vector of unknown parameters, xi is a kx I vector of kno%%m constants, 
and ui arc independently and normally distributed residuals with mean zero. 
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Results for the Tobit estimations - with ISCHL the dependent variable - am shown In 
Table 5.13 for both age subsets. From inspection. it is clear that the logarithmic 
specification of incomes again provides a bcttcr model. and that scx and the education level 
of the household head am again not significant as explanatory v"blm For the full set of 
726 Individuals, a number of simulations werc conducted at the sample means using the 
coefficients of Model (4a) - which is selected as the preferred model. lie probability of 
receiving an educadon was 90.5% and the cxpcctafion was that a child would get 1.93 
)=n of education. With an Incrc. = of one year in age. he or she can expect to receive An 
additional 0.64 years of educadon. 22 As cducadon is theorcdcally available to everyone in 
the sample. this implies that them is a fairly high drop out rate even If educadon is 
commenced. Also, simuladons suggest that a child living in a village with a school can 
expect to get 2.4 years of education compared to 1.4 ), cars received child living in a village 
%ithout a school. 
Finally, the amount of schooling which a child is expected to receive does depend 
positively on income. as the coefricicnt on the income variable is positive and significant. 
To illustrate the impacts of income an other variabim simulations were conducted at two 
income levels. Recalling that the mean per capita income in the sample is 60,000 CFAF, 
and that the mcdian is 27,000 CFAF. we can calculate the following expected values for 
ISCHL (in years): 
Nobability ExpxW Years 
of Schwling of Schwfing 
lownic lx%-d (CFAF): 27.000 60,000 27,000 (10.000 
School in %illage; living in pwk 96.5% 96.9% 2.59 2.68 
School in %illage; h%ing in buffer zone 94S% 95A% 2.34 2.43 
No school in vilUSc; li-ting in jwk 84.5% 8&0% 1.56 1.64 
No vbwl in %illage; li, *ing in buffer tow 79.7% 81.4% 1.34 1.42 
It is clear from these results that. the existence of a school locally his considerable bearing 
on a child's access to education. nose in villages where no such schools am locally 
available would normally expect to receive less schooling. Also, Income does affect the 
amount of education received. Given that - at the time at which the survey was made - 
only 6 of the 24 villages surveyed did have schools, income constraints could be a major 
concern to a large portion of the households in the region. This also suggests that some of 
the 'hidden' consumption occurs through investing in education. 
22Tbcse = the cxpccwd valuts o(ISCI[Lwýd üxlu& the zms. 
Table 5.13a 
Tobit Results for Individual Education Lcvcl (49ftc! 04) 
Lkpcndcnt Vafiablc: ISCHL 
Toul Obscivations: 726 
Llnýt ObservAdons (at 0): 215 
Non-limit Obscrvations: 511 
Esdnudon codficicnts with asymptodc t-mdos in parenthcscs: 
Variable : Modd (5a) (6a) (7a) (8a) 
ISEX 0.078 0.085 
(W) (0.74) 
IAGE 0.682 0.682 0.682 0.682 
(25.69) (25.77) (25.81) (25.90) 
IISCIILV U24 1.107 1 D43 1.129 
(7.71) (9.22) (&23) (&73) 
MNCONIE 0.131E-5 0.143E-5 
(1.73) (1.93) 
IIU)GNC 0.111 0.113 
(3.59) (3.66) 
IIIIIHISCL 0.015 0.017 
(0.68) (M77) 
DUMMUZ . 02M -0.226 (1.92) (IA5) 
DtAUM . 0.291 - 0.2 61 (2.03) (IM) 
DUMMZ -0.304 . 0.263 (2.42) (2.09) 
MNSTAW -4.283 -5.395 . 4.213 -5.327 (17.28) (IZ79) (17.94) (12.81) 
Sundudenur 
of esumze (0) 1.4338 1.4233 1.43m 1A243 
Us Ukebhood (0) -143895 -1438.95 -1438-95 -1438-95 LOS LUhhood (Nlodcl) - 1046.05 -1040.97 -1046.49 -1041.51 
L. R Test (Nla&l) 785.80 793.96 784.92 794.88 
Dcjp= o( Frcedm 7 7 4 4 
Crifical x2 14.07 lý. 07 9.49 9.49 
Ihlermd Nlo&t- 0600000 
7.2 (dLIa3): 7.81 
I)e,. v, l. e, pwwplr Imeefstl%vt lot Ketrup 190 
Table 3.13b 
, 
Tobit Results for Individual Education Lc-vcl MgAgc: 514) 
V kcýcnt Variabic: ISCHL 
ToW Obsavations: 626 
Unit Obscrvadons (at 0): 120 
Non-limit Obsavations: so()- 
F-sti=tion cocfficients %ith &*-Tnptotic t-ratios in parmtheses: 
Varüble : NloM (5b) (6b) (7b) (8b) 
ISEX 0.090 01)98 
M75) (0-83) 
IAGE 0.623 0.626 0k26 0.626 
(21.89) (2100) (22.06) (22.17) 
IISCIILV 1.035 1.115 1.038 1.12) 
Cm) (IM) (7.93) (M2) 
U DZ ON tE 
M. OGL%Z 0.107 0.109 
(3.32) (3.39) 
IIHIÜISCL 0.012 0.013 
DUMM= -0.320 () -t 
DUNUFM -0.274 -0.239 
DUNUBZ -0.263 
(2.37) (2. M) 
C (IN ST AN T -3.672 4.732 -3km -4km 
(13.45) (1a61) (13.91) (10.64) 
Sunäud = 
of cuü=c (0) 1.4300 1.4204 1.4311 1.4213 
Leg Lik£hhwd «» -1279.17 -1279.17 -1279.17 -1279.17 Log Lücühood (Nlcdd) -100438 -999.96 -1004.86 . 1000.49 
L-R Tcst (Nlc*l) 349.58 338.42 548.62 357.36 
Dclýr= of B=Iom 7 7 4 4 
criücal i2 14.07 14.07 9,49 9.49 
httcrrcd NiakL- 9000999 
17 (dta3): 7.81 
M chver. 1 
While the foregoing discussion of the Tobit results concentrated on the 4-14 year age 
group, similar conclusions can be drawn from the s=llcr subset of individuals which ex- 
cludes the 4-ycar old children. Results for the Tobit cstinutions on this smaller subset are 
presented In Table S. 13b. The conclusions are consistent %kith those for the larger data seL 
f 5.6 Empirical Evidence: Migratory Adjustment In Korup 
5.6.1 Methodology 
11c purpose of this section is to chaiwerise the migratory adjustment process in the survey 
area, and to describe what factors have caused people to movc away from their home 
villages. 7bis is important because - in designing policies which attempt to induce people 
to migmic - we need to know those factors to which people appear to ream It is normally 
presumed that people arc induced to migrate to higher income areas, but the theory 
discussed in Section 5.2 indicated that this was not necessarily the case. Income may be a 
requisite to financing a move or - as was illustrated in the previous section - income may 
be Important for financing cducadon which might subsequently increase an individual's 
mobility. 71is section therefore attempts to quantify more precisely how various factors 
influence an Individual's decision to migrate. While a number of demographic factors are 
of interest, we arc particularly concerned with how education levels and income levels 
influence this decision. Before proceeding with the formal analysis, however, some 
additional comments regarding methodology are in order. 
First, the models described in this section all concentrate on the individual migration 
decision. All models arc specified as Probit estimations where the individual either decides 
to leave (1) or stay (0). This contrasts sharply with most models of migration which 
attempt to estimate the flows of migrants from one area to another. 71ese flow models 
have the advantage that they rcquirc very little detailed data, but they have a disadvantage in 
that they do not allow one to separate individual characteristics (such as household income) 
from regional characteristics (such as regional income). T'he models used here, by 
focussing on the individual, allow us to isolate the effects of household characteristics in 
the migration decision. Tle disadvantage of the individual -based model, however, is that 
one requires information not only on those individuals which migrated, but also on those 
which did not migratc. The data gathering and management task is thus compounded 
many-fold, as non-n-dgrants normally far outnumber the migrants. Nonetheless, the survey 
undertak-en for this study does provide such dam and - given that the survey approached 
100% coverage in those villages where observations were made - meaningful analyses can 
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potendally be undertaken. 
While we gain some information about how people respond to Individual circumstances, 
however. we do lose information regarding the factors which pull people Away from their 
home villages. It is usually asserted that low income levels at home push people AWAY, 
whereas high income levels elsewhere pull people away. Many of the empirical studies 
cited in Section 5.2 found that income differentials paid an Important role In describing 
migrant flows. Such analysis is not available to us with such a Probit specification for two 
reasons: one practical and one theoretical. Ibc practical reason has to do with migrant 
tracing: information %%-as gathered on individuals which hid left a household some time In 
the previous rive years. But the type of information gathered concentrated on their 
individual characteristics and the characteristics of the household and village frornwhich 
they IcfL Only in 10 out of 407 cases was it possible to tmcc these migrant$ to obtain 
information on the conditions to which they migratcd. 23 In any event, even If such data 
were available for all of the n-dgrants in the samplcý a conceptual problem still exists as to 
how to treat the majority of people who did not migrate. 
To see how this conceptual problem arises, suppose, that an individual's decision is based 
on some decision process depending on a vector of individual ch=ctcrisdcs Cj, a vector of 
household characteristics Ili, and some opportunity to which he or she would be migrating 
designated by Yi. Then %%r- can characterisc the migration decision for individual i as: 
Migrate if and only if g, >O, where at, . ari (Cjjj,, yj ) o.. (5.16); 
where Ati might be regarded as the marginal utility of migrating. Formul3ted this %%-ay. It is 
clear that Yj must includc the costs of migrating as wcll as the returns from tiýgrating. In a 
Probit specification we observe only an individual's migration decision, Mi, where. 
? ADi=1 ifAt, >0; 
hIDi=O if Af,: 5 0 
The probability PMj that an individual i \%ill migrate is then given by Pilaf, >0 I CjJ1j, Yj 
and we esfimate by maxim= likelihood the model. 
91(ii - CE + Prci + Plifil + PYIi + Ei ... (5-18). * 
where Ei is nonnaUy distributed %%ith zem nxan and unit variance. 
71c conceptual problem is perhaps now more obvious: although detailed migrant tracing 
23 Of 407 individuals %hich left their hocne villages for rmsons other than schooling, migrant tracing 
allowed the identification orthe target villsScs for 53 of them. Incamd3taon the houschold%hichthcy 
left w= available for 46 or these. and income d., ta on the household to %% hich they weat were available for 
io or these 46. Of the 10 migranLs %% hich %-cre individually traced. 5 went to higher income households and 
5 went to lower incoine households. Of the 46 for %hich only village dats were available. 24 wcat to 
villages %ith higher per r-Vit3 inmes, and 22 utnt to villagm with lower pcr c. Viu Incomes. 
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might yield Information regarding Yj for thosc who did migrate, it is normally impossible 
to rind out what - If any - opportunity an individual turned down by not migrating. At best 
we can define some common opportunity V which everyone in the sample has, Including 
those who actually did migrate. Wc thus address this problem In the follo%ing esthnations 
by assuming that Yj=T for all observations. 
It should be noted, however. that sonic 'opportunidcV can be isolated in terms of a 
household cha=tcrisdc. In particular. the estimations attempt to take account of household 
location by introducing dummy variables for locationwithin the sample. 71cse dummy 
variables allow separation of the WBZ, EBZ, and KNP only. where it is supposed that 
WBZ is the most isolated and that individuals might have the fewest opportunities (or larger 
costs In gaining access to those opportunities). Similarly. EBZ is the least isolated and 
KNP is somewhere in between. %VhUc it might seem to have been more desirable to derinc 
a distance variable for every vill3gc, this option was rejected for a number of reasons. 
First. there exists a complex tangle of trails throughout the survey area and the trails which 
am actually used vary considerably dcpcnding on tinic of year. %%=thcr condidom purpose 
of travel, and general condition of the trail. Second, distance in itself is not necessarily a 
good measure of isolation as some villages which arc quite isolated during high water 
pcriods on the major rivers havc excellent access during the dry season. Also. actual trail 
conditions depend a lot on how often they arc used, which seems to depend in turn on how 
much hunting and trading is going on in any given area. Third, there is no obvious central 
reference point to which distance would be measured as migrants were found to travel in all 
directions: Nigeria to the west; Nguti to the northeast; and Douala, Umbe or Kumba to the 
southeast. While using dummy variables as a locational variable does not offer the same 
resolution as a distance variable, dummy variables have the advantage that they assume no 
a priori relationship between location and opportunity. For example, given the proximity 
of the WBZ to Nigeria, it might equally well be argued that the KNP is the most isolated 
arca. Through the dummy variables. such hypotheses can be tested explicitly. 
AnoLher major point concerning the methodology is that the procedures here model only the 
emigration decision. In some cases this would be a major weakness, although, for reasons 
soon to be elaborated, this limitation should not restrict the relevance of the results which 
arc obtained. Many empirical migration models which concentrate on modelling flows 
actually measure net flows from one region to another. In the context of our problem. 
assuming that people go to high Income areas, an increase in buffer zone incomes might 
have two direct effects on n-dgration: (I) more people will migratc to the buffer zonC4 and, 
GO fewer People will emigrate from the buffer zone. By concentrating only on the second 
effect, we uc In a sense understating the impact of any income increase in the buffer zone. 
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But a number of factors indicate that the first effect will be relatively small; evidence 
suggests that there is little Hgr: don into the region. 
First. of the households surveyed, the household head was bom In the village In which he 
or she was currently resident in 85% of the cases. 5% originated from a village within the 
survey area, mid 4% did not uy. Ile remaining 6% - only 21 of the 357 household heads 
- had actuaUy Come from outside the region. Second. rriigrant tracing suggested that when 
people left their vil. 13ge, they nornully left the region altogether r-athcr than staying In close 
neighbouring village&. Of 407 people leaving their home village, 87% left the region. 
Both of these observations are consistent with traditions of land tenure and tribal custom. 
As %%-as discussed earlier, land is freely available if one stays in one's own village, but must 
be paid for if one goes to another village. Given that there Is little land scarcity in the 
region. it is not surprising that few people come to this area. Further. although the people 
have a common background dating back some- 300 years, a number of distinct tribal groups 
exist and definite rifts exist bct%%-ccn some groups. While this his not generally developed 
into aggressive behaviour. individuals tend to stay with their o%m'pcople' in small clusters 
of vill3ges rather d= moving around the region. 71csc institutions highlight the fact that 
people in the region am not. as a rule, very rnobile. If they actually leave, it will normally 
be to somewhere far enough away that contact is made only sporadically with their home 
villages. 
Finally. although wc am investigating the 'evene of an individual migration, it is worth 
asking whether this event is actually an individual decision - as we have charactcrised it - 
or whether it is a household decision. Therc am two issues of potential empirical interest 
which I %%ill address here. The first is the actually declilon which leads to a single 
household member moving away. One can inugine circumstances in which a household 
head might decide that one of the household members should go to the city in search of a 
job, in the hopes that he or she will send money back or open doors for other household 
members. This decision would probably depend upon a range of household 
characteristics. opportunity variablesý and consideration of the characteristics of each of the 
household members. Should the snurtest ones leave because they have the best chance of 
finding work? Should the laziest ones leavc because they are a drain on the household? 
How many should go and how nuny should st3y? While it is clear that the household 
might have different decision criteria than individuals, many of these factors will be 
captured in the approach which we arc using as both household and individual 
ch=cterisdcs ut included as cxplanatory %, wiables. 
The second issue of household decision-nuking involves c=s where the entire household 
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has rnovcd. Where this occurs to a large extent, there is a serious risk of underest. imating 
migration bccausc of the lack of Infortnation Available on the rrtigrants. In the Korup 
survey. this was not bchcvcd to be a problem bccausc the villaScs were rcladvely s=U and 
the ch1cf or some other cldcr could norrnally provide sornc relevant infonnafion in the cases 
whcre It did arise. 24 
5.6.2 lktmninants of FHgodon 
In conducting the actual estimations of whether any given individual would niigrate. the 
sample of 2619 individuals2s was split into three separate data sets which were intended to 
addrcss tbc following issucs: 
what factors influenced the migration of young people aged less than 15 
ycm; 
b) what factors influenced the emigration of people aged 15 years and over. and. 
C) of those 364 individuals aged 15 years and over who did emigrate, did those 
who moved to urban centms have different characteristics to those who 
moved to another rum] location. 
IMc f u-st two issues were isolatcd because it was believed that the emigration of those of 
school age, many of whom were indeed leaving for schooling. would be governed by a 
different set of factors than those which influenced the rest of the population. While the 
choice of splitting the data at the 15 year age level was somewhat subjective, it was chosen 
to correspond to the upper age level of those individuals for which access to education was 
explicitly modcllcd in the previous scction. The third issue, which relates to the urban-rural 
split. explores whether the subset of individuals who did decide to migrate had any 
particular tcndcncy - based on personal or household characteristics - to go to another rural 
area or to an urban ccntre. 
A definition of the variables used in the migration modclsý sho%ing as weU the means and 
standard deviation for each subset of dam is provided in Table 5.14. In addition to the 
explanatory variables which were used in describing access to education, a variable IIMC 
24 In addition, It is noted that the intmic%tm during the survey Process, also made detailed maps of the 
vdlsgcs which located all vxant and abandoned buil&ng sites: them wcm a tow of 76 such sites identified. 
In most cases these sites had belonged to someone else in ft village who had chosen to bufld a bigger 
house clsc%, km in the viHage. Some sites had been abandoned - according to the Qlage elders - for a 
Period longer thin the five-year time horizon set by the stavey. OrJy in 6 cases %tre the sites actually 
Ninaccounted foe. Using the j%trage household size of the survey suggcsu " these sites might account for 
an Additional 30 migrants % hich were missed. about 7% of the total ernigr3tion which %-as recorded. 23 This is sOmC%h3t less than the toul popuLation of 2718 because income characteristics. which %, ere 
included in the CIPLI=Ory variables.. %= available for only 341 of the 357 households swycycd. 
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Table 5.14 
Dcrinition of Migration Variables 
Vubble 13cfuition Nim Sund-ud n 
S b -I i i . 
Dmiation 
u , -; ct v nd 
M10123 
Agc! ý 14 duals 
uI If individual is nomally abscru 0.16 0.37 1041 
clscao ISEX Individual's scx (D. F. I mNj) 0.51 0.50 1041 [AGE Individual's ap ()-ars) 6.72 3.87 1041 
IISCIILV nI ir ttxm is a vjxx-A In an 0.55 0.50 1 D41 
individual's hmnc viUagc. clsc mo UNCOME IIII Incorne or individual 
(PH/nm pcr capita) 
IU. OGINNC aln(IIIINCOME-) 9.86 2.11 1041 
IIVINC Vdlagc hune of Individual 
(CFAFI)vm pc r c. * ta) 
LOGVINC WIVIINC) 10.78 0.67 1041 
11111111SCL ScbmUng of hc, 3d of I III In wWch 2.29 2.83 1041 
indi%ida bvcs ()tm) 
DUMM3Z =I ir individual's lilt in WBZ 0.34 0.47 1041 
cisc so 
DLN, 1IEBZ -Iif indi-widuaYs IIII in EBZ 0.32 0.47 1041 
CISC so 
Su bse r Ind ivi du al s, A ge ý! 15 
hUG123 aI if individual is normally absent 013 0.42 1578 
ClSC=O 
ISEX Individuars sex (D. F. I . No 0.49 0.50 1379 tAGF. individual's age ()=rs) 32.69 14.58 1578 
ISCIII. individual's schooling ()vars) 3.10 3.36 1578 
HINCOME lift income of individual 
(IýFMO rarperc3rita) 
IlLOG11NC aln(IIIINCOME) 10.07 2.16 1578 
IIVD; C Vtlbgc income of individual 
(CFAFI)=r Fxr cqiu) 
LOGMC r-1w1V1NQ 10.82 0.67 1578 
DUNUN\13Z -I if individual's lilt in WBZ 0.28 0.45 1578 
else =0 DLr. \IIEBZ aI if indNidu3l's lilt In EBZ 0.40 0.49 1378 
the =0 
Subset Indivi dual Mi gMnts- Age ?. 15 
NSIGUR13AN -1 If individual kft to urtmn area 0.28 0.45 364 
CISC=O 
ISEX Individual's sex (O=F, I zM) O. S4 0.49 364 
IAGE Individual's age ()zars) 26.70 10.25 364 
ISCIII. Individual's schooling ()tars) 5.40 3.83 364 
11INCONCE lilt income of irxfi%idujJ 
(PMO -Car per Capita) 
IILOGI, NC , u1n(UNCOME) 10.10 2.36 364 
IIVIINC Village income of Individual 
(CFAF/)varpcrc3piu) 
LOGVINC =ln(IIV11NQ 10.90 0.70 364 
DU. \UN%MZ at if individual's lilt In WBZ 0.11 0.32 364 
CISC CO 
DUMIEBZ =I if individual's lilt in EBZ 0.64 0.48 364 
else =0 
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has been Included in these estimates to represent the average level of per Capita income in 
tiny particular village. For each of the 24 villages In the sample, it mm village income Was 
calculated and was then specified In the variable IIVINC which had dimensions consistent 
with the particular data subset which was being investigated. In this manner. each 
individual was assigned a value of IIVINC which coffcspondcd to that in the village in 
which the head of their household lived. 
The masoning behind specifying an additional Income variable was to allow the separation 
of effects which might influence the financing of a move (through household income 
IIINCOME) and effects which might reflect the overall profitability of living in a given 
village (through village income IIVINQ. As before, all income variables are specified in 
logarithmic formý6 as estimations conducted using the linear form often seemed to suffer 
from some hetcroskedasticity. The reader will note from Table 5.14 that, although the 
means of the LOGVINC and IlLOGINC variables are typically similar, the standard 
deviations of LOGVINC are considerably smaller thin those of IILOGINC This is 
because LOGVINC takes on one of 24 values corresponding to the 24 villages, whereas 
IILOGINC takes on one of 341 values corresponding to the number of households in the 
survey. Although there clearly exists some collincarity between LOGVINC and 
IILOGINC, 27 they were nevertheless both introduced in the estimations to investigate 
whether they had any independent effects on rruigration. 
Results of the first set of estimations relating to individual migration of those of school age 
are presented in Table 5.15. Using the same coefficient and model selection criteria as 
those applied in Section 5.5. it is clear that Model (1) is statistically an improvernient (at the 
5% significance level) over taking a simple mean of the data to decidewhether any given 
individual would cinigmte. In this estimation, however, the variables ISEX, IHMSCL, 
and DUhIIWBZ were all found to be insignificant. and were dropped to arrive finally at 
Model (3) which was the preferred model of those: reported here. The results of this 
exercise indicate that, for those of school age, an individual will be rnorc likely to leave 
home it he or she: has no school in their village: has high family incon-be: comes from a 
village with a low income; or fives in the Eastern Buffer Zone. FunhermoM older children 
are more likely to cmigratc than younger children. In light of previous comments, all of 
these conclusions seem masonable. 
26 For those few households with zero income, IILOGIINC was set to zero. Given that non-zero incomes 
were expressed in CFAF and were generally of the order of many thousands Of CFAF. this adjustment was 
ý71 I-r 
UCd 
to be rc=(Qwc. 
corTeWon coefficient r for these two variables took on values of 0388.0370. and 0.400 for the 
three dau sets used. At a 5% significance level, this would indicate Out a Pak-W-40 regmuion Of one 
variable on the other would prove to be signifiCant. 
f)ety141pmwjqt lntenlityt In Korup 197 
It seems obvious that a child would be less likely to leave for any reason If there were a 
school In their honx village and. Indeed, the presence or such a school decrease$ the 
probability from 27.8% to 8.9% (calculated at the means orother variablez). But it Is clear 
that children in this age group would not normally be expected to leave unless accompanied 
by another family nxmbcr. 7bis would explain why children living In the C-Aztcm Buffer 
Zone am about three drms mrc likely to leave than those living elsewhere In the region 
(31% vs 10.7% at the means). We shall see later that this pattern exists for the older age 
groups as wc1l, and that we might therefore attribute the significancc of location hcM as 
reflecting this'a=mpanied'cmigradon. 
Thc results also show that we were justified in using the two income variables: they arc 
both significant )vt of opposite sign. High family incorm increases the probability that a 
given child %%ill cmigratc. whereas high villagc income reduces this probability. Intuitively 
this rmkcs sense in light of the analysis in Section 5.5 which suggested that children arc 
more likely to get in education with higher family income. In cases whcrc there Is no 
school available this would suggest that they would have to emigrate. With respect to 
village income, ho%%-cvcr. it reflects the fact that children from villages with high incomes 
are less likely to have someone available to accompany them as most of the older 
gencradons will be happy sta)ing wh= they are. 23 71c data also suggest that changes in 
village income would have a much greater effect on mobility than would changes in 
household income. To see the imp3ct of changes in income. the following simulation 
results are relevant for those under 15 yean of age: 
case 11mbabilitv of Emi- 
Base Case (Sample Njeans) 15.7% 
Double Household Inconr 17.1% 
Double Entire Vill3ge Inconx (incl. fill) 10.8% 
-ne -puir effect of higher local inconxs in this case clearly offsets any of the'push' effects 
%%hich higher incornes rnight contribute to a household's ability to finance a move. 
21 Alm=jtly. it might reflect a 'friends AM relltili-CS'CIfOCL I. Aw VillaSC InCOMCS Mean (13 Will tv 
&jnonsu3,,., d Ulu) ",, Kx peWle will jea%-c and. &I such. it is pethaps morv likely thx &child CAn be 
Sent A1A-3Y to school or to live Mth somcone ouuide of the village- To test this h)T*thcsis. estimaLiOns 
were conducted with tvio Witional expLuutory %-xiables: IFRIENDII - to mflect the number of 'othee household me-mbers. Ahich had kft: and IFRIM)V - to reflect the number of 'other' village memben 
%% hich had kfL Tbesc %%= used for all threc general cases (c 13 )tars. > 14 yc= urban) and %%= found 10 
bc insigniraeant in all of them wiLh the exccption that IFRIENDII %2s positive and almost significant 
(tal-9) %hCn AUd to the >14 cze- In that case. however, it 1votubly reflects the fact that Ixople tend 10 
leavc home in the comiuny of araher family member. 
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Table 5.15 
Probit Results for Individual Migradon (Agc! 04) 
Dependent Variable: MIG 123 
Total Observadons: 1041 
Obscrvadons at 0: 874 
Observations tit 1: 167 
Esdrmdon cocfficients with asymptodc t-mdos in parentheses: 
Variable : Model (1) (2) (3) 
ISEX 0.037 O. D40 
(0.36) (0-39) 
IAGE 0.113 0.114 0.114 
(7.86) (7.97) (7.98) 
IISCIILV . 0.744 . 0.758 . 0.755 
(6.39) (6.69) (6.87) 
IU. OGNC 0.079 0.076 0.076 
(2.50) (2.45) (2.45) 
LOGvNC . 0.419 -0.414 . 0.412 
(4.75) (4.72) (4.75) 
11HIIIISCL -0.011 
(0.55) 
DUNW-3Z -0.006 -0.013 
(0. (g) (0.09) 
DLJNMBZ 0.758 0.754 0.748 
(6,23) (6.21) (7.07) 
CONSTANT . 3.090 2.085 2.097 
(11.06) (2.21) (2.23) 
Log Ukehhood (0) -458A3 -458A3 -458A3 Log Uclifvod (Niodd) . 367.36 . 367.51 . 367.59 
L, R Test (Modef) 182.14 181.94 181.68 
Dcpm of FrcWm 8 7 5 
Oidcal X2 15.51 14.07 11.07 
Pittcrred NlaJcL- *0***** 
xi (din 1): 3.94 
X2 (M. 4): 5.99 
XI (dLf. =3): 7.81 
M 
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Table S. 16 
Probit Results for Individu3i Migration (Agc. M) 
Dcpcndent Variab1c: MIG123 
Total Obscrvations: 1578 
Observations at 0: 1214 
Obscivations at 1: 364 
Estirnation codficients with asymptotic t-mdos in pamnihescs: 
Variable (4) (5) 
ISEX -0.072 
(0-n 
IAGE -0.016 -0.016 (4.53) (4-98) 
IISCIIL 0.119 0.114 
(9-M (&96) 
M. OGD,. V OB28 0.027 
(2.41) (21.38) 
LOGVNC -0.116 -0.115 
(2-92) (2.90) 
DUNM%IBZ -0339 -0.362 
(3.15) (3.18) 
DUINUM 0.500 0.506 
(5-55) (5.62) 
MNSTANT ozi 0.256 
(2.91) V-90) 
Log LiUtihood (0) -85226 -83226 Log LücbhoW (Nlo&» -694M -694.43 
1. -R Tes4 (Niadcl) 316.42 315.66 
Dcgr= of Fiecdm 7 6 
cridcal x' 14.07 12.59 
Pmfcrrcd Nkxkt- 0900900 
(dfa 1). - 3.84 
2m 
-- -- 
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The next set of esti=don results deals with the 1578 people in the survey sample aged 15 
or over for whom income and demographic data were available. Of these, 364 had made 
the decision to emigrate. As Indicated in Table 5.16, the individual's sex was found to be 
Insignificant as an explanatory variable, and Model (5) was selected as the preferred model 
of those tested. It has an LR test stadsdc of 315.66 which allows us to reject comfortably 
the null hypothesis (critical j2nI2.59) that the csfimadon is the same as using a simple 
constant (which In this case would be 0.23) for the probability of emigrating. The decision 
to emigrate is influenced by individual and household charactcrisdcs. 
With respect to personal characteristics, the results show that individuals with more 
schooling arc more likely to emigrate. At the sarnple means, the probability that an 
individual will migrate is 21.6%; increasing schooling by one year will increase that 
probability to 25.1%. 71csc results confirm other empirical studies which suggest that 
education does increase mobility. Also consistent with other empirical studies, the data 
conrum that )vung folk are rwre likely to emigrate than their elders. 
With respect to income, both income variables again test significant, and village income 
again has a greater influence on mobility than does household income. Tbe coefficients are 
again of opposite sign, suggesting that household income does actually appear to be a 
barrier to leaving, although individuals in low income villages are nwre likely to emigrate. 
We can again see the impact of changes in income through the following simulation results 
for those at least IS years of age: 
C =C. I)Mmbilitvof Emimen, 
Basc Casc (S=Plc Nt=s) 21.6% 
Doublc Household Incomc 22.2% 
Doubic Enfire Village Incomc fincl. MI) 19.9% 
Finally, the location dummy variables suggest that those in the Eastern Buffer Zone are the 
most mobile and those in the Western Buffer Zone are the least mobile. Any of a number 
of conditions might generate this result. Possible reasons, however, for the higher 
mobility of people in the EBZ include better access to information, lower real costs of 
moving, or better access to home support groups if they do move. Unfortunately, the data 
do not allow us to test any of these hypotheses explicitly. 
The final Probit estimations which were undertaken were on the subset of 364 individuals 
in the previous group who actually did move. In all of these cases. the survey determined 
to where they had moved and it was thus possible to categorise this migration as either 
rural-rural or rural-urban. The raw statistic that only 28% of the migration was to cities or 
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nujor towns is in itself of interest empincally. as It is often assumed that mst people lcavc 
to the cities when they leave the country. sidc. This assumption Is In this case not true, as 
most of the cnýgration was rural-ruml. 
The h)TKxhcscs which %, c %ish to test at this stage again involve the significance of vAdOus 
individual and household charactcrisfics on whether an Individual moves to the city or to 
another rural area. Results of the cstinut, ions am shown in Table 5.17. While the LR 
stadst. ics are not very high In any of these models, they do nonetheless Indicate that they are 
better thin taking a simple average. Model (7) is better than model Model (6), however, as 
the LR test for adding the 2 variables of age and DUNIIWBZ provides a test statistic of 
LR67=0.32 and Nith a critical X%d. 99) we would accept the null hypothesis that these 
two variables add no addi6onal explanatory power. Similarly. we accept the hypotheses 
that the two income variables add no explanatory power to Model (8), and we are lcft with 
Model (8) as the prefcn-ad structurc of those tested. 
7be results are quite interesting. in that they again support the idea that those with more 
education am morc likely to migrate to the city rather than to another rural location. Also. 
in this sample, women were more likely to migrate to the cities and towns and men were 
more likely to migrate to another rural area. Again, this is consistent with fears (and at 
times pride) cxprrssed by the household heads that young women would leave and were 
leaving for the cities and towns to become prostitutes. Finally. the empirical results also 
show that those in the EBZ were more likely to move to the city thin those in either the 
WBZ or the KNR29 
29 Results of simulations at the sample means %% hich rcflcct these statements are: 
Case Probability of Emigr3fing 
Bax CAsc (sxnpk mcAns) 26.8% 
Thse Cise clus I Yew FdWation 10-7! E 
Base Casc (Women) 34.7% 
ID! ksc c2se (Men) ---!! 
()-9ct 
Base Cwt (EDZ 34.7% 
Due Case (NVH7 or KNT) 
2.02 chapff 5 
Tablc 5.17 
Probil Results for Individual Nligmtion to Urban Centres (Age->15) 
I)cpcndcnt Variabic: MIGURBAN 
Total Obscrvations: 364 
Obscrvadons at 0: 263 
Otm-crvatiom at 1: 101 
Estinution cocfficiients with asymptotic t-mdos in parenthcscs: 
Variable (6) (7) (8) 
ISEX -0A07 -0.419 -0A16 (2.51) (2.63) (2.62) 
IAGE . 0.003 (0.33) 
IISCIIL 0.082 0.083 0.081 
(3.75) (3.93) (3.86) 
mme; c . 0.026 -0.027 (0.77) (0.79) 
LOGVDZC 0.094 0.092 
(0.81) (0.79) 
DU. %UWBZ -0.14) (0.46) 
DLR, UEBZ 0.562 0.598 0.622 
(2.94) (3.58) (3.76) 
CONSTANT -1.907 -1.994 -1261 (1.61) (1.70) (7.13) 
Log Ukehhood(O) -214.96 -214.96 -214.96 Log Lachhood olako -194.65 . 194.81 -195.25 
L-R Test (Niodel) 40.62 4030 39.42 
Dcgmcs of Frecdom 753 
Cri deal X2 14.07 11.07 7.81 
Pmf=d NUck 0000000 
ZI (M. 4): 5.99 
ZI (dfm4): 9A9 
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5.6.3 Effects of Incentive 11tosmmmel 
7be impetus behind conducting the analysis of migratory behaviour was ultimately to 
determine if increasing incomes in the buffer zone would Indeed decrease pressures on the 
fomst. 71c general results from the empirical work suggest that an incM= In buffcr zone 
incomes would -other things equal - decrease the probability that any iven individual will 91 
leave the region. Given as well that people in the buffer zone am to some extent 
responsible for some of the non-sustainable forest uses, one would expect that income 
incrc, ases in the buffer zone would increase pressures on the forest. To provide some 
quantitative estimate of the connection bctween income and forest use, we shall conduct 
some simulations using the model results derived in this chapter. 
First. however. it is useful to oudinc the theoretical basis of such simulations. Recall from 
Table 5.1 that any changes in pressure on the forest can be reprcsented as: 
AF 'ANb(%Yb-VOp)"P-[I*V]Ocyc) ... (5.19), 
where we have defluned Y- the proportion of the migrants coming from the protected arca - 
as V-ANP/ANb. While one can go into considerable detail analysing this. I shall limit 
myself here to a simple fflustrafivc analysis. 
First, we note that an increase in buffer zone incomes (region b) should not affect 
population exchange between the other two regions (p and c). In addition, because of 
institutional constraints and traditional systems of land tenure. it was observed that there 
was very little opportunity for intra-regional migration. This implies that ANp--O and, 
therefore, V=O. If %%t note further that those outside the park and buffer zone do not hunt 
in Korup, then Oc=O. and Equation (5.19) simplifies to: 
AF = ANb (ObYb) ... (5.20). 
If wc now assume further that income support will be for non-hunting activities and that 
per capim hunting income (ObYb) rtnuins consmntýO then - within the buffer zone - wc 
can estinute the clasticity of forest usc to changes in inconx as: 
EFY 
Au 
a 
ANLýN'b 
oo. (5.21). AY Aybfyb 
cxt, we decompose the population change in the buffer zone into the fO Owing 
components: 
ANb I- Mbc + hIcb - h1bp + hIpb ... (5.22)-. 
where Mij is the flow from region i to region J. We h3ve already noted the 13ck of intm- 
30 It should be mphuised Out Obyb is 11CM cOnsunt $0 %hen Yb 9cxs up Ob goes down proportion3telY. 
See also footnote 2 of this clupter. 
-? 
w ChapserS 
regional migration, implying that AMbP"Mpb'O- In addition, however, these same 
constraints generally prevent individuals from entering the buffer zone from the outside so 
that we can safely assume that Kb4 in response to any change in income in the buffer 
zone region. 7bis implies that Equation (5.22) reduces to: 
, &Nb '- Nlbc ... (5.23). 
which reflects the fact that (apart from births and deaths) population will faU only through 
higher emigration or increase through reduced cmigrafion to the outside world. But the 
readcr will note that the Individual migradon 'events' which were being modeled in this 
chapter were those which contribute to Mbc. If %%r can link these migration decisions to the 
actual population levels, then we have a means of estimating the changes on forest use. 
To address this, we shall abstract from the time period over which changes in population 
occur and simply estimate the extent of the comparative static shift in population in 
response to a change in income. Consider, for example, some total source population Nt 
which has a probability P of being absent from the buffer zone at income level Y, and a 
probability P+, &P of being absent at income level Y+AY. As the actual population 'presene 
in the buffer zone is Nbý-(I-P)Nj, we can approximate the change in population as, 
ANb - -APINj - -APIN ... (5.24); O-P) 
and Equafion (5.21) now bccomes: 
CFY " nA-p/(I-P) AWYb (5.25). 
Using the models in this chapter to simulate changes in incomes, this elasticity can readily 
be approximated. 3' Ile results of these simulations arc presented in Table 5.18. 
In conducting the simulations, we concentrate on household and income characteristics in 
the Eastern Buffer Zone, as it is assumed that most of the development incentives will be 
targeted to this area. We scparately model the effects of a 30% income change on the two 
age groups (514 and ý0) and aggregate the results by noting that about one-third of the 
population in the EBZ is 14 or under. 
Case I reflects the impacts of increasing incomes by 30% to all households in the EB7. 
Results indicate that the probability of being absent falls by 1.7%. which implies in turn 
that the elasticity of forest use to income, CFy. is just under +0.1 if one assumes that the 
only adjustments which occur are through changes in riýigration behaviour. 
31 Given that P has been defined as the probability of being abjent. it is clex that an equivalent 
inicyprcWon of this Is the income clasticity of ft probability of being present 
CFY - 
APR, 
Aybtyb 
where VA I -P. 
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A second simulation was conducted which provides some Indication of the effects Of 
education on forest use. Empirical results suggested that an Increase in Incomes would lead 
to higher levels of schooling. But the migration model indicated that higher levels of 
education increased the probability that an Individual would leave the region. One might 
therefore expect some long-term effect which links current access to education to future 
IcNvls of trtigration. The simulation in Case 11 provides a rough calculation of the potential 
order of magnitude of such effects, assuming csscntially that the increased education levels 
of the current 'young' generation arc translated into a similar increase in future older 
Table 5.18 
Effects of Increasing Buffer Zone Incomes 
Lutc= 
Eastern nuffcr zone 
lnitW Income (Yb) a 32.000 CFAF rw Capiu (ERZ Median) 
(kherVariablet at S3mple Meant at in Tablet 5. in and im 
A 
: iH 
ge rironp 
?. 11 An 
Proportion of Individuals in Age Group 035 0.65 1.00 
rvrl Impact Case 1: Incmasc Incomes by UP I ExcludinL, Fducafinn Rec=ce 
Base Case ftbability of Being Absent (Po) X601 37A%M 37.8% 
Impact Cax Prob4bibty of Being Absent (PI) 35.3%111 36.5%M 36.1% 
Change in Probabifity of Being Absent (-&PwPj-P*) -3.3% -0.9% . 1.7% 
(7AP, 1- Elasticity of Forest Use to Incocne % 
41 PC] ) +0.190 +0.047 +0.093 MX AM MOCIM= 
Impact Case 11: Increase Incomes by 30% 
Including Education Ret=nse 
Base CAse Expected Education btars) I -W, 3.1 
W'1 
Impact Case Expected Ed- ration ()v=) 1.927D) 3.127 
R 
Change in Expected Edir3lion ()=n) +0.027 no +0.027 
Base Case Probabil4y of Being Absm (PO) 39.6%t1l NAVA 37.8% 
Imp3a Case Probability of Being Absent (P2) 35.3%P) 36.7%M 36.2% 
Change in Pmbabihty of Being Absent (, &PmP2. -PO) -3.3% -0.7% -1.6% 
Elasticity of Form Use to income 
t--AP4 '-pal) +0.180 +0.040 +O. OA9 wwý AM 
Notes: 
(1) Uses NWd (3) in Table S. IS. 
(2) Uses KWI (5) in Table 5.16. 
(3) Uses NWd (93) in Table 5.13a. 
(4) Rised on Sarnple Me= in Table 5.14. 
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the region. While households In the park u-crc more reliant on hunting than those outside 
the park. substantial hunting acdvity still occurred by individuals living outside of the park. 
Given the management goals of dre park. It Is contemplated that some regional developmcnt 
programme be inidated In the buffer zone to induce Individuals out of the park and to give 
them something better to do than hunL 7bis chapter concentrated on what effect an IWO= 
support policy might have in the area. 
Income support policies were available in the first instance through mechanisms which 
supported either conventional cash crop activities or traditional forest gathering activities. 
A study of income distribution indicated that them Is a large amount of inequality In the 
region. A decomposition of income distribution suggests that supporting tradidonal forest 
gathering activities will decrease income inequality In the region. and that supporting 
conventional coffee and cocoa cash crops will increase income inequality. 
Supplernentary analyses, %-cre undertaken to determine what, if any. relationship existed 
between incomes and educadon. In spite of the unequal income distribution, observations 
made during the survey process did not suggest large differences in consumption patterns. 
One suggestion for this discrepancy was that income was being capitalised in less visible 
assets. Although there was some correlation between income and farm land, this was not 
believed to account for the discrepancy as farm land is for most purposes a free good In the 
survey area. A studywas, hence made of education levels as. in Cameroon, families are 
required to pay most of the current expenses of their children's education. Thcsc studies 
confizmM that those children from higher income households were generally more likely to 
get an education, and that the amount of schooling which they eventually received was also 
positively dependent on their household income- 
Migratory behaviour %%-as modeled to determine if individuals with certain types of 
characteristics %%= more likely to migrate than others. School aged children were most 
likely to cmigrate if they ca= from high income householdsý low income villages. or lived 
in a vilbgc without a school. Other individuals in the sarnplc were most likely to emigrate 
if they had an education, came from high income households, or camc from low income 
villages. 
7tc effect of incomes on mobility is often discussed in the literature and there Is no a priori 
reason for bclieving that increased income in a region will decrease emigration from that 
area. 71c model used in this study - which focuses on individual and household 
characteristics - allows us to separate potential effects from increasing income in the 
region. First, higher incomes in a region will make it easier for individual households to 
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move - perhaps either to cover costs or to provide income security. Second, higher 
Incomes in a region will create an incentive to stay. Both of these effects were measured in 
the sample and were found to be significant, although the incentive effect which holds 
people In a high income region exceeds the effect of higher incomes on increased labour 
mobility. Thus, any Increase in regional income will tend to hold people there more 
strongly. A third effect also occurs, however, which in principle increases long-term 
mobility. 7bis relates to a response through the education mechanism. Increased incomes 
would improve access to education for children, which would in turn make them more 
likely to cnUgrate in the future. Simulation results suggest, however, that this effect is 
small in relation to the direct effects of higher incomes. 
An analysis of the specific data for migratory adjustment around Korup National Park 
suggested that an income support programme in the Eastern Buffer Zone would actually 
increase net pressures on the park if one relied purely on the migratory adjustment process. 
Increased income will have the effect of decreasing cmigration from the area and the added 
population will thus Increase non-sustainable pressures such as hunting. Ibis result 
presumes that there is no switching of acdvities from hunting to other activities, which %rill 
be the subject of study in Chapter 6. 
In addition to the empirical results arising from this study, a number of comrmnts can also 
be made regarding the methodologies employed. 
First, the chapter demonstrates the feasibility and usefulness of using household survey 
data for analysing problems Mating to conservation and economic dcvelopmenL Surveys 
of the type used in this analysis are often conducted as an integral part of a socio-economic 
study process aimed at describing some baseline conditions before the implemcntafion of a 
conservation or development programme. Such studies are not usually analysed in detail 
because they are often thought to be too noisy to be of any use. While reducing the data 
into a manageable format is by no means trivial. the task seems to be worthwhile given that 
important insights can be generated which %; iU assist in policy design. 
Second, although the concept of a buffer zone was designed primarily as a management 
too) to facilitate policy design and implementation around a conservation programme, it has 
also proven to be a useful analytical concept. Because physical conditions are often 
different outside a primary rainforest than they are inside the forest. activities which are 
pursued outside the rainforest may be constrained inside, or vice versa. 77hrough 
disaggrcgating and analysing data on the basis of various physical zones, insights can be 
gained which would not be obvious from an aggregated data set. It was noted, for 
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example, that residents in the Eastern Buffer Zone area of Korup would - all other things 
equal - be more likely to emigmte thin those In the mst of the sample and. If they were to 
emigrate. they w= more likely to go to an urban ama than were those in the mst of the 
sample. 
Finally. the process of using Individual and houseltold characterlitic; as a basis for 
modelling migratory behaviour was particularly fruitful. In addition to its theoretical Appeal 
- that decisions are ultimately made at the individual or household level - the empirical 
results which were generated could be reconciled intuitively through a knowledge of 
existing institutional structures in the region. Further, the results were often consistent 
with those generated by aggregate analyses of mýigratory flows - for example, that people 
am more likely to migrate if they are young and educated. More significantly. however, 
modelling the rnýigmtion process at this level allowed us to isolate the two potential effects 
of income on migration. Whereas aggregated analyses of flows allows us only to 
investigate the effects of regional income levels. the use of household survey data sheds 
light as well on how household income influences cn-dgration decisions. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES AND HUMAN INMERACTION WITH THE 
FOREST: HUNTING IN KORUP 
16.1 Introduction 
Much of r=ived econornic theory is based on ideas that individual agents yxnchow make 
choices in a fashion that n=imise their utility. It requires little intuition to conclude that, 
all other things equal, individuals might prefer high income jobs over low income Jobs. It 
should come as litt. le surpriscý therefore, that a common approach suggested for stopping 
people from work-ling in activities which hurt the rainfomst bionre - such as hunting - is to 
give them something better to do which generates higher incomes In an alternative activity 
which does not hurt the rainforest. "is straightforward logic is so compelling that 
planners seem to give Htfle second thought to whether the provision of an alternative source 
of income might not increase pressures on the biomc. 
onetheless, economic theory is ambiguous over how changes in compensation affect 
acti%ity. A simple formulation for the Slutsky equation for labour supplied to a particular 
activity suggests this ambiguity. For example, where h are the number of hours of activity. 
w is the hourlywage, and y is the income level, we know that for a utility maximising 
individual: 
dh ah I+h ah 
dw- a%-, ay- ... (6.1), 
where the first term on the right hand side measures a substitution effect and the second is 
the income effect. As labour is supplied while leisure is demanded, the sign of the 
subsdtudon effect is posýitivc and. if leisure is a normal good, the sign of the income effect 
is ncptive. Tbe net effect of any change in wages on the effort dedicated to the ac6vity is 
hence indeterminate. While this can arise even %; -here there is only one productive activity 
(labour) and one unproductive acdvity (leisure), extending the problem to cases where 
multiple potential productive activities exist - such as in the minforest, area of Korup - does 
little to simpufy the issue. 
If we concentrate more specifically on hunting activity. we might expect the time (1111) 
which an individu3I dedicates to hunting will depend on the hunting 'w3gc' (W11). the 
%%-aScs from other sources (WO). the household income (y). and a mngc of individual and 
housebold ch=cterisfics (Ci): 
hit = hit (Wit; WO - Y; Cl9C2w .. 9, CO ... (6-2). 
71c intuitive argument contained in the first p3ragraph focuses on the Assertion that 
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Increases In WO will lead to decreases in fill. But there is no a priori reason for beEeving 
that Individuals will actually decrease their hunting activities just because we give them 
something better to do; a change In wo could affect one of the other variables in a manner 
which will increase hit. If, for example, hunting is regarded as complementary with 
leisure, then increases in other income sources might in fact increase hunting effort: 
Implying that hunting %%-as a normal good in demand with a positive income elasticity. This 
might apply even if hunt-ing yielded no financial return (i. e.. W11=0). Once again, although 
the theory provides a useful framework for discussing the problem sonic empirical 
research is required to verify any presumpdon that increasing household incomes will in 
fact promotc conscrvation. 
An addidonal ambiguity arising from the economic theory has more to do with the basic 
assumption that individuals or households are maximýising udfity. In the case of hunting, it 
is worth asking whether people indeed try to maximise anything, and whether what they 
are maximising can be expressed by some profit or utility function. 1 Some observers 
(Anandu, eL al. (1988). Hart and Hart (1986), Martin (1983)) point out that in many cases 
hunting has certain spiritual or cultural elements which go beyond the apparent economic or 
physical needs of a society. In West African rainforest arcasý those in the Korup area 
included, ancestors' spirits are believed to reside in the animals of the forest and hundng 
certain animals is often regarded as a show of reverence for these ancestors. Further. as 
hunting is generally regarded as a skill which must be learned over a considerable length of 
time, as well as something which must be practised on an on-going basis to maintain ones 
proficiency, models which rely on short-term utility maximisafion rnýight not adequately 
explain observed behaviour. 
Irrespective of the economic theory. ho%tver, experience suggests (Child [ 19881; McNeely 
[ 19881) that hunters in traditional cultures do react to economic incentives or disincentives 
in regulating the level of their hunting activity. Informal interviews with hunters 
undertaken for this research, as well as by Infield (1988) in independent work, revealed a 
number of reasons for why people hunted. Hunting provides both cash income and meat 
for the household, and many hunters regard it as an activity which elevated their stature in 
the village. Although some complained that it was hard work which kept them away from 
home, others claimed that it was an enjoyable activity and seemed to relish the time spent 
IA related empirical question is whether the behaviour which is Observed can be reconciled with the 
M, Uimi&adon of a pxlicular utibty funcaon. in pracficc this is referred to as the integrability problern'and 
It involves deriving a utility function from some given functional spccirtcadon- The economic literature 
addresses this Issue at length (see, for example, Stern 119961 for a review of the attributes Of A number of 
functional spcciricaLions), but the general thrust of it is that one can use whichever of die supply function, 
indirect utility function. or direct utility function is most convenient: the others can be imputed as long as 
ceitain conditions apply (primarfly. as shown by Ilurwicz and Uza%i (1971). that the Slutzky matrix is 
negative semi-definite mid symnxuic). 
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away. Further. many believed that it assistcd In controlling animal pests on their farms. 
and that they therefore generated some benefits to thcmsclvcs as well as to fellow farmers 
by controlling such pests. While such Information does not specifically give us direction as 
to what policies would be optimal to control hunting behaviour. It does provide a basis for 
rnore rigourous investigations into why Individuals hunt. 
Given that hunters often expressed some economic rootivation (cash, food, pest control) 
for hunting, a muldvariatc analysis can provide sonve Important Insights into how hunters 
rnight react to conservation Incentives. Also. in the pardcular case of Korup, wc arc 
interested in knowing whether policies which increase people's incomes are likely to 
increase or decrease: hunflng prcssurts on the forest. Accordingly. the purpose of this 
chapter is to inve-st. igate: - using the household survey data - whether and how incentives 
can induce individuals to pursue activides which promoic rainforest conservation. 
To this end. Sccdon 6.2 provides an analysis of the forest use and income data for the 
Korup National Park area in Cameroon. The results in this sccdon rely solely on an 
estimation of a model using a single equation probit specification. A closer look at the 
hunting activity and income linkages is provided in Section 6.3 using a tobit model and a 
double hurdle model. Tbc purpose of this section is both to evaluate the robustness of the 
results from the simple probit specificadon and to compare the effectimess and usefulness 
of %-Arious applied econometric techniques for our problem. Conclusions relating to the 
theory and the individual empirical findings are presented in 6.4. 
§ 6.2 Korup National Park Revisited 
6.2.1 Hunting in Koru2 
Results from the household survey indicated that one third of the households surveyed in 
1988 in the Korup National Park area were Involved in hunting. and that hunting 
represented some 12% of household cash income. As such. it was the third most important 
single activity in terms of its contribution to household income. after cocoa production and 
bush mango gathering. Given the seasonality of cocoa harvesting, and given further that 
traditional forest gathering activities am undertaken primarily by women and children. 
hunting ranks high as a )=-round activity for adult miles. 
Hunting is of policy concern because, as noted in Chapter 5. it is the only acdvity which is 
apparently being conducted non-sustain3bly and which directly threatens the existence of 
_ 
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currently endangered species. Policies involving taxation of inputs or output are not 
feasible as most of the inputs are smuggled in from Nigeria and, similarly, about 90% of 
the meat from the hunting is exported illegally to Nigeria. The effectiveness of policing is 
limited by the availability of qualified personnel. Other mechanisms often used to control 
hunting - such as tags or quotas - provide considerable management problems in this 
instance: most of the animals hunted are too small to tag. and quotas can normally only be 
established once accurate population estimates are available. Matters are complicated by the 
fact that some of the primates and deer being hunted are endangered whereas others are in 
apparent abundance, yet identification of a particular species is normally possible only after 
a kill is made. To reduce pressure on the endangered species hence requirts a reduction in 
the total hunting effort. As noted in Chapter 5, the provision of alternative income sources 
is often regarded as a potential means for reducing hunting pressures. 
If wc are interested in knowing how much time any individual is going to spend hunting, a 
natural question we might ask is "what is the production function for hunting? " To answer 
this question fully, however, would require fairly exact accounting of all of the inputs and 
output from hunting. 71c most rigourous investigation of such a type was conducted by 
Infield (1988), and based on observations conducted during about half a year of hunting 
parties. he found that the activity could probably best be defined as a constant returns to 
scale activity in the short run, requiring variable inputs of carbide, cartridges and labour. 
Hunters typically travelled in groups, although smaller groups were proportionately no 
more or less successful than larger groups. Similarly, short trips were proportionately no 
more or less successful than long trips. The only fixed requirements were guns, and trips 
could be extended to almost any length by using young boys to shuttle meat and provisions 
between the hunting parties and their home villages. On this basis, one would, formally, 
expect that an individual would kcep on hunting until the marginal disutility of his effort 
exceeded the marginal utility of the net income from hunting. Chayanov (1966) argued that 
individuals are more likely to maximise their own utility rather than profits from a given 
exercise. 711s argument is particularly relevant here where the expected marginal profit 
remains positive for any apparently feasible level of activity. As simple observation 
indicates that not everybody hunts all of the time, it is clear that there is some process (or 
set of processes) occurring which limits hunting to current levels. 
In addition to the supposed marginal disutflity which is eventually involved with hunting2, 
there do exist barriers to participation. First, each village has traditional hunting areas 
which, although they often overlap each other, arc respected throughout the region. As 
2 Many hunters complained that they did not enjoy hunting because it was hard work and they were away 
from home nine or more months of the year. yet they acknowledged that they also enjoyed the life and that. 
without it, they would probably have to help on the farnHy farm. 
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such. these hunting areas am perhaps morr, properly described ascomnwn property' rather 
than 'open accese resources. Second, hunting is a skill which is acquired over many years 
which commence: in a boy's childhood. 7bc passing on of these skills between generation$ 
is acquired through an apprenticeship which includes teaching the hunter a number of 
Iia magical' feats which Improve his abilities. 3 Finally. there is some: potcnd I financial 
barrier to entry in that one needs a gun to hunt, and thesc sirc normally purchased from 
Nigeiian tmdem 
6.2.2 Data and Methodology 
Ibc data on which the analyses arc based were taken from the household survey discussed 
in Ch3pter 5 and in the Appendix. 7be single equation models were applied to households 
rather than individuals. 77his is both because there was no information available on 
individual hunting Worts, and the observation that household income was at times 
aggregated for the general use of the entire household. It is important to note that - for a 
number of reasons - the hunting data addressed in this chapter excludes trapping activities. 
First. almost everybody having a farm would also do some trapping to control pests near 
the farm. Second, these pests were rodents such as moles or the African Grasscutter 
(locafly called a "cutting gTass), and the level of trapping being conducted is not regarded 
as being detrimental to the forest. As the conservation concern focused on non-sustainabic 
activities, exclusion of the trapping activities allowed a finer focus. 
7`he dependent hunting variable takes on a number of forms. 71c original raw data 
contained three potential types of information. It identified those households where 
nobody hunted with a'zcro!, it identified those: households which hunted a small amount 
for their own purposes only with a 'one', and it identified all active hunting households 
uith a figure representing the net incorric (in CFAF) from hunfing. 
3 I-he most ob%ious example of this is that people claim that good hunters can draw on the animistic 
spirits of th6rances to turn themscl%T4 into the animals which they = sulking. A hunter sulking a 
duil-cr can thus tum himse(f into a duiket. approach his prey without distressing it. and then t= back to 
hu=n form to kill it at close range. As might be expected. however. hunters sometimes end up 
mistakenly shooting other huntm with this alleged ability and therefore. in most caw, accidental 
shootings am not punished as the parly regmsible could to reasonably be expected to distinguish between 
a fellow hunter in duilet form and a real duiler. This tWition also automatically implies that any hunter 
&CCidcAWlY %%uukkd Of killed must have been a 'good'hunter, as he must hmv been mnsformed into an 
animal at the time! 
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most people in the region contend that E-rat is wcll known for Its hunting prowess. 
Income from the household, in the estimations contained in this chapter# Included net 
income from all sources exclu&ng hunting. 17his approach was taken as A simple expedient 
to removing potential simultaneity. It is noted that. In the usual structural models of labour 
supply, it is the outside wage rate (wo) rather than income which is cxogcnous to the 
hunting decision; the absence of Wo from the specificadon merits some rcnuuU. Although 
the lack of data was a relevant constraint, 5 its exclusion Is not necessarily serious. First, If 
the other income accrues ptimadly to household members who could not hunt - which is 
certainly the case for the forest product gathering and manufacturing tasks pursued by 
children and women - then such income is exogcnous to the problem (faced by men) of 
how much time to spend hunting. Second4 as we am dealing with a relatively small area, it 
might not be unreasonable to assume that - when a hunter hunts - the wage rate foregone. 
whatever it is. is common across households. In the cross-scctional analyses undcnakcn 
here, Wo could then be left out of the specification. 6 While this precludes explicit 
invcs6gation of the subbtitudon effects between acdvitics, we are still in a position to 
address the impo=t policy qucsfion of how households react to changes in Incomes. 
We have no particular expectation of the connection between income and hunting activity. 
If strong substitution effects occur, we might expect hunting activity to go down with 
increases in income from other sotirces. If incomc- from other activities somehow facilitates 
hunting, however. then we might expect a positive relationship between hunting and other 
income. 
Other &=graphic variables were also investigated (including education and the number of 
other household members) but they were found to be insignificant. 71c role of village 
income levels is dismscd in funher dcuil in Section 62-4. 
3 The &= wound Korup is chuxuTised by MY little wage Income. While good detail was available on 
the hotischold income by sourccý thm -mas fittle basis for estimating the actual physical labour required to 
obtain UM incorne and hcra no cffoW%-c A-4c could be imputcd. 
6 One Mimi test was conducted to test if differences existed betweta sub-regions. As noted. loc3don 
%viibles DU, \IIIBZ and DERAT were specified and interpreted as'opportunity' variables. An alternate 
interpretation of these is that they rcfkct the foregone opportunity wo - or pcdups more precisely some 
Wlative opportunity such as wit/wo - %hich might be different in the %-arious sub-rcgionL To test this, 
and in line with Ow specifications pmcntcd in Chapter 5, four sub-rcgions %%vrc derined using dummy 
%viablcs DUNHIER7, DU?. tIIWDZ, and DERAT. Consistent with results msentcd later in this Chapter 
(forjust DUNIIIBZ and DERAI). the prcfcrrcd specifications included only the variable DERAT and (Ound 
that the other variables did rot contribute significantly to the estimations. 
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Table 6.1 
Derinidon of Hun6ng Activity Variables 
Variable Dcrhtion 
RUNT Annual fill Hunting Income (CFAF) 
lIDIWNT Dummy V"ble for Hunting Participation 
INCOME Annual till Income (CFAF) 
CASHALL Annual lilt Caskrop Income (CFAF) 
INCXIIUNT Annual fill Non-hunting Income (CFAF) 
VINC Per Capita Income in Village (CFAF) 
LOGRUNT - In(l WNT+ 1) 
LOGCASIIA a ln(CASIIALL) 
L. 0Gl)XII = K'NICX I PJlSm 
LOGVINC -WVINQ 
"PES710 lluntable Animal Pests in lilt 
ADMALE Numbcr of Adult ?. Wes in lift 
IIPRESNOM Numbcr of Persons in 1111 excluding Adult I-Wes 
DERAT Dummy for Erat 
DLTMJIBZ Dummy (ot Buffer Zone 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
46,416 157,420 
0314 OA65 
397.964 641.197 
132,870 306.010 
341.550 566,690 
58,478 34,100 
3.096 5.046 
6.616 5.791 
11395 2.795 
10.790 OA09 
0.205 OAOS 
1.704 1.123 
4A22 3.386 
0.103 0.304 
0.698 OA60 
n=341 
6.2.3 A First Look at the Empirical Evidence: The Probit Model 
71c first estimation conducted involved a probit specification for hunting. 71c probit 
model uses the variable HDHUNT as the dependent variable, taking on the value of unity 
for a household which hunts and a value of zero for a household which does not hunt. 
Results from the probit model are interpreted as how individual explanatory variables 
influence the probability index7 of a household being involved in hunting activity. 
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in these estimations are shown in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.2 shows the results of the probit estimations for the 341 households in the sample. 
Four scparatc models were specified. The estimation coefficients are interpreted as the 
effect of a unit change of the independcrit variable on the probability index of a household 
hunting. The models were tested with two nestings: the first was simply against a 
specification comparing a simple constant term with the explanatory variables excluding 
any income variables (Model 1a). The results indicate that the model does provide a 
significant improvement over a simple constant term. The LR test statistic for the model is 
39.28 and the critical value for X2 (at a 5% level of significance) is 7.8 1. 
7"he second nesting involved adding a single income variable to this. The specification of 
the income variable took two basic forms: a logarithmic and a linear specification. In all the 
cases tested, the addition of the income variable provided a significant improvement to 
Model (I a). On the basis of sclecting the model with the greatest incremental improvement 
Recall that the index is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 1. 
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to the log-likclihood function, the logarithmic specification using all non-hunting Income 
was better. This corresponds to Model (4a) in Table 6.2, and I &hill confine my comments 
rtgarding speciric results to this model. 
6.2.4 InteMMIationof the Results 
First. it was clear that the number of niales in the household had an important Impact on 
whether the household would be involved in hunting. Calculations of elasticities at the 
means of the sample indicated that an increase of 10% in the number of potential hunters 
available would increase the probability of hunting by 5.6%. 8 The elasticity of less than 
unity illustrates that effort does not increase proportionately with the number of men in the 
household, although an increase in hunting activity does occur with more men in the 
household. To investigate whether activity was correlated to household size, estimates 
were also conducted using non-males as an explanatory variable and no additional 
explanatory power u-as generated by adding this variable. Although the detailed results are 
not presented hem, adding the variable RPRESNOM to designate the number of household 
members normally present who were not adult males, yielded a test statistic LR=0.44. 
Given that the critical X2 =3.84 for the additional degree of freedom, it suggests that the 
level of hunting activity is not driven by household 'needs'. or that this 'need' factor is 
already captured by the ADNLALE variable. 
Second, the results indicate that those households with farms being bothered by huntable 
animal pests will have a higher propensity to hunt. Calculations of elasticities at the rmans 
irxhcated that a 10% increase in such pests increased the probabifity that a given household 
would hunt by 1.5% (i. e., APiP-=0.015). Again, this coincides with accounts given by 
some hunters that they do hunt in part to protect their farms. 
Results indicated that the coefficients for the 'opportunity" variables DERAT and 
DUNIIIBZ were of the expected sign, but when both were included in the estimates, the 
incremental improvement was not significantly larger than if only one of the two variables 
were included. 71c greatcst improvement occurred when only DERAT was kept in the 
estimation procedure and, given that locals normally acknowledged that those in Erat had 
the best hunting territory. and that those in the buffer zone had hunting opportunities which 
8 Ws should be interpretod as APIP-0.056, whm P is the probability of hunting, evalumed At the means 
of all the explanatory wariable. In this instance it reprcscnts an inctcaw in the probability of hunting from 
273% to 28.9%. 
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Table 6.3 
Probit Results for Hunting Activity Including Villarc Incomc V., uiablcs 
L)cpcndent Variable: IIDIIUNII 
Total Obscrvations: 341 
Obsmations at 0: 234 
Obscrvations at 1: 107 
Estimation coefficicntsuith asymptotic t-rados in parendxses: 
Variable : Model (4a) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
MNSTANT -3394 -3333 -3.693 -1.620 4.180 (531) (SA8) (2.25) (7.50) (2.62) 
ADMALE 0170 0.272 0.270 0313 0.315 
(3.78) (3.78) (3.78) (4A5) (4.53) 
LOGDal 0.187 0.169 0.184 
(3.75) (3.21) (3.44) 
VINC 0.262F, -S 0.622E-5 
(0-99) (2.57) 
LDGVD; C -0.032 0.270 
(0.20) (1.93) 
BPESTO 0.587 0.537 0.590 0.504 0.519 
(3.15) (2.95) (3.08) (2.74) (2.83) 
DERAT 0.720 0.828 0.756 0.891 0.931 
(3.02) (Mo (2.52) (3.44) (3.18) 
Log Likelihood (0) -212.13 -212.13 -212.13 -212.13 -212.13 Log IikeLhood (Modd) -182.61 -182.12 -182.59 -189.18 -190.76 
LR Test Qttodcl) 39.04 60.02 59.08 45.90 42.74 
Degrees o(Frecdom 4 5 5 4 4 
Crifical X2 9.49 11.07 11.07 9.49 9.49 
LR Test 0.98 0.04 
Compared to Model (4) (44 
Degrees of Ficodkxn I I 
cri6cal e 3.94 3.94 
Preferred Modet 0000000 
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therefore reject the hypothesis that village income levels arc responsible for the hunting 
activity. 
A third possible set of explanations is related to the financial rcquircmcnts of hunting. Two 
possible connections can be made here. First, as noted by Infield (1988), hunting requires 
relatively expensive purchased inputs and other Income facilitates the purchase of guns, 
carbide and shells to undcrtakc hunting expeditions. If credit were available for hunting, 
these costs would not be a constraint given that hunting is expected to generate positive 
returns. With some exceptions. 10 credit is not formally available for this illegal activity. 
Second. given that the hunter's time is also a necessary input to hunting, it is possible that 
farmers who are also good hunters Vill hire 13bour to work on their fanns while they go 
hunting. I'lie ability to hire such labour will increase with higher household income levels. 
While this appeared, from informal interviews. to occur in Nigeria, It would seem to be 
less of a factor in Cameroon given that income data for the survey area showed that very 
litfle wage labour was being c=cd. 
7be causal connection, if there is indeed any causality. could of course be the other way 
around: high hunting income leads to higher non-hunting income. This could arise, for 
example, if the hunting income %%= used to finance necessary inputs for other activities. 
An example of this would be fertilisers or pesticides: these inputs am expensive and formal 
credit mechanisms are not available to small-holders. Income from hunting could 
potentially finance the purchase of such inputs which, in turn, would increase cashcrop 
income. The wea1mess of this argument, however. is that farmers in the area generally did 
not use purchased inputs for the tTujor cashcrops: cocoa and coffee treccrops would be 
tended and hanested using farn1ly labour. 
In surnm M,. there is no obvious single factor which would account for the observed 
relationship between non-hunting income and hunting activity. Based on the preceding 
cursory review, however, the most likely contributory factors am that: (i) people like 
hunting and it is a normal good having a positive income elasticity of demand; and, (ii) 
increases in non-hunting income help to overcome some of the financial barriers to hunting. 
10 Hunters indiczed that at times tradas woum come fnxn Nigeria and loan' guns and provide shells and 
carbide to hunters in Cameroon on condition that anything %hich was b3gged would be sold prcfcrcnti. IIIY 
to that trader at muka prices less the cost of the Inputs and some amount as rental p3yment for the Sun. 
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16.3 Hunting and Income: A Closer Look 
6.3.1 Oycryiew of Methods 
71e pmbit specification explored in the previous section has the advantage that it is robust 
to reporting errors in measuring the dependent variable: hunting. As it relies basically on a 
simple yes or no response, the respondent is not rtquired to give a great deal of thought to 
how much hunting is actually undertaken. But therein lies a disadvantage as well: ideally 
we are interested not just in whether a household is hunting, but also how much hunting 
activity it eng: igcs in if it does hunt. 71e simple probit specification does not explicitly 
address this problem and, in this section, I shall investigate the usefulness of some other 
econometric techniques which can be applied to the data. 71c two models which I shall use 
are: 
2) a tobit model; and, 
b) a double hurdle model. 
The tobit model approach was discussed in detail in Chapter 5. In the context of 
conservation, we are particularly interested in kno%ing what the actual physical capture is 
from the hunfing activity and in knowing what influences the amount captured. If we 
assume, as before, that prices are cons=t throughout the sample and that hunting capture 
is proportional to effort. then the income generated by hunting activity serves as a proxy for 
both the level of capture and the level of effort applied. By using hunting income as the 
dependent variable, we can therefore get an idea of what influences the levels taken. The 
independent variables identified for the probit studies apply here as well. 
Two specifications of dependent variable in the tobit model were used. Ile first, HUNT. 
was simply the hunting income earned by the household in a given year, as estimated by 
the respondent. To address potential hetcroskedasticity. LOGHUNT was used as a 
dependent variable as well, and it was dcrined as the natural logarithm of (HUNT+I). It is 
noted that such a normalisation process was required as the logarithm of HUNT N%-as not 
defined for those housc6lds which did not hunt. Because HUNT was gencrally large and 
positive for non-zero values, the LOGHUNT variable as defined in this rnanncr would 
opcrationalise the data urithout creating ovcrt distortions. 
7be second modelling approach used was a double hurdle specification. Discussion of the 
estimating procedurc applicable to double hurdle models can be found in Cragg (1971), and 
Atkinson, Gornulka and Stern (1984; 1989). 1 am in particular grateful to Dr. Joanna 
Gornulka for having run my data through her model to generate the estimated equations 
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presented in this chapter. In the context of this study. the basic idea in a double hurdle 
model is that there: is some proportion of the population which %ill not hunt no matter what 
economic incentives might exist to encourage - or discourage - hunting. An obvious 
example in this study would be Household 60. consisting of a lame old lady who Is 
supported entirely by those in the village. While this is clearly an extreme case, one can 
nonetheless postulate that one set of charactcri'stics will determine whether or not it given 
household falls into that proportion of the population which would hunL 7bis Is the first 
hurdle. The second hurdle corresponds to the truncation which exists in a standard tobit 
specification. Another way of looking at it is that, in the data. zeros %ill arise (for 
households which do not hunt) for two rc=ns. First. households may lack the physical 
ability to hunt and would, therefore, under all conceivable conditions register a 'zero!. 
Second, sonic households with the ability may choose to hunt but at certain levels of 
income or other variables their level of hunfing effort falls to zero. Because of the large 
number of zeros in the data (234 out of 341 households did not hunt), it is particularly 
important from a policy perspective to determine what factors contribute to thcsc zeros. 
Formally. the double hurdle model can be defined as follows. A household will potentially 
hunt if uh >0 where, 
Uh Ctj - Zh: j + 11 h 
where atuibutcs ZI, Z2, . -, Zj arc those which correspond to the rust hurdle, and that, as a 
potendal hunting household, the arnount of effort actually expended is Max[O, ), hl. where 
Yh Y, Ok 0 Xh: k + Eh 
k 
and the set of variables (XI. X2. -.., Xk) does not necessarily exclude any of the attributes 
Zt. In the specifications undemiken in this chapter it is assumed that the disturbance terms 
Ilh and Eh are normally distributed and are independent, impl)ing a covariance matrix 
101. 10 
(72 
Our observations of hunting effort , )-h*. then indicatc dut 
)-h if )-h >0 and ufi >0 
0 otheruim 
In selecting which specification best describes the data, it is noted that the tobit is a special 
case - and is thus ncsted within - the double hurdle model. 71is allows us to investigate 
whether the double hurdle specification does indeed provide any improvements over the 
tobit. 
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As with the tobit model, results from the double hurdle model can, for any set of household 
characteristics, be translated into two indicators which are of potential policy intcmst: the 
probability that the household will hunt; and the expected level of hunting of any given 
household. These are independent of the stochastic tcnns (TI and c) and are calculated 
using the following formulac: 
Probability of falling at first hurdle = P, = 4) (ca) ... (6.6a); 
Probability of falling at second hurdle m P2 a0 
fB. XN 
... (6.6b); FC, ) 
Probability of a household not hunting - PO = P, + P2*(I-PI) ... (6.6c); 
Expccted Lcvcl of Ilundng a 
[P'X'P2 
+0 (B. x PI Fc, 
)I- 
where (D is the distribution function for the standardiscd normal distribution and 0 is its 
density function. The reader will rccognise the term in square brackets in Equation (6.6d) 
to be the expected value function (conditional on X) for a standard tobit model. 
Also, I shall be investigating whether the tobit model itself is a good specification by 
comparing it to the probit: in the limit the tobit and probit specifications should give the 
same (relative) estimated cocfricients. If these coefficients diverge, it suggests that the tobit 
specification may not be appropriate and that alternative models rnay be better. 
6.3.2 Results- Tobit Model 
As with the probit estimates, the tobit models were estimated using SHAZAM econometric 
software. Results presented in this section refer to adjusted estimation coefficicnts: the 
normaliscd coefficients for calculating the appropriate indices can be extracted by dividing 
these coefficients by the standard error, cy. I concentrate here on the models with and 
without the household income terms; the conclusions dra%%m in the probit analysis regarding 
the significance of demographic variables (education and non-malcs) and village incomes 
applies here as well. This section presents the results of various tobit specifications and 
addresses the selection of a'prcfcrrcdmodcl. Explicit interpretation of the model will be 
deferred until later when it will be compared in greater detail with the double hurdle model. 
Table 6.4 summarises Models (lb) and (4b) for the linear dependent variable HUNT. Both 
models represent improvements over the case where only a constant is used to estimate 
behaviour. Through the inclusion of a household income variable, Model (4b) also 
represents an improvement over Modcl (I b). Ile LR test statistic for adding the single 
variable LOGIXII is 27.68 which, at the 5% significance level, indicates that income is a 
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significut explanatory vaflable In the estimation. 11rough Including thi's term, the variance 
fell by 11.6%; although them Is still a substantial residual variance not explained by the 
model. 
Table 6.4 also provides an indication of whether the tobit model approaches, at the limit, 
the probit results. If the tobit model Is a corrcct specification, then the relative values of the 
estimation coefficients should be the same as those in the probit model having the same set 
of explanatory variables. The third column in Table 6.4 shows the ratio of the coefficient$ 
in Modcl, (4b) to those in Modcl (4a). normalised such that the ratio for the constant is 
exactly unity. in a wcll-spccified model, the ratios for all of the coefficients should 
approach unity. While these ratios are close to unity for some variables, there Is some 
divergence for others - notably for DERAT. Given, however, that the variable DERAT is 
not highly significant in the estimation (with at statistic of 1.82) one might not consider 
this divergence to be too serious. yet it suggests that other specifications might be more 
appropriate. 
One such alternate specification is to use a logarithmic specification for the dependent 
variable. as shown in Table 6.5. In this specification. the ratio of the estimation 
coefficients to those for the probit specification is improved somewhat. with the greatest 
divergence arising from the variable ADMALE. In the logarithmic specification there is 
again a significant improvement in the likelihood function from adding the income variable. 
The variance fell by 13.8% and the LR statistic of 28.20 for adding one variable is 
significant at the 5% level. 
The choice between the linear model and the logarithmic model is, admi'ttedly, somewhat 
judgmental. 71cre are. however, some indicators which can guide us. First. all of the 
coefficients which were individually significant in the probit model arc also individually 
significant in the logarithmic model; this is not the case %%ith the linear model. Ilis is also 
reflected in the ratio of the relative coefficients. Second, one often presupposes the 
existence of heteroskedasticity in these observations. and adjusts for it by taking 
logarithms. A more direct test is suggested by White (1990), which requires comparing the 
conventional t statistics with "robust' t statistics. As the robust t statistics were available on 
the software used for the double hurdle models, they were calculated for the tobit Models 
(4b) and (4c). The results suggested that hetcroskedisticity did exist In the linear 
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Table 6.4 
Tobit Rcsults for Hunting Activity - Uncar Dcpcndent Variable 
I)cpcndcnt Viriablc: HUNT 
ToW Observations: 341 
ljnýt Obscrvations (at 0): 234 
Non-limit Observations: 107 
Esfimadon codricients with asymptodc t-rados in parenthescs: 
Vafiable : Nlodcl (I b) (4b) Rado* 
10-4al 
CONSTANT 419,400 -1.113.030 1.000 
(10.33) (6.69) 
ADMALE 115,130 94,44 1.07 
(6.71) (5.70) 
LocDal 63,293 1.03 
(4.61) 
HPESTIO 144.490 140,670 0.73 
(3.02) (3.06) 
DERAT 71.738 109.750 OA6 
(1.15) (1.82) 
SLvAard = 
of estinuzc (0) 291.810 274310 
Img Likehhood (0) -1622.95 -1622.95 Log Lkchhood (Niodcl) -1594.53 -1580.69 
LR Test (Nlodel) 56.84 84-52 
Degrc, cs of Fm*n 3 4 
criücal 7.81 9.49 
LR Ttst 27.68 
C=parr, d to Nfo&l (1b) 
Dcg= of Freodm 1 
Crifical Z, 3.84 
Pmfcrred W&L 0000000 
* For variable 1. Coefficient estirmate al. the ratio is defined as the ratio of ai(Tobil)/ai(Probit) to 
al(Tobit)tai(Probit) where ao is the coefficient of the estirnate for the consunt term. 
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iI ablc b. 5 
Tobit Results forifunting Activity - Logidthmic Dependent Variable 
LkTcndent Variablc: 11071, 
ToW Obscrvations: 341 
limit Obsmations (at 0): 234 
Non-limit Obscrvations: 107 
Estimation coefficients %%iLh asymptotic mfios in parentheses: 
Va&blc : Model V C) (40 Rado* Rc: 4al 
CONSTANT -12.632 -38-505 IDW M03) (6.11) 
AD. %VUX 3.166 2.276 0.74 
(4.76) (3m) 
LOGDL14 2.355 1.11 
(4.53) 
HPESTO 5.513 5.210 7 0.78 
(2.90) (2.91) 
DERAT 6.862 8.030 0. " 
(2.91) (3.46) 
Surdud a, tx 
of cuinutc (a) 11.8210 10.970 
leg la-ciihmi (0) -547.84 -347.84 
1. pg L&-thhwd (Ntodd) -52L77 -514.67 
LR Tcst (ModcO X14 66.34 
Dcgm of Frccd= 34 
cli6co iz 7.81 9A9 
LR Test 28,20 
Compared to Mokl (1c) 
DcSr= of Ftecd= I 
CriticA e 3S4 
Pmiarcd Nkxkt 0000000 
* For %wiible i. coefficient estinutc ai, the ratio is defined as ft ratio of ai(Tobit)/ai(Probit) to 
a, (TObitVG, (PrOW) %here ao is the Coefficient of the eninute for the con=t term. 
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specification and that using a logarithmic specification did provide an improvcment. 11 For 
this reason, Model (4c) was selected as the preferred tobit model and was used as the basis 
for nesdng the double hurdle models. 
6.3.3 Results: Double flurdle Model 
Results for the double hurdle model am presented in Table 6.6. In addition to aNowing a 
heteroskedasticity check, the tobit model was run using the double hurdle software to 
ensure that the results were consistent with those done using Shazam. The results for the 
estimation cocfficicnts agreed in all cases to three signirimnt figures. As before, the results 
presented in this table are for the estimation cocfficicnts and normalised coefficients can be 
deduced by dividing through by a. 
Ile first double hurdle model investigated involved adding a constant term and the number 
of adult males as explanatory variables for whether a household was potentially a hunter. 
This differs from an approach taken by Deaton and Irish (1982) who rely on a 'p-tobie 
model which is equivalent to the double hurdle model with only a constant in the first 
hurdle. Ile 'p-tobit' would capture the effect of a fixed probability of not hunting, 
whereas Model (9) is somewhat richer in that it allows other variables to have an effect on 
the propensity of the household to hunt. As the variable ADMALE had the largest 
divergence in the tobit. Trobit ratios, and as it seems a priori to be an important indicator for 
a household's propensity to hunt. it was placed in the first hurdle. 
7be result of adding af irst hurdle to the basic tobit model is striking and highly significant. 
The standard error of the estimate falls from 10.97 to 3.46, implying a reduction in the 
variance of 90%. 71c logarithm of the likelihood function increases by 38.16, implying a 
LR test statistic of 76.32, and one would accept the hypothesis that the additional two 
variables added significantly to the model (critical X2 is 5.99 at a 5% significance level). 
Further improvements in the double hurdle model were tested by adding income, pest and 
opportunity variables to the first hurdle as shown in Modcls (10) to (12). Results indicated 
that no improvement arose by adding the opportunity variable, a marginal improvement 
was achieved by adding the pcst variable, and an unambiguous improvement was achieved 
A comparison of the t Statistics for the %'Ariables follows: 
Limu Modd (I IUN7) LogafiLhmic Model O-OGHUNM 
CONSTANT 6.69 3.50 6.11 4.59 
ADMALE 5.70 2.87 3.58 3.73 
LDGIXII 4.61 2.78 4.53 3.30 
IERESTO 3.06 3.37 2.91 3.18 
DERAT 1.82 2.29 3.46 3.68 
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Table 6.6 
Double Ifurdle Results for Hunting Activity 
Dependent Writable: EOGIIUNI' 
Total Observafioiu: 341 
Unit Obscmadons (at 0): 234 
Non-bnýt Obýavations: 107 
Esfitmdon cocfficients uith asymptotic t-rados in parenthescs: 
V"ble : Model (4c) (9) (10) U 1) (12) 
rrmm 
Fu---. t Hurdle 
CCXNSTA, %T -0.994 -17S (S-7) (33) (5.8) 
AD. %LAI. E 0311 0281 O-UM 0312 
(3.9) (3.3) (3.8) (3.8) 
LOGD. 11 O. Isl 
(2.1) 
HPESTO 0.470 
(2.1) 
DERAT 0.423 
(IA) 
Truncated Re gnscion 
MNSTANT -38.505 -5.72 -4.08 -5.60 -5.74 
(6,11) (. 13) OA) (2.2) (2.3) 
AD%, VUX 2.276 0.104 0.109 0.103 0.109 
(3.58) (0.39) (0.41) (0.39) (0.41) 
LOGMI 2.355 1.21 1.09 1.20 1.21 
(4-53) (&2) (4-8) (&1) (&1) 
HPEM 5.207 -0.128 -41161 -0.133 -0.2m 
(2.91) (0.16) (0.21) (0.17) (0.26) 
DOW 8J)50 1.99 1.79 1.94 1.96 
(3.46) (2.0) (LS) (2.0) (2.0) 
Stxxivd cm 
of estünate (0) 10.97 3.46 3.43 3.45 3.46 
LOS L&clihmd (0) -547.84 -54714 -34714 -547.84 -547.84 IAS L&cbhoW (Niadd) -5 14.67 -476.51 -471.83 -474.80 -473.11 
LR TCU (Ntodcl) 66.34 142m 152.02 14U8 149.46 
Dcg= ci Ftmian 4 6 7 7 7 
Critical Y. ' 9.49 1239 14.07 14.07 14.07 
LP- Test 76.32 9.36 3.42 6.80 
Compx, cd to Nioda (40 (9) (9) (9) 
Dcg= c( FeaJom 2 1 11 
criücai ki 5.99 3.84 3.84 3.84 
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by adding the income variable to the first hurdle. While other models were tested, 
Including the use of an education variable In the first hurdle, none provided significant 
improvements to Model (10) which was hence designated as the preferred double hurdle 
model. 
Apart from the fact that the double hurdle model is a notable improvement to the simple 
tobit model, the nature of the preferred model is quite interesting. 71C coefficients in the 
first hurdle imply that a household will be more likely to be a'potcntial huntce if there are 
more males and there are higher income levels in the household. At the sample means 
(ADMALE- 1.7; LOGIVlnl 1.4), the probability of being a 'potential hunter' is 43.6% 
(corresponding to a normalised index of -0.16). An increase in the household composition 
by one male would increase the household's probability of being a potential hunter to 
46.8% (corresponding to a normalised index of -0.08). A doubling in the non-hunting 
income would increase the household's probability of being a potential hunter to 45.5%. 
71at these two variables are significant confirms earlier suggestions that hunting is an 
enjoyable pursuit with a positive income elasticity of demand, or that 'barriers' to entry 
might exist corresponding to the availability of skilled men or the availability of adequate 
capital to finance hunting trips. 
The fact that the ADINLALE variable is significant in the first hurdle and, one will note, not 
in the truncated regression, suggests that the number of rmlcs is important in determining 
whether or not a household %kill hunt but not, ultimately. how much it will 'conditionally' 
hunt. Two explanations would be consistent with this observation. First, if only a certain 
proportion of males were trained as hunters and if these hunters would always hunt, then 
this would be reflected in this model. Alternately, perhaps all males are potential hunters 
but other household tasks preferentially require males: the ru-st hurdle night then reflect the 
idea that some minimum number of males are required by the household to meet its other 
basic needs before it can 'afford'to send surplus males out on hunting expeditions. Such 
circumstances might, for example, arise if households need a male around for protection. 
Based on what we know about the population, however, the first reason seems more 
plausible. 
Unlike the adult male variable, the income variable is significant and posidve both in the 
first hurdle and in the truncated regression. Households with higher income will have a 
higher probability of hunting and, if they hunt, they will tend to hunt more. While this 
would support the argument that hunting is a leisure acdvity with a positive income 
elasticity of demand, it is also consistent with observations that the financial barriers to 
hunting might be both capital in nature (gun purchases) and current (for carbide and shells). 
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It is notable that the pest variable bccomcs insignificant In the double hurdle model. Ills 
might be attributable to a mis-specification in the tobit which causes the effects of the Pcst 
vuiable to be captured partially by other variables in the double hurdle model. r-or 
example, the income variable - to the extent that it reflects cash cmp income - could act AS A 
proxy for'value of crops at risk- to pests! and further reinforce the positive rcladon baween 
hunting and other inconr. 
6.3.4 Cum2adson of Resulm 
The mst revealing way to show the differences in the mdels and at the same time show 
some of the potential policy implications Is through simple simulations using the model 
coefficients. As a base case we use a typical household to Compare thc'prcfcrrcd tobit' 
Modcl (4c) with the 'preferred double hurdle Model (10). The typical household is one 
with one adult male; it is located outside of Erat, has animal pests on its farm. and has an 
income level falling at the top of the first quartile. lie results for these simulations are 
gw%-n in Table 6.7. Note that the expected hunting activity level is normalised, to a level of 
1000 for the b= cam 
Table 6.7 
C(xnparison of Pmbit. Tobit and Double Hurdle Models 
(B= Case Prodoed at Fifu Quwulc incme; I mile; aninaA pestu not in 
wickiel. Pft*i1 (43) TcNi (46 NxiNe flurdk- (1111 
case %SAX %'ýV EXPOCWd P1 P2 %, ýv U rwA 
Huntm flunim Hunting M M fluntm, Ifunting 
RM Ow 16.8 153 1000 63.7 7.2 33.7 1000 
One Mort Mile 24.4 20.7 1502 60.6 6.7 36.8 1221 
Double Income 202 19.0 1323 62.5 4.6 35.7 1385 
One Mam NUk 
*Double Income 28.6 251 2193 59.4 4.3 39.9 1736 
1111 in Ent 40.4 38.5 8095 63.7 2.4 35.5 1861 
Notes: 
Pi - Pmbabibty of filling at fint hurdle 
Fý n Pmtubdity of faffing at scowA hurdle 
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Results arc illustrated for the probit, tobit, and double hurdle specifications. Note that in 
the base case the predicted nurnbcr of hunters is highest with the double hurdle model: the 
household would normally not hunt bccause it failed to overcome the first hurdle, and the 
model predicts that the probability of the household actually hunting is 33.7%. The 
Impacts of adding a single male to the household are more pronounced in the tobit and 
probit models than they are in the double hurdle model. The tobit model would predict a 
52% increase in hunting capture over the base case; the probit model - assuming that there 
was a constant level of off-takc for anyone hunting - would predict a 44% increase. By 
contrast, the hunting off-take in the double hurdle specification would increase by only 
about 22%. If the double hurdle model is regarded as the preferred model for estimating 
hunting effort, It is clear that the tobit specification would overestimate the impact of 
additional niales in the household. 
The tobit and double hurdle models agree fairly well, however, on the impact of increased 
incomes on hunting activity. Taking into account the zeros, Table 6.7 shows that a 
doubling in incomes implied an increase in hunting activity of about 32% (tobit) to 39% 
(double hurdle). Note that if one relied simply on the probit model to predict hunting off- 
take and assumed that there was a constant level of hunting for anyone that did hunt, then a 
doubling of income would lead to only a 20% increase in off-takc. In this case the tobit 
and double hurdle models make an important contribudon by identifying both the increased 
participation and the increased effort which arises at higher income levels. 
j 6.4 Conclusions: When are Development Incentives Effective? 
The impetus behind undertaking the investigations in this chapter was ultimately to 
determine whether increasing incomes in the Korup National Park area would indeed 
decrease pressures on the forest. Hunting was singled out for detailed investigation as it is 
regarded to be the primary non-sustainable forest use currently being pursued in the region. 
Empirical studies were regarded as important because the theory is ambiguous about how 
people respond to increases in income. While it is often assumed that the provision of 
alternate income sources would stop individuals from hunting, a case can also be made that 
the higher incomes will IcM to higher hunting effort. 
The investigations support the hypothesis that hunting activity and household income- from 
other sources am positively related. Simulations suggest that the elasticity of hunting effort 
to non-hunting income is of the order of, +0.4. There are a number of potential reasons for 
Itundsif low Ktwsip 
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this. One possible explanation Is that hunting is regarded as an enjoyable activity with 11 
positive income elasticity of demand. A second possible explanation is that some type of 
financial barrier exists both to entering into the hunting activity and to actually conducting 
it. A similar barrier exists in terms of the number of potential hunters In the houschold: till 
of the modelling results clearly identified that a household will be more likely to hunt If it 
has rwre adult malcs. 
7be policy implications of these results indicate that one must be very careful in providing 
alternative income opportunities in this area Untargctcd transfer% would, for cxlmplco be 
expected to increase hunting pressures and the case illustrates that development and 
conservation goals might conflict in this instance. One might assert that a carefully targctod 
development programme might be able to skirt the connection bct%%-ccn income and hunting 
activity. For example. promoting prqJects %ith a high intensity of male labour may enforce 
what (if any) substitution effect exists in the income: hunting relationship. It is, however, 
perhaps more effective not to look in this case to development Incentives to promote 
conservation. Other policies associated %%ith directly controlling hunting probably deserve 
a closer look, even though they n-Light have been originally rejected on the assumption that 
the development incentives would do the job. One should perhaps not even overlook the 
obvious answer of overfly depressing incomes in an area to induce both emigration and 
hunting pressures; while this rnay have little political appeal. one might imagine cases 
where it could be justified if conservation priorities am high. 
In closing, it is useful to add some caveats to thm results. Although there is an apparent 
correlation between income and hunting activity, there arc a number of possible 
interpretations which gi%v rise to this. Thosc interpretations that can be tested with the data 
at hand have already been discussed. but it is also rccognised that such a correlation would 
arisc if them was a consistent misreporting in income levels. 7bc tobit and double hurdle 
models mlied on hundng income estimates to estim3te hunting efforL If individuals 
consistently mis-estimated all income levels from all sources. then one would expect a 
positive relation between hunting and income. In this respect, however. the probit results 
provide an imporunt contribution: they are generally regarded as more robust because they 
do not attempt to estimate actual levels of activity. 
Finally. it is also appropriate to comment on the cross-sec6onal nature of the d3t: i. As 
noted earlier, the factors which influence hunting acdvity am not just current in nature. 
Only men wained to hunt can actually participate, and the sl=ific3tions which were Made in 
this section looked at a cross-scction ofactivity at a single point in time. If development 
activity somehow effects - over the longer term - the number of men trained as hunters. 
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then this development activity might eventually assist in decreasing hunting. Chapter 5 
Illustrated, for example, that higher incomes increased the propensity of households to send 
their children to school. and children would often leave the local village for this schooling. 
One would presumc that this would isolate the child from hunting opportunities at an early 
age and - although the traditional structures might be threatened - conservation goals 
would likely be supported. In short, this illustrates that a more critical analysis would 
require panel data to allow identification of longer term trends between hunting and income. 
Nonetheless, the results suggested by the cross-section analysis provide an important 
contribution to understanding some of the potential short-term responses to development 
0 incendves. 
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CHAPTER 7 
INDIRECT TAXES TO REDUCE EXTERNALITIES: THE CASE OF 
FUELWOOD DEMAND IN INDIA 
17.1 Introduction 
As described in earlier chapters, primary tropical rainforest exploitation and depletion in the 
developing world has received increued international attention over the past decade with 
rising environmcnW consciousness. While timber exploitation his traditionally bccn an 
important source of export earnings to LDCs, international aid and funding agencies have 
more recently begun to recognise the importance of the resource in other economic sectors. 
In addition to the potential "passive" roles which tropical rainforcsts play as mechanisms 
for controlling soil stability. water catchmcnt integrity, and regional climatcs, they have 
also provided a traditional and important source of energy to developing nations: fuclwood. 
The overall scope of this chapter is to explore some of the fundamental issues relating to 
fuelwood dcn=d in a formal framework. highlighting the policy choices which are often 
seen to arise from this framcworL- In particular, the paper concentrates on interfuel 
substitution possibilities through describing and demonstrating the application of a 
methodology for analysing substitution possibilities. It should be noted that the 
methodology prescribed is not a new approach; it has been used extensively in developed 
countries to establish demand relationships between fuels. Its application in this context, 
however, is less de%vioped and introduces certain chaUenges: particulady in relation to data 
availability. As such. one of the objectives of this ch3pter is simply to demonstrate the 
viability of the approach as an applied tool for analysis in LDCs. 
As always. when focusing on a particular issue. related yet equally important issues must 
be overlooked. As this study concentrates on demand relationships. many fuelwood 
supply-side issues am not addressed. In particular, the ovaall question of supply from an 
open access resource: does not enter into the formal analysis hcrr- Similarly, management 
and intmention in the fuelwood "crisis" %%iU havc substantial distributional effects %ithin a 
country. For example, many individuals currently derive income from gathering and 
selling scarcc fuelwood at fairly high prices. While the distributional implications of 
intervention should enter into ultimatc decisions regarding "optimal intervention" policies, 
they am beyond the scope of this study. 
Ilie prinury modva6on behind investigafing intcrfuel substitution policies here has to do 
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with evaluating taxation policy. Intuitively. when commodity consumption causes negative 
externalities, It seems plausible that one could levy appropriate indirect taxes on that 
consumption to intcmalisc any such externalities. Indeed, this is the basic idea behind the 
"Pigovian" tax. Where It is not feasible - for whatever reasons - to tax the commodity 
causing the externality, one normally attempts to identify complementary goods (for 
taxation) or substitutes (for subsidics). 1 The identification of such goods essentially 
reduces the problem to one of identifying the demand functions for the goods, but the 
stral gh t- forward logic of the intuitive argument has caused many to presumee that fuclwood 
consumption can be decreased by subsidising kerosene. 
no formal analytical framework used in this chapter robes on two demand-side modelling 
approaches: 
a) a muld-fuel trans-log cost share model; and, 
b) a simple single fuel residuals model. 
Although a complete description of the approaches is presented in Section 7.3, a brief 
outhe of the methodology is given here. 
71c trans-log model provides a framework for modelling interfuel demand relationships 
between substitute (or complementary) products. The framework has been used 
extensively in analysing both time-serics and cross-sectional demand data for electrical 
energy, oil, natural gas, and coal in developed economies. The same principles can, 
however, be extended to analysing fuelwood demand in developing countries. The 
advantages of the trans-log approach arc that it: (i) is very dam efficient; (ii) does not 
require price deflators which are often notoriously difficult to use consistently in LDCs; 
Gii) allows separability from the supply questions; (iv) is based on an explicit theory of 
utility maximisation; and. (v) has no a priori restrictions on the demand elasticities. 
Although the model is =enable to any number of fuels in any sector, this chapter 
addresses only fuelwood and kerosene in the household sector. 
7bc disadvantage of the trans-log modelling approach is that its application is restricted to 
estimating demand elasticities. It cannot be used to forecast explicitly total demand, nor can 
it capture the effects of lagged responses to cxogcnous changes in capital stocks. 
Spccificafly, it is incapable of capturing trends in increased cooker efficiency arising from 
1 The appropriate indirect 'taxa may. in fact. be a subsidy depending on the relative contributions and 
directions of the income and substitution effects. In the discussions here. however. we shall for the 
moment assume that wing complements and subsidising substitutes %ill reduce total consumption of the 
good which causes the negative externality. For early discussions of using taxxion to offset externalities, 
see PiSou (1947). Omen and Sheshinski (1976) review the use of direct and indirect mechanisms in 
reducing externalities; Sandmo (1975; 1976) discusses optimal taxation in the presence of externalities, 
highlighting how one might target complementary or substitute goods when the good causing the 
externality is not uxable. 
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changes in prices. Hence. a simple single fuel residuals model Is used for this task. 1"his 
model is essentially a simple cconotmuic multiv"tc specification of fuclwow demand as 
a function of fuel prices and population. 1Mc residuals from this model are regressed 
against lagged pammetcrs or through timc-scrics analysis to extract information respecting 
factors not captured by the cost sham model. The advantage of this approach Is that It 
allows cxploration of hypotheses regarding these cxogcnous factors. Ile disadvantage is 
that the model Specification is largely arbitrary and has only a %vak thcomflical basis. As 
such, it should be regarded as a secondary tool to cross-chcck the results of the trans-log 
model. Indeed, one chock of the residuals model is that it generates the same own- and 
cross-pnce elasticities suggested by the cost-sh= mdeL 
In all modelling exercises in LDCs, data am often a constraim India was one country for 
%hich the minimum required data were available. Government of India statistics were used 
for rnonLhly fuelwood and kerosene prices, and annual forestry data relating to fuclwood 
consumption. 'ne United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation provided 
supplementary fuclwood statisticsý and the International Energy Agency provided kerosene 
consumption by houscholdL Selected data were available from 1949 to 1988 but. due to 
data rcHability. the estirmtions were conductcd over the period 1962 to 1982. 
This chapter continues in Section 7.2 %%ith a description of the international fuelwood 
situation and a more detailed description of the links in the conceptual framework. Section 
7.3 presents the formal economic models: the trans-log cost share model and the simple 
residuals model. A complete discussion of the data and related problems is also provided 
in Section 73. Empirical results from the modelling exercise and their interpretation arc 
presented in Section 7.4. Finally. Section 7.5 summarises the findings of this chapter and 
presents some conclusions. 
17.2 An Overview of Fuelwood Issues 
7.2.1 Intemation3l Fuelwood Situation 
77he pressures which fuelwood gathering have had on moist forest Cxploitation arc 
significant. Myers (1984) suggests that some 12% of trOPical deforesmdon can be directly 
linked to the process of fuelwood g3thering. Ile problem of decreasing fuclwood 
availability is often cx-acerb3ted by inc=sing population pressures, common property 
access, and non-susuinable rates of harvcsfing. Indeed. whcr=s developed countries h3vC 
experienced a number of energy crises over the past two decades relating to fossil fuel 
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supplies, growing fuclwood scarcity in the developing world is often charactcrised as the 
energy crisis faced by rnany LDCs: it is as persistent as it is threatening. 
In fairness to planners, the situation has not gone unnoticed and considerable efforts have 
been made on numerous fronts in an attempt to mitigate the effects of this criSiS. 2 
Programmes established to increase wood supplies or to create incentives to shift to 
kerosene or bottled gas have been implemented with various degrees of success. With 
international real oil prices in recent decline, some suggest (Krapels [19871) that 
households will rind a real economic incentive to shift towards refined products. 7be 
process of interfuel substitution rnay take some of the pressures off of fuelwood scarcity. 
The largely empirical question of whether households will switch from fuelwood to 
kerosene has implications reaching far beyond simple fuel choices and the rate of forest 
exploitation. If a switch is made to kerosene, it will in many cases increase a nation's 
import requirements or, for oil producing countries, decrease their export eamings. 
Conversely, however, if households simply cut back on fuclwood with no substitution, 
then legitimate concerns arise that they will be consuming less cooked food and suffer 
itinerant health problems. An intermediate choice - using agricultural residues or animal 
manure as a fuel substitute - raises concerns that these products might be better left on the 
land as natural fertilisers. Clearly, while normally only energy economists have held an 
interest in interfuel substitution possibilitim planners and analysts concerned with external 
trade balances, agricultural productivity, and community health conditions would also be 
%%ise to lend an ear to the issues raised here. 
Fuelwood is, with few exceptions, the fuel used for household cooldng and heating 
requirements in the developing world. Table 7.1 illustrates the use of fuelwood in the total 
energy mix of selected developing countries. Even where severe deforestation or 
desertification has occurred - such as in Nepal, Ethiopia, 'and Upper Volta - wood still 
accounts for over 90% of the energy consumption. As noted in Chapter 2, many countries 
rind themselves in situations of relative fuclwood 'scarcity. 
Ile pressures exerted by such scarcity have invariably increased fuelwood prices relative to 
other goods. Where no formal markets exist, there are clear cases indicating that individual 
efforts must increase to gather fuelwood. Eckholm et. al. (1984) documents cases in 
Papua New Guinea of individuals travelling 30 kilometres daily to gather fuelwood. Evans 
(1984) notes that in parts of Mexico it has become a full time task of one of the children in 
2 See, for example, Teplitz-Scinbiuky and Schr=m (1989)- Pcamn and StcvMs (1989), and L4wh ct. a'. 
(1986). 
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Table 7.1 
Fuelwood Consumption Estimaics 
Country Wood m% o( Country Wood as % o( 
Total Erwrgy Conumd Total Energy Comunwd 
N V 98 Mozarribique 74 
I 97 Kcnya 70 
R-A-anda 96 sargal 63 
Chad 94 mullan] 63 
Tanzania 94 Sri Lanks 55 
Upper Volta 94 Liberia 53 
Elhýa 93 Ivory Coast 46 
Ccntral African Rcpublic 91 Honduras 45 
Somalia 90 Tunisia 42 
Burundi 89 Papua Ncw Guinca 39 
Nigcr 87 1: 1 Salvador 37 
Bcrdn 86 Palistan 37 
Carnerom 82 India 36 
Nigeria 82 ZarnW 35 
Sudan 81 Brazil 33 
I. Wagas= so Zimhab%v 28 
Sierra lixim 76 Nicaragua 25 
AngW2 74 h1omxo 17 
Ghzu 74 Chk 16 
Guinea 74 hwaysia 8 
Source: Eckholm. et. al. (1984) 
the household to gather fucl%%wd. As a ballpark estimate (Myers 119841). it is not unusual 
for individuals to spend up to 40% of their incomes or their time to meet their fuclwood 
needs. The increase in prices or effort required to gather fucl%h-oDd potentially diverts 
income or effort from meeting other subsistence requirements: notably food. 
7.2.2 Interfuel Substitution 
Tbe question of whit people do as fuelwood prices increase is important and is open to 
debate. One expects that fuelwood and kerosene ought to be fairly good substitutes, and 
that individuals would arrange their consumption to allow for Interfuel substitution. The 
evidence of such substitution is. however. inconclusive and studies are not always 
complete in providing empirical evidence one way or another. Foley (1986). in fact, 
SeneraUses thst the avail able evidence suggests that relative changes in the prices of wood- 
fuels and conventional fuels twe little effect on consunrer beh3viour. 
Kam= (1986) rinds. for example, that fuelwood consumption in Sicrra Leone has a 
pmitivc incorTx elasticity wA that the income elasticity Is lower for other fuels. Inaddition. 
be notes that people uill tend to do less g3thcring on their own bch3lf its their incomes rise. 
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In most cases It Is difficult to assess ikt the outset %hcthcrIn1c: rfucI substitution will occur as 
relative fuel prices shift. It comes. In the end, to an empirical question which must be 
Investigated on a country by country - If not region by region - basis. Indeed. the 
conclusions of such Investigations have matked imputs on policy choices which might be 
pursued. 
7.2.3 U-se of Emriricig r-,, idcnce 
In selcaing the pohcy choices, empinical evidence relating to intcrfud substitudon can make 
sonz imporunt contributions to selected policy contiderations. We summarise these in 
terms of. - 
a) pricing issues; 
b) twmdon reform issues; 
C) distuibudonal issues; and. 
d) resource managemcnt issues. 
Fust, regulating prices through intervention had become a popular policy in the 1970s for 
countries with large oil import requirements. 71c justification was often that individuals 
should be shielded from the price shocks. Ibis nonetheless has a substantial foreign 
exchange cost. and analysts, (Krapels 119871) continue to advise that "efficiency" dictates 
that donxstic prices be aligned with international prices. If. however. such a policy leads 
to increased substitution towards fuelwood and accelerated fuelwood scarcity. then a 
government might still conclude that it is **optimal" to provide somc degree of implicit fossil 
fuel subsidy. 3 But such conclusions could only be drawn if the substitution effects are 
known. 
Second. many developing countries am currently rationalising their taxation systems 
thmugh the introduction of nujor reforms designed - ostensibly - to improve economic 
utlfam 71e mforms often include changes in indirect taxes or subsidies, and fuels = 
often singled out as stmicSic goods. 71c linkages = similar to those arising from price 
controls discussed above, as the msponsc to taxes or subsidies will depend cTitically on the 
structum of denwid for potential substitutes. 
Third. distribudonal issues &rise frequently In fuelwood use situations, and governments 
often purpon to pursue policies proming rnorc egalitarian distribution of Income. In the 
3A m1wd Pril: ing i"w it. Of cOunc. %that effects & fossil fuel subsidy might have in fossil fuel marktts. "'Crc Prc'Jucu hs**'c 11 V'NictY of uses. subs"es urgeted to coffoct one qxCific mxkct cuawlity might 
Create distortions In cow mzkctL For exmpk-. jewscac subsidies in cooLins fud mxkcts %ill rwmally 
$Pill 0*1V intO MAACU %% hcrC 1C: =nc is being uscd In saull c1ccuic gcnmkw icts. 
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of cooked food. In that event, however. we might be more concerned with the effects It 
has on rril incomes of households and the availability of Inconx for othcr goods. 
If. however. it turns out that fuclwood consumption does fall as its pricc Increases. then the 
next problem is to explore how in fact households accommodate their consumption. The 
four possibilities outlined in Q2 arc regarded, in most practical cases. to represent an 
exhaustive list of the possible outcomes. If evidence suggests that fossil fuel substitution 
occurs, then an LDC can expect the Increased wood prices to influence Its external trade 
balance through increased oil imports or reduced exports. 5 If. however, fossil fuels arc not 
adopted, then households may substitute agricultural residues. By agricultural residues we 
include both animal residue in the form of dung. as well as crop residues. This possibility 
begs another line of questioning addressed in Q3: whether the use of the agricultural 
residues has some effect on productivity. Such residues normally have been used to return 
nutrients to the sofl, and burning them Wectively robs the land of these nutrients. Even so. 
however. some argue that the optimal use of residues may be as fuel even if some 
agricultural productivity is IOSL6 Or, in other instances, leaving the residues on the land 
might decrease the productivity of die next crop if it increased the incidence of crop pests or 
discases. 7 Again, these are empirical problems which can be investigated. 
If options (a) and (b) are not undertaken. then one option is still for households to change 
their capital stock and use cookers with higher cfficicncies. Indeed. many efforts in policy 
intervention have simply involved distributing pots and stoves which have higher energy 
cfficiencics. Eckholm CLal. (1984) observe quite rightly, however, that fuel efficiency is 
notoriously difficult to measure and that great variance exists in the efficiencies of 
a-aditional methods: which usually rely on open fires. 711cy also observe that peasants tend 
to conserve fuel when it is scarce by controlling the fire and recovering unburnt wood. 
Formally, this provides a problem for the economist bent on distinguishing bctwccn 
conservation from changes in the capital stock and conservation from changes in the mode 
of operating cxisting stocL CapiW stock changes arc normally easier to detect, as will be 
discussed 13ter, whereas when households simply conserve using existing technologies, 
they may still ultimately achieve the same cnd-usc value from their decreased consumption. 
5 Strictly speaking. it rnay have no impact on oil exporters if low cost in==Ul production is possible 
and if expons am somehow constrained by quous. This situation occurred %ith Nigeria. and provided a 
useful rationale for subsidisin dornestic kerosene consumption to aMc%i= the fuelwood problem. 
6 Eckholm ct. &L (I M) cite a ciz in India in % hich a mv-ud= calculated that a toraw of oow dung could 
displace W Rp worth of firmood in the 1=1 mukcL The &3= amount of dung. when applied to the Luk, 
as fertiliser. would result in incre4scd grain produc6on or only 80 Rp, 
ona pw ou ho 7 7bis point came up during inforrn3l discussions with farmers in the Korup Niti Ik It sc Id 
Survey in Cameroon (Ux Appcndixý The farmers generally mutaged more than one crop of mlize in One 
semn; but the maize in%wiibly suffered from insect pests. When the riesidues A-eje left on the land 
between crops, these pests semcd to flourish and affect the productivity of the second cRV rnore adversely 
than they did the first crop. 
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'niis issue actually is reflected as well In Q4 above, which asks whether health indeed 
suffers if fuclwood use declines. A logical argument can be made that decreased fuelwood 
use leads to decreased cooking times, which in turn leads to decreased consumption of 
cooked foods and Increased incidence of parasites or malnutrition. However, each of the 
links in this argument must be empiriically demonstrated and if, indeed, households can 
conserve fuel with no detrimenua effects on health, then increasing fuel prices may not 
have severe detrimental welfare impacts. Some suggest that decreasing the number of fires 
will improve health conditions as high smoke densities in traditional conditions contribute 
to respiratory ailments. Ile East-West Centre in HonoluluS observes that "the women 
cooks am inhaling as much benzopyrene as if they had smoked 20 Packs of cigarettes a 
day. " 
So even with a conceptual fnuncwork in which to ask questions and develop our 
arguments, it is not always clear what effect increased fuelwood prices wW have in a 
society. Nonetheless, the ftamework allows us to address the issues in a coherent fashion. 
The methodology adopted in this study is capable of addressing only some of the questions 
enumerated here. Ile: interfuel substitution model certainly allows us to address Q1 and 
Q2a, relating to the own-price and cross-price clasticifies of den=d for fossil fuels and 
fuelwood. In theory, the model could also be used to address Q2b, as agricultural residues 
are tcchnicaUy substitutes. In practicc, however, price and consumption dam for this class 
of cor=odity will not nomully bc av6hble. 
Problem Q2c (whether increases in cooker efficiency occur) can be explored with the 
residuals model, although the model can detect only such increases when they are induced 
by changes in the capital stock or by exogenous trends in cooking techniques. Any direct 
efficiency increase (through conservation) arising from increased prices is indistinguishable 
from a simple reducdon in use with no efficiency changes. 
The two models together, therefore, allow us to explore Q 1, Q2a and Q2C. Problems Q2b 
and Q2d can not be addressed directly, although one can draw conclusions depending on 
the outcome of Q2a and Q2c. Finally* the problem of whether increased use of agricultural 
residues results in lower productivity. and whether decreased uncompensated fuclwood 
consumption is actually a bad thing. are not addressed by our models or by our study. 
I Quoltd in Eckholm CL &1. (1984). p. n 
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7.2.5 A Comment Regarding Empirical pmblems 
On a note of definition, all or the consumption data used In this chaptcr have 099mgated 
charcoal and fuelwood. 'Mis was primarily b-ocausc forcstry production statistics wcrc 
used as a basis for esfimadng consumption, and no reliable and consistent means could be 
found for separating the amount used for fuel and the amount used for charcoal 
manufacture. Prices, however. were strictly fuelwood prices. 7be potential wors 
introduced by this procedure are thought to be small. as Govcmrmnt of India Forest 
Statistics in the 1960s typically estimated that less than 5% of the fuelwood harvest was 
convcned to charcoal. 
Although some of the analytical steps are clear, often difficult challenges arise In dealing 
with the data which am available. Many countries do not have well developed markets for 
fuelwood, and proxies must be found for fuelwood prices and consumption. Further. 
fuclwood, even when measured, is normally reported In terms of volume or wcighL As 
an)vne who has ever built a fire knows. the value to the user of a kilog= or cubic metcr 
of wood can vary tremendously depending on what type of wood it is, how wet it is, and 
how densely it is packaged. Ile need for developing consistent means of measurement is 
far from trivial and. ultimately. completely necessary to detcnmine fuelwood demand 
rclationships. At this juncture we therefore provide the common lament of the development 
economist: that being the need for reliable data in this area- 
§ 7.3 Measuring Fuelwood Demand Response In India 
7.3.1 Methodology 
Energy demand modelling in developing countries is as much an exercise in developing 
systems which efficiently use the sparse dam as it is an exercM in developing theoretically 
sound models. Although simple single equation models am popular ber-ausc they allow the 
analyst to look for correlations between variables. their thcorctical basis is often suspect 
and their specification is arbitraq. Conversely. however. models which have a defensible 
theoretical basis - by being founded on some utility maximising principle, for example - 
often require estimating systems of equations which lose their significance in measurement 
noise. 
The approach adopted here attempts to use the advantiScs of each of these two 
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approaches. 9 A trans-log cost share rnodel is specified which is founded in a theory of 
utility maximisation. Ile model allows us to extract estimates of the interfucl elasticities of 
substitution, but captures only responses to single period price changes. A single equation 
residuals model is then specified which explores any lagged responses arising from 
changes in the exogcnous capital stock. The specification of the residuals model is 
somewhat arbitrary, and is to a degree an exploratory exercise. Specific hypotheses can be 
tested, however, as described later. 
Although the actual models arc relatively straight- forward, their validity relies on a number 
of underlying assumptions about individuals' behaviour. Potentially serious objections to 
the approach arise if. 
a) no formal markets exist for the goods; or, 
unmeasurable quantitics of potcntial substitutcs (agricultural rcsiducs) are 
known to be consumed. 
Each of these objections will be addressed in some dctail in Section 7.3.5. 
7.3.2 The Th. ns-Log Model 
The use of the trans-log model has been well developed for analysing energy demand in 
developed countries using only timc-series data (Berndt and Watkins [1978]) or time-scries 
and cross-scctional data (Halvorsen [1975]; Chem [1976]; Uri [19821). In general the 
model can be used for any number of substitute or complementary goods. It is based on 
the premise that individuals attempt to maximise utility by minirnising the cost of satisfying 
any given level of energy demand. The existence of an energy cost function is thus 
hypothesised which sets an aggregate energy price, PE, as some function of the prices of n 
individual fuels: 
PE =F (P,,..., Pi,..., Pn) (7.1). 
71c transcendental logarithmic functional form of this relationship allows considerable 
generality since it places no restrictions on the partial elasticities of substitution and is 
shown by Christensen et. al. (1973) to be a good second-order approximation of any 
arbitrary twicc-differentiable price possibility frontier. For any number of fuels, the U=- 
log spcciricadon is as foHows: 
log PE c BO +Z ßi log Pi +LY, Eyi, log Pi log Pj ... (7.2). 
121jJ 
9A third approach to demand modelling in LDCs is demonstrated by de Lucia and Tabors (1982). which 
consists essentially of a detailed accounting of the energy intensities of various Sectom While this is a 
revealing exercise, it does not in Itself provide information about demand c"cides. 
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Here the B's and Ys am unknown parameters. Sornc further restrictions must apply for 
the function to be hornogencous. In order that total energy expenditures increase 
proportionately with proportionate incmases in prices. we must have: 
and, 
-fij 
One feature of the price possibility frontier apprmch is that the derivcd dernand X, for any 
fuel can be obtained by partially diffcrentiat. ing Equation (7.2), with mspcct to prices. Ws 
gives, generally. aPV9Pj=Xj, and. in the case of the trans-log specification: 
a oF PE 
= 
Pi x, 
22 Z) log Pi L Pi Xi ... (7.5); 
which is better known as Shephard's lemnu (after Shephard 119631). Ifere: Sj is the cost 
share of fuel i. 
This derivation now allows us to exprcss a system of Cost share equations for any number 
of fuels. In our case, we will restrict the model to two fuels: fuclwood and kerosene. 
having subscripts W and K respectively. The share equations =: 
Model I 
Sw = Bw +y %%. W log PW + WK log PK ... (7.6a); 
SK f PK, +7 K-W log Pw + *fKK log PK ... (7.6b). 
From the restrictions imposed by Equations (7.3) and (7.4), it is clear that the cost shares 
must sum to unity. Further. thm restrictions imply that for any system with n fuels, we 
can estimate any (n-1) of the equations and then the last %%iU be uniquely dcrined. Indeed. 
Bartcn (1969) shows that the system is invariant to which of the equations is dropped. 
Once the cost share equations are estimated, one on dcrive conventional oA, n. and cross- 
price elasticities either through simulation or. after Allen (1938) and Uzawa (1962). we on 
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7.3.3 The Residuals Model 
An alternate approach to desaibing fuclwood demand Is to specify the quantity demanded 
as a function of numerous cxplarutoryvariables. An example of Ns approach is that used 
by Bryant (1986) in estimating the U. S. residential demand for fuclwood. Using a 
weighted least squares approach. he csfimaics the amount of wood burned In homes as a 
funcdon of wood price, alternate fuel price. household income, weather. age of the head of 
the household, the number of individuals in the household. and some 14 dummy variables 
relating to demographic and aesthcdc factors. 71is approach has the advantage that It 
allows the analyst to isolate those variables which are apparently significant in explaining 
fuelwood deimnd. 
Our residuals model is based on such an approach. Ile approach is further divided into 
two steps: the first to confirm the cost share model, - and the second step to evaluate the 
residuals. 
The first step involves estimating fuelwood consumption as a function of prices only. 
although an added term (POP) is specified to capture growth in the population. Also. 
rather than using nornin: Ll prices. real fuclwood and kerosene prices are used, and are 
designated as P'W and VK respectively. Adding the time period subscript explicitly, the 
single equation model is thcn cstimatcd as: 
Model Ila 
XW, + b, POP, + b2 Vwt + b, VKt + c, 
Using this specification, it is possible to test whether the own- and cross-price elasticities 
generated here are equal to those estinuted by the cost share model. 7bis is an important 
step b=use. as noted, the cost share model is Lucd on some form of utility nmirnission 
and it is desirable to obtain a spccifimtion for thIs model which generates results which am 
consistent %%ith such an assumption. 
71c second step involves attempting to extract explicitly further Information from the 
residuals, er 71cre am numerous techniques available for obtaining information from such 
residuals. For time series data, one useful approach is to develop an auto-rcgressive or 
ARINIA1 I type of model to provide Information about the underlying time series. Such 
II This refers to an auto-rcgressive integrated moving &vcr3&c atimalion procedure, often Wed thC Box- 
Fmet,. N%-. 1 Dembisd A Inds"I 2%1 . 
If a distributed lag of the fonn aku 1.3k., for kA is further assunwd. then as T -0 00, wc 
derive: 
Model 11b 
summmamcmumm 
e, w sio 0- X+ O-X) 
77his is what we refer to as the simple single equation residual% model. If significant 
estimators are found. it is concluded that evidence exists supporting the hypotlicsis that 
new capital is adopted in msponsc to fuclwood price changm 
7.3.4 Data Sources 
While the procedums can be applied for any country for which dau am available, India was 
selected in this study as it provided a sufficiently long tinic-scries of consistent data and 
thus allows a dernonstradon of the approach. 
Prices for kerosene and fuelwood were based on rnonthly statistics reported by the 
Government of India Depar=cnt of Statistics under the series "All India Average Rural 
Retail Prices of Some Selected Commditics/Smices". The particular series for both 
fuelwood and kerosene prices were available from August 1969 to December 1986. From 
January 1963 to July 1969. kerosene and fuclwood price data for Bangalore were used and 
were nonnalised such that they coincided to the "mral" series In July. 1970. Bangalore 
data, 12 %%tm used as they %%tm found to have the uTWIest variance frxxn the "rural" statistics 
over the one year period (August 1969 to July 1970) during which both were reported. 
Monthly prices were then avenged on a calendar )var basis to generate the average annual 
nominal prices on which the estimations uvre based. 
Kerosene consumption data were available from 1967 to 1985 from assoned series 
published by the International Energy Agency (1979.1984) and the United N36ons (1983.. 
1984; 1987). For India them am basically two sources of fuelwood sutistics. Ile India 
Depamnent of Agriculture prepares estimates of annual wood production for fuelwood and 
charcoal. These data art available from 1949 to 1982. Ile second source is the Food and 
Agricultural Organisation which estimates fuelwood and charcoal consumption In the 
developing countries. 'ne FAO data are available to 1988. Ile disadvantage of using the 
12 This was bwd on the scries 'Retail Ptice. s of Ewnflil Commodities &t Selected Centrcs'. A 
discontinuity occurs not only in the mvkct location here but &Iso in the commodity soldL Pticts PriO( 10 
AugusL 1969 = KT*ncd in terms of RjV40 ks %he=% dwrcafter they am rcj*rW In terms of RIVIDO I't- 
Ilence the 'nornulisatioW pmcedure c3lxured both kc4tkxW diffesences as %tll as any potcntisl non' 
fincaritics. in the mWons-hip bct*vca ivice W bundIvAtight. 
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approaches would, for example, reveA whether or not there existed any exogenous trend 
towards Increased fuel efficiency which was unrelated to prices. 7be problem with such 
approaches is that, first, they assume that the underlying time series is stationary and, 
second, they require very long time series to extract useful information. Series stationarity 
can often be achieved through differencing techniques - albeit at the expense of data - but 
seldom are sufficiently long fime-series available in developing countries. A more tractable 
approach, and the one adopted here, is to regress explicitly the residuals on lagged 
variables. 
Specifically. we tire interested in testing the hypothesis that increased fuelwood prices 
cause the adoption of capital equipment which is more energy efficicnt. Because we have 
no information on the vintage or nature of the capital equipment in use at any time, we must 
explore the data for signals that this adoption occurs. In order to do this, we are testing the 
follo%ing hypothesis: 
110: Increased fuclwood prices in year t lead to the adoption of new more efficient 
capital equipment E, in year t. 
we assun-c further that: 
Al: The useful fife of the new equipment is T years such that TA; 
, which provides us with the comflary: 
Cl: An increase in fuelwood prices in year t will lead to a decrease in fuelwood, 
use in years t, t+l, ..., t+T-1. 
7bis gives us the testable impEcation that XW1 must also be a function of historical prices if 
some new capital stock is adopted in response to price changes. In terms of our residuals, 
it implies that: 
C, Ct (Pt. i...., P,. T+l ) ... (7.9). 
Note that the P, term does not appear here because all of its effects will have been capn=d 
by Model Ila in estinuting Xwt. 
Although numerous functional fonns can be specified, we choose an obvious lag function 
of the form: 
et m a0 al Pi. 1 + 112 PI-2 + *** + aT-1 Pt-T+l 
Jenkins mcOW (after Box and Jenkins 119761). 
rwt.. V"i Despupid lot tokis"t 
Iii 
If a distributed lag of the form aku X3k., for kA is further assunwd. then as T -0 0*. we 
daivc: 
Model Ilb 
almommucoemm 
el a, 0(1- + (I. X ... P. M. 
I'his is what we refer to as the simple single cquaticm residual% model. If significant 
esd=tors arc found, it is concluded that evidence exists supporting the hypothesis that 
new capital is adopted in response to fuel%%-ood price changm 
7.3.4 Data Sourres 
While the procedures can be applied for any country for which dam am Aval, lable, India was 
selected in this study as it provided a sufficienfly long 6me-scrics of consistent data and 
thus allows a demonstration of the approach. 
Prices for kerosene and fuelwood were: based on monthly statistics reported by the 
Government of India l3cpaiment of Statistics under the series "All India Average Rural 
Retail Prices of Some Selected Commodities/Scr%jecs". 7bc particular series for both 
fuelwood and kemsenc prices were available from August 1969 to Dccmbct 1986. From 
January 1963 to July 1969, kerosene and fucl%vod prioc data for Bangalore were used and 
were normaliscd such that they coincided to the "rural'* series In July. 1970. Bangalore 
data, 12 were used as they %= found to have the smallest variance from the "rural* statistics 
over the one year period (August 1969 to July 1970) during which both were reporied. 
Monthly prices wem then averaged on a calendar year basis to generate the average annual 
nominal prices on which the estimadons u= based 
Kerosene consumption data were available from 1967 to 1985 from assorted series 
published by the Intemational Energy Agency (1979; 1984) and the United Nations (1983; 
1984; 1987). For India them are basically two sources of fuelwood ststistics. Ile India 
Department of Agriculture prepams estimates of annual %%ood production for fucl%vod and 
charcoal. Ilese data arc m-allable from 1949 to 1982- 7be second Source is the r-ood and 
Agricultural Organisation which estimates fuclwood and charcoal consumption In the 
developing countries. The FAO data are available to 1988. The dis3dvantage of using the 
12 This w3s bised on the Suits "Retail hice-s of Etscat'sil Commodities at Selected CentrCso. A 
discontinuity occurs not only in the mvkct location kre but also in the commodity sold. Price$ prior to 
August. 1969 am frporwd in terms of Rp/40 L& %%hema% Lhertafter Lky are rcrorw in taw of R14100 kt- 
Ileace the 'normilisation' procedute ujured both loc4tion4l differences as well as any Potential nor'* 
linearitics in the rditionship b-, tAvcn price W bunXe %tight. 
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FAO data am that they am simply estimates derived by multiplying population by per capita 
fuelwood requirements, and their estimate for per capita requirements remained unchanged 
from 1974 to 1985. No rationale for this assumption is given, although it should be bome 
in mind that the concem of the FAO was to forecast gross global fuelwood demands and 
price rcsponses would not likely change the thrust of their conclusion. Mxrtforc, for this 
study, the India forestry production estimtes w= used. It should bc noted that this has 
the added advantAge in that it also includes fuelwood which would not have passed through 
normal markets, as they w= trying to determine the total resource use. 
71c residuals model also requires miscellaneous population and price dcflator statistics 
which were based on annual data presented by the India Department of Statistics. 7be 
spccific price dcflator used was the "All India Food Index for Agricultural Iabour". 7bese 
dam were available from 1960 to 198 8. 
Because of the data limitations. therefore, various constraints were imposed on the 
estimations. Model I was constrained by the absence of reliable kerosen e ponsumption data 
prior to 1967. Model 11, however, which did not require these data. was constrained by 
the avaflability of reliable price series prior to 1963. Both models were constrained by the 
lack of recent forestry production estimates, as the FAO data were deemed inappropriate for 
the reasons discussed earlier. In summary, therefore, the cost sham model was based on 
an estimation period of 1967 to 1982 and the residuals model was based on an estimation 
period of 1963 to 1982. 
7.3.5 Discussion of Underfling, Assu=tions 
Pmduct Prices 
vmýmmwmmmmmmý 
One of the potential objections to the overall approach adopted here is that much of the 
activity In the fuelwood sector never passes through formal markets. 71c cost sh= model 
requires that individuals have opportunities to interact and trade in a market. responding to 
price changes. While in developed countries this assumption is valid4 it can be questioned 
in LDCs where much of the activity is not observed. 7be objection basically relates to 
product pricing: that many products am gathered 'free and are consumed individually 
without ever entering the markCL 
In response to this objection, it is important to realise what the cost share model is doing. 
It allows individuals to minimise some aggregate price by selecting various mixes of 
commodity inputs. The prices used in the model must reflect, in ieffiect, the marginal utiliry 
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to the user of consumption and the quantity consumed must mflect their total consumption 
and not necessarily what passes through the MWkCL It Is argued. thctc(ort. that as long as 
prices rcflcct marginal utilities to the consumers and as long As total (tr; Wcd + untraded) 
consumption is used, the approach is malid. 
In terms of consumption, our empirical study has, in fact, used total production data as a 
proxy for consumption. This is believed to approximate total consumption more closely 
than somcthingwhich measures traded goods. Second, in terms of product prices. this 
may be a valid objection in some instance&. In the case of India, however. a faltly good 
private market is developed in most centres because of the existence of plantation forestry 
which aims to provide fuclwood (Gupta t19821; FAO 119811). Butthemark-ctisopcn. aM 
anyone can gather fuelwood and sell into the market or choose not to gather fudwood and 
purchase from woodlots or private individuals. I fence. although not all goods are traded. 
the existence of the opporrunhy suggests that, at the margin, non-traded goods must have 
the same value as traded goods. 13 I'his may not. however. generally be the cast and 
researchers should establish what market conditions In fact exist before proceeding with 
this approach. 
Altemate Fuels 
A second potential objection relates to the fact that unknown quantities of an untraded 
good, in this case agTicultural residues, are known to be consumed. Strictly, one should 
consider three goods: fuelwood. kerosene, and agricultural residues. While in theory the 
cost share model can be r=st to accommodate all three fuels. data limitations prevent 
explicit incorporation of the agricultural residue share. Even though it has no formal 
market price, its cost share can not be mgarded as zero as one must consider its value to the 
user (as discussed above). 
Although the only rationale for excluding agricultural residues is the lack of data, we can 
identify the conditions sufficient to N-alidate our approich. Basically, the evaluation ofjust 
fuelwood and kerosene implies that the fueNvod/kcroscne mix is scparablc in the utility 
function from the agficultural residues. In practice. this rcquircs that any change in 
agricultural residue 'prices' can affcct all of the cost shares SWO SK# and SR, but that the 
ratio S%4K must rmuin unchanga 
13 In essence, an individual gathering his own %%wJ must &Wtn a valoe V to It uKh that It is equal 90 the 
mxk, ct price P. If V<Po then it %vuld be in his interests to sell it In the matitt and ir V>P. then he should 
not be Sidwing wood but rather be buying it fr= thC MXLCL lkr4c equilibrium can only Occur %%hm 
VEP. 
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Figurc 7.1 
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In temas of the price funcdons and corollaries to Equation (7.1), this separation effectively 
lets us define two sets of problems in which we have two price functions: 
PE m F, (PR9 PT) 
PT ý F2 (PK, PW) 
... (7.12a); 
... (7.12b); 
where PR is the price of the agricultural residue and Pr is the price function for traded fuels. 
71is separation allows us to model, in trans-log form, the system in Equation (7.6). 14 In 
principle, Equation (7.12a) can also be transformed into a cost share model in cost shares 
SR and ST. but it would not be estimable due to data constraints. 
17.4 Empirical Results 
7.4.1 An Historical Pmp=dve 
Mie historical trend of real fuel prices in India is shown in Fig= 7.1, with 1963 arbitrarily 
chosen as a reference year. Both wood and kerosene prices varied only about 1- 25% from 
1963 to 1973. After the oil embargoes of the early 1970s, kerosene prices jumped by 
about 60%, but remained remarkably stable in real terms from 1975 to 1985. It is clear, 
however. that fuclwood prices have doubled in real terms over the same ten )= period. 
In terms of consumption, most of the residential energy requirements are met by fuelwood. 
14 The trarts-log model is sometimes mistakenly believed to assume. in this case. that peopk have & r1led 
energy budget which they spend in a nunner to minifnise C=SY Prices_ wjýlc the uans'109 model can be 
used for such circumstances. it does not assume that the total cmgy share in the consumption basket 
remains constant. 
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In 1977. for example. some 89% of the mcasurcJ residential energy consumption Me.. 
excluding agricultural residues) can bc attributed to fudwood, with 10% to kerosene and 
I% to other products (IEA [ 19791). 
7.4.2 Trans-U& Model Results 
lie cost share model was cstinutod for the period 1967 to 1982. As described In Section 
7.3, it is necessary to estinute only one of the shut equitions In a two Cquation tystern, 
hence the kerosene cost sham was dropped. lie resultant estimate is as follows (with 
standard cffors in parendxses): 
Model I 
sw -0.06234 + 0.062S2 W Pw 0.06979 loSPt 
(0.04418) (0.01743) (0.018m) 
F. 1119.4 R2 to in, im D-W a 1,6170 
Own- and cross-price elasticities were calculated using Equation (7.7). First. howevers 
tests were performed to determine whctherthe elasticities were signift=tly different from 
zero. 15 Mic null hypothesis that the own-pricc clasticity for fuelwood was zero was 
rejected at a 95% confidence level. With respect to the cross-pricc custicity. however, the 
null hypothesis could not be rejected. Ifenm recalling that the elasticities can vary from 
year to year, the model suggests the follcming: 
Tl%%-W,,,., = -0.24 1 11%. W. 1,011 n -0.32 1 lik-w u0 
This suggests that fuelwood demand was inelastic to its own price, and that no interfuel 
substitution occurmd due to relative price changm 71ese results are now further checked 
%%ith the residuals model. 
13 The tests and the estinutions of cUsticities %= conducted by the SHAZAN-1 WfI%%WC used (Of the 
regnssions. Referfing to Equation (7.7). the relevant tests batically try to dctc-rmine if Thi"OO(T14*0 At 
the meancost shamsSjandSj Ws is equivalent. for example. to testing %hether YmSj-Sj2- Rtsulud 
the tests indicated the following 1-statistics for the indicated taltv. ij***O (tell)-. YlkwsO OMI-5). 
Simul. 3tions for kerosene suggested Out iu own ivice clasticity (vljjL) wit only about -0-02. but test$ 
indic3ted that WsA2s nodiftcrent than rm (tnl. 5ý 
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7.4.3 Hesiduali Model Results 
71c first part of the residuals model is meant to vcrify the cost share model and, as the cost 
share model indicated that PK should be insignificant, two regressions were undertaken 
which resulted in the following (with standard errors in parentheses): 
Model Ila anýal 1) 
xw 5408.5 + 217A3 POP - 99190 rw -(7.14&). (2750.6) (54.82) (46207) 
F R93.4 RI m 0.57(U D-W m 1.49 
Model Ila (Trial 2) 
Xw 5592.2 + 204.80POP - 115990 Vw + 362400 VK -. (7.14b). (2898.6) (66.44) (66197) (983890) . 
F 621.9 R2 a 0.5757 D-W u1 -50 
It is clear that the regression without the kerosene price generates significant coefficients 
with the expected signs and that, when kerosene prices are added, these are not significant 
and contribute little to the overall explanatory power of the regression. Ilis conrMW that 
no interfuel substitution is cvidcnL Further. a calculation of the own-pricc elasticity of 
fuclwood at the means in Equation (7.14a) yields qwW = -0.2974. This concurs with the 
estimate generated by Model 1. 
Ile next step is to explore the residuals from Model Ila. Before applying the procedure 
described in Section 7.3, however. it is noted that some simple tests can be conducted on 
the residuals to determine their nature. A D-W=1.49 was computed, which, for n=20 and 
W, suggests that the Durbin-Watson test is inconclusive at a 95% level of confidence 
(du=1.54). although it concludes that no autocorrelation would exist at a 90% level of 
confidence. To a degree, therefore, we might expect our residuals to look like 'white 
noise, but it is nonetheless useful to conduct the estimation exercise. 
71c model specified in Equation (7.11) was estimated to yield (with standard crrors in 
parcnthcscs): 
Model fib 
-1598.9 + 0.2645 cýj + 41065 Vwg., -. (7.15). 
(1726.5) (02824) (43444) 
Fn0.6 R2 n 0.1317 D-W u2.09 
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By these tests it is clem that no apparent lagged response exists and that the milduals arc, 
indeed, 'white noise. We hence rcjcct the hypothesis that cxogcnous changes to cooker 
cff icicncy arose as a result of changes to the capital stock. 
7.4.4 Intemmation of Re, -; ultq 
71c results of the empirical exercise am best expressed as a response to the questions 
which were originally framed in Section 72. To reiterate, these am as follows: 
Q1. What happens to ftxl%%uA demand when wood prices rise? 
Q2. If the quantity of fuelwood demanded falls, do households: 
a) replace the fuelwood with fossil fuels? 
b) replace the fucl%vod with agficultuml residues? 
c) incrtase cDok-er cfriciency? 
d) do none of [a] - [c)? 
Q3. If agriculmml residues am 3dopted, what is the c5mon productiýity? 
Q4. If no substitution occurs. docs malnutrition or di wise cnsue? 
In response to the first question. fucluvod demand falls when fuclwood prices rise. all 
other things equal. Both the cost sham and the residuals model suggest that for every 10% 
increase in real fuel prices. fuelwood consumption falls by approxinutcly 3%. When one 
considers that. in India, real fuelwood prices doubled over the period 1975 to 1985. the 
fuelwood consumption change which ensued from this would be of the order of a 30% 
decrease. 
Ile second quesdon relates to how households ad3pt. when less fudwood is being con- 
sumedL The empirical evidence for India suggests th3t substitution towards kerosene has 
not occurred, nor has there been a significant adoption of cookers with higher efficiencies. 
One is forced to conclude, within the above framcwork, that either households arc making 
increased use of agricultural residues or they arc simply not replacing the fudwood with 
any other fuel. 
If, indeed, they am using agricultural rcsiducsý then one might ask whether there are any 
adverse impacts on agricultural productivity. Conversely, if households are simply cutting 
back on fuelwood consumption, then %%-c might be concerned that they are cooking less and 
might decrease their consumption of cooked foods. Some argue that this would lead to 
increased malnutrition or incidence of disease. %N%ilc these questions were not explicitly 
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addressed here, verifying whether such linkages exist is clearly of concem to planners. 
The results suggest that, In India, continued increases in fuclwood prices will decrease 
fuelwood consumption, but that any real decreases In kcmscnc prices arising from low 
International oil prices or from deliberate kerosene subsUes will not have similar Wects. 
71c declining kcrosene prices might initiate small increases in kerosene dcmand but will 
elicit no decrease in fuclwood demandL 
While on the surface these results may seem surprising, they would be consistent with 
circumstances where either kerosene rationing occurred, or where kerosene and fudwood 
were used in completely separate markets. As noted by Ahmad and Stem (1987; p. 311). 
both of these factors might exist in India: there was some explicit subsidised rationing of 
kerosene in India, and "the different ['fuel and light' goods - cow dung, firewood, coal, 
kerosene, and electricity -I are consumed by very different household groups". 
Although investigating the specific local marketing arrangements was beyond the scope of 
this study. it would be useful to determine whether, for example, kerosene was readily 
available in traditional fuclwood markets or if some logistical (supply) constraints limited 
its availability. If such constraints do indeed exist, then pricing incentives in association 
with programmes which promote improvements to the kerosene supply system may well 
eUcit sme effccdvc subsfitudon. 
§ 7.5 Conclusions 
7.5.1 SummajX 
Deforestation of tropical moist forests in developing countries is becoming a vital concern 
as, in many circumstances, these forests have traditionally provided critical supplies of 
fuclwood to indigenous populations. 11c deforestation has often resulted in increased 
prices for fuclwood or has required greater individual effort for fuclwood collection. 7bis 
has manifested itself further through decreased fuelwood consumption which. in turn. 
leads to potential decreases in total fuel use, decreases in cooked food consumption, 
increased incidence of related health problems, or substitution towards alternate fuels. 
This chapter outlined the general fuelwood problem and discussed the potential impacts of 
price increases to final demand for various energy commodities. 7be issue is important 
because, In planning optimal allocation and intervention strategies in these economics, 
planners must have empirical evidence of what linkages. if any. exist between demand for 
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=ditional items (such as fuelwood) and nunufactumd or Imported fossil fuel products. In 
particular, the substitution possibilities in final demand bct%%tcn kerosene and fuclwood In 
India ue investigatod. 
The approach used involves first the estimation of a tmnsccmcntll logarithmic spocification 
of residential energy demand for two commodities: fuelwood and kcroscncý to test the 
substitution effects between these commoditics. The advantage of this approach Is that It 
poscs no a priori restrictions on the derrtand clas6citics, aM that it is founded in a simple 
theory of individual utility maximisation. Ibc system of cost share equations Is estimated 
using OLS techniques. A second step is then made using a simple single equation model of 
fuelvwod. dcn=d to investigate whether changes in the capital stock cf ficicncy (of Cooker%) 
havc occuffed. 
The empirical results of the cost-sham model indicated that the own price elasticity of 
fuelwood, was approxinutely -03. Substitution effects through changes in relative fuel 
prices are non-existcnt. The single equation formulation confirmed thcsc results. and 
additionally illustrated that there was no evidence for exogcnous increases in cooker 
efficiency. 
The results suggest that the increases in fuclwoW prices from increased scarcity do indccd 
manifest themselves in lower fuelwood use, without substitution towards fossil fucl 
products. As there is no evidence suggesting increases in cook*cr cfricicncyt one must 
conclude that either no substitute is being adopted for the fuelwood, or that it is being 
substituted %%ith other products such as livestock dung or crop residues. If no substitution 
occurs, there is some possibility that the situation may lead to health related problems. If. 
on the other hand, fuelwood is substituted by agricultural wastes, increased use of these 
products may decrease overall agricultural productivity. Either of these possibilities %%Duld 
be of concern to planners in these countries. 
7.5.2 Poligy Implications 
Intervention in any sector to achieve any given set of goals %kill depend upon the policy 
objectives and the effects which a policy would have. Although this study does not 
prescribe any particular set of objectives, the results do indicate what the effects would be 
of certain policies and, thereby. suggest whether policies might achieve their stated or 
implicit goals. 
First, for example, the results suggest th3t a policy of subsidising kerosene prices will not 
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alleviate any pressures on fuelwood demand as individuals simply do not switch. The 
kerosene pricing mechanism in this case is not an effective policy ]ever. Conversely, 
however. if the policy goal is to restore individual fuelwood consumption to higher levels, 
then this can bc achieved through decreasing fuelwood prices (which, it is noted, would 
likely only be sustainable through resource management programmes promoting more 
intensive forestry projects). 7bese are, in fact, being pursued in India with vigour and the 
analysis suggests that this is an appropriate action if the goal is to restore a higher level of 
fuelwood consumpdon. 
Second, the analysis indicates that residents are not by and large adopting more efficient 
cookers in their capital stocks as fuelwood prices have increased. If it is indeed a desire of 
the government that cooker efficiency increases, it is likely that some form of direct 
intervention will be required rather than relying on the fuelwood price mechanism. 
7.5.3 Suggestions for Funher Research 
7be analysis in this chapter had two primary goals. The first goal was to outline the 
fuelwood problem in a consistent framework which was amenable to empirical analysis. 
71c second was to develop and demonstrate the viability of using intcrfuel substitution 
demand models for analysing fuelwood demand. While data problems arose in this study 
and will persist through others, it is believed that the approach adopted here is valid and can 
contribute to more coherent policy decisions in developing countries. 
In particular, however, further research is wan-anted in three major areas: 
a) d-ata coUecdon; 
b) applicadon of the mediodologY; and, 
C) exploration of related issues. 
Ile task of data collection is perhaps the most critical; the problems are essentially 
empirical, so the soludons must rely on empirical evidence. Although historical data are 
often poor in developing countries, the approach is amenable as well to cross-sectional 
analysis, which suggests that locational surveys can contribute significantly to the available 
data. As panel surveys are being conducted on a more formal basis in many regions, these 
would provide further benefits by collecting information relating to fuelwood and energy 
use in the home. 
Once the data become available, this type of analysis can be extended to other regions and 
countries. Indeed, if sufficient data were available, it would be of immense interest to 
discover what similarities and differences exist between nations. While the current 
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litcrature includes spot sumeys and accounts. few havc attcmptcd to provide a morc global 
analysis of fuclwood tictnand rclationships. 
Finally, there are a number of areas which wcrc Introduced but not Investigated In this 
study. Mrst. issues related to the use of agricultural rcsiducs art of thcorctical concern and 
- in India - of empirical ttlcvancc. While It Is not likely that useful aggregate data of the 
typc uscd hcrc %kill become a%-ailablc for agricultural rcsidues, it socnis feasible to undcrtake 
more region or Vill3gC specific studies or the use of residues. One might expect that. if 
sufficicrid rich dam %%tre a%-ailabic, some substi tu don effect s from, fuel wood to a 'Cultural y gn 
residues might be picked up in potentially related indicators such as agricultural 
productivity, agrochcmical use, foddcr purchases, or milk production. A second, perhaps 
morc critical, issue relates to the overall question or whcthcr malnutntion or disease 
incidcnce can be linked to lowcr fuclwood use. Rcxarch in the general area of LDC food 
requirements and food policy is =iving increasing attention, but seldom does this work 
address in any rigourous fashion whether food intake may be constrained by fuel 
a%-ailability. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Ile individual chapter sununarics have for the most pan provided specific conclusion 
arising from the analyses which were conducted. Appropriatcly. I %hill bc brief hcrc: 
highlighting some of the salient features of the wotk and suggesting some potentill avenucs 
for further research. 
The broad issues of rainforest consm-ation were characterisod by noting first that a nurnbc! ' 
of rmjor land-use pressures am currently being blamed for tropical deforestation. The 
deforestation is resulting in a reduction of a number of crivironnnntal services which the 
rainfortst provides both locally as well as globally. As the rest of the world bccotnes 
a%-are of sorrie of the effects of deforestation, pressum has mounted to institute policy 
refonns which %-ill prorrxxc minfomst consmation in dcvcloping counuies. 
One of the major empirical problems of deciding how to develop rainforrests optimally is 
that the linkages between %-arious components of the rainfomst. between the rainforest and 
the global environment. and between the rainforest and the 'economy' am not well known. 
But econon-dsts am currently being called upon to contribute to the design of policies which 
will promote consemation. This thesis has attempted to demonstrate that, in spite of the 
information constrainm economic theory can provide some important contributions and 
that, where economic theories provide ambiguous conclusions. careful empirical analyses 
can assist in designing appropriate policies. 
An imponant Scrieralisation arising from the economic theory is that tropicAl deforestation 
is occurring too quickly %%ith respect to the optimal r, 31C. A C=llary to this Is that a sub- 
optimal amount of consmadon is occurring. A review of the litcrat= suggested that 
some of the famrs which contribute to this result am: 
a) much of minforest explojudon Is through conditions of open access; 
b) the services rainforests provide to the rest of the world am public goods from 
%%hich exclusion is essentially impossible: 
C) those harvesting the resource do not take into account the effects their actions 
have on the rest of the muld. 
d) development is irreversible and benefits are unectuin; and. 
C) qpical valu2tion prmdures of conservation benefits may understitc SOC131 
benefits because of free-rider effects, the l3ck of appropri3bility of rc$t=h 
benefits, and potenti: dly significant divergences between will ingness-10-PaY 
OVTP) and %%illingness-to, -Accept OVTA). 
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Ile last issue relating to WFP and WrA is still contentious and requires additional msearch 
In the context of rainforcst conservation. Drawing on theoretical and empirical evidence 
form other environmental issues, the cnvironmcntal economics litcraturc suggests that 
WrA - the amount the world would accept as compensation for further rainforcst loss - 
might cxcced by up to an order of magnitude the amount the world would be wiffing to pay 
for more rainforcsts. 
Although we might gencralisc that we should conserve more rainforest. we can not with the 
informafion available at hand esdmate the optimal amount of conservadon. A pracdcal 
problem then becomes finding policies which promote conservadon. In the process of 
evaluating such policies, one expects that Information useful to the actual optimisation 
programme rnýight also be gencratccl. 
Ile global situation was charactcrised as one where we in the developed world are - 
presumably - willing to compensate developing countries for their conservation efforts, 
whatever those efforts might be. Under these circumstances, this thesis addressed the 
following two questions: 
Ql. Are the inte=donal inducements we pay worth the conservation received? 
Q2. Will the internal policy reforms available to the IXC achieve conservation? 
To address Ql, a concept labelled the "rainforcst supply price" (RSP) %-as derined as the 
minimum amount of compensaflon which an 11)C would have to receive to conserve a 
particular rainforcst area. To allow comparisons between different conservation 
programmes, the RSP was calculated on the basis of a protcction scenario which reflected 
the amount of rainforcst area protected by conservadon efforts. Calculation of the RSP 
involves a relatively simple extension of cost-bcncrit analysis and, to illustrate the point, a 
study was done of a conservadon project intended to protect Korup Nat: ional Park in 
Cameroon. Ile analysis suggested that the project was not in Cameroon's interest unless a 
5.4 million ECU inducement is transferred to Cameroon. Given the protecdon afforded, 
the transfer is equivalent to a RSP of 1060 ECU per km2 per year. Evaluadons of six other 
tropical rainforest projects suggests that intemafional donors made transfers having values 
ranging from 15 to 1575 ECU per kM2 per year. It was thus concluded that the 
Inducements required arc %ithin a range which conservation interests arc apparently %%il. Ung 
to mobilise. 
71c second question - regarding the effectiveness of available reforms - was addressed 
through a number of empirical studies. In support of this work, a survey of 341 
households around Korup National Park was analysed in detail to test a number of specific 
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hypotheses. In particular, we were Interested In knowing whether Increasing Incomes In a 
"buffer zone" around a patk would promote conservation-. It Is often hypothcsised that 
incrmcd incomes would draw individuals out of the park and would give them something 
better to do thin exploit the park. Empirical cvidcncc did not, however. support this 
hypothesis. The cvidencc suggests that economic development In the buffer zone would 
increase prtssurcs on the park bccausc: a) higher Incomes would reduce emigration from 
the region and would thus causc greater population pressure on the Nrk; and, b) hunting 
effort incrtascs as non-hunting income increases. 
While the msearch on Korup involved specific household data. a study using aggregated 
national data relating to fuclwood demand In India was also undertaken. Ile impetus 
behind this %%-ork %-As to determine whether kemscric subsidies would decrease fuclwood 
demand and. in the process, take some pressure away from the forest resource. While the 
results showed that fuclwood dcmand responded to its own pdcc (having an elasticity of 
-03), there was no evidence for intcrfucl substitution between kerosene and fuclwood. 
While there are a number of potential reasons for this result, it suggests that indirect 
subsidies of kerosene would not promote rainfortst conscn-ation through this mechanism. 
The conclusions of the analysts in Canx-roon and in India provide a sobering back-drop to 
presumptions and rules-of-thumb which are often used in policy design. Intuitively one 
might have expected higher incomes in a buffer zone to promote conservation, or kerosene 
subsidies to reduce fuclwood use. But the empirical evidence shows this intuition to be 
incorrect in these cases. Nlorcovcr, the evidence is perfectly consistent with economic 
theory and, upon reflection, it does not take any great Icap of faith to accept the 
conclusions: one can readily irwgine. for example. that hunting increases as non-hunting 
incomes increase if people simply like to huntand hunting is &'normal' good having a 
positive income elasticity of denund. 
While these specific results nuy conx as no surprise to economists, the exercise provides 
an important lesson to conservation groups. In the past, it has often bccn gencralised that 
economic development and environmental protection were conflicting goals. More 
recently, conservation groups have Scneraliscd that economic development and 
cmdronmcntal protection are, in fact. complementary. that econornic development initiatives 
can be used to promote conservation. and that such conservation %%ill In the longer term 
improve economic development prospects. While the current scntimcnt is laudable. I 
would sutxnit that neither gcncr3lisadon is correct. Under certain circwnstancti, economic 
dcvclopmcnt and conservation are complementary. To contribute meaningfully to the 
design of policies, one of the challenges to the economics profession is to discover %hat 
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thosc circumstanccs might bc. 
7"his challenge provides ample scope for additional research opportunities. In particular. I 
would note: that important insights - relating to conservation - can be gleaned from 
household surveys. 71is study has shown that such surveys can play a useful role in 
providing cconomýically meaningful results in the design of pol. icies which are intended to 
promote conservation. As their use and analysis is becoming more common in the 
discipline of development ccononiicsý it would likely require httle incremental effort to ask 
how observed behaviour might affect conservation of somc of the critical environmental 
msourccs. 
In addition, the use of the RSP as an analytical tool suggests some interesting avenues of 
research. Two directions stand out as being particularly relevant: one relating to 
conservation benefits and one relating to conservation costs. 
First, the calculation of the RSP abstracted from the issue of the quality of particular 
rainforests; it essentially uses a square kilomctrc of rainforcst as the num6raire for 
comparative purposes. While it was illustrated that. in theory, there would be little 
difficulty in using a 'quality-adjusted RS V for making comparisons ýnd selecting which 
rainforest to protect, in practice this requires some valuation of the 'quality' of any given 
rainforcst area. For the most part this falls into the realm of evaluating the global bcncrits 
of saving rainforcsts. While some headway is being made in this area, it would also be 
useful to investigate which particular characteristics of rainforests attract support from the 
conservation community. If one looks at all of the 'conservation' projects in the world, for 
example, is thcre any systematic relationship between the amount of money given to any 
given project and, say, the number of threatened animal species, the total area, or the t)TC 
of scenery? 
A second avenue involves determining whether there is any relationship between RSP and 
rainforest location. On the assumption that conservation precludes other destructive land 
uses, we might conjecture that, other things equal, the RSP will be lower in poorer 
countries than in wealthier countries because of the lower opportunity costs in poorer 
countries. If this conjecture is correct, it implies that. if we are indifferent to which 
rainforest we save but have only limited funds to do so, and if we are concerned only with 
conservation, then we should be concentrating our efforts in conserving rainforests in the 
poorest areas since they will be the cheapest to save. Interestingly, this criterion might 
place Amazonia into the'expcnsive bracket. 
- 
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RegirdIcss of %%hich avcnucs of ivsc=h am pursued, the tools economists have at their 
disposA art quite diverse: and can. with proper application of both the theory and the 
empirical msc=h, potentially nuke impomnt contributions to the design of policies which 
promote conscrva6on. 
Finally, I would like to close on a less technical note. Ile empirical work in this thesis 
spent considerable effort tr)ing to describe what Influenced people's behaviour. A case In 
point is migration. But we should always remember that trying to predict migratory 
adjustment - either through observing aggregated flows or individual events - is a tricky 
process and we should never presume to know ultinutely. for cx=plc. what nukes people 
leave home. In designing models we rnay at fimcs overlook-. or bury. facton which am 
obvious to the people we am studying but arr- totally foreign to us. A striking example of 
this involves a local farmer near Korup National Puk with whom I passed an crijoyable 
few hours one moming. 11c was about thirty years old, had lived on the fringe of the 
Prim. ary forest his entire lifcý and %%-as by all appearances fairly typical of cvcr)-onc clse I 
had encountered. Mien wc came around to discussing the possibility of moving away to a 
more lucrative lifestyle. be admitted that he had heard a lot of how much better life was 
elsewhere. but that he himself would never leave. Nklicn I asked him why he would not 
leave, he was incrcdulous that I did not know that thcjuju would not protect him if he left 
the area. Juju is the animistic spirit - the magic - resident In the trees and aninuls of the 
rainfomst; many in the region bcbc%-c that it guards and guides them in their dafly lives. Of 
the twelve %illages in the primary and high secondary forest zone of Korup, all but one W 
Juju houses in which to ccIcbratc and pay homage to thcjuju spirits. 
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APPENDIX 
KORUP NATIONAL PARK HOUSEHOLD SURVEY9 1988 
I A. 1 Background 
7be analyses presented In Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis rely to a large extent on 
household survey data collected at the Korup Pmjcct In Cameroon. Ile purpose of tills 
appendix is to provide additional detail on the survey which, although highly relevant to the 
analyses conducted in the central text of the thesis, would unnecessarily distract from the 
key arguments being nude. 7bis appendix first describes the populadon at which the 
survey was targeted. Next. it describes the qucitionnaire guide used in the survey. 
highlighdrig the aggregate summaries in each key arca. Theteaftcr. the data reduction 
process - i. e., the manner in which information is tcduccd from Its inidal raw form on the 
quesdonnaires to a final form which is amenable to analysis using computcr-bascd 
economic evaluadon packages - is discussed. Finally. some summary comments am 
presented which review sonic of the qualitative aspects of the survey procedure. 
j A. 2 Target POPU121ion 
7berc arc a total of 30 settlements which are found within 3 kilomctrcs of the Korup 
National Park boundary. and approximately another 40 which am uiLhin the usual wading 
areas of these villages. Based on surveys of the 1976 Census, the regional population is 
appmxirrmiely 12,000 pcople- 
Of these vill3ges. 24 %%tm surveyed in the demognphic and income survey. As indic3tcd 
in the follo%ing table. this rieprmented all of the %illages In the Rark and the %Vcstcm Buffer 
Zone MZ), and 12 of the 18 villaps in the Eastern BufferZone (E-BZ). 
Raim 
Western Buffer Zone 
Korup N36on3l Park 
Eastern Buffer Zone 
External Trading Arca 
Villag es in Region 
6 
6 
18 
40 
Villages survacd 
6 
6 
12 
0 
Although them is a road %% hich extends to the edge of the buffer zone, there are no roads 
within the arta and tmvel is normally by foot or. during the dry season, by boat along the 
Ndian River. A distinction was nude between the two different buffer zones on the basis 
of access3bility to the main road systems in the region: those In the EBZ could w3lk to the 
roads within a few days without crossing through the park. whereas those in the WBZ 
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would need to pass through the park first on any such walk. 
Ile target population within these 24 villages consisted of 379 households, although 
demographic data was obtainable for only 357 (94%) of the households. 7bose missing 
represented households which were obviously lived in but for which no one in the village 
was able to give reliable information. Income data were obtained on only 343 (91%) of the 
households. Missing data in this event arose when the interviewee was not a household 
member and knew enough about the household's composition but little about its activities. 
Finally. the number of households which were ultimately analysed was further reduced by 
two to 341 (90%). 71esc two were rejected because other obvious evidence suggested that 
the responses were not reliable. 1 
A summary of each village is presented in Table A. I. Tables A. 2 to A. 5 provide 
aggregates for the Eastern Buffer Zone, the Western Buffer Zone, Korup National Park, 
and the entire survey sample. Although the migration data arc analysed rigourously in 
Chapter 5, it is obvious even from the descriptive statistics that there has been an exodus 
of individuals of working agc,, both male and fcnmlc. from these rural areas. For cx=plc, 
in the survey as a whole, 24% of the 15-34 year age group was "away at work" whereas 
only 15% of the 35-54 year age group and 4% of the 55+ year age group was absent for 
work reasons. 
I One should normally have fairly good reasons for discarding data on the basis of a priori evidence. In 
th, is case, I fouschold 041 was excluded because the household twad claimed to be a highly trained crocodile 
and hippo hunter who regularly sold his catches to the Calabar Zoo in Nigeri3. Apart from the fact that 
there are no hippos in the area, his stated annual income amounted to 188 million CFAF. or about 
L400.000.7U second case involved Household 331 in the village of Lobe. 7Ure lived a single lady who 
cUmed that her son was a rich cocoa farmer in Tombel %%ho sent her about 4 miflion CFAF annually. 
Others in her village claimed that she received nothing from her son and that she was fed by those in Lobe. 
As Tombel was one of thevill3ges survcyed, it w-as possible to rind her son in the sample (Household 360) 
and the dwa indicated that his income. with which he had to support 10 household members, was only 450,000 CFAF. 
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TabIC A. I 
Sununary of Vill3g e Data 
Ifouscholds Status 
AN AN AN 
RcgiorJVilbgc SUnT)vd On NIV PMWlt School W(wk N/S TOW 
Westem Buffer 
Zone 
Akpasan 56 57 309 0 5 0 314 
Akm-a 12 12 79 10 6 2 97 
Ekoncn= 4 7 42 2 5 1 so 
Ek-ong 1 36 39 275 7 16 1 299 
hibofong 6 8 32 6 2 0 40 
Nguru Koru 1 1 3 0 3 0 6 
SubtoW 
ZZ 
115 124 740 25 37 4 800 
Korup Nadonal 
Park 
Bucka Ba=ga 5 5 13 3 7 3 26 
Bem 12 12 36 1 8 1 66 
Ek-ong 11 (Erat) 35 38 266 6 24 7 303 
Ekundo-Kundol 18 18 9. ) 16 7 6 121 
Esukutan 23 25 197 1) 0. 4 2 205 lkcnge 20 20 137 14 33 10 194 
SubtoW KNT 113 118 761 42 83 29 915 
Eastern Buffer 
Zone 
abiabanga 6 6 40 0 8 5 53 
BNO 17 18 58 21 28 1 108 
Bak-ut 1)11 d&ý 25 146 6 32 5 189 
1121da Batanga 7 7 24 7 14 1 46 
Banyu 5 5 22 6 0 9 37 
Bam 29 30 132 12 52 0 196 
Basu 6 6 31 12 14 3 60 
Ek-opte 4 4 . 26 1 3 6 
36 
Lobe 6 6 28 0 5 1 34 
hiopak-o 11 11 64 12 15 12 103 
Ngenye 14 15 71 4 38 2 115 
Tombel 1 4 20 0 0 0 20 
SubtoW EBZ 12ý 137 662 81 209 45 997 
IMAL 357 379 2.163 148 329 78 2,718 
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Table A. 2 
Summary of Village and Population Dcmg mphics - Eastem Buffer Zone 
Total number of households surveyed: 129 
Summary of Village: 30 All ESZ: Came roon Side --EBZ: Cameroon Side-- 
Includes households 1 to 361 inC lU3iVG 
HOU3ehold3 surveyed 129 
Households on map 137 
Schools 3 
Churches 5 
Meeting Places 1 
Commercial Buildings 0 
Unoccupied Abandoned Sites 31 
Sites Under Construction 2 
Households with Zinc 29 
Households with Concrete Blocks 2 
Population Distribution for All EBZ: Cameroon Side 
0-14 15-34 35-54 55+ TOTAL 
Pre3ent F 116 110 63 36 325 
m 135 89 73 40 337 
F+M 251 199 136 76 662 
At School F 28 9 0 0 37 
m 24 19 1 0 44 
F+M 52 28 1 0 81 
At Work F 6 79 17 1 103 
m 6 64 30 6 106 
F+M 12 143 47 7 209 
Ab3 NIS E* 16 4 2 0 22 
m le 5 0 0 23 
F+M 34 9 2 0 45 
Ab3ent F 22 83 19 1 125 
m 24 69 30 6 129 
F+M 46 152 49 7 254 
Total F 166 202 82 37 487 
m 183 177 104 46 510 
F+m 349 379 186 83 997 
Lorup Ifou isWdSum" 
Table AJ 
Summary, of Village and Popul3tion Dawgraphics - Westan Buffer 7Anc 
TotaJ number of households surwycd: 115 
Sumary of VL11aget 29 K11 %MZM1qerL* Side --wnZtRLg9rL& Side- 
Includes households I to 361 inclusive 
Households surveyed 115 
Households on cap 124 
Schools 2 
Churches 0 
M*etinq Places 5 
ComercLal Buildings 0 
Unoccupied Abandoned Sites 14 
Sites Under Con3tructLon I 
Households with : inc 39 
Hou3ehold3 with Concrete blocks 0 
Population OLstrLbutLon for All WnIftmigetLa Side 
0-14 15-34 35-54 55+ TOTAL 
Present Ir 171 122 68 25 386 
11 110 se 24 3S4 
Ir+m 333 2 321 126 49 740 
At School Ir 7 0 0 0 7 
m 16 2 0 0 is 
F+H 23 It 0 0 2S 
At Work F 1 12 *1 & 0 is 
m 1 19 2 0 22 
F4H 2 31 4 0 37 
Abs WS r 0 1 0 2 3 
m 0 1 0 0 
F*H 0 1ý & 0 I & 4 
Absent F 1 13 2 2 is 
20 2 0 23 
F+H 33 4 2 41 
Total F 179 135 70 27 411 
H 179 132 60 24 395 
F+H 358 267 130 51 806 
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Table A. 4 
Summary of Village and Population Demographics - Korup National Park 
Total number of households surveyed: 113 
Sumary of Village: 28 All KNP --KNP-- 
Includes households I to 361 inclusive 
Households surveyed 113 
Households on map lie 
Schools I 
Churches 4 
meeting Places 6 
Conwrcial Buildings I 
Unoccupied Abandoned Site3 31 
Site3 Under Construction 1 
Households with Zinc 32 
Households with Concrete Dlock3 0 
Population Distribution for All KNP 
0-14 15-34 35-54 55+ TOTAL 
Present r iss 146 67 21 389 
m 164 121 64 23 372 
F+M 319 267 131 44 761 
At School F 11 5 0 0 16 
m is 11 0 0 26 
F+M 26 16 0 0 42 
At Work F 2 31 5 0 38 
m 0 32 13 0 45 
F+M 2 63 18 0 83 
Ab3 N/S F 14 4 0 0 le 
m 9 2 0 0 11 
F+M 23 6 0 0 29 
Absent F 16 35 5 0 56 
m 9 34 13 0 56 
F+M 25 69 18 0 112 
Total F 182 186 72 21 461 
m lea 166 77 23 454 
r+m 370 352 149 44 915 
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Tablc A. 3 
Vulation Dampniphiq Sumnury of Villarc andik Entire Sur%*CY 
Total numba of houscholds surwyed: 337 
Su. -. =. ary of Vill&q9i 27 TOTAL I- 24 
Includes households I to 361 inclusive 
HOU3eholds surveyed 357 
Households an map 379 
Schools 6 
Churches 9 
Meeting Places 12 
CommarcLal Buildings I 
Unoccupied Abandoned Sites 174 
Sites Under Construction 4 
HOU3ehold3 with Zinc 99 
HOU3ehold3 with Concrete Block* 
Population Distribution for TOTAL I- 24 
0-14 15-34 35-54 55+ TOTAL 
Present F 442 378 198 82 1100 
m 461 320 195 87 1063 
r+m 903 698 393 169 2163 
At School Ir 46 14 0 0 60 
H 55 32 1 0 e8 
Irim 101 46 1 0 148 
At Work Ir 9 122 24 1 156 
m 7 115 45 f 173 
r+m 26 237 69 17 3419 
Ab3 NIS ir 30 9 2 2 43 
m 27 8 0 0 35 
rtm 57 17 2 4L 76 
Absent ir 39 131 -ý 6 a 3 
199 
H 34 12 3 45 6 208 
r4m '73 254 71 9 4 07 
Total F 527 523 2: 4 es 1359 
m 550 475 241 93 13S9 
F4H 1077 998 465 178 2716 
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Tigurc A. I 
Examplc of SurvcY Form 
III 170 1 lQUISMIOLI) MNIPOSfnO' N AND INCOME! KORUP NATIONAL PARXý CANIEROOIý*14 
Volage: BabLakwp Izeation: 2 
111111CA. SUNGO ACH UNIACHU Born in Village 
Intaviewed. 
HOUSEHOLD 
Inakad 
CONWOSM0 1 4 THI 7 
on 3/24/88 
Relation 
, 
Sex Age Schl Sum L=ation X-Ref 
IUDk2d m 50 a Present 
Spouse F 45 0 Present 
Spouse F 43 0 Present 
Child NI 23 7 P=nt 
Child NI 25 7 Present 
Child NI 18 5 Prcscnt 
Child NI Is 6 Present 
Child NI 12 1 Present 
OLha 1111 NI 55 0 pn=t 
Child F 35 7 Abs NIS Tiko 
Child F 20 7 Abs N/S Bakundo 
Otha 1111 F 14 5 Abs N/S Rakundo 
Oth" I III F 12 4 Abs N/S Bakundo 
Othff 1111 ht 6 3 Abs N/S Man)=xn 
HOUSEHOLD UNC ONIF IN 1997 (CFAF) 11117 
Household Income Estimate: .1 Zinc Construction: No Numbcr of Farms: 3 HH Self-sufficient: Yes 
Avm, Pe Walk- 25 min 
Cash Crops: Tunes caten peruvela 
Coffee (6 bags) 102000 Meat in Rainy Season 3 
Cocoa ( 15 bags) 40M Meat in Dry Season 3 
Other Yes Fish in Dry Season I 
Food Crops: Fish in Rainy Season 0 
Cassava Forest Product Gathaing- 
Plantain Timber 0 
Cocoyam Mango 30000 
Banana Niangsang 2000D 
Oil Palm Njabe 0 
Farming Problems: Shell 
Nut 
NtisccUancous (see Memb) 
10000 
0 
I- Animals Country Onion 0 2- Insects Pepe 0 
Sales: Kola 0 
Uvestock 20000 Forest Product Nt; inufacturing: Hunting 25000 Cane Rope: 0 
Trapping 15" Woven Bags 15000 Fishing 0 Fishing NetVBaskets 0 
Trading- MaLs 0 
Snuff 0 Furniture 0 
Afofo 0 Building 0 
Cisarctlewrobacco, 0 Palm Wine 0 
Beer 12000 Afufu 0 
Wine 0 Canoes 0 
General Goods 0 Palm Oil 0 
Kerosene 0 Remittances (we Memn)- 0 
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I A. 3 Survey Instrument 
The household surveys wcre undertaken through a ftladvcly Informal IntervicIv Process, 
usually In the mspondenfs, hotm. 7be lntczvlc%%-cr was guided by a survey Instrument 
intended to provide the required demographic and Income Information about the housthold. 
An cx=plc of the survey Is provided In Sgurc A. L Ile original survey uscd in the field 
consisted of three pages-. this exampic was replicated by one of the report generation 
routines developed for analysing the data. Tbe data reduction process Is discussed In 
Secdon A. 4. 
The first pan of the survey form deals %ith the basic background of the household head 
and of the household. Indi%iduals %%= ask-cd whether they were born in the village and. If 
they were not. when they wivcd in the village and from wherc. In addition, this pan of 
the survey specifies the location of the household in the village through a map refcrence 
number. 
Ile next pin of the survey obtained information about the household composition. The 
actual survey form also reported names of all of the individuals in the household. although 
these are suppressed from the output to maintain the confidentiality of the individuals. In 
specifying the "status" of each individual. they were eventually categorised as either. 
present. absent at school. absent at %%vtk-. or absent not-specified. If they were absent, 
information %ras obtained regarding their uhcmbouts. Ilose individuals that were 
0 temporarily absent" (which was not uncommon for those away on hunting trips) were 
=tcd as present. 
The collection of income data took most of the effort In the survey process, In that 
respondents %vere often uncertain about their exact income levels and at times found It 
difficult to estimate. 7bis was most obvious in the response to the first question. which 
was "What %%-as yxxx fami]ys total cash income from all sources in 1987? " In many cases 
the respondent had no idea how much it was and, where responses were given. they were 
not always consistent with answers provided later In the Intervicw. 2 Respondents 
2 For thow tiousdiokIs A here toth dxsa; Vcpud incornes W totAl income cWnutcs Ave avaLble. there 
was a d[istinct tcadc; ncy to unddestinute the toW incom (ot mrmsainult the individuaj Mx1tv income). 
Cursory analysis of the dzu indic=s thm. on awnge. the aSSregate of the indi%idual sccuxs was SM, 
higha thin the toW inconx estirrule. A simple OLS trStrition of the Indi%idLur, houlthoij income 
estinute 011M an grou k4o= (INCOME-G) as a sum of the s"regma )ickh the follo%iq Multi (With 
swulmd am in pxtrdxscsý 
IDIYB 0.670 MOMEG - 39.6 Obwn-Aions a 63 
(OD6.1) (651) R-UPUW a 0.63 
If thertutre perfect agntn=4 tM cansuntwouU tv : crov.,..., ., j, n %%ixdd N om At 
it sUndt. 
the consUnt is rot significandy differcat from : cm (F*037. toOhl) but the slope is signir"ntly kit thin 
one (F, @28.1*. W. 3). As the slcqv is 0,67 %%t can conclwk Out the toul Income gi%vn in seacral is &n 
2PA 
_ 
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generally had much less trouble answering questions about income from various single 
sources and. to that extent. the survey performed a useful function by focussing on the 
disaggrcgatcd incomc so=cs. 
Before gctflng into the details of cash incomes, household heads were asked to describe 
their farm ownership and farm locadons. 17hey were asked how many farms they had, and 
what they grew on each of them. Ideally, it would have been desirable to have each fanner 
estimate their own farm area, but many would not have had the required information. 
Fortunately, it is common in that part of the country to refer to a single "farm" as a standard 
unit measured as a "lope". One "lope" is approximately 50 mctrr-s by 150 mctrcs in size, or 
about 0.75 hectares. Household heads wcre also asked to csfimate the distance which they 
had to walk to get to their farms, and were asked whether they grew enough food on the 
farm to feed their entire household. 
Ile survey did not explicitly intend to collect information about family wealth. As wealth 
is, however, often an important economic variable in describing and analysing the well- 
being of a household's members, some data were gathered regarding the ownership of 
various assets. In addition to farm land, household construction was thought to be a 
potcnfial indicator of family wealth. While most houses were of 100% thatch construction. 
some had a zinc roof and fewer still had concrete blocks included in their construction. 
77his information was thus recorded for every household. Although it would have been 
helpful to have had information on the ownership of consumer durables (such as watches 
or radios) no such data were collected. 
Details about a houschold's farming were split into three areas: cash crop production, food 
crop production, and farming problems. With respect to cash crops, individuals were 
asked whether or not they grew coffee and cocoa, how much was sold, and how much 
income was earned from the sale. Some individuals knew the quantity sold but not. the 
income, or vice versa, but in principle whatever information was offered was recorded. It 
should be noted that the standard unit of measure was a "bag", which was the usual unit 
purchased by the government cooperative and which theoretically consists of 50 kg of 
One possible exp"don for this is Out the 'toul household income" question u2s posed rust. As the 
respondent was normilly the household head and normally mate, he may have excluded at that juncture 
thou sources which were nomWly accruing to the women. These sources would include food crop sales. 
livestock sales, fishing. forest gathering. and some of the forest manufacturing. The results for this 
regression, where the explatutory %-ariable is income normaHy earned by miles (MG-SLUX). yields: 
IHIYM 0.837 INCGMALE - 21.9 ObsmzLicxu - 63 (0.063) (53.3) 
1 
R-ujuarod - 0.74 
This formulation is someAhat more acceptable. Although it suggests that there is still a slight yet 
significant (14.6) undercsfirrution of toul income by the rCSNndenL 
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product. The product was normally brought to the coop by hcadloading. Table A-6 
providesa sunumry, by va use, or the activity In cash crops. Note that average prices My 
considerably aniongvillaScs. Although to some extent this can be attributed to different 
costs for bringing the product to market. most of the differences are attributable to 
v"tions in product quality. Discussions with the coop Indicated that they normally to 
through the bags. selecting only those bcms which arc acceptable. and then apply one of 
three prices to those which am stfll acccptable depending upon whether they am high grade. 
low gradc, or sub-standard. 
Sonx households also sold a portion of their food crops for cash. usually to travellers. sind 
these were included as "Other Cash Crops" In the survey. Table A. 7 Indicates thit about 
35% of the households sur-myed obuined some Income from the sale of food crops. 
Table A. 6 
Sun=rv of Coco3 and Coffcc Production Activitv 
MIS coff" c"('011 
-RegiordVillalre 
corrm Sell PWV Sales CffTw Sell Nico Sale$ 
, WICFAJF MCI-AJ- NICIFAIF MCFAF Wcswm Bufter 
7A,, ne 
Akp"an 36 2 1 Wai 13.0 0 0 0.0 
Ake, a 12 0 0 0.0 1 9 17.0 664.5 
Eloneman 4 0 0 0.0 2 2 32.0 1,792.0 
ckms 1 36 7 0 0.0 20 1 11.0 11.0 
Nibofong 6 0 0 0.0 6 4 17.0 323.7 
NSvru-Kcrup I 1 1 S. 7 8.5 0 0 0.0 
Sub4*W U13Z 115 to .1 23.3 36 Is 2.791.2 
KoW NatioW 
Pwk 
HUCLA D&UAJ& 5 2 2 17.0 231.0 1 1 27.0 270.0 
Bets 12 1 1 13.0 13.0 2 2 19.0 196.0 
Elm& 11 (Etas) 35 5 0 0.0 19 1 40.0 80.0 
Elm%lo- Kurdo I Ia 3 4 10.0 200.0 8 2 40.0 120.0 
Esukum 23 A 4 5.7 102.0 20 19 17.0 4.359.6 
1kcale 20 3 6 20.2 616.0 16 12 26.1 1.812.6 
SubwW KNP 113 25 17 11171.0 66 37 6IS31.2 
Ujum Buffa 
7me 
Babosbanp 6 6 6 17.0 916.0 6 6 27.0 3,402.0 
Bsjo 17 14 14 10.0 391.9 14 14 10.4 240.9 
RAW 22 11 11 13.0 11093.0 21 21 32.0 6.321.0 
BAIcks BmAnsa 7 6 6 12.0 612.0 7 7 27.0 1.566.0 
san)v 5 3 3 17.0 IOLO 3 3 27.0 119.0 
BAM 29 22 22 15.1 2.121.2 27 27 40.0 7.812.7 
Basu 6 5 5 6.0 103.0 1 1 a/$ 1.0 
Ekopta 4 3 3 5.7 561.0 2 2 17.0 630.4 
LAke 6 6 s 17.0 310.0 6 5 27.0 "9-0 
Nlopalo II A 0 0.0 5 0 0.0 
NScn)v 14 4 2 6.0 120A 6 3 17.6 131-S 
Tognbtl 2 0 0 0.0 2 2 27.0 340.0 
SutwW ERZ 129 14 77 6.614.1 100 91 232.1 22.067 
TMAL 357 119 96 7.101.6 202 14) 252.1 31.697 
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Table A. 7 
Summary of Food Crops Grown (households growing) 
EBZ mz KU IDW 
Total Households 125 113 103 341 
Food Crop Income 34 35 51 120 
No Food CropS3 4 1 0 5 
Cocoyam 109 104 96 309 
Plantain 111 93 89 293 
Cassava 73 107 88 268 
Banana 92 76 99 267 
Yam 29 22 38 89 
03 Palm 32 17 32 81 
Vc*ctables 12 19 3 34 
hm 4 14 13 31 
Egusi 6 14 10 30 
Pineapple 11 5 6 22 
Pepe 5 2 13 20 
Okra 0 7 3 10 
Sugar Cane 1 4 3 8 
Citrus 2 1 4 7 
Ground Nut 0 2 3 5 
Papaya 1 0 4 5 
It should be noted that. in general, when asked if something contributed to their income, 
one of several responses were given. Depending on the response, the value noted in the 
data base was set as Wows: 
a) do not know: Value = -1 Onissing data) 
b) none: Value= 0 
c) yes but a negligible amount was sold: Value= I 
d) yes: Value= Income in CFAF 
With respect to food crops, respondents were asked simply which crops they grew. 
Respondents typically listed at least half a dozen varieties from the list shown in Table A. 7. 
Cassava, plantain and cocoyarns (taro) were grown almost universally. Only 5 households 
were in a position that they grew no food crops of any varicty. 4 Of all of the varieties 
documented, it is interesting to note that one native forest plant - pepe - was being 
culdvated by 20 households. 
To conclude the farming section of the survey. respondents were asked to indicate, in order 
of priofity. the problems which they encountered on their farms. Tlese problems ranged 
37U particular situations of the households %hich grow no food crops = documented in Table A. 10. 4 The situations of these households are described later in Table A. 10. but it %"As DonnallY the casc in these 
circumstances that the houschold members %tre physically incapable of farming NO required support from 
other village households. 
Table A. 8 
SummaTV of Faming PrWcms 
Prnblern 31 =1. cw 3l MmCi COtgA_Lvj 
Cocoa Disc" 84 23 
porcutines 83 34 
Coffee Dmease 81 77 
Cutting Girass 79 31 
Monkeys 70 27 
Rat MOICS 51 4 
Snakes 214 1 
No Road 22 7 
Anirngs 15 3 
Poor SOO 5 1 
Dinh 4 1 
No Chern"i 4 0 
No Lzbour 3 0 
No Adsice 2 1 
Dccr/Daa I I 
Insecu I I 
Korw Park 1 0 
Nor"My"Wen 1 0 
Tbcft 1 0 
SUM 532 212 
from Identifying specific animal pests, to 
more general infrin-ucture problems. An 
exhaustive list of the responses along 
with the friulucricy at %hich the problem 
arose is provided In Table A. B. It should 
be noted that respondents were not 
guided in their answers to the question by 
present. ing them with a list of potential 
hindrances: the list appearing In Table 
A. B was compiled from their free 
responses. It is quite likely that some 
ovcrl3p occurs between categories of 
" pests". For example. depending upon 
the familiarity of an Individual with the 
various blights and afflictions 
cxpcncnccd by cocoa. some "insect" 
problems nuy have been trdsidentificd as 
"diseases". Similarly. the generic 
category of "animals" was meant to 
include unidentified larger msm=ls which could include twnkcys. dcer. dulkcr. forest 
elephants, and forest buffalo. 
It is clear from the enumeration of the fanning problems that the most pervasive problems 
are associated with cash crop discuum Small mammals (porcupines, cutting grass, and rat 
moles) were often cited. as were monkeys. Input constraints (for extension services. 
fcrtilisem tabour. or road access) %%= not a paniculv concern to mst famem although 
the most common of these cited was the poor access to markets because of the lack of 
roads. Finally. it is notable that the existence of the park was itself not regarded Mis a 
hindmncc to fanning activities, even though fanning is technically a disallowed pursuit 
within its boundaries. 
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71c next section of the survey deals with specific income sources, which are, for the 
purposes of the thesis, disaggregatcd Into the following subcategories: 
a) Cash Crop Sales 
b) Livestock Sales 
C) Ifunting Income 
d) Trapping Income 
C) Fishing Incomc 
f) Trading Inconre 
g) Income from Gathered Forest Products 
h) Incomc from Manufactured Forest Products 
0 Rcmittancc and Labour Inconx 
Table A. 9 provides a summary of the number of households involved in each activity. 
First, it is noted that, of the households surveyed, 15 households, or 4% of the total, had 
no household cash income. The circumstances of these households are summarised in 
Table A. 10. 
Livestock sales refer almost exclusively to chickens. Cattle is not raised in this part of the 
country, and only a few households keep goats and pigs. To a great extent, goats and pigs 
arc regarded as pests as they are usually given free reign and thus cause damage to crops. 
Most of the villages in the survey have thus taken steps to eliminate them simply by 
banning their presence in the village. Chickens, on the other hand. are raised by many 
households and are on occasion sold. As noted in Table A. 9, some 44% of the households 
in the sample derived income from this source. 
Hunting. trapping and fishing provide an important source of income in the region. Table 
A. 9 indicates that households both within the park and in the buffer zone rely on it, even 
though both hunting and trapping are Hlcgal. 5 
Also, about 50% of the households are engaged in some form of trading activity. 17his is 
not unusual because of the isolation of the Qlages from the major regional trading centres. 
Individuals travelling to market areas would often rctumwith additional goods for resale in 
their villages. 
Perhaps most striking from Table A. 9 is the activity involved in forest product gathering 
and sale. Fully 84% of the households surveyed were involved to some degree in 
gathering nat=l forest products. Further. this activity %%-as not isolated to thosc within the 
park, extending as well into villages in the buffer zone. In addition. about 59% of the 
households were involved in the sale of goods manufactured from forest products. 
although the majority of this was attributable to the manufacture of wines and distillates. 
5 Technically, hunting And trapping Are Also illegal in the buffer zone, but most people believe ftu it is 
only Olegil within the park. 
Kewpuriloulth4dSurtyY 
- 
295 
Table A. 9 
Summarv of Inconv Sources ftutcholds) 
Sourcc Imz Alz 
Toul Ifouscholds 125 113 103 341 
No Inccxnc6 4 10 1 15 
Cash Cmps 113 47 72 232 
cocoa 91 Is 33 141 
coffec 77 2 17 96 
Ottia 34 33 st 120 
Uvcswck- 43 48 57 150 
Ituraing 37 19 51 107 
Trarring 47 61 75 183 
Fisling 50 66 70 186 
ThAding 32 76 63 171 
- Snuff 1 14 13 28 
- Afofo 13 8 23 34 c3garcuesfrobww 9 27 27 63 
BCCr 12 6 7 25 
%VLM 1 17 13 31 
Kerostne 3 10 5 18 
General Goods 9 21 16 46 
Ga2xmd Forcst 
Products 96 94 96 286 
-Timber 2 3 2 7 
- Bush mango 63 93 92 248 
- Njangsang 75 37 58 170 
- Njabc 8 23 45 76 
- shell Nut 14 31 53 100 
- Wild (Mon 0 0 to to Pepe 1 21 24 
K013 Nut 0 4 11 
-Miscellancous 2 5 
Muwf==d Forest 
Products 58 64 78 200 
- Cam Rope 0 16 0 16 
- Woven Bags 15 5 21 41 
- Fish %cLVBaA- ets 2 7 6 15 
- Mats 21 12 30 63 
- Furniturc 0 1 3 4 Building It ý& 3 0 
5 
Afofo or Wu*4 29 40 60 1.19 
c4nocs 0 3 0 3 
- Palm 00 2 1 10 
46 23 
Remiuan, ccs 8 2 Is 29 
6Tbc putkuhr siauuonsd the houscholds %ith no c4sh ircme = doc=ntcd in Tsbk A-IM 
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Table A. 10 
Sununary of Circumstances of I fouseholds with No Cash Income or No Food CroPs 
1111 iýj= Incerne £hp 
2 WBZ No Yes The head, aged 50, was born in the village and now 
lives with his 2 wives and 3 of his young children. 
lie has 5 farms on which he grows cassava, plantain 
and cocoyam, and he does some trapping for their 
own consumption. Ile women gather bush mango 
but it generates negligible income. 
10 WBZ No Yes 7be head, aged 45, arrived from Nigeria and now 
supports just himself and his young son. He has 2 
farms on which he grows cassava, plantain, 
cocoyam, banana and maize. 
32 WBZ No No Off iong Arong, aged 60, and his wife are both blind. 
They depend entirely on the goodwill of their 
neighbours for food. 
33 WBZ No Yes T'he head, aged 70, lives here with his son and two 
grandchildren and together they are self-sufficient 
from their farms and from what they trap near their 
farm. 
50 WBZ No Yes Alice Morimo, aged 30, has lived in the village for 
15 years and now supports herself and seven 
children. All of her school-aged children are in 
school, with the exception of her oldest daughter, 
who has no schooling and who helps her mother do 
the fanning on which they survive. 
54 WBZ No Yes Usim Alfred, aged 27, was bom in the village and 
supports his wife and two infant children by 
fanning. 
56 WBZ No Yes Christina Inyang, age 65, was bom in the village and 
now lives here with a 16 year old son who is still in 
school in the village. They farm food crops and fish, 
and did some trading of kerosene and cigarettes last 
year although it generated negligible income. 
77 EBZ No No Tckla Eta, age 60, arrived in the village around 1930 
from a neighbouring village. She lives alone, 
receiving fish, meat, and food crops from fellow 
villagers. 
continued) 
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Tablc A. 10 (continucd) 
IW Aim lnmnc c= llnuschnld Dcui 
123 EHZ No No The. head. age 50. had moved away to Tombel with 
his family after his house here had collapsed. Ills 
sons arc now %=king In Tombel suut he is back here 
alone rebuilding his house. He has one farm but. 
having been neglected. it does not product anything 
and he is dcMdent on his neipbouez V will in 
the mcantimc. As he was born In s village 
(Banyu) he intends to return his family here 
pcnnancndy whcn his house is itbuilL 
125 EBZ Yes No Ilis =n. agod 27, lives alom having arrived In the 
village in 1979. He has a farm plot but It Is not 
producing anything as he spends his time tradin I 
caming cash from the resale of gencral goods. 
Re 
buys his food and does some trapping for his own 
meat. 
127 KNP No Yes He is the %illagc chief and lives with one of his 
younger sons. Ili& older sons. who have moved 
away, scnd him some (apparently negligible) amount 
of moncy. and he lives primarily from the food%ill 
of his neighbours and from his one cassava tarTn. 
160 EBZ No No John %, aong, age 56. lives alone. lie was born In 
the, 611age and, as he is lame. cannot farm or work. I Ic r=ivcs Wp from cvcr)-onc in the village. 
207 %VBZ No Yes 71c head, arc 23. and his brother. farm cassava and 
vegetables to support themselves. 
209 %VBZ No Yes Mary Afion. age 65. and her son have lived in the 
villagc, 211 of their lives. 7bey arc self sufficicnt from 
their food crops and fishing. 
218 %VBZ No Yes The head. age 30. support& himself and four other 
i b h h ld b e was orn ouse o mem ers through farminp l 
i h ilb dh li dh l hi lif nt e% gc an as ve ere a l of s e. 
340 EBZ No Yes The head. age 31. livcs here with his three eldest 
sons and two young daughters. 71cy Are self 
sufficient through farminý, fishing. trapping. 
hunting and wmc poultry raising. 
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§ A. 4 Data Reduction Process 
A. 4.1 Intoduction 
Information presented in the previous section was extracted directly from a dam base which 
was constructed from the survey data. As extensive statistical analyses of these data were 
to be conducted, it was imperative that they be organiscd in a fashion amenable to the 
different types of analyses. The data reduction and management process which was 
undertaken to fulfill these demands was comparable in effort to the work done in actually 
collecting the survey information in the first case. The purpose of this section is to 
dcscribeý in some detail, the procedures which were followed in reducing the data. 
As a preamble. it should be noted that the original questionnaire %%-as not designed by WWF 
with any rigourous statistical analysis in mind. It was meant to provide a count of 
individuals in the area whfle also dowing some qualitative characterisation of the types of 
activities in which they were engaged. Ile format of the qucstionnairc does, however, 
lend itself to sorm considerable analysis if the data can be put into a suitable formaL Given 
that the survey was not designed with any particular data management system in mind, 
ho%%, cvcr, it was necessary to custom build a data management system. 
In looking at the design of the data management system, it is useful to surnrnarise the 
dcrnands; which would be rnade of it. These arc: 
a) replication of the original survey data: 
b) ability to recogrusc inconsistencies in the data-, 
C) aggregation of individual data to a household level; 
d) aggregation of household data to a village level; 
C) aggregation of village data to a regional level; 
f) correlation studies of individual or household behaviour to characteristics of 
the individual, household, village, or region, and, 
g) amenability to repeating the process at some future date to allow the analysis 
of panel data. 
Further, these requirements had to be inct under the fbHowing consmaints: 
a) the existence of substantial amounts of qualitative information; 
b) missing data; and, 
C) data requiring manipulation before statistical analyses can be undertaken. 
Mic framework for the data rnanagement system which was designed to acconunodate these 
requirements is shown in Figure A. 2.71c entire system was maintained on an Apple 
Macintosh SE. 
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A. 4.2 12ata En= 
The first stage of the data management involved manual entry (by IIJ. Ruitcnbcck) of the 
data from the raw surveys. A spreadsheet system Microsoft ExcCIT") was used to 
facilitate data entry and editing. Village data for the 24 villages were entered intojust a 
single rile. Data pertaining to the 2,718 individuals were entered into 2 separate files: 
a) demographic infonnation-, and, b) migration information. The demographic data 
included the individual's household, age, sex. schooling, rcladonship to household head, 
and status. Ile migration informadon was included for all individuals not normally 
prcsent, and included where they had gone to and their names. Ws was to be used later 
for migrant tracing. Household data were split into six separate files dealing with: 
basic household information (village, locaflon on map, date swveyed, person 
interviewed, and any qualitativc notes or "memo items" which should be 
stored); 
b) household composi6on (number of individuals present, absent, in school); 
C) farming data; 
d) farming pcsts; 
C) income data for non-forest use sources; and, 
0 income data for forest use sources. 
Missing data were nonnally specified as a "-I" in the data scL 
A. 4.3 INalmosfics and Data Verificaflon 
Although the spreadsheet environment is ideal for data entry, it is not very amenable to the 
sort of manipulation required of the overall management system. T'he core of the system 
was therefore a model programnicd in Basic which did most of the actual data management. 
7bc first responsibility of this model - Korup. basic - was to conduct a detailed set of 
consistency and error checks. 77hese were intended to detect both reporting errors as well 
as potential errors arising from the survey process. Although no replica households were 
detected, the model has the ability to detect whether the same household had been surveyed 
more than once. Many errors were not considered critical and only warning messages 
would be generated (such as when a child was older than one of the parents). Critical 
errors were flagged when inconsistencies arose between, for example, individual data and 
household data. 77his is because there was, in effect, a double entry process of sotne of the 
key characteristics dealing with household demographics: once for individuals and once for 
the household as a whole. If, upon aggregating the individuals in a household it was found 
to disagree with the household data, then the crrors would be flagged. 
Korl4piloulfw4sum" 
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Tabic A. II 
-Diagnostic 
Checks Undemkcn by Data Manarement S-mcm 
1111 Count Iniconsiumt with Villqe Dats 
Dau less Ow rao ard * -1 valage loation not spocirwd 
Date of survey not 1988 
Ittlit. ion to 1011 kad wxkfinod 
Incon pktc dau on binhpLwc o(lill IlW 
Indi%idual sex w-ddgvd 
M%i&W We undcfmW 
Mvidual schooLng tn&ruvd 
Nljgr=my stam undduxd 
Ntanu" o( til I Read sex to kidiv; dual dau 
Nhun=b of 111i IlW W to individuaJ d= 
Ntisrnatch of 1111 Head wlx)dinj to buhtidual dxa 
1111 Ilead nc-s-cr pmsmt 
RH Mad and sixxm am Lame xx 
Miscount of pcople prment 
Miscount of pcopic at school 
Nfiscuiunt of PMOC at %%Axk 
Miscount or jw0c ab=t (N5) 
In I income Wlkf[Wd 
Numbcr o( (aims umiduW 
Cash Crtlp Undefined 
r" crop undcruvd 
U%v&uxk unLictaW 
II untin j ur-okruvd 
Tr4yvl tv*fincd 
Ashing tm&fwcd 
Tmkd SoM XX m1crowd 
rv"m "Diu" XX w%krawd 
NAir&'CFAF exchange rat Inconsigmt =VU MCI 
htiveRancoul pro&xt wlqvCirKd 
Corict Value/Ammm mimnatchcd 
Cbcoa Vadue/Anvunt iniunaschcd 
N-st ranking inmuistent 
Int Ifead moved to vilait Wore being bum 
Ycars of scWing > (Age-S) 
huhiidual okkt than 90 
Chikhm oUa thin parmu 
Remmance MCC mspCcified 
Table A. 1 I illustrates the types of diagnostic checks which were conducted on the data 
base. If even a single warning was appropriate. the model would Scneratc a diagnostic 
report indicating where in the cUu base the error occurred and what the nature of the error 
%-as. This procodure allows the user to verify the data. make adjustments, and continuc 
%%ith the d= manipulation. 
Thc crror checking routines %%trc a useful atuibute of the data management system On the 
first pass through the data base. about one hundred warning or crmr messages wcrc 
generated. Although in most cases these w= due to data entry errors, in some Instances 
they ffigged unusual household circumstances %% hich had been improperly rocorded on the 
questionnaire- If the roquimd cor=ions were obvious - such aswhcn the IIII Head and 
the spouse %%-ere the sanve sex - corrections were madc to the raw data. If the rcquircd 
corrections %%-ere not obvious - such &s when the years of schooling for an Individual 
exceeded their age - then a 'nuissing daW indicator wu instrtcd In lieu of the suspect raw 
dam 
A. 4.4 Data ManiMlstion 
Once a"clean" data set Is available, the nxyJcl conducts a number of data Runipulation 
steps. These am: 
A) cuntncy conversion; 
b) cash crop %-Auadon-. 
C) calculation of nct incomes from hunting and tr3dins; 
d) calculations of equivalent populations. 
--- 
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Tabic A. 13 
Mcc E-stinutes Rcquircd for Cash Qvp Nxluccrs (fmm %2mple of 337 hmacholdt) 
Enz mm luit low 
Toul COCW Sclkn 91 Is 37 143 No Egimuc Ncakd 28 3 36 67 
- N-n-VdLap Estimax 49 0 1 so 
Nc. ighbow-VdUp Estinuic 14 12 0 26 
Toul Cbffct Sclkrt 77 2 17 96 
No Estirn= Nccdcd 23 1 17 41 
- (), A-n-VJUjc Estimate 40 0 0 40 Ncighbm-VJLaSc Emirrute 14 1 0 Is 
7lic second adjustment which was required was in the valuation of cocoa and coffee 
income. Respondents gave a variety of rcsponscsý and many were Incomplete. Although 
the survey was meant to obuin data on both income and quantities. not all respondents 
could give this infortnation: some provided only Income and others provided only 
quandties (in terms of the number of bags). A remedial measure was applied to value the 
output of those individuals which gave only quantity information. In essence. a price was 
apphod to their output which was calculated as follows: 
a) the avenge price received in their village by those individuals reporting both 
income and output; or. 
b) if no average price could be established in this manner. the average price of 
the nc=st viUagc for %hich a price could be calculated In this manna. 
As noted in Table A. 1 3. a considerable number of households %%= found in this position. 
To kcep them in the sample. the application of a pricing estinutc was required and the one 
sclccted was beliewd to be the imst approprime, 
The third adjustment which was required was to the income from goods for which 
intemrdiate inputs %-crc purchase& All of the income in the data base was gross Income. 
%Vhflc this is ccnainly appropriate for mst sources of Income as there wcm no purchased 
variable inputs. $ it is not the case for either hunting or tmding. Hunting requires the 
purchase of caruidges and carbide for I=ps and, based on Infield (1988). a downward 
adjustment of 25% was made to the gross camings from hunting to rtnect the costs or 
these inputs. Tmding involves resale or nunufactured commodities but. unfortunatcly. no 
detailed informadon was availAbIc on the margins generated through trading. 11c only 
soumes of infonmdon available were the respondents themselves and many did not say 
I'The pd=ry input to all wti%itks in the region wai Ubour and. as notod in C114W S. thm WIJI a UMS 
Micaom to using fxnily Ubour mthcr than hiring Wour. While wme MivitC% %vuld h3%*C W Some 
initial caPtul cog rNuuvrricats. non-Ub= wublc inpuu %ould be bmilrd to: Chcmicals (Of cash cfw%. 
mmUges and cxbýk (Of hunung. Cow of tocdt for walng. As no evi&nca W3% found of the AMHWiOn 
Of CNT6, cals. no adjustment tot thiswit rn&k to czih crop income. 
- 
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what the cost of their goods had been. Based on the sporadic information which was 
available, however, the following margins were assumed in calculat-ing the net incomes 
from trading: 
Snuff. Cigarettes and Tobacco 
Kerosene 
Wine, Beer and Spirits 
General Manufactured Goods 
20% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
Finally, in calculating various Inequality 
indices. the index depends upon sorting 
populations according to income or asset 
distribution. As discussed in the main 
text, adjustments are sometimes made to 
rccognise the fact that some individuals 
have different requirements than others. 
In particular, adjustments arc made for 
individual characteristics of sex and age. 
The assumed equivalent consumption unit 
scales used for this adjustment are shown 
in Table A. 14. 
A. 4.5 Nligmnt Idendficafion 
aeA. 
Equivalent Consumption Unit Scales 
(Ba= Maks 20-39) 
Age Cob MA Rmale 
0-3 0.50 0.50 
4-9 0.80 0.80 
10-19 1.00 0.80 
20-39 1.00 0.70 
40-49 0.95 0.70 
50-59 0.90 0.65 
60+ 0.75 0.50 
Source: Estimates provided by Professor Q. B. O. 
Andwnio, University of lbadan, lbadan. Nigeria, as 
typical consumption requirements for =21 West 
African pcTulations. 
Ile survey gathered information both on those normally present in the household as well 
as those which were absent for one reason or another. 7he purpose of the migrant 
identification procedure conducted by the data management systcrn is two-fold: a) to 
prepare summaries of the characteristics of the migrants; and, b) to assist in tracing those 
migrants which migrated to a village which is included in the survey sample. 7le first of 
these tasks is relatively straight forward, involving simply coding the dcstina6ons of the 
individual migrants according to whether they were migrating to a rural destination or to an 
urban destinafion. To prevent errors in the data analysis, this step was automated through 
specifying valid urban desdnations. The only five which were specified were Yaound6, 
Douala, Kumba, Limbe, and Calabar. Yaound6 is the capital city of Cameroon, and 
Douala is the capital of Littoral Province and the largest city in the country. Strictly 
speaking, Kumba and Urnbc can perhaps be better described as large towns, although they 
arc both major regional trading ccntrcs. Calabar is the regional capital of Cross River State 
in NiScria. 9 
9 ne populations of the major centres are approximately as follows: Yaoundl - 800,000. Douall - 1.200M Calabar - 200,000. 
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77he second step. that of migrant tracing within the survey. Is mote complex. Thc 
procedure involved first flagging all of those Individuals which migrated to a destination 
vill3gewhich fell within the survey. 71is consisted of sonw 53 Individuals. IMc model 
then listed potential candidates by identifying everyone In the "Urga" village who was 
within 10 years of age and the correct sex as the particular individual. With this list, a 
manual search was then conducted through the raw surveys to attempt to rind a match 
based on the individuals' name, age, sex, and years of schooling. Because of the usual 
variances in reporting, there is no reason to believe that individuals would match exactly. 
Indeed. no "perfect" matches wcm identified. but positivc Identification on the basis of 
name and approximate demographic characteristics %%-as possible In 16 of the 53 cases. Ilre 
others may have been present in the village but were not identifiable because of na= 
changes. To complete the procedure, the data base in Korup-Excel was then corrected 
manually to nuke the individuals! characteristics correspond to those of the Individual In 
the target household. The rcNised data assumed that the data corresponding to the 
household where the individual was present uvrc the correct data. and those In the 
household where the individual was absent were adjustc& Finally. specifiers were placed 
in the data base to allow the migrant to be traced and linked automatically in subsequent 
invoc3tions of the model. 
A. 4.6 Agg=gaflon and OuMut 
Once all of the preceding steps have been carried out. the information contained in 
Korup. basic %; ill be ready for an: d)-sis. At this stage the model flags all households and 
individuals for which one or more income sources are missing. Although demographic 
summaries will be conducted for the entire data set. the income summaries am prepared 
only for a slightly smaller subset. The model then prepares various aggregations, which 
are essentially a straightforward counting procedure. and generates standard reports. In 
addition, the model is capable of replicating any of the raw data surveys. excluding the 
names of those individuals which am prcscnL This survey replication procedure Is useful 
in that it generates a complete archivc of the original surveys which can be more easily 
referenced than the data In the individual data film 
In addition to the reports. the model generates two tpes of dam rites for further analysis. 
7be first is a sorted list of incomes or assets for generating Lo=z curves and calculating 
various measures of inequality. Ile data which am downloaded include the population (or 
equivalent population), the total household income (or assets). and the decomposition of 
the total by sub-catcgories. Sorting is done on the basis of per c3pit3 Income (or asset) In 
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the household where each household member is then assumed to earn that income. 71c 
actual calculation of GINI coefficients and Atkinson indices, as well as the drawing of 
Lorenz curves, is performed by a separate Excel utility. 
Ile second set of data riles generated arc those required for the econometric analysis. 
Miere are separate files for the data pertaining to individuals, households, and villages. 
A. 4.7 Econo=tric Models 
Because of the preponderance of qualitative infonnation, it was clear at the outset that 
analyses involving qualitative dependent variables would be required. To conduct this 
task, Version 6.0 of SHAZAM based on White (1987) was selected. The particular 
features which made SHAZAM a suitable program for these taskswcre: 
a) its abil. ity to do PROBIT and TOBIT analyses; 
b) its ability, with a single user-spýdfied command, to exclude households in a 
data set if particular dam were missing; and, 
C) its abifity to cross-reference data intemally of different vector lengths. 
This last attribute was especially crifical to the overall modelling ease as it aflowed the 
specification of separate data blocks for the 2,718 individuals, the 357 households, and the 
24 villages. 71rough simple lookup functions, analyses could be conducted without 
having to create massive data blocks. 10 71c primary disadvantage of SHAZANI is that it is 
extremely cumbersome for entering, verifying and editing large amounts of data and, 
hence, the front-end tasks completed by Korup. basic were vital to making the use of 
SHAZAM a viable opfion. Finally, however. as SHAZANI was available for a micro- 
computer it could be readily integrated with the other modules of the data management 
systcm. 
SHAZAM has its own versatile command language which allows a substantial degree of 
data manipulation if one is confident that the initial data are clean. 7be command language 
was used to read the input data files, and then perform different types of transformations 
(such as logarithms, dummy variable creation, and so on) which would eventually be 
required for the econometric analyses. Also, through the command language, the 
appropriate links between individual, household, and village can be established. SHAZAM 
was then used to perform all of the regressions on the survey sarnple data. As SHAZAM 
does not, however, have the facility to do double hurdle evaluations, it was used to 
download data to a text rile which could be used to perform the double hurdle analyses. 11 
10 It should be noted that this feature Aas not available on Version 5. 11 The double hurdle model is maintained on a Cray mainframe computer to which the data were 
downloaded. I gun grateful to Dr. joanna Gomulka for her assistance with this procedure and for providing 
access to thit model. 
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This rile was created by SHAZANI (rather than by Korup. basic) to cnsure that the data 
being used for the double hurdle model would be consistent with those used within 
SHAZAM. As both the double hurdle routine and SHAZANI have the ability to do a 
TOBIT analysis (%%-hich Is. after all, just a limiting case of the double hunile specification). 
msults could be compared to ensure that they weve comp=blc. 
I A. 5 Summary Commcnis 
In summary. with a view to conducting improved surveys In the future. it Is U$Cful 10 
highlight sotnc of the good and bad characteristics of the survey and data reduction process 
which arose here. 
First, a particular advantage of this survey was the detail in the demographic information 
collected on those members of the household that had left the household and the villagc. 
This detail allows one to infer - albeit to a limited degrcc - why people migratc. While 
migratory flows are normally analysed on a gross basis, the availability of data for 
individuals with sin-dlar characteristics allows a more refined analysis of the migration 
decision. Notwithstanding this. however. the survey could have bccn improved had 
additional information been obtained on those normally presen Of those normally 
present, migration data were available for only the head of the household, and it was not 
known if the other household members were originally from that village or if they had 
moved there recently. It would be a relatively straight-forward matter to ask, as was done 
with the head of the household, if each individual was born in the viflagc and, if not, from 
wh= they h3d come. 
Second, alLhough the demographic data were in a format which was amenable to double 
entry and thus could be verified for int=al consistency, the household income data was 
not in a format which would allow independent checks. IMc one question which would 
potentially have provided this check ("%Vh3t was the household's total income? ") was 
usuaUy not pursued by Interviewers because the individual being interviewed did not know 
and, in the few cascs where they had an opinion (which, in this case, occurred only 66 out 
of 357 times). it was. as noted earlier, usually less than the totals based on wtoral 
incomes. It would have been useful to pursue this further during the interview process - 
requiring some mconcili3tion before the interview %%-as brought to a close. 
7"hird, any addition. 21 surveying which is done in the area should g3thcr twre demiled 
infonnation, on consumer durables and other assets. As noted In Ch3ptcr 5, caSU31 
observations suggested that there were few appircm differences in conspicuous 
29R 
consumption, yet there is a large degree of income inequality in the sample. While the 
analysis in Chapter 5 suggested that some of the income was being capitaliscd by 
Inconspicuous investment in education, such a conclusion would bc more robust if 
supporting data were available on physical assets. 
Ir- Fourth, one valuable item which was collected during the survey were detailed maps of 
each of the villages allowing specific identification of the households. While this was not 
used in this study except to verify the survey coverage and to ensure that no household had 
been surveyed more than once, it is critical information should a resurvey ever be 
conducted for the purposes of collecfing panel data. 
Fifth, it is worth noting that there is some advantage in having transcribed the data from the 
raw surveys into a computer based data management system myself. It gives some insights 
into the overall quality of the data which might not jump out at the analyst when simply 
looking at the final summary results. For example, the distinction between the Eastem and 
Western Buffer Zone was actually selected after all of the results had been tabulated. The 
distinction was made primarily because of comments from the individuals being 
interviewed in the WBZ that they were so isolated that it was sometimes difficult for them 
to f ind out about work opportunities, or for them to sell their cash crop production. This 
latter assertion was obvious when going through the raw data for the WBZ - as many cash 
crop growers with mature trees did not actually market their crop. As noted in Table A-6, 
only about one-third of the households growing cocoa or coffee in the WBZ sold their 
output, whereas in the EBZ essentially everyone growing coffee or cocoa would sell it. 
Also, the 'hands on' =scription of the data suggested that - by and large - the data were 
of fairly good quality. From an original sample of 379 households, a working data base of 
341 households was generated. The data generally appeared to be best when the household 
head himself or herself was being interviewed, and more missing dam and inconsistencies 
arose when the household head was not available. 
Finally, on a more general note, one should realise that similar surveys arc often 
undertaken by development agencies to provide a "socio-economic" baseline for assessing 
- at some future date - the impacts of a particular project on local communities. While 
these surveys are not originally designed for rigourous economic analyses - as indeed was 
the case here - this exercise has demonstrated the feasibility of casting the data into a 
structure which is amenable to fairly standard econometric analyses. Furthermore, as 
demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, the results of these analyses provide estimates which are 
economically meaningful. Ilis is an encouraging feature as a common rationalisation for 
not proceeding with rigourous analyses of such surveys is that the data are too noisy. 
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